

An Applied Approach To Modern And Post Modern Political Science

A Truth Revealing Guide To Reality



Editor

Muhammad Ali Junaid

Karachi University Research Forum

An Applied Approach To Modern And Post Modern Political Science
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Editor Note

As we see that in Pakistan Especially and Throughout Asia and Africa Generally Textbooks recommended by Universities covers mostly prof. Laski as a last major political Scientist of Modern times.

So they in foundation level discuss that politics/Political science is either an Arts or Science? then touch few approaches regarding political science while study. This in return cast an impression that concepts of liberalism, enlightenment, individualism, freedom, capitalism, communism etc, are the only major matters someone should learn mostly, Despite ignoring the fact that political science is a huge field of study and she encompasses over thousands of entries.

their courses are usually Outdated and they mostly didn't try to enter the phase of Modernity in latter and post-modernity in initial level, as we see that HEC has restricted Universities to refresh their M. phil and Ph.D. scholars academic level by introducing course work before qualifying for their synopsis submission.

but reality is that these are just Academic formalities no level of knowledge is updated on the name of such a course work ,on the other hand they still teach an old curriculum that has not been updated since the Independence of Pakistan.

I myself as a PhD research scholar submitted my thesis for approval and who privately used to teach CSS level students subjects like political science and political philosophy, I never got a chance when any one asked me about new development in the discipline of political science ,Marxist too came and argue about Karl Marx and refers Sibte Hasan Syed 's Master Piece Mosa say Marx Tak and consider that they have conquered Us very well, No one know about Adorno or habermass.

I even didn't know about post-modern and later modern philosophers like John Rawls, Habermas, Karl poper and Foucault. etc. who directly has huge appeal as a major political scientists of current modern and post-modern political philosophy.

so who introduced me to these major ideas and philosophers? Karachi university school of philosophy is definitely a unique and outstanding school of philosophy in the current Muslim world, those who read KURF publication know her better than who didn't read their literature.

the men who introduced me to these ideas and personalities is a major member and an expert of Muslim Modernity, that person is Syed Khalid Jamie whose writings introduced me to these modern and post-modern philosophers even though I am directly not his student but his writings introduced me to new lands of Modernity .

so while leading Karachi University Research Forum we presented many books under the umbrella of KURF, I thought one day there should be a book that not only cover modernity and post-modernity in Political Applied perspective but also, this book should have in-depth critical and analytical aspect.

For that I collected Dr. Jawad Akbar Ansari and Dr. Abdul Wahab Suri writings and articles in addition, I kept on consulting Syed Khalid Jamil and discussed the idea of this project and asked his advice in various sittings with him and the result came in the shape of this book with the labor of one month only.

A huge range of encyclopedia's and dictionaries of philosophy and political science were screened and then selected entries that are neither very long nor very short by description were included where necessary.

The first part of this study is fully my effort in which, I tried my level best to include all major modern and postmodern thoughts, ideas, personalities and analysis that may be helpful while reading part two and three of this book, that is encyclopedia by nature, in contrast, to be called a book. The part Two and Three not only covers Analytical approaches but they are Definitely Best Critique on Political Science Discourse in Pakistan by Any Philosopher, Ever made.

Dr. Jawad Akbar Ansari is considered as a father of Karachi University Philosophical School and Dr. Abdul Wahab Suri, is a current head of, Department of philosophy, KU is his pupil.

and both are well known for their in-depth critique on Modernity and post-modernity generally and their major attacking victims are modernist and post-modernist Muslim Intelligentsia who without knowing epistemological backgrounds of these discourses hovered around them like honey bees so one of a major reason to write down, compile and edit this work is to correct their perceptions regarding Modernity and Post-Modernity.

so in addition to their name and works and to boost the reference level of this piece of work, someone may definitely say that this piece is unique and very different in Pakistan by her topics of covering, into the Discipline of political science.

this book also might be helpful for students of all social and natural sciences not only but also for general readers who like philosophy. In last this book will also supplement reasoning of those who wanted to know about the clash of cultures and religions.

I accept my inability to express immaculately ideas and vision in English, that is not my mother tongue so if you find any flaw kindly pardon me, I will try to correct my mistakes in the later edition.

Editor

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PART :1

preamble:

Today we see each and every news paper , an anchorperson related to Media houses worldwide Generally and In Pakistan Especially Uses the terminologies like Politics, foreign policy ,Liberalism, constitution, basic rights, civil liberties ,Modernity ,colonialism, democratic values ,dictatorships etc .

Each and every writing and an anchoric Expression blurs the pictures they present remind me the back titled written review by daily guardian , London over the Dictionary of politics written by David Robertson That :

“Political terms form a vital part of our language. We depends on them in our reading of Newspapers .In discussing current events and in forming our views on world situations. Yet many commonly used words are abused, many over simplified and many misinterpreted .over use by media of such terms as democracy, liberty and capitalism has finally resulted in loss of accuracy “.¹

The case with Pakistan which has been a colonial slave of British Empire is more bleak and un realistic by nature and sprit in term of using and utilizing concepts, ideologies and terminologies used by discipline of political science. Our parliamentarians, and media persons Mostly don't know the exact meaning and context regarding the discourses that they mostly cites' to validates their case against their opponents.

The most advance case they may made in this context is to Google and to search Wikipedia or to see third quality Authors and Substance Material to cite something. They are being nurtured, and get known regarding political terms and an expression while working in office, at on job training or in business environments. They use these terms like common shared communicative words, our most of media persons don't possess any degree in political science and philosophy, if they have such a degree their standard of study is mostly based on private candidate appearing in exam while working simultaneously somewhere else.

And someone who hold a regular degree he just follows traditional lectures, notes and Text book based tradition of learning his own intellectual search for knowledge stands nowhere .I know many parliamentary members who while as member of any house

¹ Robertson,David. Dictionary of politics .Penguin books.middle sex England.1990.

appeared as a private candidate in examination and also know many University employees having M.phil degree and ph.d's degrees without knowing anything regarding their topics of research.

British as a colonial Master gave liberty to their subject nations due to future post-colonial Mechanism imposed by Underground and behind the curtain forces who have already decided to give super power ideological status to USA and Soviet Union and they were being backed by free Masonic like Capitalists forces. British who gave freedom to Indo pak and other regions in her last fifty years deliver very little to train their subjects in their own political Environment .their training of parliamentary affairs was Raw and Un Ripe ,for example in 1909 they accepted separate electorate voting system because they wanted to tackle Indian National congress and Hindu Nationalism pouring in Streets by the announcement of division of Bengal somehow .

On the other hand They also wanted to give impression to their western audience that they strongly believes in Minority rights, Pluralism, liberty and public participation etc . But what they done in subjective land is to appoint feudal lords, feudal saints, rajas, monarchs of Indian states as a member of viceroy Executive Council and as a Members of handicap short sized legislature.

The events that took place during 1911 to 1919 forced them to change the nature of executive and legislative councils and increase the numbers of non Appointed Members of Executive Council and Legislative Body. So they further boosted their functions by introducing diarchy system in 1919 Indian Act .But when allied forces Won the war these British Masters gone more prude, crude, rude, harsh and proud.

How cruelly they dealt with Turkey, Germany and Austria is clear, and don't need any Introduction or briefing to General Readers. We know that Till 1927 they were making mockery to their Indians Subjects that if you have any learning and Training in parliamentary Affairs then draft and Present any Written Constitution to Us.The communal issue that they generated through their own westernized intellectual practice of oriental ism divided Indian under the Umbrellas of Hindu's , Muslims's ,Sikhs and Christians Slogans.

The 1935 Indian Act was More complete and Enhance rather than their predecessor Acts but it held lot of loop holes like United Kingdom had An Unitarian system of State

and Parliamentary system of Government, but they Introduced In India A Federal System of State and Parliamentary System of Government , That's mean Indian sub continent was neither purely a Federal Cum Presidential by Nature nor it was An Unitarian Cum Parliamentary .

The people who were roughly trained, nurture and prepared for this system were facilitated through the production from westernized Universities, colleges and mostly through Lawyer and Law graduates .so these bodies always welcome such a trends in politics and to become the cream who took Advantage by these practices. Now As an Independent Nation same curriculum, terminologies, bureaucratic attitudes and epistemological level we share yet now in our daily walk of life.

Our political scientist just know Modernity, liberty, freedom, western narratives, values, secularism etc., but despite surviving 70 years after independence we finish our western political thoughts course to Karl Marx and Lenin etc. and our maximum ideological flight May be to touch the threshold of Mao As a Political Philosopher and post-World war Politico Philosophical epistemology is mostly not taught in Asian Universities .

Our Universities, media and state institution are passing through the stage of Enlightenment Modernity, on the other hand world is moving toward Post Modernity and post- Post Intellectual valued Modernity, and they are gaining ground but our whole state institutions are currently stranded in same state of mind where we started our journey as a British slaves. The real face of subject matter is that Modernity and Post Modernity both are Killing Ideologies by Nature and in reality beneath These ideologies lies lust, pleasure and un bound freedom to entertain their worshipers un limited desires .

We have created new idols and god on the name of Modernity but what is our state of mind may be understood by example That when we say abhor dictator ship and love democracy we present the case not through intellectuality but through established narratives that are passionate rather than wise and calculative.

But despite such a observation our leader ship convince us that lame democracy is better than best welfare dictator ship, we forget that if people use their collective energy

to choose lame representatives so we already decide to bring lame leaders as our master then result of these practices should also be expected lame.

Even though all human created, crafted and listed terminologies are just symbolic expression giving and delivering specific meaning while communication.

If we see Through the eye of lexicographer all words have to be included in dictionary in same level of inclusion, so if anybody says that I hate someone and I love someone he expresses his religion and self desire that he opted through world standard of choices.

And reality convinces researchers that all recent, pre recent ideologies, terminologies and expressions are so absurd, blur and unclear by their definition and nature while psycho Analyzing it becomes difficult for someone to which definition and expression to choose or not to choose. Below we will try to present Modernity and postmodernity and their relation with Political science.

And I will also try to present definitions with their epistemological, historical ,social, religious and philosophical context so that to help readers to Understand The logic and critic of Dr jawaid Akbar Ansari and Dr.Abdul Wahab Suri while reading Collections of Articles article Coming After This Humble case of Modernity in part one that is not more Than a simple Encyclopediac Case of Western Modern and Post-Modern Epistemology .And Then in part two and part Three of this book Dr. jawaid akbar Ansari and Dr .Wahab suri will criticize or post mortemize Modern and postmodern Discourse and they will also Utilize psycho Analytical skills while discussing these concepts, ideologies and idols in their own and unique style of Action.

I openly express my limited Ability and skills to write down anything in English compared to My Native Language Urdu, so if you find any grammatical errors lingual flaws kindly pardon me.

* The Case of Modernism :

Now I turn my attention towards Modernism, modernity and Post Modernity that what really these terms explain?

❖ What Is Modernity ? :

Modernism (religion), in theology and philosophy, attempts by a group of scholars and church officials to reinterpret Christian doctrine in terms of the scientific thought of the 19th century. The collected attempts, although not a single system, were treated as such and called Modernism by Pope Pius X in 1907.²

Basically Modernism, is_ a general term applied retrospectively to the wide range of experimental and *AVANT-GARDE trends in the literature (and other arts) of the early 20th century, including *SYMBOLISM, *FUTURISM,*EXPRESSIONISM, *IMAGISM, *VORTICISM, *DADA, and *SURREALISM Along with the innovations of unaffiliated writers.

❖ Modernity And Literature :

Modernist literature is characterized chiefly by a rejection of 19th-century traditions and of their consensus between author and reader: the conventions of *REALISM, for instance, were abandoned by Franz Kafka and other novelists, and by expressionist drama, while several poets rejected traditional *METRES in favour of *FREE VERSE. Modernist writers tended to see themselves as an avant-garde disengaged from bourgeois values, and disturbed their readers by adopting complex and difficult new forms and styles.

In fiction, the accepted continuity of chronological development was upset by Joseph Conrad, Marcel Proust, and William Faulkner, while James Joyce and Virginia Woolf attempted new ways of tracing the flow of characters' thoughts in their *STREAM-OF-CONSCIOUSNESS styles. In poetry, Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot replaced the logical

² "Modernism (religion)." Microsoft® Encarta® 2009 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008.

exposition of thoughts with *COLLAGES of fragmentary images and complex *ALLUSIONS.

Luigi Pirandello and Bertolt Brecht opened up the theatre to new forms of abstraction in place of realist and* NATURALIST representation. Modernist writing is predominantly cosmopolitan, and often expresses a sense of urban cultural dislocation, along with an awareness of new anthropological and psychological Theories. Its favored techniques of juxtaposition and multiple * POINT OF VIEW challenge the reader to reestablish a coherence of meaning from fragmentary forms. In English, its major landmarks are Joyce's Ulysses and Eliot's The Waste Land (both 1922). In Hispanic literature the term has a special sense:

" modernismo denotes the new style of poetry in Spanish from 1888 to c.1910, strongly influenced by the French *SYMBOLISTS and *PARNASSIANS and introduced by the Nicaraguan poet Ruben Dario and the Mexican poet Manuel Gutierrez Najera. For a fuller account, consult Peter Childs, Modernism (2000).³"

❖ Modernity And Christianity :

In Roman Catholic Church history, a movement in the last decade of the 19th century and first decade of the 20th that sought to reinterpret traditional Catholic teaching in the light of 19th-century philosophical, historical, and psychological theories and called for freedom of conscience. Influenced by non-Catholic biblical scholars, Modernists contended that the writers of both the Old and the New Testaments were conditioned by the times in which they lived and that there had been an evolution in the history of biblical religion. Modernism also reflected a reaction against the increasing centralization of church authority in the pope and the Roman Curia (papal bureaucracy).

In France the movement was closely associated with the writings of Alfred Firmin Loisy, who was dismissed in 1893 from his teaching position at the Institut Catholique in Paris for his views about the Old Testament canon. These views, later expressed in *La Religion d'Israel* (1900; "The Religion of Israel"), and his theories on the Gospels in Études évangéliques (1902; "Studies in the Gospels") were both condemned by François

³ Baldicks, Chris. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms. Oxford University Press Inc., New York.2001.pp:159-160.

Cardinal Richard, the archbishop of Paris. In England George Tyrrell, an Irish-born Jesuit priest was dismissed from his teaching post and from the Jesuits for his views on papal infallibility and for a doctrine that minimized the intellectual element of revelation and thus seemed to contradict the teachings of the First Vatican Council (1869–70).

His theories influenced others, notably the French layman Édouard Le Roy. Also in England, a scholar, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, was critical of some methods of church government and defended the right of Loisy and Tyrrell to publish their views; he did not, however, reject the papacy or share some of Tyrrell's philosophical opinions. In Italy the writings of Loisy and Tyrrell influenced the priest-scholars Ernesto Buonaiuti and Giovanni Semeria, the novelist Antonio Fogazzaro, and other Catholics. In Italy, as also in Germany, concern with reform of church institutions was a more prominent theme than rejection of doctrine.

The reaction of Rome included the suspension or excommunication of certain priests and scholars who were associated with the movement, the placement of books on the *Index of Forbidden Books*, the establishment in 1903 by Pope Leo XIII of the Pontifical Biblical Commission to monitor the work of Scripture scholars, and the formal condemnation in 1907 in the papal encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* and the decree *Lamentabili Sane Exitu* of the Curia's Holy Office.

In order to ensure enforcement, the priest-scholar Umberto Benigni organized, through personal contacts with theologians, a nonofficial group of censors who would report to him those thought to be teaching condemned doctrine. This group, known as Integralists (or *Sodalitium Pianum*, “Solidarity of Pius”), frequently employed overzealous and clandestine methods and hindered rather than helped the combating of Modernism. On June 29, 1908, Pius X publicly admitted that Modernism was a dead issue, but at the urging of Benigni on Sept. 1, 1910, he issued *Sacrorum antistitum*, which prescribed that all teachers in seminaries and clerics before their ordination take an oath denouncing Modernism and supporting *Lamentabili* and *Pascendi*.⁴

⁴ “Modernism.” *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013.

On the other hand we see that a corresponding movement among Protestants had also been developing. If one accepted the historical findings of biblical scholars and the so-called higher criticism, questions arose that could not be answered in terms of traditional beliefs. The philosophical emphases of the Enlightenment of the late 18th century and the contemporaneous reexamination of the sources of personal religious expression added force to such questions. Prominent among Protestant Modernists were the German theologians Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl.

❖ **The Protestant Case Of Modernity:**

These Protestants attempted to find new interpretations of religious experience and an understanding of history that could accommodate the implications of the theory of evolution and discoveries in psychology, archaeology, and ancient history. To a large extent, they denied literal inspiration of the Bible and the historicity of the Jesus Christ of the Gospels. They stressed ethical and moral behavior, rather than adherence to formal creeds, as essential to Christian life. They turned the activity of church officials to social areas and away from academic issues.

The case with USA with little late but powerful in the 1920s in the U.S., the term *Modernism* took on a more restricted meaning. It began to be applied to any rejection of traditional doctrine. At the same time a movement called Fundamentalism developed among conservative members of various Protestant denominations in opposition to Modernist tendencies.⁵

⁵ Op cite.

○ 5.1"Modernism (religion)." Microsoft® Encarta.

Post Modernity Against Modernity :

❖ **Literature And Post Modernity**

We See that post Modernity Was Baically literary Movement but later Post Modern Literary Criticism Magnetized The Attentions of A Serious thinkers and Philosopher than later they polished up this Approach In their later Theories .

Inaccessible ideas and impenetrable prose also characterize many postmodern philosophical texts, although the difficulties in this case are often intentional and reflect specific postmodern claims about the nature of language and meaning.

The literal meaning of *postmodernism* is “after modernism,” and in many ways postmodernism constitutes an attack on modernist claims about the existence of truth and value—claims that stem from the European Enlightenment of the 18th century. In disputing past assumptions postmodernists generally display a preoccupation with the inadequacy of language as a mode of communication. Among the major postmodern theorists are French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, and psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan.

❖ **Derrida And Deconstructionism :**

Derrida originated the philosophical method of deconstruction, a system of analysis that assumes a text has no single, fixed meaning, both because of the inadequacy of language to express the author’s original intention and because a reader’s understanding of the text is culturally conditioned—that is, influenced by the culture in which the reader lives.

Thus texts have many possible legitimate interpretations brought about by the “play” of language. Derrida stresses the philosophical importance of pun, metaphor, ambiguity, and other playful aspects of language traditionally disregarded in philosophy. His

method of deconstruction involves close and careful readings of central texts of Western philosophy that bring to light some of the conflicting forces within the text and that highlight the devices the text uses to claim legitimacy and truth for itself,

many of which may lie beyond the intention of its author. Although some of Derrida's ideas about language resemble views held by the analytic philosophers Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson, many philosophers schooled in the analytic tradition have dismissed Derrida's work as destructive of philosophy.

❖ Foucauldian Enlightenment:

Foucault created a searing critique of the ideals of the Enlightenment, such as reason and truth. Like Derrida, Foucault used close readings of historical texts to challenge assumptions, demonstrating how ideas about human nature and society, which we assume to be permanent truths, have changed over time. From an array of historical texts Foucault created "philosophical anthropologies" that reveal the evolution of concepts such as reason, madness, responsibility, punishment, and power.

By examining the origins of these concepts, he maintained, we see that attitudes and assumptions that today seem natural or even inevitable are historical phenomena dependent upon time and place. He further claimed that the historical development of these ideas demonstrates that seemingly humane and liberal Enlightenment ideals are in reality coercive and destructive.

❖ Lacan Responses :

Lacan agreed with Derrida and Foucault about the need to overturn crucial cultural and philosophical assumptions, but he arrived at this conclusion by a different method altogether. Influenced by Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud, Lacan claimed that the unconscious portion of the mind operates with structures and rules analogous to those of a language.

He used this claim to criticize both psychoanalytic theory and philosophy. On the one hand, he believed that concepts from linguistics could clarify and correct Freud's picture of the mind and provide the field of psychoanalysis with greater philosophical depth. On the other hand, he maintained that applying psychoanalytic methods and

theories to linguistics would radically revise traditional philosophical views of language and reason.

❖ **Feminist Flight In response to Current Situation :**

Feminist philosophers also challenge basic principles of traditional Western philosophy, investigating how philosophical inquiry would change if women conducted it and if it incorporated women's experiences as well as their viewpoints. In interpreting the history of Western philosophy, feminists study texts by male philosophers for their depiction of women, masculine values, and biases toward men.

Feminist philosophers also write about women's experiences of subjectivity, their relationship to their bodies, and feminist concepts of language, knowledge, and nature. They explore connections between feminism in philosophy and other emerging feminist disciplines, such as feminist legal theory, feminist theology, and ecological feminism. Central to feminist philosophy is the concept of the oppression of women who live in *patriarchal* (male-controlled) societies; much of the work of feminist philosophers has gone into understanding patriarchy and developing alternatives to it. Prominent feminist philosophers include French postmodern philosophers Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous and American philosopher of law Catharine MacKinnon.⁶

It's a fact that there is great dispute regarding Definitions of Modernism and Post Modernism but the Dispute Regarding Definitions in case with Modernity is not as wide and deep as we note in relation with Post Modernity .

⁶ Carpenter, Andrew N. "Western Philosophy." Microsoft® Encarta.

➤ What does Mean by Modernity ?:

❖ According to Miriam Webster Digital Dictionary : Modernism is :

1 a : of, relating to, or characteristic of the present or the immediate past : contemporary b : of, relating to, or characteristic of a period extending from a relevant remote past to the present time
2 : involving recent techniques, methods, or ideas.

❖ On the other Hand Chris Baldick defines post Modernity in Literary Term :

As a disputed term that has occupied much recent debate about contemporary culture since the early 1980s. In its simplest and least satisfactory sense it refers generally to the phase of 20th- century Western culture that succeeded the reign of high *MODERNISM, thus indicating the products of the age of mass television since the mid- 1950s.

More often, though, it is applied to a cultural condition prevailing in the advanced capitalist societies since the 1960s, characterized by a superabundance of disconnected images and styles—most noticeably in television, advertising, commercial design, and pop video. In this sense, promoted by Jean Baudrillard and other commentators, post modernity is said to be a culture of fragmentary sensations, eclectic nostalgia, disposable simulacra, and promiscuous superficiality, in which the traditionally valued qualities of depth, coherence, meaning, originality, and authenticity are evacuated or dissolved amid the random swirl of empty signals.⁷

⁷ Baldick, Chris. Op cite .pp:201.

❖ Encyclopedia Britannica Article Over Post Modernism Further illuminates post Modernity That may be seen below :

Postmodernism as a philosophical movement is largely a reaction against the philosophical assumptions, values, and intellectual worldview of the modern period of Western (specifically European) history i.e., the period from about the time of the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries to the mid-20th century. Indeed, many of the doctrines characteristically associated with postmodernism can fairly be described as the straightforward denial of the general philosophical viewpoints that were taken for granted during the 18th-century Enlightenment, though they were not unique to that period. The most important of these viewpoints are the following.

1. There is an objective natural reality, a reality whose existence and properties are logically independent of human beings—of their minds, their societies, their social practices, or their investigative techniques. Postmodernists dismiss this idea as a kind of naive realism. Such reality as there is, according to postmodernists, is a conceptual construct, an artifact of scientific practice and language. This point also applies to the investigation of past events by historians and to the description of social institutions, structures, or practices by social scientists.
2. the descriptive and explanatory statements of scientists and historians can, in principle, be objectively true or false. The postmodern denial of this viewpoint—which follows from the rejection of an objective natural reality—is sometimes expressed by saying that there is no such thing as Truth.
3. Through the use of reason and logic, and with the more specialized tools provided by science and technology, human beings are likely to change themselves and their societies for the better. It is reasonable to expect that future societies will be more humane, more just, more enlightened, and more prosperous than they are now.

Postmodernists deny this Enlightenment faith in science and technology as instruments of human progress. Indeed, many postmodernists hold that the misguided (or unguided) pursuit of scientific and technological knowledge led to the development of technologies for killing on a massive scale in World War II. Some go so far as to say that science and technology—and even reason and logic—are inherently destructive and oppressive,

because they have been used by evil people, especially during the 20th century, to destroy and oppress others.

4. Reason and logic are universally valid—i.e., their laws are the same for, or apply equally to, any thinker and any domain of knowledge. For postmodernists, reason and logic too are merely conceptual constructs and are therefore valid only within the established intellectual traditions in which they are used.

5. There is such a thing as human nature; it consists of faculties, aptitudes, or dispositions that are in some sense present in human beings at birth rather than learned or instilled through social forces. Postmodernists insist that all, or nearly all, aspects of human psychology are completely socially determined.

6. Language refers to and represents a reality outside itself. According to postmodernists, language is not such a “mirror of nature,” as the American pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty characterized the Enlightenment view. Inspired by the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, postmodernists claim that language is semantically self-contained, or self-referential: the meaning of a word is not a static thing in the world or even an idea in the mind but rather a range of contrasts and differences with the meanings of other words. Because meanings are in this sense functions of other meanings—which themselves are functions of other meanings, and so on—they are never fully “present” to the speaker or hearer but are endlessly “deferred.” Self-reference characterizes not only natural languages but also the more specialized “discourses” of particular communities or traditions; such discourses are embedded in social practices and reflect the conceptual schemes and moral and intellectual values of the community or tradition in which they are used. The postmodern view of language and discourse is due largely to the French philosopher and literary theorist Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), the originator and leading practitioner of deconstruction.

7. Human beings can acquire knowledge about natural reality, and this knowledge can be justified ultimately on the basis of evidence or principles that are, or can be, known immediately, intuitively, or otherwise with certainty. Postmodernists reject philosophical foundationalism—the attempt, perhaps best exemplified by the 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes's dictum cogito, ergo sum (“I think,

therefore I am”), to identify a foundation of certainty on which to build the edifice of empirical (including scientific) knowledge.

8. It is possible, at least in principle, to construct general theories that explain many aspects of the natural or social world within a given domain of knowledge—e.g., a general theory of human history, such as dialectical materialism. Furthermore, it should be a goal of scientific and historical research to construct such theories, even if they are never perfectly attainable in practice.

Postmodernists dismiss this notion as a pipe dream and indeed as symptomatic of an unhealthy tendency within Enlightenment discourses to adopt “totalizing” systems of thought (as the French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas called them) or grand “metanarratives” of human biological, historical, and social development (as the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard claimed). These theories are pernicious not merely because they are false but because they effectively impose conformity on other perspectives or discourses, thereby oppressing, marginalizing, or silencing them. Derrida himself equated the theoretical tendency toward totality with totalitarianism.

Postmodernism and relativism:

As indicated in the preceding section, many of the characteristic doctrines of postmodernism constitute or imply some form of metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical relativism. (It should be noted, however, that some postmodernists vehemently reject the relativist label.) Postmodernists deny that there are aspects of reality that are objective;

" that there are statements about reality that are objectively true or false; that it is possible to have knowledge of such statements (objective knowledge); that it is possible for human beings to know some things with certainty; and that there are objective, or absolute, moral values. Reality, knowledge, and value are constructed by discourses; hence they can vary with them.

This means that the discourse of modern science, when considered apart from the evidential standards internal to it, has no greater purchase on the truth than do alternative perspectives, including (for example) astrology and witchcraft. Postmodernists sometimes characterize the evidential standards of science, including the use of reason and logic, as "Enlightenment rationality."

The broad relativism apparently so characteristic of postmodernism invites a certain line of thinking regarding the nature and function of discourses of different kinds. If postmodernists are correct that reality, knowledge, and value are relative to discourse, then the established discourses of the Enlightenment are no more necessary or justified than alternative discourses.

But this raises the question of how they came to be established in the first place. If it is never possible to evaluate a discourse according to whether it leads to objective Truth, how did the established discourses become part of the prevailing worldview of the modern era? Why were these discourses adopted or developed, whereas others were not?

Part of the postmodern answer is that the prevailing discourses in any society reflect the interests and values, broadly speaking, of dominant or elite groups. Postmodernists

disagree about the nature of this connection; whereas some apparently endorse the dictum of the German philosopher and economist Karl Marx that :

“the ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class,” others are more circumspect. Inspired by the historical research of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, some postmodernists defend the comparatively nuanced view that what counts as knowledge in a given era is always influenced, in complex and subtle ways, by considerations of power. There are others, however, who are willing to go even further than Marx. The French philosopher and literary theorist Luce Irigaray, for example, has argued that the science of solid mechanics is better developed than the science of fluid mechanics because the male-dominated institution of physics associates solidity and fluidity with the male and female sex organs, respectively.

➤ Enlightenment And Post Modernity :

Because the established discourses of the Enlightenment are more or less arbitrary and unjustified, they can be changed; and because they more or less reflect the interests and values of the powerful, they should be changed. Thus postmodernists regard their theoretical position as uniquely inclusive and democratic, because it allows them to recognize the unjust hegemony of Enlightenment discourses over the equally valid perspectives of non elite groups. In the 1980s and '90s, academic advocates on behalf of various ethnic, cultural, racial, and religious groups embraced postmodern critiques of contemporary Western society, and postmodernism became the unofficial philosophy of the new movement of “identity politics.”⁸

Politics of Modernity and post modernity mostly are agree regarding liberal discourses they share same point of view regarding worshipping of liberalism .

⁸ Brian Duignan. "Postmodernism." Encyclopedia Britannica. Opcite.

Liberalism

❖ A Case of Political Liberalism :

political doctrine that takes protecting and enhancing the freedom of the individual to be the central problem of politics. Liberals typically believe that government is necessary to protect individuals from being harmed by others; but they also recognize that government itself can pose a threat to liberty. As the revolutionary American pamphleteer Thomas Paine expressed it in *Common Sense* (1776), government is at best “a necessary evil.” Laws, judges, and police are needed to secure the individual's life and liberty, but their coercive power may also be turned against him. The problem, then, is to devise a system that gives government the power necessary to protect individual liberty but also prevents those who govern from abusing that power.

The problem is compounded when one asks whether this is all that government can or should do on behalf of individual freedom. Some liberals—the so-called neoclassical liberals, or libertarians—answer that it is. Since the late 19th century, however, most liberals have insisted that the powers of government can promote as well as protect the freedom of the individual. According to modern liberalism, the chief task of government is to remove obstacles that prevent individuals from living freely or from fully realizing their potential.

Such obstacles include poverty, disease, discrimination, and ignorance. The disagreement among liberals over whether government should promote individual freedom rather than merely protect it is reflected to some extent in the different prevailing conceptions of liberalism in the United States and Europe since the late 20th century. In the United States liberalism is associated with the welfare-state policies of the New Deal program of the Democratic administration of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, whereas in Europe it is more commonly associated with a commitment to limited government and laissez-faire economic policies.).⁹

⁹ "liberalism." Encyclopedia Britannica. Opcite.

➤ The Relation Between Liberalism and Democracy :

"Liberalism and Democracy : According to few Intellectuals Democracy Works Under The Umbrellas Of Liberalism ,As Syed Khalid jamiee has a point of view that Democracy is Hosted and supported by Liberalism ".

Liberalism, attitude, philosophy, or movement that has as its basic concern the development of personal freedom and social progress. Liberalism and democracy are now usually thought to have common aims, but in the past many liberals considered democracy unhealthy because it encouraged mass participation in politics. Nevertheless, liberalism eventually became identified with movements to change the social order through the further extension of democracy. A distinction must therefore be made between liberalism, in which social change is conceived of as gradual, flexible, and adaptive, and radicalism, in which social change is seen as fundamental and based on new principles of authority.

The course of liberalism in a given country is usually conditioned by the character of the prevailing form of government. For example, in countries in which the political and religious authorities are separate, liberalism connotes, mainly, political, economic, and social reform; in countries in which a state church exists or a church is politically influential, liberalism connotes, mainly, anticlericalism.

In domestic politics, liberals have opposed feudal restraints that prevent the individual from rising out of a low social status; barriers such as censorship that limit free expression of opinion; and arbitrary power exercised over the individual by the state. In international politics, liberals have opposed the domination of foreign policy by militarists and military considerations and the exploitation of native colonial people, and they have sought to substitute a cosmopolitan policy of international cooperation.

In economics, liberals have attacked monopolies and mercantilist state policies that subject the economy to state control. In religion, liberals have fought against church interference in the affairs of the state and attempts by religious pressure groups to influence public opinion.

➤ Negative and Positive Liberalism :

A distinction is sometimes made between so-called negative liberalism and positive liberalism. Between the mid-17th and the mid-19th centuries, liberals fought chiefly against oppression, arbitrariness, and misuses of power and emphasized the needs of the free individual. About the middle of the 19th century many liberals developed a more positive program stressing the constructive social activity of the state and advocating state action in the interests of the individual. The present-day defenders of the older liberal policies deplore this departure and argue that positive liberalism is merely authoritarianism in disguise. The defenders of positive liberalism argue that state and church are not the only obstructers of freedom, but that poverty may deprive the individual of the possibility of making significant choices and must therefore be controlled by constituted authority.¹⁰

It is a un deniable fact that all seculars, liberalists, democrats, Modernists, post modernists, human rights activists, anti religion segments, neo socialists and Marxists are on same page while idolizing ,worshipping and praising liberalism due to these characteristics :

❖ Two Related Features of Western Culture :

Liberalism is derived from two related features of Western culture. The first is the West's preoccupation with :

(1) individuality, as compared to the emphasis in other civilizations on status, caste, and tradition. Throughout much of history, the individual has been submerged in and subordinate to his clan, tribe, ethnic group, or kingdom. Liberalism is the culmination of developments in Western society that produced a sense of the importance of human individuality, a liberation of the individual from complete subservience to the group, and a relaxation of the tight hold of custom, law, and authority. In this respect, liberalism stands for the emancipation of the individual.

Liberalism also derives from the practice of :

¹⁰ Gay, Peter. "Liberalism." Microsoft® Encarta. opcite.

(2) adversariality in European political and economic life, a process in which institutionalized competition—such as the competition between different political parties in electoral contests, between prosecution and defense in adversary procedure, or between different producers in a market economy) generates a dynamic social order.

Adversarial systems have always been precarious, however, and it took a long time for the belief in adversariality to emerge from the more traditional view, traceable at least to Plato, that the state should be an organic structure, like a beehive, in which the different social classes cooperate by performing distinct yet complementary roles. The belief that competition is an essential part of a political system and that good government requires a vigorous opposition was still considered strange in most European countries in the early 19th century

❖ Human Being As a Rational Entity :

Underlying the liberal belief in adversariality is the conviction that human beings are essentially rational creatures capable of settling their political disputes through dialogue and compromise. This aspect of liberalism became particularly prominent in 20th-century projects aimed at eliminating war and resolving disagreements between states through organizations such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the International Court of Justice (World Court).

❖ Liberal Tensions with different Governments, Democracies and Environments :

Liberalism has a close but sometimes uneasy relationship with democracy. At the centre of democratic doctrine is the belief that governments derive their authority from popular election; liberalism, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the scope of governmental activity. Liberals often have been wary of democracy, then, because of fears that it might generate a tyranny by the majority. One might briskly say, therefore, that democracy looks after majorities and liberalism after unpopular minorities.

Like other political doctrines, liberalism is highly sensitive to time and circumstance. Each country's liberalism is different, and it changes in each generation. The historical development of liberalism over recent centuries has been a movement from mistrust of the state's power on the ground that it tends to be misused, to a willingness to use the power of government to correct perceived inequities in the distribution of wealth resulting from economic competition—inequities that purportedly deprive some people of an equal opportunity to live freely.

The expansion of governmental power and responsibility sought by liberals in the 20th century was clearly opposed to the contraction of government advocated by liberals a century earlier. In the 19th century liberals generally formed the party of business and the entrepreneurial middle class; for much of the 20th century they were more likely to work to restrict and regulate business in order to provide greater opportunities for laborers and consumers.

In each case, however, the liberals' inspiration was the same: a hostility to concentrations of power that threaten the freedom of the individual and prevent him from realizing his full potential, along with a willingness to reexamine and reform social institutions in the light of new needs. This willingness is tempered by an aversion to sudden, cataclysmic change, which is what sets off the liberal from the radical. It is this very eagerness to welcome and encourage useful change, however, that distinguishes the

liberal from the conservative, who believes that change is at least as likely to result in loss as in gain.¹¹

¹¹ "liberalism." Encyclopedia Britannica.opcite.

➤ Humanism And Related Issues :

Western society for the sake of their intellectuality coined many concepts and ideologies to validate and provide assistance to their weak epistemological foundation like Humanism, cultural diversity and plurality.

If opinion and ideologies are diverse and opposite they says that plurality and diversity of opinion is a soul of living sensations, even though they are anti human and mankind but they are allowed due to liberal discourse, and they are just full because political individualism relies over Man as mean it selves and in universe only living,automated Human is men so whatever men think, suppose and perceive is right and just and diverse opinions are the symbol of human Existence .

➤ Humanism and Renaissance :

So in this context Humanism flourished and Human rights were declared as world standard of state existence. Humanism, a 19th-century term for the values and ideals of the European *RENAISSANCE, which placed a new emphasis on the expansion of human capacities.

Reviving the study of Greek and Roman history, philosophy, and arts, the Renaissance humanists developed an image of 'Man' more positive and hopeful than that of medieval ascetic Christianity: rather than being a miserable sinner awaiting redemption from a pit of fleshly corruption, 'Man' was a source of infinite possibilities, ideally developing towards a balance of physical, spiritual, moral, and intellectual faculties. Most early humanists like Erasmus and

Milton in the 16th and 17th centuries combined elements of Christian and classical cultures in what has become known as Christian humanism, but the 18th-century *ENLIGHTENMENT began to detach the ideal of human perfection from religious supernaturalism, so that by the

20th century humanism came to denote those moral philosophies that abandon theological dogma in favor of purely human concerns. While being defined against theology on the one side, humanism came also to be contrasted with scientific

materialism on the other: from the mid- 19th century onwards, Matthew Arnold and others (including the New Humanists in the United States, led by Paul More and Irving Babbitt in the 1920s) opposed the claims of science with the ideal of balanced human perfection, self-cultivation, and ethical self-restraint.

➤ Arnoldian humanism :

This Arnoldian humanism, which has enjoyed wide influence in Anglo-American literary culture, is one variety of the prevalent liberal humanism, which centres its view of the world upon the notion of the freely self-determining individual. In modern literary theory, liberal humanism (and sometimes all humanism) has come under challenge from *POST-STRUCTURALISM, which replaces the unitary concept of 'Man' with that of the 'subject', which is gendered, 'de-centered', and no longer self-determining.¹²

❖ Modern Liberals and Governmental Ideas :

Such, at any rate, was the verdict reached by an increasing number of liberals in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As noted above, modern liberals held that the point of government is to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of individual freedom. In this they followed the lead of thinkers and reformers such as the British political philosopher T.H. Green.

According to Green, the excessive powers of government may have constituted the greatest obstacles to freedom in an earlier day, but by the middle of the 19th century these powers had been greatly reduced or mitigated. The time had come, therefore, to recognize hindrances of another kind—such as poverty, disease, discrimination, and ignorance—which individuals could overcome only with the positive assistance of government.

The new liberal program was thus to enlist the powers of government in the cause of individual freedom. Society, acting through government, was to establish public schools and hospitals, aid the needy, and regulate working conditions to promote workers'

¹² Baldick, Chris. Opcite .pp:117-118.

health and well-being, for only through public support could the poor and powerless members of society truly become free.

Although most liberals eventually adopted this new course, there were some dissenters, notably the influential social Darwinists Herbert Spencer in England and William Graham Sumner in the United States. As the term *Darwinists* indicates, these writers thought of politics, economics, and society in general in evolutionary terms.

Like Paine, they regarded government as at best a necessary evil—not, however, because it coerces but because it too often interferes with the struggle for survival that nature imposes on human beings as much as on other species. Helping the poor and the weak, they argued, impedes individual freedom and retards social progress by holding back the strong and the fit. The social Darwinists concluded that the sole responsibility of government must be to protect the lives and property of the people—that is, to be nothing more than a “night watchman.”¹³

❖ Post Medieval Liberalism and Humanism :

In post medieval European culture liberalism was perhaps first expressed in humanism, which redirected thinking in the 15th century from the consideration of the divine order of the world and its reflections in the temporal social order to the conditions and potentialities of people on earth.

Humanism was furthered by the invention of printing, which increased access of individuals to the classics of antiquity. The publication of vernacular versions of the Bible stimulated individual religious experience and choice. During the Renaissance in Italy the humanist trend affected mainly the arts and philosophic and scientific speculation. During the Reformation in other countries of Europe, particularly those that became Protestant, and in Britain, humanism was directed largely against the abuses of the church.

¹³ liberalism." Encyclopedia Britannica.opcite

As social transformation continued, the objectives and concerns of liberalism changed. It retained, however, a humanist social philosophy that sought to enlarge personal, social, political, and economic opportunities for self-expression by removing obstacles to individual choice.

❖ Liberalism and Great Rebelionic English Society :

In England in the 17th century, during the Great Rebellion, Englishmen in the New Model Army of Parliament began to debate liberal ideas concerning extension of the suffrage, parliamentary rule, the responsibilities of government, and freedom of conscience.

The controversies of this period produced one of the classics of liberal thinking, *Areopagitica* (1644), a treatise by the poet and prose writer John Milton in which he advocated freedom of thought and expression. One of the opponents of liberal thinking, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, contributed significantly to liberal theory, although he favored strong and even unrestrained government.

He argued that the sole test of government was its effectiveness rather than its basis in religion or tradition. Hobbes's pragmatic view of government, which stressed the equality of individuals, opened the way to free criticism of government and the right to revolution, ideas that Hobbes himself opposed. In the U.S., positive liberalism was further extended, with such developments as the social criticism of the muckrakers, the agitation for and enactment of legislation curbing trusts and extending the suffrage to women, the trade-union movement, the "New Freedom" of President Woodrow Wilson, and the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Gradually these programs, movements, and laws prepared the way and provided sanctions for government intervention in the economy.

❖ Liberal Individualism In US Supreme Court :

The U.S. Supreme Court, which had long maintained a sturdy defense against such intervention, heard eloquent defense for state regulation of hours and wages by both conservatives, such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and liberals, such as Justice Louis Dembitz Brandeis.

Their opinions were accepted by the majority after 1936, when the Court sustained one act of New Deal legislation after another, asserting that individual citizens must be protected against overpowering economic groups and from disasters they have not brought on themselves. Legislative enactments provided for old-age and survivors insurance, unemployment insurance, federal control of various financial interests, minimum wages, supervision of agricultural production, and the right of labor unions to organize and bargain collectively.

Despite the metamorphosis in the philosophy of liberalism since the mid-19th century, almost all modern liberals agree that their common objective is enlargement of the individual's opportunity to realize full potentialities.¹⁴

¹⁴ Gay, Peter. "Liberalism." Opcite.

➤ **Liberalism as a political and moral philosophy is centred on two main principles :**

These are individualism and liberty. Firstly, liberalism places the individual at the heart of society and argues that the highest value social order is one that is built around the individual. Secondly, the purpose of society is to allow individuals to reach their full potential if they want to, and that the best way to do this is to give the individual as much liberty as possible. These two key principles are the foundations upon which the various elements of liberalism spring forth.

➤ **four essential elements of liberalism :**

➤ **"John Gray" identified four essential elements of liberalism. These were individualism, egalitarianism, universalism and meliorism.**

1. **Individualism :**

Individualism values individuality and as such it entails a number of beliefs. One belief forwarded by John Locke was that individuals have rights simply because they are human and that these rights are above the discretion of the state and exist pre-politically. A classical liberal would view these rights in a formal or legal way.

That is, rights should be negative in the sense that the state should not impinge on those rights, and not positive in the sense that government should provide something (e.g. welfare). However, these rights are subject to the harm principle which argues that individuals should be allowed to do whatever they want as long as they do not harm anyone else.

The definition of harm is controversial, but as a theoretical principle it implies there is a legitimate role for the state to protect individuals from each other.

Another belief is that individuals are self-interested and are the only ones who know best what their interests are. It follows that individuals should be left alone in their decisions to maximize utility and that any government imposed decision would only make the individual worse off. Underlying the previous belief is the assumption that individuals are rational and capable of deciding what is in their best interests - they do not need, and even find it undesirable, for the government to decide for them.

2. Egalitarianism:

While individualism is probably the most important element, egalitarianism, universalism and meliorism are also critical components of liberalism.

Egalitarianism, in the sense promoted by classical liberals, means equal opportunity. It does not mean equality in a positive way, whereby there would be a redistribution of wealth. But rather, it entails legal and political equality. Melleuish gave a good analogy where egalitarianism meant that there should be no impediments to individuals as they run the race of life, but not that they should all cross the finishing line together.

3. Universalism: implies that the moral principles that follow liberalism apply to all human beings, no matter what culture they are in.
4. Meliorism : is the belief that human beings have the capacity to become better just as their social and political institutions can become better. ¹⁵

¹⁵ Chau, Ronald . Liberalism: A Political Philosophy. 2009.pdf.online.(publisher?).

➤ Neo Liberalism of Recent Times :

Paul Verhaeghe ,in The Guardian Explains Interesting points noted by Experts that :

A neoliberal meritocracy would have us believe that success depends on individual efforts and talents, meaning responsibility lies entirely with the individual and authorities should give people as much freedom as possible to achieve this goal. For those who believe in the fairytale of unrestricted choice, self-government and self-management are the pre-eminent political messages, especially if they appear to promise freedom.

Along with the idea of the perfectible individual, the freedom we perceive ourselves as having in the west is the greatest untruth of this day and age. The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman neatly summarized the paradox of our era as: “Never have we been so free. Never have we felt so powerless. ” We are indeed freer than before, in the sense that we can criticize religion, take advantage of the new laissez-faire attitude to sex and support any political movement we like.

We can do all these things because they no longer have any significance – freedom of this kind is prompted by indifference. Yet, on the other hand, our daily lives have become a constant battle against a bureaucracy that would make Kana weak at the knees. There are regulations about everything, from the salt content of bread to urban poultry-keeping.

Our presumed freedom is tied to one central condition: we must be successful – that is, “make” something of ourselves. You don’t need to look far for examples. A highly skilled individual who puts parenting before their career comes in for criticism. A person with a good job who turns down a promotion to invest more time in other things is seen as crazy – unless those other things ensure success. A young woman who wants to become a primary school teacher is told by her parents that she should start off by getting a master’s degree in economics – a primary school teacher, whatever can she be thinking of?

There are constant laments about the so-called loss of norms and values in our culture. Yet our norms and values make up an integral and essential part of our identity. So they cannot be lost, only changed. And that is precisely what has happened: a changed economy reflects changed ethics and brings about changed identity. The current economic system is bringing out the worst in us.¹⁶

¹⁶<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/29/neoliberalism-economic-system-ethics-personality-psychopathicstic>

Constructivism in the light of International Relations and Post Modernity:

In the late 20th century the study of international relations was increasingly influenced by constructivism. According to this approach, the behavior of humans is determined by their identity, which itself is shaped by society's values, history, practices, and institutions. Constructivists hold that all institutions, including the state, are socially constructed, in the sense that they reflect an “inter subjective consensus” of shared beliefs about political practice, acceptable social behavior, and values. In much the same way, the individual members of the state or other unit continuously construct the reality about which policy decisions, including decisions about war and peace and conflict and cooperation, are made.

Some constructivists contend that gender is socially constructed. On the basis of this thesis, feminist theories of international relations have attempted to address the fundamental question of the extent to which gender-based role differentiation is socially rather than biologically determined. In so doing, they have sought to answer questions such as: Are men more prone than women to aggressive, warlike behaviour? If gender roles are socially constructed, then according to feminist theory it would be possible to reduce male aggressiveness by changing beliefs or values regarding what it is to be male. On the other hand, if aggression is the product of male biology, then such change becomes impossible, or at least considerably more difficult.

Part of the newer intellectual landscape in the study of international relations is formed by postmodernism and critical theory. According to postmodernism, the international structures posited in realist and other international relations theory are social constructions that reflect a worldview that serves the interests of elites.

❖ Critical Theory And Frankfurt School :

Critical theory was developed from the 1920s by the Frankfurt School of social and political philosophers, especially Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979). For critical theory the essential issue is how to emancipate human beings from social

institutions and practices that oppress them. Although inspired by Marxism, critical theorists recognize forms of domination other than class domination, including those based on gender, race, religion, ethnicity, and nationalism. Because each of these forms has been in abundant evidence in the global landscape, critical theory was thought to provide important insights into the study of international relations at the start of the 21st century.¹⁷

¹⁷ international relations." Encyclopedia Britannica. opcite.

D Econstruction and Post Modernity :

a philosophically skeptical approach to the possibility of coherent meaning in language, initiated by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida in a series of works published in 1967 (later translated as *Speech and Phenomena*, *Of Grammatology*, and *Writing and Difference*), and adopted by several leading literary critics in the United States—notably at Yale University—from the early 1970s onwards. Derrida's claim is that the dominant Western tradition of thought has attempted to establish grounds of certainty and truth by repressing the limitless instability of language.

❖ Logo And Phono Centricism :

This '*LOGOCENTRIC' tradition sought some absolute source or guarantee of meaning (a 'transcendental signified') which could centre or stabilize the uncertainties of signification, through a set of 'violent hierarchies' privileging a central term over a marginal one: nature over culture, male over female, and most importantly speech over writing.

The '*PHONOCENTRIC' suspicion of writing as a parasite upon the authenticity of speech is a crucial target of Derrida's subversive approach to Western philosophy, in which he inverts and dissolves conceptual hierarchies to show that the repressed or marginalized term has always already contaminated the privileged or central term. Thus, drawing on Saussure's theory of the *SIGN, Derrida argues that the stable self-identity which we attribute to speech as the authentic source of meaning is illusory, since language operates as a self-contained system of internal differences rather than of positive terms or presences: writing, distrusted in the Western 'metaphysics of presence' because it displays the absence of any authenticating voice, is in this sense logically prior to speech.

❖ Difference :

Derrida's central concept (although in principle it ought not to occupy such a 'hierarchical' position) is presented in his coining of the term *DIFFERENCE, a French *PORTMANTEAU WORD combining 'difference' with 'deferral' to suggest that the

differential nature of meanings in language ceaselessly defers or postpones any determinate meaning:

language is an endless chain or 'play of difference' which logocentric discourses try vainly to fix to some original or final term that can never be reached. Deconstructive readings track down within a *TEXT the *APORIA or internal contradiction that undermines its claims to coherent meaning; or they reveal how texts can be seen to deconstruct themselves. Derrida's difficult and paradoxical attitude to the metaphysical tradition seeks to subvert it while also claiming that there is no privileged vantage-point from which to do this from outside the instabilities of language.

Deconstruction thus undermines its own radical scepticism by admitting that it leaves everything exactly as it was; it is an unashamedly self- contradictory effort to think the 'unthinkable', often by recourse to strange *NEOLOGISMS, *PUNS, and other word-play.

Although initially directed against the scientific pretensions of *STRUCTURALISM in the human sciences, it was welcomed enthusiastically into literary studies at Yale University and elsewhere in the English-speaking world, partly because it seemed to place literary problems of * FIGURATIVE language

and interpretation above philosophers' and historians' claims to truth, and partly because it opened up limitless possibilities of interpretation. The writings of Paul de Man, Barbara Johnson, J. Hillis Miller, and Geoffrey Hartman in the 1970s and 1980s applied and extended Derrida's concepts to critical questions of interpretation, tending to challenge the status of the author's intention or of the external world as a source of meaning in texts, and questioning the boundary between criticism and literature. These and other deconstructionists came under fierce attack for dogmatic nihilism and willful obscurity.¹⁸

¹⁸ Baldick, Chris. Op cite .pp:59-61.

❖ Deconstruction in the social sciences and the arts :

Deconstruction's influence widened to include a variety of other disciplines. In psychoanalysis, deconstructive readings of texts by Sigmund Freud and others drew attention to the role of language in the formation of the psyche; showed how psychoanalytic case studies are shaped by the kinds of psychic mechanisms that they purport to analyze (thus, Freud's writings are themselves organized by processes of repression, condensation, and displacement); and questioned the logo centric presuppositions of psychoanalytic theory. Some strands of feminist thinking engaged in a deconstruction of the opposition between “man” and “woman” and critiqued essentialist notions of gender and sexual identity.

The work of Judith Butler, for example, challenged the claim that feminist politics requires a distinct identity for women. Arguing that identity is the product or result of action rather than the source of it, they embraced a per formative concept of identity modeled on the way in which linguistic acts (such as promising) work to bring into being the entities (the promise) to which they refer. This perspective was influential in gay and lesbian studies, or “queer theory,” as the academic avant-garde linked to movements of gay liberation styled itself.

❖ Critical Legal Studies movement and deconstruction In United States :

In the United States, the Critical Legal Studies movement applied deconstruction to legal writing in an effort to reveal conflicts between principles and counter principles in legal theory. The movement explored fundamental oppositions such as public and private, essence and accident, and substance and form.

In anthropology, deconstruction contributed to an increased awareness of the role that anthropological field-workers play in shaping, rather than merely describing, the situations they report on and to a greater concern about the discipline's historical connections to colonialism.

Finally, the influence of deconstruction spread beyond the humanities and social sciences to the arts and architecture. Combining deconstruction's interest in tension and oppositions with the design vocabulary of Russian constructivism, de-constructivist

architects such as Frank Gehry challenged the functionalist aesthetic of modern architecture through designs using radical geometries, irregular forms, and complex, dynamic constructions.¹⁹

¹⁹ "Deconstruction." Encyclopedia Britannica.opcite.

Structuralism:

A modern intellectual movement that analyses cultural phenomena according to principles derived from linguistics, emphasizing the systematic interrelationships among the elements of any human activity, and thus the abstract *CODES and *CONVENTIONS governing the social production of meanings.

Building on the linguistic concept of the *PHONEME—a unit of meaningful sound defined purely by its differences from other phonemes rather than by any inherent features—structuralism argues that the elements composing any cultural phenomenon (from cooking to drama) are similarly 'relational':

that is, they have meaning only by virtue of their contrasts with other elements of the system, especially in *BINARY OPPOSITIONS of paired opposites. Their meanings can be established not by referring each element to any supposed equivalent in natural reality, but only by analyzing its function within a self-contained cultural code. Accordingly, structuralist analysis seeks the underlying system or *LANGUAGE that governs individual utterances or instances. In formulating the laws by which elements of such a system are combined, it distinguishes between sets of interchangeable units (*PARADIGMS) and sequences of such units in combination (*SYNTAGMS), thereby outlining a basic '*SYNTAX' of human culture.

❖ Structuralism and its 'science of signs' :

Structuralism and its 'science of signs' are derived chiefly from the linguistic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), and partly from *RUSSIAN FORMALISM and the related *NARRATOLOGY of Vladimir Propp's Morphology of the Folktale (1928). It nourished in France in the 1960s, following the widely discussed applications of structural analysis to mythology by the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. In the study of literary works, structuralism is distinguished by its rejection of those

traditional notions according to which literature 'expresses' an author's meaning or 'reflects' reality.

Instead, the '*TEXT' is seen as an objective structure activating various codes and conventions which are independent of author, reader, and external reality. Structuralist criticism is less interested in interpreting what literary works mean than in explaining how they can mean what they mean; that is, in showing what implicit rules and conventions are operating in a given work.

The structuralist tradition has been particularly strong in narratology, from Propp's analysis of narrative *FUNCTIONS to Greimas' theory of *ACTANTS. The French critic Roland Barthes was an outstanding practitioner of structuralist literary analysis notably in his book *S/Z* (1970)—and is famed for his witty analyses of wrestling, striptease, and other phenomena in *Mythologies* (1957): some of his later writings, however, show a shift to *POST-STRUCTURALISM, in which the over-confident 'scientific' pretensions of structuralism are abandoned.

❖ Enonce and Enonciation:

enonce and enonciation, terms of a distinction observed in* STRUCTURALIST theory, between what is said (the enonce) and the act or process of saying it (the enonciation). The linguist Emile Benveniste has defined enonciation as a process by which a speaker (or writer) adopts a position within language as an T addressing a 'you' and perhaps referring to a 'they'. Whenever I say T, however, the I who speaks can be distinguished (as the 'subject of the enonciation') from the T that is thus spoken of (the 'subject of the enonce'). This splitting of the subject by language has been of great interest to theorists of *POST-STRUCTURALISM, notably the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan.

In literary analysis, the distinction leads to a further differentiation between *DISCOURS, in which first- and second-person pronouns and other markers of the situation of the enonciation are evident (see deixis), and the more 'objective' mode of *HISTOIRE in which the enonciation seems to have disappeared into or behind the enonce. So while a *FIRST-PERSON NARRATIVE will show a split between the narrating I of the enonciation and the younger T spoken of (enonce) in the narrative, a

***THIRD-PERSON NARRATIVE** will often be able to disguise the distinction between the process of narration and its result.²⁰

❖ **post-structuralism** :

, a school of thought that emerged partly from within French ***STRUCTURALISM** in the 1960s, reacting against structuralist pretensions to scientific objectivity and comprehensiveness. The term covers the philosophical ***DECONSTRUCTION** practised by Jacques Derrida and his followers, along with the later works of the critic Roland Barthes, the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva, the historical critiques of Michel Foucault, and the cultural-political writings of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze.

These thinkers emphasized the instability of meanings and of intellectual categories (including that of the human 'subject'), and sought to undermine any theoretical system that claimed to have universal validity—such claims being denounced as 'totalitarian'. They set out to dissolve the fixed ***BINARY OPPOSITIONS** of structuralist thought, including that between language and ***METALANGUAGE**—and thus between literature and criticism. Instead they favoured a non-hierarchical plurality or 'free play' of meanings, stressing the ***INDETERMINACY** of texts. Although waning in French intellectual life by the end of the 1970s, post-structuralism's delayed influence upon literary and cultural theory in the English-speaking world has persisted. For a fuller account, consult Madan Sarup, *An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism* (1988).²¹

²⁰ Baldick, Chris. Op cite .pp: 245-246,80-81.

²¹ Ibid.pp:202.

Functionalism :And Psychology :

During the first decades of psychology, two main schools of thought dominated the field: structuralism and functionalism. Structuralism was a system of psychology developed by Edward Bradford Titchener, an American psychologist who studied under Wilhelm Wundt. Structuralists believed that the task of psychology is to identify the basic elements of consciousness in much the same way that physicists break down the basic particles of matter. For example, Titchener identified four elements in the sensation of taste: sweet, sour, salty, and bitter. The main method of investigation in structuralism was introspection. The influence of structuralism in psychology faded after Titchener's death in 1927.

In contradiction to the structuralist movement, William James promoted a school of thought known as functionalism, the belief that the real task of psychology is to investigate the function, or purpose, of consciousness rather than its structure.

James was highly influenced by Darwin's evolutionary theory that all characteristics of a species must serve some adaptive purpose. Functionalism enjoyed widespread appeal in the United States. Its three main leaders were James Rowland Angell, a student of James; John Dewey, who was also one of the foremost American philosophers and educators; and Harvey A. Carr, a psychologist at the University of Chicago.

In their efforts to understand human behavioral processes, the functional psychologists developed the technique of *longitudinal research*, which consists of interviewing, testing, and observing one person over a long period of time. Such a system permits the psychologist to observe and record the person's development and how he or she reacts to different circumstances.²²

²² Kasson, Saul. "Psychology." Microsoft® Encarta.opcite.

As we may see that social sciences and their sister concern discipline utilize functionalism with little difference :

According to Functionalism (social sciences), the view of society as a system made up of interrelated parts, all interacting on the basis of a common value system or consensus about basic values and common goals. Every social custom and institution is seen as having a function in ensuring that society works efficiently. Deviance and crime are seen as forms of social sickness.

Functionalists often describe society as an organism with a life of its own, above and beyond the sum of its parts. French sociologists Auguste Comte and Émile Durkheim and American Talcott Parsons assumed functionalist approaches for their studies.²³

Post Modernity also brought apprehension which resulted in post Modern revolt That is post –post modern revolt against Modernity and Post Modernity as we see that structuralism saw rift with post structuralist.

❖ Subjectivity And History :

The restraint the structuralists extended toward the traditional views of subjectivity and history dramatically colored their treatment both of the individuals who are agents of meaningful discourse and of the linguistically articulable object field in general.

This redirection of research interests (particularly in France, due to the influential work of Barthes and Michel Serres in the fields of poetics, cultural semiotics, and communication theory) has resulted in a series of original analyses and also provoked lively debates between the adherents of structuralist methodology and the more conventionally oriented schools of thought (e.g., phenomenology, existentialism, Marxism, and empiricist and positivist philosophies of science). These debates served as an agency to open up subsequent discussions on deconstruction and postmodernist theory for the philosophical generation of the 1980s and later.

²³ Functionalism (social sciences)." Microsoft® Encarta.opcite.

❖ Post structural Social Phenomena :

These post-structuralist thinkers were perhaps less concerned with the organization of social phenomena than with their initial constitution and subsequent dynamics. Hence, the problem-atics of the subject and history or, in broader terms, temporality itself were again engaged. The new discussions were abetted by a more critical appraisal of language and tended to be anti- Hegelian in their rejection of the totalizing tendency of systematic metaphysics. Heidegger's critique of traditional metaphysics was one of the major influences in the discussions following

structuralism, as was the reexamination of Nietzsche's earlier accounts of "genealogy," his anti-essentialism, and his teaching of a dynamic "will to power." Additionally, many poststructuralist philosophers stressed the Freudian notions of the libido and the unconscious as determining fac-tors in understanding not only the subject, but the deep rhetorical and affective components of language use.

An astonishing variety of philosophers and critics engaged in the debates initially framed by the structuralist thinkers of the period, and their extended responses and critical reap- praisals formed the vibrant, poststructuralist period of French intellectual life. Such figures as Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, Kristeva, Maurice Blanchot, Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Philippe Lacoue- Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Irigaray inaugu-rated a series of contemporary reflections that have become international in scope.²⁴

The terminology that reader also read during philosophical inquisition is Positivism that As a philosophical ideology and movement, positivism first assumed its distinctive features in the work of Comte, who also named and systematized the science of sociology. It then developed through several stages known by various names, such as empirio criticism, logical positivism, and logical empiricism, and finally, in the mid-20th century, flowed into the already existing tradition known as analytic philosophy (also called linguistic philosophy).

²⁴ Audi, Robert. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, New York.1999.pp:883-884.

P ositivism :

The basic affirmations of positivism are :

- (1) that all knowledge regarding matters of fact is based on the “positive” data of experience,
- (2) that beyond the realm of fact is that of pure logic and pure mathematics, which were already recognized by the 18th-century Scottish empiricist and skeptic David Hume as concerned with the “relations of ideas” and, in a later phase of positivism, were classified as purely formal sciences.

❖ Negative Side of Positivism:

On the negative and critical side, the positivists became noted for their repudiation of metaphysics—i.e., of speculation regarding the nature of reality that radically goes beyond any possible evidence that could either support or refute such “transcendent” knowledge claims.

In its basic ideological posture, positivism is thus worldly, secular, ant theological, and anti metaphysical. Strict adherence to the testimony of observation and experience is the all-important imperative of the positivists.

This imperative is reflected also in their contributions to ethics and moral philosophy, and most positivists have been utilitarian’s to the extent that something like “the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people” was their ethical maxim. It is notable, in this connection, that Comte was the founder of a short-lived religion, in which the object of worship was not the deity of the monotheistic faiths but humanity.

❖ Positivism and Ancient Times:

There are distinct anticipations of positivism in ancient philosophy. Although the relationship of Protagoras—a 5th-century-BCE Sophist for example, to later positivistic thought was only a distant one, there was a much more pronounced similarity in the classical skeptic Sextus Empiricus, who lived at the turn of the 3rd century CE, and in Pierre Bayle, his 17th-century revival. Moreover, the medieval nominalist William of Ockham had clear affinities with modern positivism. An 18th-century forerunner who had much in common with the positivistic ant metaphysics of the following century was the German thinker Georg Lichtenberg.

❖ Enlightenment reason and Positivism:

Positivism clearly has its proximate roots, however, in the French Enlightenment, which stressed the clear light of reason, and in the 18th-century British empiricism, particularly that of Hume and of Bishop George Berkeley, which stressed the role of sense experience. Comte was influenced specifically by the Enlightenment Encyclopaedists (such as Denis Diderot, Jean d'Alembert, and others) and, especially in his social thinking, was decisively influenced by the founder of French socialism, Claude-Henri, comte de Saint-Simon, whose disciple he had been in his early years and from whom the very designation positivism stems.²⁵

²⁵ "positivism." Encyclopedia Britannica. Opcite.

New Approaches In Logic, Empricism ,Inductive Methods, Scientificism and In Philosophy Of Science.

We note that most of a logical questions, matters, paradigms and Approaches are very complex and structured in their Nature and Essence , the facts who were considered as a facts that may not be un rooted or jolted in the Middle of Eighteen Century and were on boom After Darwinism, latter on came under severe criticism after science Investigated and inquired universal Realities in more Matured way .

The religion regained his influenced after such discoveries not most due to Evidences but due to several factors like increasing inclination Among scientists and Explorers regarding god and religion, huge difference, cleavages, antagonism, opposition Among different School of thoughts, approaches and Models .

The Structulists like lakatos and Thomas Kuhn has a view that through poppers Falsification Method any previous experiment may be refuted or rejected by new experiments .But it is mostly not necessary to reject such experiments completely, because it needs not a single experiment but a series of experiments and inquiries that may proof that they have discovered reality or something more accurate.

Karl Raimund Popper :²⁶

Austrian-born British philosopher of natural and social science who subscribed to antideterminist metaphysics, believing that knowledge evolves from experience of the mind.

Although his first book, *Logik der Forschung* (1934; *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*), was published by the Vienna Circle of logical positivists, Popper rejected their inductive empiricism and developmental historicism. After studying mathematics, physics, and psychology at the University of Vienna, he taught philosophy at Canterbury University College, New Zealand (1937–45). In 1945 he became a reader in logic at the London School of Economics, and he served there as professor of logic and scientific method from 1949 until his retirement in 1969.

²⁶ born July 28, 1902, Vienna, Austria- died Sept. 17, 1994, Croydon, Greater London, Eng.

Popper's principal contribution to the philosophy of science rests on his rejection of the inductive method in the empirical sciences. According to this traditional view, a scientific hypothesis may be tested and verified by obtaining the repeated outcome of substantiating observations.

As the Scottish empiricist David Hume had shown, however, only an infinite number of such confirming results could prove the theory correct. Popper argued instead that hypotheses are deductively validated by what he called the “falsifiability criterion.”

Under this method, a scientist seeks to discover an observed exception to his postulated rule. The absence of contradictory evidence thereby becomes corroboration of his theory. According to Popper, such pseudoscience’s as astrology, metaphysics, Marxist history, and Freudian psychoanalysis are not empirical sciences, because of their failure to adhere to the principle of falsifiability.

in the philosophy of science, a standard of evaluation of putatively scientific theories, according to which a theory is genuinely scientific only if it is possible in principle to establish that it is false. The British philosopher Sir Karl Popper (1902–94) proposed the criterion as a foundational method of the empirical sciences.

He held that genuinely scientific theories are never finally confirmed, because disconfirming observations (observations that are inconsistent with the empirical predictions of the theory) are always possible no matter how many confirming observations have been made. Scientific theories are instead incrementally corroborated through the absence of disconfirming evidence in a number of well-designed experiments. According to Popper, some disciplines that have claimed scientific validity—e.g., astrology, metaphysics, Marxism, and psychoanalysis—are not empirical sciences, because their subject matter cannot be falsified in this manner.²⁷

❖ According to him :

If observation shows that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted. The theory is incompatible with certain possible results of observation-- in fact with results which everybody before Einstein would have expected.¹ This is quite

²⁷ "falsifiability, criterion of." Encyclopedia Britannica.opcite.

different from the situation I have previously described, when it turned out that the theories in question were compatible with the most divergent human behavior, so that it was practically impossible to describe any human behavior that might not be claimed to be a verification of these theories. These considerations led me in the winter of 1919-20 to conclusions which I may now reformulate as follows:

(1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look for confirmations.

(2) Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory--an event which would have refuted the theory.

(3) Every 'good' scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.

(4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.

(5) Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks.

(6) Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of 'corroborating evidence'.)

(7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers--for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a 'conventionalist twist' or a 'conventionalist stratagem'.) One can sum up

all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.²⁸

❖ Imre Lakatos (1922–74) :

In the wake of Kuhn's work, all of these options have been pursued. Beginning from within a Popperian framework, the Hungarian-born philosopher Imre Lakatos (1922–74) attempted to provide a “methodology of research programmes” that would understand progress in terms of increasing the “truth content” of scientific theories. The American philosopher Larry Laudan tried to show how it is possible to think of scientific progress in terms of “problem solving,” and he offered a methodology of science based on the assessment of problem-solving success. Unfortunately, however, it seems difficult to make sense of the notion of a solution to a problem without some invocation of the concept of truth; the most obvious account of what it is to solve a scientific problem identifies a solution with a true answer to a question.

The dominant position among those philosophers who tried to explain the notion of scientific progress, not surprisingly, was to try to rehabilitate ideas of convergence to the truth in the face of worries that neither truth nor convergence can be made sense of. This fueled a wide-ranging dispute over the viability of scientific realism, one that engaged philosophers, historians, and other students of science. This controversy will be the topic of the next section.

More generally, Imre Lakatos argued that most mathematical progress stems from a concept-stretching process of conjecture, refutation, and proof. This view has spawned a historical debate about whether critical developments such as those mentioned above represent Kuhn-style revolutions or even crises, or whether they are natural conceptual advances in a uniformly growing science.²⁹

²⁸ Popper, Karl. Science: Conjectures and Refutations. Philosophy of Science: a Personal Report' in British Philosophy in Mid-Century, ed. C. A. Mace, 1957.

²⁹ Audi, Robert. Op.cite.pp:684.

❖ Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996):

Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), American historian and philosopher of science, a leading contributor to the change of focus in the philosophy and sociology of science in the 1960s. Thomas Samuel Kuhn was born in Cincinnati, Ohio. He received a doctorate in theoretical physics from Harvard University in 1949. But he later shifted his interest to the history and philosophy of science, which he taught at Harvard, the University of California at Berkeley, Princeton University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

In 1962, Kuhn published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, which depicted the development of the basic natural sciences in an innovative way. According to Kuhn, the sciences do not uniformly progress strictly by scientific method.

Rather, there are two fundamentally different phases of scientific development in the sciences. In the first phase, scientists work within a *paradigm* (set of accepted beliefs). When the foundation of the paradigm weakens and new theories and scientific methods begin to replace it, the next phase of scientific discovery takes place. Kuhn believes that scientific progress—that is, progress from one paradigm to another—has no logical reasoning. Kuhn's theory has triggered widespread, controversial discussion across many scientific disciplines.³⁰

In the 1960s, the reductionist program of the logical positivists came under attack by Thomas Kuhn and his followers, who argued that, in the history of science, the adoption of new “paradigms,” or scientific worldviews, generally results in the complete replacement rather than the reduction of older theories. Kuhn specifically denied that Newtonian mechanics had been reduced by relativity.

Philosophers of biology, meanwhile, advanced similar criticisms of the purported reduction of Mendelian genetics by molecular genetics. It was pointed out, for example, that in many respects the newer theory simply contradicted the older one and that, for various reasons, the Mendelian gene could not be identified with the DNA molecule.

³⁰ Thomas Kuhn." Microsoft® Encarta.opcite.

(One reason was that Mendel's gene was supposed to be indivisible, whereas the DNA molecule can be broken at any point along its length, and in fact molecular genetics assumes that such breaking takes place.) Some defenders of reductionism responded to this criticism by claiming that the actual object of reduction is not the older theory of historical fact but a hypothetical theory that takes into account the newer theory's strengths—something the Hungarian-born British philosopher Imré Lakatos (1922–74) called a “rational reconstruction.”

Although a few philosophers of science tried to make this line of response to Kuhn's challenge more general and more precise, many contemporary discussions seem to embody one of two premature reactions. Some hold that the worries about revolutionary change have been adequately addressed and that the philosophy of science can return to business as usual. Others conclude that Kuhn's arguments are definitive and that there is no hope of salvaging the progressiveness and rationality of science (some more-radical versions of this position will be considered in the next two sections).

Kuhn's discussions of incommensurability challenge claims about the rationality of science by asking whether it is possible to show how the accepted views of method and justification would allow the resolution of scientific revolutions. The philosophical task here is to adapt one of the existing approaches to confirmation (Bayesianism or eliminativism, for example) to the complex contexts Kuhn presents or, if that cannot be done, to formulate new methodological rules, rules that can be defended as conditions of rationality that will apply to these contexts.

Equally, the points about incommensurability challenge the thesis that the sciences are progressive by denying the possibility of understanding the history of science as a process of accumulating truth. Here the philosopher of science needs to provide an account of progress in terms of convergence on the truth or to show how progress can be understood in other terms.³¹

³¹ science, philosophy of." Encyclopedia Britannica. Opcite.

His most popular quotation is : There is no appropriate scale available with which to weigh the merits of alternative paradigms: they are incommensurable .(see :khun again in later historicist critique)

❖ Richard Phillips Feynman ³²:

Richard Feynman (1918–1988), American physicist and Nobel laureate. Feynman shared the 1965 Nobel Prize in physics for his role in the development of the theory of quantum electrodynamics, the study of the interaction of light with atoms and their electrons. He also made important contributions to the theory of quarks (particles that make up elementary particles such as protons and electrons) and super fluidity (a state of matter in which a substance flows with no resistance).

He created a method of mapping out interactions between elementary particles that became a standard way of representing particle interactions and is now known as Feynman diagrams. Feynman was a noted teacher, a notorious practical joker, and one of the most colorful characters in physics.

Feynman's stature among physicists transcended the sum of even his sizable contributions to the field. His bold and colourful personality, unencumbered by false dignity or notions of excessive self-importance, seemed to announce: “Here is an unconventional mind.”

He was a master calculator who could create a dramatic impression in a group of scientists by slashing through a difficult numerical problem. His purely intellectual reputation became a part of the scenery of modern science. Feynman diagrams, Feynman integrals, and Feynman rules joined Feynman stories in the everyday conversation of physicists. They would say of a promising young colleague, “He's no Feynman, but....” His fellow physicists envied his flashes of inspiration and admired him for other qualities as well: a faith in nature's simple truths, a skepticism about official wisdom, and an impatience with mediocrity.³³

³² Born :May 11, 1918, New York, New York, U.S - died :February 15, 1988, Los Angeles, California.

³³ See Articles "Feynman, Richard P. In : Encyclopedia Britannica and Encarta's .

Feynman tried to change the perception regarding nature and Essence not only among scientists but also among Masses by his own and Unique simple funny way.

He defined very briefly that science is not cent percent accurate, immaculate and error free entity as she is being presented and propagated.

➤ According to Him:

Each piece, or part, of the whole of whole nature is always merely an *approximation* to the complete truth, or the complete truth so far as we know it. In fact, everything we know is only some kind of approximation, because *we know that we do not know all the laws* as yet. 'Therefore, things must be learned only to be unlearned again or, more likely, to be corrected. The principle of science, the definition, almost, is

the following:

The test of all knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific" truth." But what is the source of knowledge? Where do the laws that are to be tested come from? Experiment, itself, helps to produce these laws, in the sense that it gives us hints. But also needed is *imagination* to create from these hints the great generalizations—to guess at the wonderful, simple, but very strange patterns beneath them all, and then to experiment to check again whether we have made the right guess. This imagining process is so difficult that there is a division of labor in physics: there are *theoretical* physicists who imagine, deduce, and guess at new laws, but do not experiment; and then there are *experimental* physicists who experiment, imagine, deduce, and guess. For

example, the mass of an object never seems to change: a spinning top has the same weight as a still one. So a "law" was invented: mass is constant, independent of speed. That "law" is now found to be incorrect. Mass is found to increase with velocity, but appreciable increases require velocities near that of light. A *true* law is: if an object moves with a speed of less than one hundred miles a second the mass is constant to within one part in a million. In some such approximate form this is a correct law. So in practice one might think that the new law makes no significant difference. Well, yes and no. For ordinary speeds we can certainly forget it and use the simple constant-mass law as a good approximation. But for high speeds we are wrong, and

the higher the speed, the more wrong we are.

Finally, and most interesting, *philosophically we are completely wrong* with the approximate law. Our entire picture of the world has to be altered even though the mass changes only by a little bit. This is a very peculiar thing about the philosophy, or the ideas, behind the laws. Even a very small effect sometimes requires profound changes in

our ideas. ³⁴

³⁴ Feynman, Richard. P. Six Easy Pieces: Essentials of Physics Explained by its Most Brilliant Teacher. Helix books.1995.pp:2-3.

Feynman also smashed the Ultimate Concept of Experiment, Testability and Objectivity:

For example, it is possible to arrange an atom which is ready to emit light, and we can measure when it has emitted light by picking up a photon particle, which we shall describe shortly. We cannot, however, predict when it is going to emit the light or, with several atoms, which one is going to. You may say that this is because there are some internal "wheels" which we have not looked at closely enough. No, there are no internal wheels; nature, as we understand it today, behaves in such a way that it is fundamentally impossible to make a precise prediction of exactly what will happen in a given experiment. This is a horrible thing; in fact, philosophers have said before that one of the fundamental requisites of science is that whenever you set up the same conditions, the same thing must happen. This is simply not true, it is not a fundamental condition of science.

different phenomenon.

35

³⁵ Ibid.pp :35.

H istoricist Critique :

The historicist critique was initiated by the philosophers N.R. Hanson (1924–67), Stephen Toulmin, Paul Feyerabend (1924–94), and Thomas Kuhn. Although these authors differed on many points, they shared the view that standard logical-empiricist accounts of confirmation, theory, and other topics were quite inadequate to explain the major transitions that have occurred in the history of the sciences.

Feyerabend, the most radical and flamboyant of the group, put the fundamental challenge with characteristic brio: if one seeks a methodological rule that will account for all of the historical episodes that philosophers of science are inclined to celebrate—the triumph of the Copernican system, the birth of modern chemistry, the Darwinian revolution, the transition to the theories of relativity, and so forth—then the best candidate is “anything goes.” Even in less-provocative forms, however, philosophical reconstructions of parts of the history of science had the effect of calling into question the very concepts of scientific progress and rationality.

A natural conception of scientific progress is that it consists in the accumulation of truth. In the heyday of logical empiricism, a more qualified version might have seemed preferable: scientific progress consists in accumulating truths in the “observation language.”

Philosophers of science in this period also thought that they had a clear view of scientific rationality: to be rational is to accept and reject hypotheses according to the rules of method, or perhaps to distribute degrees of confirmation in accordance with Bayesian standards. The historicist challenge consisted in arguing, with respect to detailed historical examples, that the very transitions in which great scientific advances seem to be made cannot be seen as the result of the simple accumulation of truth. Further, the participants in the major scientific controversies of the past did not divide neatly into irrational losers and rational winners; all too frequently, it was suggested, the heroes flouted the canons of rationality, while the reasoning of the supposed reactionaries was exemplary.

❖ Paul Feyerabend (1924–94) :

The disappearance form of central-state materialism was held by P.K. Feyerabend, an American philosopher, who denied that the materialist can give a neutral analysis of introspective reports. In Feyerabend's view, commonsense introspective reports are irreducibly immaterialist in content. He argued, however, that this admission does not show the untenability of materialism.

Ordinary mentalistic discourse, he held, is comparable to the medieval discourse about epileptics as being “possessed by the devil.” If one now “identified” demon possession with a certain medical condition of the brain, this would really be an assertion that there is no such thing as a demon-possessed state: the medieval way of looking at the matter is thus rejected. It is in this sort of way that Feyerabend wanted to “identify” the mind with the brain: he simply rejected the ordinary mentalistic conceptual scheme and so felt no obligation to show its compatibility with materialism.³⁶

The idea that what is true in one situation might not be true in another may seem more plausible than it is. This may arise from two confusions: the belief that ‘true in one situation but not in another’ means

Nothing more than ‘believed to be true in one situation but not in another’; and the failure to specify statements fully. The truth of ‘it is raining’ appears to be ‘relative’ because the sentence is incomplete; but the truth of ‘it is raining at place p at time t’ does not even appear to be relative. Is there some scientific methodology, valid universally, for judging when one scientific theory or set of empirical beliefs is better than another? POPPER and LAKATOS believe there is; KUHN and FEYERABEND deny it. Popper, for example, requires that the theory withstand attempts to falsify it. Kuhn, on the other

³⁶ "Materialism." Encyclopedia Britannica.opcite.

hand, argues that scientific change from one theory to another is essentially non-rational. On his view, transitions between scientific paradigms can be explained but never justified in terms of methodological considerations.³⁷

**The Main Arguments that's Represent Feyerabend in his Famous book
Against Methods are following:**

no	citation	Page. No
1	Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives.	1
2	This is shown both by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes.	7
3	For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict well-confirmed theories and/or well-established experimental results. We may advance science by proceeding counter inductively.	13
4	The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree with accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older theory, and not the better theory. Hypotheses contradicting well-confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity also endangers the free development of the individual.	17
5	There is no idea, however ancient and absurd, that is not capable of improving our knowledge. The whole history of thought is absorbed into science and is used for improving every single theory. Nor is political interference rejected. It may be needed to overcome	27

³⁷ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O.(ed). The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy . Routledge. Oxon.pp:330.

	the chauvinism of science that resists alternatives to the status quo.	
6	No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress. It is also a first step in our attempt to find the principles implicit in familiar observational notions.	33
7	As an example of such an attempt I examine the tower argument which the Aristotelians used to refute the motion of the earth. The argument involves natural interpretations - ideas so closely connected with observations that it needs a special effort to realize their existence and to determine their content. Galileo identifies the natural interpretations which are inconsistent with Copernicus and replaces them by others.	49
8	The new natural interpretations constitute a new and highly abstract observation language. They are introduced and concealed so that one fails to notice the change that has taken place (method of anamnesis). They contain the idea of the relativity of all motion and the law of circular inertia.	61
9	In addition to natural interpretations, Galileo also changes sensations that seem to endanger Copernicus. He admits that there are such sensations, he praises Copernicus for having disregarded them, he claims to have removed them with the help of the telescope. However, he offers no theoretical reasons why the telescope should be expected to give a true picture of the sky.	74
10	Nor does the initial experience with the telescope provide such reasons. The first telescopic observations of the sky are indistinct, indeterminate, contradictory and in conflict with what everyone can see with his unaided eyes. And the only theory that could have helped to separate telescopic illusions from veridical phenomena was refuted by simple tests.	83
11	On the other hand, there are some telescopic phenomena which are plainly	101

	Copernican. Galileo introduces these phenomena as independent evidence for Copernicus while the situation is rather that one refuted view - Copernicanism - has a certain similarity with phenomena emerging from another refuted view - the idea that telescopic phenomena are faithful images of the sky.	
12	Such 'irrational' methods of support are needed because of the 'uneven development' (Marx, Lenin) of different parts of science. Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived only because reason was frequently overruled in their past.	105
13	Galileo's method works in other fields as well. For example, it can be used to eliminate the existing arguments against materialism, and to put an end to the philosophical mind/body problem (the corresponding scientific problems remain untouched, however). It does not follow that it should be universally applied.	123
14	The Church at the time of Galileo not only kept closer to reason as defined then and, in part, even now: it also considered the ethical and social consequences of Galileo's views. Its indictment of Galileo was rational and only opportunism and a lack of perspective can demand a revision.	125
15	Galileo's inquiries formed only a small part of the so-called Copernican Revolution. Adding the remaining elements makes it still more difficult to reconcile the development with familiar principles of theory evaluation.	135
16	The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification, norms and facts, observational terms and theoretical terms. None of these distinctions plays a role in scientific practice. Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences. Popper's critical rationalism fails for the same reasons.	149
17	Finally, the kind of comparison that underlies most methodologies is possible only in some rather simple cases. It breaks down when we try to compare non-scientific views with science and when we consider the most advanced, most general and therefore most mythological parts of	169

	science itself.	
18	Neither science nor rationality are universal measures of excellence. They are particular traditions, unaware of their historical grounding.	223
19	Yet it is possible to evaluate standards of rationality and to improve them. The principles of improvement are neither above tradition nor beyond change and it is impossible to nail them down.	241
20	Science is neither a single tradition, nor the best tradition there is, except for people who have become accustomed to its presence, its benefits and its disadvantages. In a democracy it should be separated from the state just as churches are now separated from the state.	249
21	The point of view underlying this boole is not the result of a well-planned train of thought but of arguments prompted by accidental encounters. Anger at the wanton destruction of cultural achievements from which we all could have learned, at the conceited assurance with which some intellectuals interfere with the lives of people, and contempt for the treacly phrases they use to embellish their misdeeds, was and still is the motive force behind my work. ³⁸	265

³⁸ Feyerabend, Paul . Against Method. Verso .London &New York .4rth Edition.

❖ Thomas Kuhn :

(also see: previous Kuhn entry)

The historical dimension. Criticism of a different sort arose in America. Popper and the positivists were committed to a strong contrast between what Reichenbach called the context of justification and the context of discovery.

There might be an economic, historical, socio-logical or psychological explanation of why a particular discovery (or error) was made, but such 'external' circumstances had nothing to do with its correctness or acceptability. A number of writers, notably T. S. KUHN, fundamentally challenged this confident rationalist picture of science. His *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) describes scientific development dialectically, in terms of periods of 'normal' science being followed by 'crises, then 'revolution' and then new normal science. Kuhn is not speaking of

science as a whole, or even one of the sciences such as chemistry, but rather of small fragments of a field in which there may be fewer than a hundred significant workers. Normal science conducted by these research workers is a matter of solving puzzles or problems according to an established pattern, or 'paradigm'.

Crisis arises when central problems become intractable – for example, when there is no way to explain anomalous results inconsistent with a theory. New concepts are evolved which displace old ones, so that there may be no way of systematically comparing the successes and failures of abandoned theories and their successors. Thus the very notion of 'the facts' is called in question, and doubt is cast on the most fundamental of positivist tenets, that theory-neutral observations suffice to decide between competing theories. It is suggested instead that all observations are tinged by theory.

Kuhn's work forced a rather radical reassessment of the ideas that had been inculcated in anglophone philosophy of science by its German and Austrian teachers. Some wanted to preserve their rationalist ideology. For example, one of the more iconoclastic and polemical retorts to Kuhn came from Imré LAKATOS, a Hungarian refugee who settled in London. His *Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (1970, 1978) is a

revision of Popper's philosophy, aiming at criteria of rationality couched in terms of the track record of an entire programme of investigation.

It is notable, however, that for all his criticism of Kuhn's work, on one point he is in complete agreement. Where the logical empiricists had thought of the logic of scientific method as being essentially timeless, Lakatos' philosophy of science is entirely historicized. Most philosophers investigating the questions about science in general mentioned earlier will pay attention to this historical dimension; but the approach is not strictly new, but rather a return. Whewell's *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* was preceded by a three volume *History of the Inductive Sciences*, and Comte's monumental *Course on Positive Philosophy* is first of all an overview of the history of science.

In consequence of this return to an historical vision of scientific activity, some Anglo-American philosophers have found that their concerns were already partially addressed by French historian-philosophers of science such as Gaston BACHELARD and Georges CANGUILHEM. A more critical attitude towards science itself has also blossomed.

It is epitomized by Paul Feyerabend's question in *Against Method* (1975): 'What's so great about science?' Many of Kuhn's core ideas had been put forward simultaneously and independently by Feyerabend, who described himself as an 'anarchist' about science and argued, most specifically against Lakatos, that there is no peculiarly 'scientific' method and that fixed canons of procedure lead to stultification. Feyerabend on occasion urged that the modern scientific establishment is as effective in closing minds as was the religious orthodoxy challenged at the time of Galileo.³⁹

³⁹ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O. *op.cite*.pp ;288.

❖ The political & Philosophical Trinity Of Recent Times :

The world is populated and fill with Hundreds of Brilliant Minds and Personalities appeared at intellectual theatre ,but Among them these three persons gained much fame and applause in present Century and they are being briefed bellow.

❖ Habermas, Jürgen (1929–) :

Habermas is the most influential second-generation representative of CRITICAL THEORY, a tradition of Marxist social philosophy which originated in Germany in the 1930s, amongst members of what has come to be known as the FRANKFURT SCHOOL. Like earlier members of the School, including Theodor ADORNO and Herbert MARCUSE, Habermas is concerned with the predominance of ‘instrumental reason’ in modern industrial societies. Instrumental reason deals with the relation between means and ends, but leaves the determination of ends outside its scope.

For many modern philosophers, this is the only kind of reason. Such views, Habermas argued in his early work, encourage the ‘scientization’ of politics: political questions are reduced to problems of technical control, and the ‘public sphere’ of debate and discussion concerning social goals is eroded. Habermas also believes that earlier Critical Theory failed to clarify the broader conception of reason to which it implicitly appealed.⁴⁰

His work has consistently re-turned to the problem of the normative foundations of social criticism and critical social inquiry not supplied in traditional Marxism and other forms of critical theory, such as postmodernism. His habilitation, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1961), is an influential historical analysis of the emergence of the ideal of a public sphere in the eighteenth century and its subsequent decline. Habermas turned then to the problems of the foundations and methodology of the social sciences, developing a criticism of positivism and his own interpretive

⁴⁰ Ibid .pp:149.

explanatory approach in *The Logic of the Social Sciences* (1963) and his first major systematic work, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1967).⁴¹

Rejecting the unity of method typical of positivism, Habermas argues that social inquiry is guided by three distinct interests: in control, in understanding, and in emancipation. He is especially concerned to use emancipatory interest to overcome the limitations of the model of inquiry based on understanding and argues against “universality of hermeneutics” (defended by hermeneuticists such as Gadamer) and for the need to supplement interpretations with explanations in the social sciences. As he came to reject the psychoanalytic vocabulary in which he formulated the interest in emancipation, he turned to finding the basis for understanding and social inquiry in a theory of rationality more generally.⁴²

He strongly believes that earlier Critical Theory failed to clarify the broader conception of reason to which it implicitly appealed. Habermas’ solution to this difficulty was to shift the philosophical emphasis from the subject–object relation to the process of inter subjective communication. Thus, in his main contribution to EPISTEMOLOGY, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1968).

he argued that the existence of society depends on two forms of action, labor (instrumental action) and social interaction (communicative action). These form the basis of distinct human interests, which in turn guide the formation of categorically different kinds of knowledge. Hermeneutic and critical modes of inquiry, directed towards understanding others and uncovering unconscious compulsions, arise from communicative action, and cannot be reduced to ‘empirical-analytic’ enquiry, which arises from instrumental action and aims at the prediction and control of objective processes.⁴³

Subsequently, Habermas worked on a ‘universal pragmatics’, an account of the normative commitments which are constitutive of linguistic communication. He wished to show, in particular, that when we attempt to reach agreement through discussion, we cannot help but assume that the conditions under which an unconstrained consensus could be reached have already been realized. Thus an ‘ideal speech situation’,

⁴¹ Audi, Robert. *Opcite*.pp:359.

⁴² *Ibid*.

⁴³ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O.*opcite*.pp ;149.

characterized by equality and reciprocity, is an imminent goal of communication, and makes possible a critique of inequalities of social power a critique not based simply on personal value-commitments.

This account of communication was a central component of Habermas' comprehensive reformulation of social theory in *Theory of Communicative Action* (1981). Here Habermas argued that the pathologies of contemporary society could be diagnosed in terms of the invasion of the 'life-world' (the domain of social existence which is communicatively organized) by quasi- autonomous 'systems' of bureaucracy and the economy. Opposition to this invasion was no longer located only in the working class, but rather amongst all those social movements which attempt to expand solid artistic forms of social life, and to bring the dynamics of money and power under democratic control. He launched a vigorous assault on POSTMODERNISM in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1985).⁴⁴

Finally, Habermas applies his conception of rationality to issues of normative theory, including ethics, politics, and the law. "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Moral Justification" (1982) argues for an inter subjective notion of practical reason and discursive procedure for the justification of universal norms.

This "discourse principle" provides a dialogical version of Kant's idea of universalization; a norm is justified if and only if it can meet with the reasoned agreement of all those affected. *Between Facts and Norms* (1992) combines his social and normative theories to give a systematic account of law and democracy. His contribution here is an account of deliberative democracy appropriate to the complexity of modern society. His work in all of these phases provides a systematic defense and critique of modern institutions and a vindication of the universal claims of public practical reason.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Ibid .pp:149-150.

⁴⁵ Audi, Robert. *Opcite*.pp:359.

❖ Foucault, Michel (1926–84):

French philosopher and historian, born in Poitiers, who worked most of his life in Paris. Foucault's work is a distinctive fusion of philosophical and historical investigations. From the HEGELIAN tradition which dominated the post-war French intellectual climate of his youth, it retains two major traits: a concern to theorize relations between general history and the history of thought, and a preoccupation with the human subject, or with how individuals are constituted as knowing, knowable and self-knowing beings. It discards, from the same tradition, the idea of history as a total process with an intelligible overall meaning and direction. It also rejects the goal of a definitive science (or sciences) of the human subject.⁴⁶

There is another strand in poststructuralist thought which believes that the world is more than a galaxy of texts, and that some theories of textuality ignore the fact that discourse is involved in power. They reduce political and economic forces, and ideological and social control, to aspects of signifying processes.

When a Hitler or a Stalin seems to dictate to an entire nation by wielding the power of discourse, it is absurd to treat the effect as simply occurring within discourse. It is evident that real power is exercised through discourse, and that this power has real effects.

The father of this line of thought is the German philosopher, Nietzsche, who said that people first decide what they want and then fit the facts to their aim: 'Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported into them.'

All knowledge is an expression of the 'Will to Power'. This means that we cannot speak of any absolute truths or of objective knowledge. People recognize a particular piece of philosophy or scientific theory as 'true' only if it fits the descriptions of truth laid down by the intellectual or political authorities of the day, by the members of the ruling elite, or by the prevailing ideologues of knowledge.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O. op.cite. pp : 135.

⁴⁷ Selden Raman, Widdowson Peter and Brooker, Peter. A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory. Pearson Education Limited. Edinburgh. 2005. PP: 178.

❖ Foucault As a Historian of Sexuality and Homo Sexuality or As a Advocate Of Sexual Enlightenment :

Each of Foucault's historical studies deals with concepts which have been used in particular periods (usually, Europe from the seventeenth century to the present; in his last books, Greek and Roman Antiquity) and thematic fields (psychiatry, medicine, linguistics, penal practice, sexual conduct) to articulate systems of thought about human beings. Foucault examines the intimate and sometime morally disconcerting relationship between such knowledges and the social practices, techniques and power-relation through which they are developed and applied.

One of his recurring lessons is that the nature and limits of the thinkable both in theory and in practice, have changed more often, more radically, and more recently than we tend to suppose. Concepts such as those of normality of sexuality, through which we now think our selves and our identity, are contingent and potentially dispensable historical constructs. Foucault acknowledges NIETZSCHE's inspiration.

His later work notably *Discipline and Punish* (1975) contains a 'genealogy of morals' which demonstrates, for example, that punishment is a practice whose meaning can change fundamentally over time, and that familiar values may have forgotten, accidental and possibly ignoble antecedents.

Like their historical content, the ethical implications of Foucault's analyses are complex and challenging. Power and freedom are not seen as incompatible. Power, or our capacity to act on others, is not an intrinsic evil, but an ineluctable social fact. Freedom is a practice which can never be made safe by institutional guarantees.

Our task is to invent modes of living which avert the risk of domination, the one-sided rigidification of power-relations. Enlightenment, the modern commitment to the pursuit of rationality, is a fortunate fact but also a source of intrinsic dangers. The search for truth, especially perhaps for the truth about ourselves, is not a sure path to freedom.

In showing the historically various forms taken by the concern for truth, Foucault's intention is not to repudiate that concern as vain or culpable, but rather to assemble analytical resources enabling us to exercise it more critically and freely. His work ends in a reassertion of the practical and moral value of philosophy, which, as an effort to think the unthought, is always a thought against one's self and a readiness to 'refuse what we are'.⁴⁸

Like other poststructuralists Michel Foucault regards discourse as a central human activity, but not as a universal 'general text', a vast sea of signification. He is interested in the historical dimension of discursive change what it is possible to say will change from one era to another.

In science a theory is not recognized in its own period if it does not conform to the power consensus of the institutions and official organs of science. Mendel's genetic theories fell on deaf ears in the 1860s; they were promulgated in a 'void' and had to wait until the twentieth century for acceptance.

It is not enough to speak the truth; one must be 'in the truth'. In his early work on 'madness' Foucault found it difficult to find examples of 'mad' discourse (except in literature: de Sade, Artaud). He deduced that the rules and procedures which determine what is considered normal or rational successfully silence what they exclude. Individuals working within particular discursive practices cannot think or speak without obeying the unspoken 'archive' of rules and constraints; otherwise they risk being condemned to madness or silence (Foucault's relevance to feminism, to postcolonial theory and to gay and lesbian theory is apparent here).

This discursive mastery works not just by exclusion, but also by 'rarefaction' (each practice narrows its content and meaning by thinking only in terms of 'author' and 'discipline'). Finally, there are the social constraints, especially the formative power of the education system which defines what is rational and scholarly.

Foucault's books, especially *Madness and Civilization* (1961), *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963), *The Order of Things* (1966), *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and *The History of Sexuality* (1976), show that various forms of 'knowledge' about sex, crime, psychiatry

⁴⁸ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.o. opcite . pp :135-136.

and medicine have arisen and been replaced. He concentrates on the fundamental shifts occurring between epochs.

He offers no period generalizations, but traces the overlapping series of discontinuous fields. History is this disconnected range of discursive practices. Each practice is a set of rules and procedures governing writing and thinking in a particular field. These rules govern by exclusion and regulation. Taken together the fields form a culture's 'archive', its 'positive Unconscious'.

Although the policing of knowledge is often associated with individual names (Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, Locke, and so on), the set of structural rules which informs the various fields of knowledge is quite beyond any individual consciousness.

The regulation of specific disciplines involves very refined rules for running institutions, training initiates and transmitting knowledge. The Will-to-Knowledge exhibited in this regulation is an impersonal force. We can never know our own era's archive because it is the Unconscious from which we speak.

We can understand an earlier archive only because we are utterly different and remote from it. For example, when we read the literature of the Renaissance, we often notice the richness and exuberance of its verbal play. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault shows that in this period resemblance played a central role in the structure of all knowledge's.

Everything echoed everything else; nothing stood on its own. We see this vividly in the poetry of John Donne, whose mind never rests on an object but moves back and forth from spiritual to physical, human to divine, and universal to individual. In his *Devotions*, Donne describes in cosmic terms the symptoms of the fever that almost killed him, linking the microcosm (man) and the macrocosm (universe):

his tremblings are 'earthquakes', his faintings are 'eclipses' and his feverish breath 'blazing stars'. From our modern standpoint we can see the various kinds of correspondence which shape Renaissance discourses, but the writers themselves saw and thought through them and therefore could not see them as we see them. Following Nietzsche, Foucault denies that we can ever possess an objective knowledge of History.

Historical writing will always become entangled in tropes; it can never be a science. Jeffrey Mehlman's *Revolution and Repetition* (1979) shows how Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* presents the 'revolution' of Louis Napoleon as a 'farcical repetition' of his uncle's revolution. Marx's historical account, according to Mehlman, acknowledges the impossibility of knowledge; there is only the absurd trope of 'repetition'.

However, Foucault does not treat the strategies writers use to make sense of History as merely textual play. Such discourses are produced within a world of power struggle. In politics, art and science, power is gained through discourse: discourse is 'a violence that we do to things'. Claims to objectivity made on behalf of specific discourses are always spurious: there are no absolutely 'true' discourses, only more or less powerful ones.⁴⁹

Selden Raman, Widdowson Peter and Brooker, Peter ⁴⁹.op cite .pp:179-180.

❖ Rawls, John (1921–2002) :

Rawls is counted Among the one of a best Political Scientist Usa Produced as A super power before defining and briefing about him few terminologies should be understand and the readers mind should be clear regarding them among these terms we defined liberalism with detail ,other remaining terms are justice and social contract etc .

- So just mean :fair or right just war ,war which is considered to be morally right on the other hand justice is (as a noun) 1. the legal process of dealing with someone accused of a crime in court 2. a judge or magistrate 3. the title given to a High Judge ,⁵⁰

Rawl basically introduced his skills as a political scientist to accommodate social contracted values in Modern Political Discourse so philosophically and politically social contract as theory :

attempts to explain the duty of obedience to the laws and civil authority by reference to a contract or compact or promise to obey made for the sake of the benefits gained from the civil society thereby instituted. There are many different versions of the contract theory; one,not accepted by PLATO, is given in Republic Book II; famous modern versions are those of HOBBS in Leviathan, LOCKE in his Second Treatise of Civil Government and ROUSSEAU in The Social Contract.

These versions differ from each other as regards both the parties to the contract and its terms; they also differ in the degree to which the historicity of the contract is affirmed, since some authors content themselves with a tacit or implied contract. The theory was destructively criticized in HUME's 'Of the original contract' and HEGEL's Philosophy of Right. ⁵¹

⁵⁰ Collin, P.H. Dictionary Of Politics And Government. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. London. 2004.pp:129-130.

⁵¹ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson , J.O.opcite.pp :358.

These phenomena, and whether or not one holds them to be radically transformative, therefore put in question the dominant contemporary liberal approaches to politics in general and world order in particular. 'Liberal politics', of course, is a hugely contested term. In academic political theory over the last few years there has been a veritable explosion of interest in and discussion of liberal politics.

If one wished to be unkind, one might say that such discussions have become a drug on the market following the so-called rebirth of liberal political theory consequent upon the publication in 1971 of John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*, the locus classicus of dominant forms of contemporary liberal theory. Added to that, of course, is the large amount of discussion of the processes of 'liberalization' and 'democratization' in the aftermath of the revolutions of 1989, the growing significance of economic liberalism globally and the increasing number of countries seen as 'liberal democratic' (what Samuel Huntington has referred to as the 'third wave of democratization')⁸. However, this amount of discussion (and indeed action) has not always increased the clarity of what, precisely, liberal politics consists of.

The dominant modern forms of liberalism, as well as some forms of socialism and conservatism, at least as they are practised in the West, are subsumable under this general understanding. There are, of course, differences. Many liberal perhaps the best known is Isaiah Berlin have denied the basic assumption of what I have called 'cognitive liberalism' and suggested that politics, even liberal politics or perhaps especially liberal politics is marked by an irreducible pluralism and that it is this fact that requires us to adopt constitutional politics as the best guarantor of the protection of the individual.

Still others most notably Will Kymlicka have emphasized the significance of seeing rights, sometimes at least, in terms of groups as well as individuals. The currently most influential academic liberal, John Rawls, seems to have moved from a position which emphasized individualism as the wellspring of liberal politics to one which emphasizes constitutionalism over rights. Nonetheless, most of these liberals are, to a greater or lesser extent, representatives of cosmopolitan liberalism.⁵²

⁵² Rengger, N.J. *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order*. Routledge. London. 2001. pp: 104,105,107,108.

➤ Rawlsian BackGround :

Rawls, John (1921–2002) Born in Baltimore, and after high school in Western Connecticut, he became a student at the University of Princeton in 1939. He graduated in 1943 and saw military service in the Pacific, New Guinea and Japan. He continued postgraduate work at Princeton and spent a year at Oxford in 1952–3. From 1953 until 1959 he taught at Cornell University, but took a position at Harvard where he remained until his retirement.

In 1971 he published his most famous work, *A Theory of Justice*. Here he challenged the utilitarian view that laws ought to reflect the greatest happiness of the greatest number, fearing that this position could sacrifice the interests of the minority. He sought to develop a version of the social contract so that all would benefit.

He made the traditional liberal freedoms a priority but argued that the distribution of basic social goods income and wealth, self-respect – should also be equally distributed, unless an unequal distribution of the latter is to the advantage of the worst off. In 1993 he published *Political Liberalism*.

This acknowledged that in a free society, people inevitably have different views and values, but these can be reconciled if all accept a liberal conception based on what he called ‘public reason’. In 1999 he wrote *The Law of the Peoples* a work that argues for an international norm of justice that allows other nations to intervene where people are persecuted by their states. Help should also be given to the impoverished.

He was awarded a number of prizes and held honorary degrees from Oxford and Harvard. His *Collected Papers* were also published in 1999, and a revised edition of *A Theory of Justice* was brought out.⁵³

Rawls in his *Theory of Justice*, 1971, attempted to reconcile a liberal ideal of political obligation with a redistributive conception of social justice. The elements are:

⁵³ Hoffman, John. *A Glossary of Political Theory*. Edinburgh University Press. 2007. pp: 155. 156.

- (i) *Social contract. The contract is neither explicit nor tacit, but hypothetical: to determine the justice of an arrangement involves asking whether it would be the outcome of a social contract made under certain conditions.
- (ii) The original position. The idea of the just arrangement is formed by abstraction from all actual social conditions so as to appeal to rationality alone. We suppose a 'veil of ignorance' to be drawn over social reality, and we choose from behind this veil the social arrangement that would then be acceptable to all. (The idea here has its roots in *Kant's categorical imperative.)
- (iii) The original position is fair and what is chosen in it is just, since it makes no ungrounded discrimination among members of society. Hence the resulting theory is one of 'justice as fairness'.
- (iv) Two principles supposedly emerge from the thought experiment involved in the postulation of an original position. An arrangement is just if and only if
 - (a) Condition A :each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for all;
 - (b) Condition B : social and economic inequalities exist only if they are reasonably expected to better the position of the least advantaged, and are attached to offices and positions open to all.
 - (c) Condition (b) is not supposed to apply until (a) is satisfied, and is itself an application of the *difference principle, which will be chosen in the original position because, by virtue of the element of abstraction (ii), rational choice must concern itself with the position of the worst off, whoever he might be.
 - (d) The two principles define the just original position; all other arrangements are just to the extent that they can be traced back, via just transactions, to such a position.

The resulting theory is worked out in considerable detail, and is interesting partly for its attempt to incorporate results from theories of *rational choice, while being expressly anti-*utilitarian although some commentators have argued that the theory is in fact very utilitarian, differing largely in the constraints that it imposes on rational choice).

It is often criticized (e.g. by*Nozick) for its supposed emphasis on the *end state of a transaction at the expense of the rights that are upheld and abused in the course of a transac-tion. (See *procedural justice.) Moreover, the status of the theory is unclear. It is not certain that it provides an account of justice that is binding on all rational beings, rather than a rationalization of moral intuitions which may themselves be rationally rejected. Nevertheless, the theory has been highly influential, partly, because of its attempt to reconcile intuitions taken respectively from liberal and from socialist standpoints.⁵⁴

Rawls argues that the fundamental political value is individual rights, or 'justice as fairness'. Rawls proceeds by reviving and generalizing the hypothesis of the SOCIAL CONTRACT as found in LOCKE, ROUSSEAU and KANT.

The best political principles, he argues, are those which rational citizens would agree upon if they were to choose the 'basic structure of society' whilst a 'veil of ignorance' prevented them from knowing their own eventual position within it. According to Rawls they would recognize a general presumption in favour of equality, and hold that 'all social values liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage'.

Debate about Rawls' system has concentrated on part (a) of the second principle, which is known as 'the differenc principle'. It implies that inequalities can not be justified unless they are to the advantage even of the least privileged Left-wing critics have feared that this opens the way for attempts to just if unacceptable inequalities. Right-win critics (such as NOZICK) have argued that provided the better-off gain their advantages rightfully, they are under no obligation to bother about the disadvantaged Either way it seems that 'self-respect' which Rawls regards as 'perhaps the most important primary good', may not be safe in Rawls' system.⁵⁵

Rawls contends that, taking the two principles of justice together, a just society maximizes the worth to the least advantaged of the basic liberties shared by all (Theory, p. 205). The priority of basic liberty implies a liberal egalitarian society in which each

⁵⁴ Scruton, Roger . The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thoughts Palgrave Macmillan.. Hampshire. 2007.pp: 580- 581.

⁵⁵ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson , J.o.opcite.pp :326-327.

person is ensured adequate resources to effectively exercise her basic liberties and become independent and self-governing.

A just society is then governed by a liberal-democratic constitution that protects the basic liberties and provides citizens with equally effective rights to participate in electoral processes and influence legislation. Economically a just society incorporates a modified market system that extensively distributes income and wealth – either a “property-owning democracy” with widespread ownership of means of production, or liberal socialism.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Audi, Robert. Op cite.pp : 775.

➤ Few concepts and Authors that are mostly utilized by modernists and post Modernists' while discussing and criticizing each other :

✧ Adorno, Theodor, W. (1903–69) :

German philosopher, social theorist and musician, who developed a Marxist critique of popular culture. A founding member of the *Frankfurt school, Adorno emigrated to the US upon Hitler's rise to power. The 'commodity culture' by which he found himself, in his new home, surrounded, elicited from him many acerbic and often penetrating pages of condemnation, and even if the Marxist trappings of his thought now seem dated, his defence of musical *modernism against musical *fetishism has had a lasting impact on Western culture. Adorno argued that 'late capitalism'.

as he called it, has generated, as part of its *ideology, a 'mass culture', the function of which is to distract people from the truth of their condition, and to provide them with a blanket of sentimental clichés. By contrast modernist art is concerned to see through the 'fetishized' products of popular culture, and to reveal the exploitation and oppression on which they depend.⁵⁷

✧ Agnosticism:

At first sight agnosticism is often perceived as being less dogmatic and more open than either theism or atheism when applied to the belief-systems of religions. It appears to suspend the acceptance or rejection of belief. In practice, however, thoroughgoing agnosticism denotes the belief that to know whether a belief-system is true or false is impossible. Such knowledge lies beyond the enquirer (from Greek a-gnosis, no

⁵⁷ Scruton, Roger.opcite.pp :9

knowledge). This amounts, however, to no less dogmatic a position than theism, atheism or the belief-system in question.

For it invites the rejoinder called ‘the paradox of scepticism’: ‘How do I know that I cannot know, if I cannot know whether I know?’ Agnosticism as a world-view or attitude to theism, therefore, differs from the more pragmatic use of the term to denote a suspension of belief about some particular claim to truth. The latter may be deemed more reasonable if it is not a generalized, systematic attitude towards religion or towards the denial of religious truth. Certainly agnosticism must be clearly distinguished from atheism, which raises broader and more fundamental historical and logical issues.⁵⁸

✱ Althusser, Louis (1918–90) :

*Neo-Marxist French philosopher, who attempts to combine ‘scientific Marxism’, with the *structuralism of *Lévi-Strauss. Althusser argues, in *For Marx* (1965), that there is a fundamental discontinuity (‘epistemological break’) between *Hegel and Feuerbach, on the one hand, and Marx on the other. He dismisses the early (pre- 1845) writings of Marx as ‘humanist’, and finds the true, ‘scientific’ Marxism in the writings that follow.

Althusser’s major deviations from Marx’s historical materialism may be attributed to his conception of ‘structural causation’, which he argues to be implicit in the mature ‘scientific’ theories of Marx. Revolution and all social transformation are brought about through *contradiction, and the ‘principal contradiction’ is that identified by Marx, between *productive forces and *production relations. However, this principal contradiction is ‘inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is found’. The social body contains other contradictions, existing at several distinct levels within the *superstructure, and inter- acting systematically, as they struggle to align themselves:

so contradictions pass from one level to another. Because the various contradictions develop unevenly it is possible that an economically backward country might present

⁵⁸ Thiselton, Anthony C. *A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy Of Religion*. One world Publications. Oxford. 2002.pp:4.

the sudden confluence of contradictions necessary for successful revolution (the case of Russia).

Althusser calls this ‘fusion of accumulated contradictions’ ‘over-determination’, borrowing a term from *Freud. Thus while the economy may exert a powerful sway over social conditions, it alone can never be taken as the cause of social transformation (although Althusser affirms somewhat half-heartedly the thesis of *Engels, that ‘economic necessity . . . in the last analysis always prevails’). Althusser was briefly influential, but suffered an eclipse during the 1980s, and is now increasingly regarded as an historical curiosity. His dense, paranoid prose style, and blindness to any debates other than those current in the French Communist Party suggest, at the very least, an obsessive personality. In later life Althusser developed a psychotic illness which caused him, in 1981, to strangle his wife.⁵⁹

✱ Barthes, Roland (1915–80):

French post-structuralist literary critic and essayist. Born in Cherbourg, he suffered from numerous ailments as a child and spent much of his early life as a semi-invalid. After leaving the military, he took up several positions teaching subjects like classics, grammar, and philology.

His interest in linguistics finally drew him to literature, and by the mid-1960s he had already published what would become a classic in structural analysis, *The Elements of Semiology*. Its principal message is that words are merely one kind of sign whose meaning lies in relations of difference between them. This concept was later amended to include the reading subject, and the structuring effect that the subject has on the literary work – a concept expressed later in his *S/Z* and *the Pleasure of the Text*. Barthes’s most mature contributions to the post-structuralist movement were brilliant and witty interpretations of visual, tactile, and aural sign systems, culminating in the publication of several books and essays on photography, advertising, film, and cuisine.

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⁵⁹ Scruton, Roger.opcite.pp :22.

⁶⁰ Audi,Robert.opcite.pp:72.

✳ **Baudrillard, Jean (1929–) :**

French sociologist and cultural critic, who has given ironically endorsing accounts of the consumer society, and of the meaning of objects in an economy of waste. He celebrates the mass media for their freedom from moral, aesthetic and cultural constraints, and generally promotes a *postmodern toleration of every habit that challenges the norms of bourgeois society.

The consumer society, he argues, is one in which illusion and reality encounter each other on equal terms, and the role of the cultural critic is to decipher the new world that is precipitated from their clash. Much criticized for his pseudo-scientific and nonsense-riddled prose, Baudrillard has also been admired for his sociological serendipity.⁶¹

✳ **Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832) :**

English philosopher, economist and legal theorist, proponent of the principle of *utilitarianism, according to which the happiness of the community should be the sole aim of morality and of law. Bentham proposed a quantitative idea of happiness, as pleasure (see *hedonism), and a procedure for calculating the benefit of a course of action in terms of such factors as the quantity of pleasure, its probability, its proximity and duration in time. This (the ‘felicific calculus’) was one of the first experiments in *cost/benefit analysis. Bentham’s merits as a legal and constitutional theorist stem partly from the minuteness of detail and classificatory completeness with which he approached legal and social analysis.

He upheld a theory of legal *positivism, and opposed all ideas of *natural right, as well as the theory of the *social contract. He argued that *rights and obligations are created by *convention, and that the sole criterion to be applied in determining the merit of laws and maxims is the criterion of utility. He went on to deduce (Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789) that laws should be certain, and therefore written;

⁶¹ Scruton, Roger.opcite.pp :56.

that they should be enforceable, and therefore adapted to the actual state of society and to the movement of social reform; and that they should be calculated to maximize the overall prospect of pleasure. On such a basis Bentham constructed a liberal reformist doctrine of the law and judicial procedure that has remained influential into the present century. He attempted to synthesize utilitarianism with the economic theories of *Smith, and put forward a plan for a *welfare state with free education, sickness benefits, minimum wages and guaranteed employment.⁶²

✱ Camus, Albert (1913–1960) :

Algerian-born French writer and philosopher, who dramatized in his novels and plays the fundamental experience, as he saw it, of modernity, which is the sense of the absurd. Faced with a universe that responds to all his questions with a profound and unmeaning silence, man finds himself alone with his freedom, forced to choose between alternatives for which no reason can be given.

Despite this bleak vision of the human condition, Camus devoted himself, first to the French war-time Resistance against Nazi occupation and subsequently to a kind of *humanist politics, based on the absolute values of freedom and love. He entirely rejected the post-war leaning of the French *intelligentsia towards communism, and as a result was ostracized by *Sartre and his followers. While advocating an attitude of rebellion towards all arbitrary authority, Camus recognized the difficulties that beset an ordinary human life, and looked on bourgeois society with a compassion that was deeply offensive to Sartre's *existentialism.⁶³

✱ capitalism :

Although definitions differ according to ideological tradition, there is a general agreement that capitalism is based upon a market in which labor itself is bought and sold. The Marxist view sees capitalism as a system in which the capacity of the worker labor power is bought and sold as a commodity. The exchange process is regarded by Marx as a mysterious process in which the labour that gives commodities value is rendered abstract – that is, its particular properties are concealed.

⁶² *ibid*.pp :58.

⁶³ *ibid*.pp :76.

When labour power is bought and sold, the particular circumstances of the worker and capitalist are hidden so that it appears that a fair exchange takes place. Marx argues that the worker is necessarily exploited since he or she receives a wage that is equivalent (under conditions of perfect competition) to the value of their labour power what it takes to reproduce them as workers.

Since there is a difference between the value of their labour power and the amount they produce, surplus value is generated that enriches the capitalist. Feminist critics of Marx have argued that labour as the source of value is often interpreted in a way that ignores value that is produced by workers (usually women) in the home.

More traditional critics have argued that value also depends upon risk-taking and those who invest capital are entitled to receive dividends as a result. Although capitalism is praised (even by Marxists) as a dynamic system, socialists and (even social liberals) worry about the inequalities and violence that it generates. The wealthy live longer, are more healthy and enjoy life more: capitalism is seen by its critics as a divisive system that creates victims as well as beneficiaries.⁶⁴

✱ Chomsky, (Avram) Noam (b. 1928) :

American linguist and political activist, who has been a tireless critic of his country's foreign policy, and (according to his foes) a tireless supporter of its enemies. Chomsky's intellectual reputation is based on his contributions to linguistics. The surface grammar of language, he argues, cannot be understood in terms of rules for joining individual words together in well-formed strings. Grammatical sentences must be seen as the result of transformations effected upon a deep structure, by the iteration of 'transformational rules'. (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 1955.) Deep structures are syntactical categories implanted in the brain by evolution, and are, or contain, linguistic 'universals' – ways of conceptualizing the world in common to all language users. Hence the uniform linguistic development of children, whatever their language and whatever their culture. Chomsky's linguistic theory is developed with considerable subtlety and has had a lasting impact on the subject.

⁶⁴ Hoffman, John .opcite.pp:22-23.

Its connection to his political beliefs is unclear; nor are the beliefs based in any articulated theory. His view of America as driven by the commercial interests of its ruling circles into imperialist adventures, and his disposition to hold his country and its elected representatives to account for crimes committed around the world, have brought him large and passionate groups of both supporters and opponents.

To his supporters he is a brave and outspoken champion of the oppressed against a corrupt and conspiratorial political class. To his opponents he is a self-important ranter, whose one-sided vision of politics is chosen not for its truth but for its ability to shine a spotlight on himself. Whichever view you take, Chomsky is a leading figure in American public life, and an unparalleled stimulus to argument.⁶⁵

✱ Citizen :

1. A person who lives in a city or a particular place the citizens of Manchester.
2. A person who has citizenship.

✱ citizenship :

1. The legal status of being a citizen of a country, entitled to its protection and to political rights She has applied for, British citizenship. 2.
2. The way people take part in the life of their community as they discuss their rights and carry out their responsibilities (NOTE: In the UK, citizenship is now a part of the curriculum in schools.) the legal right to live in a particular country He is a French citizen by birth.⁶⁶

✱ civil society :

1. Term increasingly popular in the eighteenth century, and introduced into political theory largely as a result of *social contract theory. It denotes the state of society in which patterns of association are accepted and endorsed by the members. Most users of the term were influenced by *state of nature theory, seeing the individual as an atomic constituent of the civil society, which is composed by contract, consent or submission from these self-dependent atoms.

⁶⁵ Scruton, Roger. op.cite. pp:91.

⁶⁶ Collin, P.h. op.cite. pp :39.

2. In *Hegel: civil society is not formed by contract but is the sphere of contract, i.e. of free association between individuals. As such it is not a complete entity but one aspect (or 'moment') of the political order, another aspect of which is the *state. (Hegel's term is bürgerliche Gesellschaft.

which could also be translated 'bourgeois society', or 'the society of the town'.) As a result of Hegel's view many political theorists now distinguish 'civil society' from 'state', using the first to denote forms of association which are spontaneous, customary and in general not dependent upon law, and the second to denote the legal and political institutions that protect, endorse, and bring to completion the powerful but inarticulate forces of social union. Accepting such a distinction it would perhaps be right also to accept another: that between 'civil society' and 'society' simpliciter, the first denoting only those associations which also have a political aspect, the second denoting all associations generally.

3. During the years prior to the collapse of communism, opposition to communist government in Eastern Europe often proposed 'civil society' as an ideal, meaning a society organized by free association and spontaneous institution building, outside the control of the state, and independent of the ruling party. In this use the term 'civil society' refers to a de-politicized society – a society into which political power does not excessively intrude.

* Civilization :

1. The condition of society which is generally contrasted with its undeveloped, or 'barbarous', condition and in which, it is supposed, refined and rare advantages exist, usually in conjunction with refined and rare disasters. The concept has played an important part in defining the aims of nineteenth- and twentieth-century politics, and various attempts have been made to define it more precisely.
2. Thus *Coleridge (On the Constitution of Church and State, 1830) distinguishes civilization, which is the 'mixed good' consequent on general material and scientific progress, from 'cultivation', which is the unmixed good of a mind in which feeling, thought and potential have developed in harmony (see *culture). From the point of view of usage this distinction is an artificial one, but from the point of view of theory it is of some importance.

3. Thus it is integral to many forms of *cultural conservatism to oppose the unqualified pursuit of material advance, and to seek to overcome political instabilities and political dissatisfactions not through economic growth, but through education. The education in question will be *humane, united to a tradition of thought and action, and expressive of a partly sceptical, partly dignifying vision of the complexity of human arrangements. Such an education, it is sometimes thought, is as likely to be impeded as propagated by material and scientific development: this is the thought behind Coleridge's distinction.

2. A social entity that manifests legal, cultural, religious and customary continuity over an extended period and extended geographical area: as in Roman civilization, Egyptian civilization, and so on.⁶⁷

✱ Comte :

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) was the founder of sociology and the originator of the concept of positivism in the social sciences, at least in the sense that he invented both words and was the first more or less academic writer to construct a 'science of society'. Many of his ideas were in fact derived from the early French socialist thinker Saint-Simon, whose secretary he had been.

Comte divided sociology into two disciplines. One, concerned with the structure of societies and the relationships between their constituent elements, he called Social Statics; the other, Social Dynamics, dealt with the development and progress of social forms. It was Comte's Social Dynamics that made most impact in their time, but their interest today lies in the fact that they are utterly at variance with the sociological canon that we take for granted.

To Comte the only possible sources of progress or social change were changes in human thought, whereas not only Marxists but most other modern sociologists would give economic factors, or environmental determinants of some kind, an extremely important role. Comte believed he had identified three stages of social development, along with three corresponding modes of thought. During the 'Theological Age' man was quite unable to understand his environment, lacked any conception of causality, and saw every event as the result of divine intervention.

⁶⁷ Scruton, Roger.opcite.pp :99-101.

In the second, 'Metaphysical Age', man did begin to try to explain the nature of the world, but in a necessarily 'unscientific' way, since the entire intellectual apparatus of modern science (especially the idea of empirically testing hypotheses) was missing.

(Comte's analysis here ignores the fact that as early as the 13th century, for example, Roger Bacon was developing a philosophy of science in which experimental method was crucial.) Finally, in Comte's own lifetime, the 'Positivistic' or 'Scientific Age' had arrived, everything could eventually be understood and explained scientifically.

Sociology, as the latest and most far-reaching of all sciences, characterized the age. Society could now be properly planned, and institutions consciously devised or retained and modified to serve specific functions. In this belief Comte is not far removed from the advocates of 'scientific socialism', except that he rejected materialism for intellectual determinism and was also more than a little conservative once he got down to details.

For example, he attached enormous importance to the family, as conservatives have always done; but unlike earlier conservative thinkers he held that it could now be seen as a rationally functional element in a planned society.

Similarly, he attached great importance to religion as a source of social stability; but having dismissed theology as an irrational manifestation belonging to the first age of society, he tried to promote a scientific 'religion of humanity' which functioned like, and indeed resembled in its ritual, orthodox Catholicism without God. Though it is easy to deride Comte now, the breadth of his vision, his erudition and his developmental approach were quite new, and established once and for all the idea that large-scale theoretical explanations of society were possible. Elements of Comtian thought can be traced to later writers who retain a serious academic standing, notably Pareto and Weber.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Robertson, David. The Routledge Dictionary of Politics. Routledge. New York, 2004. pp :105-106.

★ *** consumer society :**

A society in which activity is directed to an inordinate extent to the accumulation and consumption of material goods, and in which the ability to consume is held forth as a standard of social achievement to be emulated, being the reward of labour and also its aim.

A loose expression used in the criticism, e.g., of *market economies, under the regime of which the motive of labour has often seemed to be little more than the fulfillment of transitory and inessential appetites.

The perennial moral conviction that, as Wordsworth expressed it, ‘getting and spending we lay waste our powers’ is thus used to criticize the structure This refers to organized interest groups that mediate between society and the state. In fascist theory, corporatism is seen as a substitute for democracy so that major groups are ‘licensed’ by the state to exercise control over ‘their’ section of the population. In the post-war period, corporatism is not restricted to business corporations, but often includes the larger trade unions as well.

A limited number of relatively privileged groups play a role in determining public policy in consultation with the state. This contradicts the assumptions of liberal theory. Individuals are not all equal, and the role played in the determination of policy by a relatively small number of actors is unrecognized in the democratic process. Unlike the notion of interest-group pluralism, corporatism assumes that relatively few organisations of a non-competitive kind relate to the state in a privileged way. A distinction is sometimes made between ‘societal corporatism’ where powerful groups in society usually employer and employee associations – are recognised by the state, and ‘state corporatism’ where the state itself takes the initiative and imposes a scheme upon dominant groups.

The latter is usually associated with more authoritarian state systems. Corporatism is defended as a way of imposing order upon society, so that the market itself is controlled and inflation and unemployment managed.

In Britain the government of Thatcher sought to eliminate corporatism, arguing that corporatism was a kind of feudal and hierarchical system that privileged the producer

over the consumer. However it would naïve indeed to imagine that free- market societies do not have ‘pockets’ of corporatism, whether in terms of powerful agricultural interests, or leading capitalist sectors that ensure that the state responds positively to their bidding.⁶⁹

✱ Culture :

1. In *anthropology and *sociology, ‘culture’ denotes indifferently all manifestations of social life which are not merely concerned with the reproduction and sustenance of human beings. Thus customs, habits of association, religious observances, even specific beliefs, may be spoken of as part of a culture. The ruling idea here is that there are activities which embellish and colour the process of collective survival, and give to it its distinctive local forms.
2. Culture is often argued to have a role in the creation and conservation of a social order, and might even be susceptible to *functional explanation. Alternatively, for the anthropological *structuralist, it is to be understood first as a complex of symbols, and only secondly in terms of any function that it may (perhaps as a consequence) perform.
3. Outside that wide, and perhaps over wide, technical usage, the term ‘culture’ is usually reserved for habits, customs and attitudes that are specific to *leisure. In this usage it is common to distinguish ‘high’ from ‘common’ culture, the first requiring educational attainments for its exercise and under standing, the second requiring no more than membership of society.
4. To the first belong all activities in which true *aesthetic interest is exercised, and aesthetic values pursued; to the second belong dancing, entertain- ment, and sport, in which relaxation and social contact are the principal aims. The distinction between the two is neither sharp nor obviously significant. Some regard the attempt to make it more precise as a form of *élitism, on the supposition that the culture called ‘high’ will inevitably be put forward as preferable, despite the knowledge that its products may often be inaccessible to the majority.

The distinction between high and common culture is nevertheless important to political thinking. Many modern governments regard themselves as under an obligation to

⁶⁹ Hoffman , John .opcite.pp:33-34.

support high culture (which, because of its limited appeal, may wither away in the absence of other forms of patronage), but usually have very little coordinated policy towards common culture, which is generally assumed to be capable of supporting itself.

(But see *leisure, *sport.) According to *cultural conservatism high culture, in forming the outlook of the educated class, will, through the inevitable dominance of that class, shape the expectations and customs of society.

A culture can be said to be ‘common’ to a nation, class or social group when there is a shared familiarity with its products and practices, so that widespread reference and allusion are made to it, causing it to be a major determinant of the form and content of communication. Among modern political movements concerned with culture, *nationalism has been the most prominent, and cultural conservatism has often formed an integral part of it. One may also mention Bismarck’s ‘war of culture’ (*Kulturkampf), in which he sought to wrest the formation of the educated classes from the control of the Roman Catholic Church, and the similar wars against cultural independence on the part of *Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and *Mao.

* culture wars :

Conflicts currently waged in US universities and media, and to a smaller extent elsewhere, between conservatives and *liberals over cultural matters thought to impinge on the conduct and aims of politics. These involve the controversies over *multiculturalism, over *neo-conservatism, over *feminism and *gay rights, over the university curriculum and all other cultural matters in which liberals strongly think one thing, and conservatives strongly think another. The culture wars have had an enormous impact on American intellectual life, raising both the temperature and (possibly) the intellectual level of public debate.⁷⁰

* Darwinism :

The name for any *evolutionary theory conceived in the spirit of Charles Robert Darwin (1809–82), who argued in *The Origin of Species*, 1859, that evolution proceeds by natural selection, generated by random mutation and the ‘survival of the fittest’. Darwin’s theory is an application of *functional explanation to biology;

⁷⁰ Scruton, Roger.opcite.pp :159-160.

it is therefore sometimes imitated by those who wish to extend such explanation to the social sciences. It had direct impact on politics in giving credence to certain *racist ideologies, or to philosophies that emphasized the importance of racial character in determining political conditions and social responses. It also led to 'social Darwinism', a theory influential in the late nineteenth century, which argued that societies, like species, are subject to the law of natural selection, and are therefore inherently progressive, later examples always showing greater adaptation to circumstances than earlier ones.

This transfer of evolutionary theory to the social sphere, while founding a certain callow optimism, seems to be based on confusion, concerning first the kind of organization, and secondly the time-scale of development, of that to which it is applied.

Nevertheless, versions of the Marxist theory of history that incorporate an idea of functional explanation seem to bear a marked similarity to Darwin's theory. The attempt to understand the social nature of the human being in terms of the evolutionary adaptation of the human species has led to several new applications of the Darwinian theory, for example in *sociobiology and also in the theory of the *meme. As a result of these theories Darwinism is once again an important force in political thinking.⁷¹

✱ Deleuze, Gilles (1925–95) :

French philosopher who started his career as a gifted but conventional historian of philosophy, with studies of HUME, KANT, BERGSON and SPINOZA. With Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) and especially Difference and Repetition (1962) and Logic of Sense (1969) he emerged as a major philosopher of desire and difference. After 1968, he collaborated with the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari (Anti-Oedipus, 1972; A Thousand Plateaus, 1980; What is Philosophy?, 1991).

His position is fundamentally anti-Hegelian: against the concepts of totality, origin and hierarchy, he develops a philosophy of difference and multiplicity which is etymologically anarchic. His work contains a powerful critique of the reductionisms which dominate contemporary French culture: against the Oedipal reductions of

⁷¹ Ibid .pp:162.

PSYCHOANALYSIS, with its interpretation of desire in terms of Law and lack, he celebrates desire as positive, productive, excessive and proliferating; against the economistic reductions of MARXISM, he gives a picture of society in terms of flows and cuts, semiotic machines rather than structures, lines of flight and bodies without organs;

against STRUCTURALIST reconstructions of language, he stresses the multiplicity of semiotic levels, the struggle of minor against majordialects, the importance of pragmatic strategies and collective arrangements of utterance. This central opposition is best embodied in the metaphors of the hierarchized tree and the proliferating rhizome. The material of Deleuze's analyses often comes from literature or art, and he wrote extensively on Proust, Lewis Carroll, Kafka, Francis Bacon and the cinema.⁷²

✱ Deism:

the view that true religion is natural religion. Some self-styled Christian deists accepted revelation although they argued that its content is essentially the same as natural religion. Most

deists dismissed revealed religion as a fiction. God wants his creatures to be happy and has ordained virtue as the means to it. Since God's benevolence is disinterested, he will ensure that the knowledge needed for happiness is universally accessible. Salvation cannot, then, depend on special revelation.

True religion is an expression of a universal human nature whose essence is reason and is the same in all times and places. Religious traditions such as Christianity and Islam originate in credulity, political tyranny, and priest craft, which corrupt reason and overlay natural religion with impurities.

Deism is largely a seventeenth- and eighteenth-century phenomenon and was most prominent in England. Among the more important English deists were John Toland (1670–1722), Anthony Collins (1676–1729), Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648), Matthew Tindal (1657–1733), and Thomas Chubb (1679–1747). Continental deists included Voltaire and Reimarus.

⁷² Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O. op.cite.pp :86-87.

Thomas Paine and Elihu Palmer (1764–1806) were prominent American deists. Orthodox writers in this period use ‘deism’ as a vague term of abuse. By the late eighteenth century, the term came to mean belief in an “absentee God” who creates the world, ordains its laws, and then leaves it to its own devices.⁷³

✱ **Democratic centralism :**

Term adopted by the *Communist Party in the USSR and elsewhere to designate the variety of decision- making recommended by *Lenin, and supposedly practised in Soviet government. It is held to involve free political discussion within the party, and free elections to party offices, combined with a one-party state and a strict hierarchical discipline.

‘Centralism’ means the concentration of all power in the central party organization, which is made responsible for the organization and development of every institution in which political influence may arise, from the school to the factory floor, and from the family to the police force, and which is therefore intolerant of every autonomous body within its sphere of influence. What the word ‘democratic’ could mean in such a context is debatable.

✱ **Democratic despotism :**

Term introduced by *Tocqueville (L’ancien régime et la Révolution, 1856) in order to signify the kind of *despotism that supposedly proceeds from too fervent and too uncritical an adherence to the doctrine of the *sovereignty of the *people: ‘No gradations in society, no distinctions of classes, no fixed ranks – a people composed of individuals nearly alike and entirely equal this confused mass being recognized as the only legitimate sovereign, but carefully deprived of all the faculties which could enable it either to direct or even to superintend its own government.

Above this mass, a single officer, charged to do everything in its name without consulting it. To control this officer, public opinion, deprived of its organs; to arrest him, revolutions, but no laws. In principle a subordinate agent; in fact a master.⁷⁴

⁷³ Ibid.pp: 216.

⁷⁴ Scruton, Roger .opcite.pp:171.

His emphasis on the active nature of experience owed much to *Kant and *idealism, although his sense of the individual as in part the active creator of the social world was more redolent of native American optimism than of the idealist philosophies of society which it distantly echoes. Dewey's emphasis on 'child centered' education and his belief that children learn by self-expression and experiment changed the attitude to education in both the US and the UK –some say with disastrous consequences.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Ibid.pp:180.

✱ **Dialectic:**

- (1) the art of formal reasoning, especially the procedure of seeking truth through debate or discussion; (2) the reasoning or logical structure that holds together a continuous argument or exposition; (3) the interplay of contradictory principles or opposed forces, as understood in the European tradition of philosophy influenced by G. W. F. Hegel and including Marx and Engels. Some schematic versions of dialectical philosophy speak of a unification of opposites in which the thesis is opposed by the antithesis but united with it in a higher synthesis.⁷⁶

✱ **Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833–1911):**

German philosopher and social theorist, influenced by *Kant, and one of the founders of the modern conception of *Verstehen. The world is to be understood in two ways – according to scientific explanation and prediction and according to the peculiarly human form of understanding (Verstehen) which is exemplified in our perception of each other, and which can be extended to all social and therefore all historical phenomena.

Verstehen is the comprehension of a mental content – e.g. an idea, experience or intention – as this is manifest in empirically given expressions. It is not that there are two worlds, but rather two ways of understanding the world. The ‘human’ way of understanding is cultivated through those studies – the Geisteswissenschaften – which explore the concepts and relations that are integral to Verstehen: this is the true reason for thinking that *humane education is essential for the correct perception of the ‘human world’, and so of all social and political reality.

The human world is a world of significances, and no human significance can be fully grasped by scientific abstractions. Every expression must be returned to its social, historical and cultural context, if its full meaning is to be revealed, and hence Verstehen must be educated through comparison and analysis.

⁷⁶ Baldicks, Chris. op.cite .pp :65.

Without that education history and society will remain only partly intelligible. Dilthey argued against *empiricism and *individual-ism, and extended his theory of under- standing to institutions and legal systems. He was a founder of modern *hermeneutics, and profoundly influenced the course of sociology, through his admirer *Weber.⁷⁷

✱ **Durkheim :**

Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), along with Marx and Weber, was one of the great founding fathers of modern social science. He took as his main task the explanation of the changes that overcame societies with the development of the Industrial Revolution and the change from traditional or feudal society to the sort of liberal capitalism current in most developed countries today.

His work covered an enormous range, encompassing sociological theory, research methodology, and empirical observation. Apart from Marxists, it is probable that the vast majority of modern sociologists would see at least something of Durkheim in their own intellectual approach. Although he wrote little that was directly and obviously about politics, most of what he has to say is suffused with political importance.

Methodologically his position was that individual motivations and feelings were irrelevant to the social scientist, because society was something with a real existence of its own, over and above the individual members who were largely formed by the social structure. Thus social facts were to be explained by other social facts, not by investigating individual human experiences. A good example of this was his classic study of suicide in which suicide rates in various areas were explained by, inter alia, the rates of affiliation to different religions.

Thus a highly personal act, self-slaughter, was turned into social fact, and explained in a structural manner. Perhaps his most important work, as far as political implications go, was his study of the breakdown of social regulation and normative order in modern capitalist societies characterized by a high degree of division of labour. This led both to his investigation of anomie (with important similarities to Marx's idea of alienation), and to the development of a theory of corporatist politics which was taken over and misused by later fascist dictatorships.

⁷⁷ Scruton, Roger .opcite.pp:184.

He is probably the most important precursor of functionalist social theory, which enjoyed a great influence in post-war social science, and he has stamped modern French social science deeply with his views and methodology. There are probably few main line sociologists nowa- days influenced by Durkheim rather than his rival MaxWeber, but Durkheim's influence is felt increasingly strongly in cultural studies.⁷⁸

✱ Empiricism :

the belief in observation and experience as the basis of knowledge, rather than logical deduction. As used in modern literary theory, the term usually has an unfavourable sense, referring to those critical approaches that dismiss theoretical abstraction in the belief that *TEXTS (or facts of history or biography) can 'speak for themselves' without the intervention of analysis and interpretation. The more neutral adjective empirical refers to research based upon observation. One who pursues any inquiry within the limits of empiricism, or who regards theory as a distraction, is an empiricist.⁷⁹

✱ Encyclopedistes:

the group of writers and philosophers led by Denis Diderot and Jean d'Alembert who contributed to the Encyclopedic ou Dictionnaire raisonnee des sciences, des arts et des metiers which began to appear in 1751 under Diderot's editorship, eventually running to 35 volumes including indexes. Other leading contributors were Condillac, Helvetius, Voltaire, and the Baron d'Holbach, who played host to the meetings of this loose association. The Encyclopedistes were the leading spirits of the *ENLIGHTENMENT, hoping through this ambitious project to sweep away the superstitions of Church and State by offering a rational account of the universe. ⁸⁰

✱ End of ideology :

Thesis associated with the US sociologists Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell, observing social and political changes in the 1950s, who argued that the old ideological conflicts between socialism and capitalism were at an end, and that a rational and

⁷⁸ Robertson ,David . The Routledge Dictionary of Politics . Routledge. New York.,2004.pp :157.

⁷⁹ Baldicks, Chris.opcite .pp :78.

⁸⁰ Baldicks, Chris.opcite .pp:78.

pragmatic approach to both economic and political questions had replaced them. See Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*, 1960.⁸¹

✱ Enlightenment:

the, a general term applied to the movement of intellectual liberation that developed in Western Europe from the late 17th century to the late 18th (the period often called the 'Age of Reason'), especially in France and Switzerland. The Enlightenment culminated with the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the *ENCYCLOPÉDISTES, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and the political ideals of the American and French Revolutions, while its forerunners in science and philosophy included Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and Locke. Its central idea was the need for (and the capacity of) human reason to clear away ancient superstition, prejudice, dogma, and injustice.

Kant defined enlightenment (*die Aufklärung*) as man's emancipation from his self-incurred immaturity. Enlightenment thinking encouraged rational scientific inquiry, humanitarian tolerance, and the idea of universal human rights. In religion, it usually involved the sceptical rejection of superstition, dogma, and revelation in favour of 'Deism'—a belief confined to those universal doctrines supposed to be common to all religions, such as the existence of a venerable Supreme Being as creator.

The advocates of enlightenment tended to place their faith in human progress brought about by the gradual propagation of rational principles, although their great champion Voltaire, more militant and less optimistic, waged a bitter campaign against the abuses of the ancient regime under the virtually untranslatable slogan *écrasez l'infame!* (for which a rough equivalent would be 'smash the system!').

In English, the attitudes of the Enlightenment are found in the late 18th century, in the historian Edward Gibbon and the political writers Thomas Paine and William Godwin, as well as in the feminist Mary Wollstonecraft. The flourishing of philosophy and

⁸¹ Scruton, Roger .opcite.pp:212.

science in Edinburgh and Glasgow in the 18th century is known as the Scottish Enlightenment; its leading figures included David Hume and Adam Smith.⁸²

✱ Existentialism:

The existentialist tradition has influenced European political thinkers in various ways since at least the 18th century. Its most recent significant manifestation is in French political thought, with the existentialism of Jean- Paul Sartre (1905–80) and Albert Camus (1913–60). It is unclear whether there are any specific doctrines in existentialism that actually have a direct political consequence, and the philosophy is, in any case, one that Anglo-American culture always found difficult and obscure.

Most probably, the political influence of existentialism has more to do with the milieu of left-wing café society, or, as in Camus's case, radical anti-colonialism, in which it was espoused than with such logical connections as one might find normally between a philosophical tradition and a political doctrine.

Sartre himself was for some time a follower of Marxism as well as existentialism and his political positions derived rather more obviously from this. The nearest one could safely come to describing the politics of existentialism is to suggest that the philosophy speaks to those who see modern societies as dominated by bureaucrats, characterized by alienation and dehumanization, and to those who would wish to destroy these aspects of state power.

Indeed a general distaste for organized power, an opposition to being forced to choose between limited alternatives in terms of organized left- and right-wing parties, and a feeling that individual autonomy and creativity are being destroyed by politicians runs through Sartre's work.

Especially in his famous four-volume novel of French life from the Spanish Civil War to the fall of France in 1940, *The Roads to Freedom* (1945–49), Sartre certainly paints a perceptive emotional analysis of the corruption of the French Third Republic, and it may well be that it is in the not strictly philosophical literature that the political theory is to be found.

This would apply equally to other modern existentialists, especially Camus, who had grown up in French Algeria and developed a hatred for the colonial mentality. In the end there is little more than a politics of despair and a fear of power to be found as theoretical doctrine in the existentialist works. One might well link this political reaction to the politics of Kafka's *The Trial*.

This is not to deny the genuine influence on many in political circles, especially among fringe left-wing groups and militant students, and many serious critics of political theory might well wish to claim a more clear-cut political consequence for existentialism. What would probably not be denied is that its days of influence have been, at least temporarily, over since the 1960s, largely to be replaced by more recent French radical philosophy in the guise of various versions of post-modernism.⁸³

✱ Federalist Papers :

A series of 85 articles by Alexander Hamilton, *Madison and John Jay, published under the pseudonym of Publius, in support of the campaign for the ratification of the US Constitution in 1787–88. They are widely admired and studied for their distillation of the principles of classical *liberalism as these applied to the American experience.

✱ Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762–1814) :

Fichte was born into a poor peasant family in Saxony, but with the aid of a local landed proprietor he studied theology, philology and philosophy at Jena and Leipzig. He met KANT in 1791 and became a close student and disciple. In 1794 he was made professor at Jena but was dismissed in 1799 on a charge of teaching atheism.

An ardent patriot, he delivered his *Addresses to the German Nation* in Berlin in 1807–8 and was influential in the rebirth of Prussia after its defeats at the hands of Napoleon. He became professor at the new University of Berlin in 1810. Fichte held that there were two possible methods in philosophy: dogmatism, which deduces the idea from the thing, and IDEALISM which deduces the thing from the idea. Which method one follows depends on one's mental make-up, but idealism is preferable since we cannot explain

⁸³ Robertson ,David .op cite.pp : 179.

consciousness satisfactorily in terms of being, as dogmatism would do, but can construct experience, though not the thing-in-itself, from consciousness as a datum.

Thus Fichte discarded the thing-in-itself and instead of deriving the nature of the thinking self from the manifold of experience, like Kant, he set out to deduce the manifold from the activity of the ego. The clearest statement of this not very easy doctrine is perhaps his Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (1797). Fichte's ethical views were developed in Theory of Morals (1798). Moral action must spring from conscience rather than obedience to authority. The basic ethical demand is that we should act according to our conception of duty, in a way we would acknowledge as ours without reservation through all time. Thus the moral life is a series of actions leading to the complete spiritual freedom of the ego.

Moral evil arises from a lazy incapacity to think out our actions to the full. Certain individuals have the power to act morally in a pre eminent way and their example is an inspiration to others; this is the basis of religion, and a church is really no more than an association for stimulating and strengthening moral conviction.

The State, according to Fichte, has the task of ensuring that citizens limit their freedom by regard for the freedom of others; but it cannot do this unless it also attempts to secure the same rights for all, which it can do only if it ensures property and economic self-dependence for all. In the light of this view Fichte was led to some socialistic doctrines about economic matters, including the transference of all foreign trade to the state. But, contrary to received legend, he did not share the organic view of the state typical of many German idealists.⁸⁴

✱ Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939):

Born in Freiberg in Moravia. In 1859 the family moved to Leipzig and then to Vienna. Here he set up a practice in neuropsychiatry. He published Studies in Hysteria, jointly with Breuer in 1895. In 1900 he published The Interpretation of Dreams, and this was followed in 1901 by The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. In 1905 he wrote Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.

⁸⁴ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O.opcite.pp :134-135.

His emphasis upon sexuality was highly controversial and it took some years before the importance of his work was recognised. In 1916 he published *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*. His work in 1923, *The Ego and the Id*, sought to analyse the mind in terms of the id, ego and super ego. The id is unconscious, irrational and amoral. Opposing this 'pleasure principle' is the 'reality principle' of the ego that seeks self-preservation.

The home of repression and conscience – the source of 'civilisation' – is the super ego that seeks to transform the child into a social being. In *The Future of an Illusion* (1927) and *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) he argued that happiness has been exchanged for security, and Freud antagonised feminists by suggesting that women represent the interests of the family and sexuality, and are the foes of civilization. He was sceptical that socialism could work since, as he saw it, private property and war are the product of an inherent aggressiveness within human nature. In 1939 the Nazi Anschluss with Austria forced him into exile in Britain.⁸⁵

✱ Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1900–2002) :

German philosopher, the main exponent and developer of the idea that HERMENEUTICS is the most fundamental of all philosophical disciplines. Much of his work takes the form of lucid and self-effacing essays on the figures he sees as dominating the HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: not only his friend and teacher HEIDEGGER, but also PLATO, ARISTOTLE, HEGEL and HUSSERL. Collectively, these essays plead for a recognition that philosophy consists essentially in the interpretation of philosophical tradition.

With the publication of his *Truth and Method* (1960), it became clear that this historical approach to philosophy was based on a general theory about the universal ontological significance of 'the phenomenon of understanding'. Following Heidegger, Gadamer rejected the idea that understanding or interpretation is the activity of a 'subject' confronting an independent 'object'. This dichotomy of subject and object is itself, he argues, a hasty interpretation with limited validity, and so are all the other dualisms characteristic of MODERNITY, especially that between art and science.

For, in spite of KANT's 'subjectivisation of aesthetics', art makes no less a 'claim to truth' than science. Once we have discovered how truth can happen in art, according to

⁸⁵ Hoffman , John .opcite.pp:60.

Gadamer, we can begin to see how understanding in general – including scientific understanding – works.

We will realize that it consists not in the pure and timeless relation between subjective representations on the one hand and objective phenomena on the other, but in historically situated ‘events’ where interpretative ‘horizons’ are enlarged, and eventually ‘fused’ with others gathered from the past. ‘Understanding’, he says, ‘must be conceived as part of the process of the coming into being of meaning, in which the significance of all statements – those of art and those of everything else that has been transmitted – is formed and made complete’.

Gadamer’s conception of understanding as part of ‘the historicity of our existence’ also led him to reject the ‘prejudice against prejudice’ which he regarded as another commonplace of modernity. Recognition of authority, he argued, is really a condition of knowledge, rather than its enemy. Our prejudices ‘constitute our being’: they are the ‘biases of our openness to the world’ and ‘the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience’.

Some left-wing critics such as HABERMAS have seen this as involving a universal endorsement of supine conservatism since, they argue, it implies that any demand for radical change must be irrational and a misinterpretation of tradition. Gadamer however sees these criticisms as mistakenly presupposing an ‘unconditional antithesis between tradition and reason’, and an ‘objectivist’ view of the past. Tradition, for Gadamer, does not ‘persist by nature because of the inertia of what once existed’; on the contrary, it is ‘an element of freedom’ which perpetually ‘needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated’. Hence even in the most fundamental revolutions, according to Gadamer, ‘far more of the old is preserved... than anyone knows.’⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.o.opcite.pp :142.

He was promoted to professor in 1987. In 1971 he published *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* and five years later, *New Rules of Sociological Method*. In *Central Problems in Social Theory* (1979) and *The Constitution of Society* (1984) he sought to develop his theory of structuration – a theory that attempts to give weight both to the question of structure and of agency in understanding society.

He helped to found Polity Press in 1985, and in 1997 he became director of the London School of Economics, a position he held until 2003. He was a member of the Advisory Council for the Institute for Public Policy Research and adviser to the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. He has been increasingly preoccupied with the question of globalisation (he delivered the BBC's Reith Lectures on the latter in 2000). In the 1990s he published a stream of books dealing with the question of modernity, personal relationships, and the 'third way' – an attempt to renew social democracy in a manner that moves beyond the traditional positions of 'left' and 'right'. In June 2004 he became a Labour member of the House of Lords.⁸⁷

✳ Globalization:

The process whereby barriers to trade, to the movement of populations, to the spread of information, disinformation, lies, truths and enquiries, to scientific knowledge and mass- produced ignorance – in short anything produced by or embodied in people – are rapidly being broken down. The causes of globalization are many, but obviously technological advances in *communication, transportation, and marketing have been crucial, as well as the implosion of regimes such as that of the *USSR which depended upon freezing populations, industries and ideas in a posture of xenophobic resistance to externally motivated change.

⁸⁷ Hoffman, John.opcite.pp :62-63.

The rise of *multinational business and *transnational institutions, the erosion of *local cultures and markets by migrations, the universal desire of people for freedom, opportunity and prosperity, not to speak of the growing *entropy of modern societies, have all made a contribution. Some welcome globalization, as one aspect of the ‘creative destruction’ celebrated by *Schumpeter – the process that destroys old and dysfunctional systems and customs, and creates the conditions in which innovation can begin.

Others welcome it as the *end of history, or as the beginning of a new and universal civilization, based on Western ideas of freedom, individuality and mobility. Others abhor it as the enemy of *tradition, *local custom and the gentle institutions of people who live close to the soil. Others still abhor it as a confidence trick practised by the multinational corporations in their desire to appropriate the resources of the *developing world. One aspect that tends not to be commented upon, is the contribution made by globalization to the *shadow economy, and also to the rise of international *terrorism, itself in a certain measure part of that shadow economy.⁸⁸

✱ Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937) :

Italian Marxist, born in Sardinia. His activities in opposing Fascism led to his arrest in November 1926. He spent the final ten years of his life in Fascist prisons and clinics, and his major theoretical work, the Prison Notebooks (published 1948–51), was written during his incarceration.

Gramsci’s philosophical aim was to reconstruct Marxism as a political philosophy, a philosophy of praxis, and thus to move away from the HISTORICAL MATERIALIST conception of Marxism as a scientific theory of economy and society. To this end he attempted to incorporate into Marxist thought, in radically altered form, the brand of Hegelianism and historicism he learned from the writings of the Italian philosopher Benedetto CROCE. For Gramsci ‘philosophy’ is a social activity;

it is the universe of cultural norms and values, the world-view, shared by all as common sense. All philosophy, then, is historically concrete, belonging to a people, a time and place, even if ‘philosophers’ – those who produce specifically philosophical writings – are unaware of it as such. In conceiving of philosophy in this way Gramsci

⁸⁸ Scruton, Roger. *op.cite*. pp :277.

was attempting to refute the standard Marxist conception of the economy as the base or infrastructure which determines society's political and cultural superstructure.

For Gramsci, politics, as the transformation of common sense, and the introduction of new philosophical perspectives, represented an independent element in historical change; and as such it was essential to the possibility of revolutionary change in the West. Central to Gramsci's conception of historical change and political education was his concept of 'hegemony'.

This refers either to the consensual basis of an existing political system, achieved when a ruling class imposes its world-view as common sense; or to the attainment of a new common sense by a dominated class. For Gramsci, ideological struggles are, properly speaking, struggles for hegemony, struggles for the hearts and minds of the people. In identifying philosophy, history and politics Gramsci transforms the Marxian problematic of IDEOLOGY into the question of the 'fate' of 'the political' in MODERNITY.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.o.opcite.pp :146-147.

✱ Grand narrative:

[French *grands récits* 'big stories']

Lyotard's term for the totalizing narratives or metadiscourses of modernity which have provided ideologies with a legitimating philosophy of history. For example, the grand narratives of the Enlightenment, democracy, and Marxism. Hayden White (b.1928), an American historian, suggests that there are four Western master narratives:

Greek fatalism, Christian redemptionism, bourgeois progressivism, and Marxist utopianism. Lyotard argues that such authoritarian universalizing narratives are no longer viable in postmodernity, which heralds the emergence of 'little narratives' (or micronarratives, *petits récits*): localized representations of restricted domains, none of which has a claim to universal truth status. Critics suggest that this could be seen as just another grand narrative, and some have seen it as Eurocentric.⁹⁰

In this context, the narrative is a story that functions to legitimize power, authority, and social customs. A grand narrative or meta narrative is one that claims to explain various events in history, gives meaning by connecting disperse events and phenomena by appealing to some kind of universal knowledge or schema. The term grand narratives can be applied to a wide range of thoughts which includes Marxism, religious doctrines, belief in progress, universal reason, and others.

The concept was criticized by Jean-François Lyotard in his work, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979). In this text, Lyotard refers to what he describes as the *postmodern condition*, which he characterized as increasing skepticism toward the totalizing nature of "metanarratives" or "grand narratives."

According to John Stephens it "is a global or totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience." The prefix meta means "beyond" and is here used to mean "about," and a narrative is a story. Therefore, a meta narrative is a story *about* a story, encompassing and explaining other 'little stories' within totalizing a schema.

⁹⁰ <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095903493>

➤ *The Postmodern Condition :*

The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979) is a short but influential philosophy book by Jean-François Lyotard in which he analyzes the epistemology of postmodern culture as the end of 'grand narratives' or meta narratives, which he considers a quintessential feature of modernity. The book was originally written as a report to the *Conseil des universités du Québec*. The book introduced the term 'postmodernism', which was previously only used by art critics, in philosophy with the following quotation: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives".

Among the metanarratives are reductionism and teleological notions of human history such as those of the Enlightenment and Marxism. These have become untenable, according to Lyotard, by technological progress in the areas of communication, mass media and computer science. Techniques such as artificial intelligence and machine translation show a shift to linguistic and symbolic production as central elements of the postindustrial economy and the related postmodern culture, which had risen at the end of the 1950s after the reconstruction of western Europe. The result is a plurality of language-games (a term coined by Wittgenstein, without any overarching structure. Modern science thus destroys its own metanarrative.

In the book, Lyotard professes a preference for this plurality of small narratives that compete with each other, replacing the totalitarianism of grand narratives. For this reason, *The Postmodern Condition* has often been interpreted as an excuse for unbounded relativism, which for many has become a hallmark of postmodern thought.

The Postmodern Condition was written as a report on the influence of technology on the notion of knowledge in exact sciences, commissioned by the Québec government. Lyotard later admitted that he had a 'less than limited' knowledge of the science he was to write about, and to compensate for this knowledge, he 'made stories up' and referred to a number of books that he hadn't actually read. In retrospect, he called it 'a parody' and 'simply the worst of all my books'. Despite this, and much to Lyotard's regret, it came to be seen as his most important piece of writing.

Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward meta narratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it.

To the obsolescence of the meta narrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements—narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside? - Jean-Francois Lyotard

➤ Examples of metanarratives:

Lyotard and other postmodernists take a critical or skeptical stance towards metanarrative in which they include a variety of thoughts from other religious doctrines to Marxism, Freudianism, and others.

- Many Christians believe that human nature, since the Fall (Genesis 3), is characteristically sinful, but has the possibility of redemption and experiencing eternal life in heaven; thus representing a belief in a universal rule and a telos for humankind. See also Universal History.
- The Enlightenment theorists believed that rational thought, allied to scientific reasoning, would lead inevitably toward moral, social and ethical progress.
- Muslims view human history as the story of divine contact through prophets like David, Abraham, or Jesus demonstrating rationally impossible feats for human beings (miracles) as proof of authenticity and sent to every people over time to teach purity of heart so that people may receive the guidance of the one true creator or God. These prophets or their messages are resisted when introduced, and distorted or corrupted over time necessitating new prophets, the final one being Muhammad and the uncorrupted Quran; victory ultimately being for those who have purified their hearts and accepted the divine nature of the world.
- The Marxist-Leninists believe that in order to be emancipated, society must undergo a revolution. Just as the *bourgeoisie* (whose living depends on the control of capital or technology) took power from the noble class (whose wealth was based on control over land), they believe that the present system of capitalism will fall and the *proletariat* (who live by selling their labor) will take over. This change will

be driven by the unstable and cyclical nature of capitalism, and by the alienation felt by the labourers who keep the system working.

- Freudian theory holds that human history is a narrative of the repression of libidinal desires.
- Categorical and definitive periodizations of history, such as the Fall of the Roman Empire, the Dark Ages and Renaissance.
- Many feminists hold that patriarchy has systematically oppressed and subjugated women throughout history.
- The Whig Interpretation of History, where history was viewed as a teleological process gradually leading to increased liberty and democracy.

➤ Replacing grand, universal narratives with small, local narratives :

According to the advocates of postmodernism, metanarratives have lost their power to convince stories that are told in order to legitimize various versions of "the truth." With the transition from modern to postmodern, Lyotard proposes that meta narratives should give way to 'petits récits', or more modest and "localized" narratives.

Borrowing from the works of Wittgenstein and his theory of the "models of discourse" Lyotard constructs his vision of a progressive politics that is grounded in the cohabitation of a whole range of diverse and always locally legitimated language games. Postmodernists attempt to replace meta narratives by focusing on specific local contexts as well as the diversity of human experience. They argue for the existence of a "multiplicity of theoretical standpoints" rather than grand, all-encompassing theories.

➤ Is poststructuralism a metanarrative?

Lyotard's analysis of the postmodern condition has been criticized as being internally inconsistent. For example, thinkers like Alex Callinicos and Jürgen Habermas argue that Lyotard's description of the postmodern world as containing an "incredulity toward meta narratives" could be seen as a meta narrative in itself. According to this view, post-structuralist thinkers like Lyotard criticize universal rules but postulate that post modernity contains a universal skepticism toward metanarratives, and so this 'universal skepticism' is in itself a contemporary meta narrative.

Like a post-modern neo-romanticist meta narrative that intends to build up a 'meta' critic, or 'meta' discourse and a 'meta' belief holding up that Western science is just taxonomist, empiricist, utilitarian, assuming a supposed sovereignty around its own reason and pretending to be neutral, rigorous and universal. This is itself an obvious sample of another 'meta' story, self-contradicting the postmodern critique of the metanarrative.

Thus, Lyotard's postmodern incredulity towards meta narratives could be said to be self-refuting. If one is skeptical of universal narratives such as "truth," "knowledge," "right," or "wrong," then there is no basis for believing the "truth" that meta narratives are being undermined. In this sense, this paradox of postmodernism is similar to the liar's paradox ("This statement is false."). Perhaps postmodernists, like Lyotard, are not offering us a Utopian, teleological meta narrative, but in many respects their arguments are open to meta narrative interpretation. Postmodernism is an anti-theory, but uses theoretical tools to make its case. The significance of this contradiction, however, is of course also open to interpretation.⁹¹

⁹¹ <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Metanarrative>

✱ Hegel, G.W.F. (1770–1831) :

German philosopher, founder, along with *Fichte, of modern *idealism, and perhaps the greatest influence on modern political thought in the German romantic tradition after *Marx, whose outlook he did much to make possible. Hegel's philosophy contains many parts, but of particular concern to politics are the following:

(i) The theory of the *dialectic. In Hegel this has two sides: (a) all reasoning is dialectical, proceeding from the positing of a concept, via the extraction of its negation and the consequent 'labour of the negative', to a new concept which transcends and makes 'determinate' the content of the first. Through the dialectical process a definite reality is gradually 'determined', the universality of the concept finds the 'particularity' of its object, and so generates knowledge.

(b) Reality itself has the structure of thought (the fundamental thesis of idealism, which also identifies thought with reasoning). Hence all processes in the world, whether the world of nature or the world of history, exhibit the order and development of the dialectic, passing from 'undifferentiated' beginnings to ever more determinate ends.

An example of this is the progress of man himself, from the primitive undifferentiated consciousness of the member of the tribe, to the final self-realized and self-conscious individual, who postulates his ideal aim and satisfaction as his own, and so challenges the world to match his individuality. (In the folds of this progression all human history lies concealed, although only its end result, the German *romantic *individualism exemplified at its highest in Hegel, is immediately knowable.)

(iii) The theory of *self-realization. The dialectical process in the individual is one of steady advance towards the determinate 'self', which is 'for itself'. The individual knows himself through his efforts to create a determinate reality: thus man realizes himself in labour, in art, in political life, and in each case the increasing self-knowledge and increasing power represent a gain in *freedom.

In this way Hegel came to view true (realized) human nature as an acquisition, rather than a gift, a fact which coloured his whole political philosophy. In particular he argued that social interaction precedes the creation of the individual, and so cannot be explained as a matter of individual choice. His complex account of self-

realization includes the celebrated theories of *alienation, and of the relation between *master and slave.

- (iv) The theory of history. History is the human spirit writ large – the ‘march of reason in the world’ – and its movement must inevitably exemplify the dialectical movement that is contained in every manifestation of the spirit.

Hence it proceeds from undifferentiated union (the equivalent of the pure concept of ‘Being’ from which the dialectic begins), through struggle and opposition (see *master and slave), to the highest forms of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness thereby emerges from the conflicts of religion (alienation), into the pure air of science, which sees everything as it is, since for science appearance has become transparent to essence.

At every period the spirit manifests itself as a specific *Zeitgeist, determining the forms of social life, political order, knowledge, religion and art. The *progressivist tendency in Hegel is mitigated by his sense that reflective knowledge arrives always too late (‘the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at the gathering of the dusk’), so that the understanding of the human condition vouchsafed to him was also the guarantee that he could not remedy it.

- (iv) The theory of the state. In *The Philosophy of Right*, 1821, Hegel produced an extremely succinct exposition of law, politics, and morality, in which he proposed the state as the highest expression of man’s freedom, resulting from the transcendence of the (philosophically antecedent) conditions of *family and (in dialectical opposition to it) *civil society. The elements of the theory are these:

(a) The bond of the family is not contractual but one of *piety. The family is an indispensable ‘moment’ (a term not to be understood in a temporal sense) of political existence, without which the free being cannot emerge;

(b) civil society is the sphere of justice, in which men freely secure and contract away their rights. Here the theory of the *social contract may seem to give a picture of social union, but only because those ‘contracting’ already possess the *autonomy which the family provides and which the state protects; (c) the unstable opposition between particularized loyalty to the family and universal loyalty to all free (contracting) beings is transcended and resolved in a new, self-conscious, but non-contractual, obligation that orders all conflicting claims – that to the state, as the body of institutions which

express, uphold and endorse the laws through which conflict is resolved. The state becomes the highest expression of man's freedom, and allegiance to it a necessary condition of full self-realized individuality;

(d) *private property is justified as a necessary part of the dialectical process displayed in (a) to (c), as are *marriage, retributive punishment and adherence to a written code of law.⁹²

✓ Emancipation from Kantianism:

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance that this problem had for Hegel. It is true that his early theological writings contain hard sayings about Christianity and the churches; but the object of his attack was orthodoxy, not theology itself.

All that he wrote at this period throbs with a religious conviction of a kind that is totally absent from Kant and Hegel's other 18th-century teachers. Above all, he was inspired by a doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The spirit of humanity, its reason, is the candle of the Lord, he held, and therefore cannot be subject to the limitations that Kant had imposed upon it. This faith in reason, with its religious basis, henceforth animated the whole of Hegel's work.

His outlook had also become that of a historian—which again distinguishes him from Kant, who was much more influenced by the concepts of physical science. Every one of Hegel's major works was a history; and, indeed, it was among historians and classical scholars rather than among philosophers that his work mainly fructified in the 19th century.

When in 1798 Hegel turned back to look over the essays that he had written in Berne two or three years earlier, he saw with a historian's eye that, under Kant's influence, he had misrepresented the life and teachings of Jesus and the history of the Christian church.

His newly won insight then found expression in his essay *Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal* (*The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate*), likewise unpublished until 1907. This is one of Hegel's most remarkable works. Its style is often difficult and the

⁹² Scruton, Roger. *op.cite*. pp :294-295.

connection of thought not always plain, but it is written with passion, insight, and conviction.

He begins by sketching the essence of Judaism, which he paints in the darkest colours. The Jews were slaves to the Mosaic Law, leading a life unlovely in comparison with that of the ancient Greeks and content with the material satisfaction of a land flowing with milk and honey. Jesus taught something entirely different. Humans are not to be the slaves of objective commands: the law is made for them. They are even to rise above the tension in moral experience between inclination and reason's law of duty, for the law is to be "fulfilled" in the love of God, wherein all tension ceases and the believer does God's will wholeheartedly and single-mindedly. A community of such believers is the Kingdom of God.

This is the kingdom that Jesus came to teach. It is founded on a belief in the unity of the divine and the human. The life that flows in them both is one; and it is only because humans are spirit that they can grasp and comprehend the Spirit of God. Hegel works out this conception in an exegesis of passages in the Gospel According to John. The kingdom, however, can never be realized in this world: humans are not spirit alone but flesh also. "Church and state, worship and life, piety and virtue, spiritual and worldly action can never dissolve into one."

In this essay the leading ideas of Hegel's system of philosophy are rooted. Kant had argued that humans can have knowledge only of a finite world of appearances and that, whenever their reason attempts to go beyond this sphere and grapple with the infinite or with ultimate reality, it becomes entangled in insoluble contradictions. Hegel, however, found in love, conceived as a union of opposites, a prefigurement of spirit as the unity in which contradictions, such as infinite and finite, are embraced and synthesized.

His choice of the word Geist to express this his leading conception was deliberate: the word means "spirit" as well as "mind" and thus has religious overtones. Contradictions in thinking at the scientific level of Kant's "understanding" are indeed inevitable, but thinking as an activity of spirit or "reason" can rise above them to a synthesis in which the contradictions are resolved. All of this, expressed in religious phraseology, is contained in the manuscripts written toward the end of Hegel's stay in Frankfurt. "In

religion,” he wrote, “finite life rises to infinite life.” Kant's philosophy had to stop short of religion. But there is room for another philosophy, based on the concept of spirit, that will distill into conceptual form the insights of religion. This was the philosophy that Hegel now felt himself ready to expound.

The compendium of Hegel's system, the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, is in three parts: *Logic*, *Nature*, and *Mind*. Hegel's method of exposition is dialectical. It often happens that in a discussion two people who at first present diametrically opposed points of view ultimately agree to reject their own partial views and to accept a new and broader view that does justice to the substance of each.

Hegel believed that thinking always proceeds according to this pattern: it begins by laying down a positive thesis that is at once negated by its antithesis; then further thought produces the synthesis. But this in turn generates an antithesis, and the same process continues once more. The process, however, is circular: ultimately, thinking reaches a synthesis that is identical with its starting point, except that all that was implicit there has now been made explicit. Thus, thinking itself, as a process, has negativity as one of its constituent moments, and the finite is, as God's self-manifestation, part and parcel of the infinite itself. This is the sort of dialectical process of which Hegel's system provides an account in three phases.

✓ Logic :

The system begins with an account of God's thinking “before the creation of nature and finite spirit”—i.e., with the categories or pure forms of thought, which are the structure of all physical and intellectual life. Throughout, Hegel is dealing with pure essentialities, with spirit thinking its own essence; and these are linked together in a dialectical process that advances from abstract to concrete.

If one tries to think the notion of pure Being (the most abstract category of all), one finds that it is simply emptiness—i.e., Nothing. Yet Nothing *is*. The notion of pure Being and the notion of Nothing are opposites; and yet each, as one tries to think it, passes

over into the other. But the way out of the contradiction is at once to reject both notions separately and to affirm them both together; i.e., to assert the notion of becoming, since what becomes both is and is not at once. The dialectical process advances through categories of increasing complexity and culminates with the absolute idea, or with the spirit as objective to itself.

✓ Nature:

Nature is the opposite of spirit. The categories studied in *Logic* were all internally related to one another; they grew out of one another. Nature, on the other hand, is a sphere of external relations. Parts of space and moments of time exclude one another; and everything in nature is in space and time and is thus finite. But nature is created by spirit and bears the mark of its creator. Categories appear in it as its essential structure, and it is the task of the philosophy of nature to detect that structure and its dialectic; but nature, as the realm of externality, cannot be rational through and through, though the rationality prefigured in it becomes gradually explicit when humanity appears. In humanity nature rises to self-consciousness.

✓ Mind:

Here Hegel follows the development of the human mind through the subconscious, consciousness, and the rational will; then through human institutions and human history as the embodiment or objectification of that will; and finally to art, religion, and philosophy, in which finally humans know themselves as spirit, as one with God and possessed of absolute truth. Thus, it is now open to them to think their own essence—i.e., the thoughts expounded in *Logic*. They have finally returned to the starting point of the system, but en route they have made explicit all that was implicit in it and have discovered that “nothing but spirit is, and spirit is pure activity.”

Hegel's system depends throughout on the results of scientific, historical, theological, and philosophical inquiry. No reader can fail to be impressed by the penetration and

breadth of his mind nor by the immense range of knowledge that, in his view, had to precede the work of philosophizing.

A civilization must be mature and, indeed, in its death throes before, in the philosophical thinking that has implicitly been its substance, it becomes conscious of itself and of its own significance. Thus, when philosophy comes on the scene, some form of the world has grown old.⁹³

✱ Hermeneutics:

the art or theory of interpretation, as well as a type of philosophy that starts with questions of interpretation. Originally concerned more narrowly with interpreting sacred texts, the term acquired a much broader significance in its historical development and finally became a philosophical position in twentieth-century German philosophy.

There are two competing positions in hermeneutics: whereas the first follows Dilthey and sees interpretation or Verstehen as a method for the historical and human sciences, the second follows Heidegger and sees it as an “ontological event,” an interaction between interpreter and text that is part of the history of what is understood.

Providing rules or criteria for understanding what an author or native “really” meant is a typical problem for the first approach. The interpretation of the law provides an example for the second view, since the process of applying the law inevitably transforms it. In general, hermeneutics is the analysis of this process and its conditions of possibility.

It has typically focused on the interpretation of ancient texts and distant peoples, cases where the unproblematic everyday understanding and communication cannot be assumed. Schleiermacher’s analysis of understanding and expression related to texts and speech marks the beginning of hermeneutics in the modern sense of a scientific methodology.

⁹³ T. Malcolm Knox, Sir. "Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich." Encyclopedia Britannica.opcite.

This emphasis on methodology continues in nineteenth-century historicism and culminates in Dilthey's attempt to ground the human sciences in a theory of interpretation, understood as the imaginative but publicly verifiable reenactment of the subjective experiences of others.

Such a method of interpretation reveals the possibility of an objective knowledge of human beings not accessible to empiricist inquiry and thus of a distinct methodology for the human sciences. One result of the analysis of interpretation in the nineteenth century was the recognition of "the hermeneutic circle," first developed by Schleiermacher. The circularity of interpretation concerns the relation of parts to the whole: the interpretation of each part is dependent on the interpretation of the whole.

But interpretation is circular in a stronger sense: if every interpretation is itself based on interpretation, then the circle of interpretation, even if it is not vicious, cannot be escaped. Twentieth-century hermeneutics advanced by Heidegger and Gadamer radicalize this notion of the hermeneutic circle, seeing it as a feature of all knowledge and activity.

Hermeneutics is then no longer the method of the human sciences but "universal," and interpretation is part of the finite and situated character of all human knowing. "Philosophical hermeneutics" therefore criticizes Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology and Enlightenment universalism in ethics, seeing science as a cultural practice and prejudices (or prejudgments) as ineliminable in all judgments. Positively, it emphasizes understanding as continuing a historical tradition, as well as dialogical openness, in which prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Audi, Robert. *op.cite*. pp :377-378.

✧ Humanism :

The term 'humanism' entered the philosophical vocabulary by way of the studia humanitatis, associated with the focus of Renaissance education on classical culture as opposed to Christian scripture. In the late nineteenth century it established itself as an umbrella term for any disposition of thought stressing the centrality of 'Man' or the humankind in the order of nature. Today, in the Anglophone world, humanism is more or less synonymous with atheism or secular rationalism.

In the CONTINENTAL tradition, however, it has come to designate (often pejoratively) any philosophy (FEUERBACH, the young MARX, PHENOMENOLOGY, EXISTENTIALISM, for example) premised on ontological differences between humanity and the rest of nature, and according priority to it in the explanation of society, history and culture. According to humanists, there are qualities and capacities peculiar to human beings which make their products – whether historical events, economic systems or literary works – unamenable to the objective and reductive analyses associated with standard scientific explanation. While the epistemological reference of humanism is to the human subject as the locus of experience and source of knowledge, the political stress falls on human agency and hence control over historical process.

Marxist and socialist humanists have wanted to respect the 'dialectic' between human agency and the circumstances in which it is exercised, but there has been a certain polarization in their argument: the existentialist approach has placed an emphasis on consciousness which is difficult to reconcile with the idea of 'unwilled' social forces whilst the Hegelian-Lukácsian school has emphasized the loss of humanity inflicted by generalized processes of reification and ALIENATION, though perhaps at the cost of making them appear inescapable.

In contrast to both these positions, STRUCTURALIST and 'post-structuralist' anti-humanists either insisted on the subordination of individuals to economic structures, codes and regulating forces (modes of production, kinship systems, the unconscious etc.) or attempted to 'deconstruct' the very idea of a 'human meaning' prior to the discourse and cultural systems whose qualities it is supposed to explain. Thus, Jacques DERRIDA detected a 'humanist' residue even in SAUSSURE's structural linguistics, in so far as it

allows the sign to retain a reference to a 'signified'. More generally, humanist argument has been rejected by these schools of thought for its 'mythological anthropology', teleology and ethnocentricity.⁹⁵

✱ Hume, David (1711–76) :

Scottish philosopher, historian, diplomat and essayist, whose radical *empiricism has had a far-reaching influence on modern thought. His political and economic writings do not represent a substantial part of his output: nevertheless, their distinctive tone and vision have often been identified, both by conservatives and by liberals, as expressing thoughts fundamental to their outlook. Hume was a Tory, and thought that this particular, historically determined political vision was both consonant with his scepticism and also commendable to common sense.

His influence was not, however, confined to British conservatism: several of the *Founding Fathers of the US found inspiration in Hume's defense of *mixed government, and many nineteenth-century *utilitarian's saw Hume as their intellectual ancestor. Had Rousseau taken time off from sentimental compassion in order to experiment with friendship, he too might have been influenced;

but despite Hume's exemplary kindness, Rousseau did not find cause to extend his compassionating zeal towards this particular benefactor. Hume attacked the theory of the *social contract, arguing that the criterion of *tacit consent is inapplicable, most people being inevitably constrained by cultural, linguistic and habitual ties to stay where they are, whatever the government that should exert jurisdiction over them.

He also argued that the only true basis for any conception of *legitimacy or *political obligation must be *utility, thus laying foundations for the utilitarian views of political order espoused by *Bentham and *Mill. (Although it is doubtful that Hume would have been in sympathy with nineteenth-century *utilitarianism, or that he would have condoned the particular idea of utility that it employed.) Hume believed that politics, as a 'moral' science, could be deduced from the study of human nature, and that controversies would dissolve if the true structure of the human sentiments could be discerned.

⁹⁵ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.o.opcite.pp :168.

The principal sentiments involved in political order he identified as sympathy and benevolence, and he regarded the sentiment and idea of justice as ultimately derived from them. Justice, he thought, required the establishment and defence of private rights, principal among which was the right of private property, for which he gave a classic utilitarian defence. He defended staunchly the liberties that he associated with the British constitution as this had emerged from the 'Glorious Revolution' and its aftermath, although he was extremely doubtful that those liberties could be easily guaranteed or that a formula could be found wherein to summarize them.

His own preference was for a form of mixed *republican and *monarchical government, such as he argued was exhibited in Great Britain, where the two kinds of power oppose and limit each other. The unsystematic nature of Hume's political reflections stems from his scepticism. Used against orthodoxies, that scepticism was devastating. His writings on economics include the first serious analysis of the *balance of payments mechanism, and were highly influential on *classical theorists.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Scruton, Roger. *op.cite*. pp :310-311.

✳ **Hyper reality :**

- ✓ Baudrillard states that postmodern society has replaced all reality and meaning with symbols and signs, and that the human experience is of a simulation of reality rather than reality itself.

Simulation: fake processes, experiences, or signs that increasingly dominate the contemporary world.

➤ **Simulacra:**

An image or representation
Hyperreality is seen as a condition in which what is real and what is fiction are seamlessly blended together so that there is no clear distinction between where one ends and the other begins. It is entirely simulated and, as a result, more real than real.

Media.....

Representation

Contemporary media such as television, film, Internet, etc are relaying information or stories but persuades us, making us approach each other and the world through the lens of these media images. We therefore no longer acquire goods because of real needs but because of desires that are increasingly defined by commercials and commercialized images, which keep us at one step removed from the reality of our bodies or of the world around us.

➤ **simulation & hyper-reality :**

Baudrillard in particular suggests that the world we live in has been replaced by a copy world, where we seek simulated stimuli.

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Examples

For example, In most situations the "average person" will find it easy to avoid the temptation to gamble large sums. However, if that "average person" were to vacation in Las Vegas he would find himself in a new temporary reality.

The ads, flashing lights, billboards and the sound of the exciting machines are all used to excite people. Interacting in a hyper real place like a casino gives the you the impression that you're walking through a fantasy world where everyone is playing along.

Advertising adds its own element to hyper reality. For example a BMW driver for a lower exchange value he could have bought a car from a less reputable manufacturer which

would have provided him a similar use value as his BMW. However, what that driver is paying for is the symbolic value that only exists in his mind and the mind of others. By driving the BMW he is saying to all that see him that he has made it and is able to afford a luxury car.

"The media and the official news service are only there to maintain the illusion of an actuality, of the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of facts. All the events are to be read backwards."

This quote from Baudrillard explains how the media portrays news on television. One great example Baudrillard used was The Gulf war. The events that were happening on the front line would bear very little resemblance to what was reported on the news. We get sensational images of missiles being fired and aerial shots of explosions but they were all very sanitized. These reported facts are what are lived by the reader or viewer through his imagination and therefore become real.⁹⁷

✧ icon:

or iconic sign, in the *SEMIOTICS of the American Philosopher C. S. Peirce, a sign that stands for its object mainly by resembling or sharing some features (e.g. shape) with it; such resemblance having a status called iconicity. A photograph or diagram of an object is iconic, but the signs of language (apart from a few * ONOMATOPOEIC words) have a merely conventional or * ARBITRARY relation to their objects: in Peirce's terminology, they are not icons but *SYMBOLS. ⁹⁸

✧ idealism:

A view of the world that sees reality as ultimately composed of ideas rather than as a realm existing outside of consciousness. Idealism argues that because human activity is conscious activity, the real world itself can never be more than a world of ideas. All

⁹⁷ <https://prezi.com/7xluoupffvqu/ baudrillards-hyperreality-theory/>

⁹⁸ Baldicks, Chris. opcite .pp :120.

religious attitudes, conventionally understood, are idealist in character, but they can be described as forms of objective idealism.

Objective idealism does not doubt the existence of a reality outside of the individual mind, but sees the real world as the creation of gods or God, so that worshipping God or appeasing the gods is essential for the human control over nature. In its 'deist' form, objective idealism argues that while the world is ultimately created by God, science studies its regularities and character without assuming any further divine intervention. Objective idealism needs to be distinguished from subjective idealism. Subjective idealists argue that the real world is created by individual ideas. Since all data must be processed by the human mind, it is impossible to prove that there is a world beyond these data. It could be argued that idealism in general is unable to provide an analysis as to how consciousness itself is a product of history.⁹⁹

✱ Institutionalism :

Institutionalists share many of Realism's assumptions about the international system that it is anarchic, that States are self-interested, rational actors seeking to survive while increasing their material conditions, and that uncertainty pervades relations between countries. However, Institutionalism relies on microeconomic theory and game theory to reach a radically different conclusion—that co-operation between nations is possible.

The central insight is that co-operation may be a rational, self-interested strategy for countries to pursue under certain conditions (Keohane 1984). Consider two trading partners. If both countries lower their tariffs they will trade more and each will become more prosperous, but neither wants to lower barriers unless it can be sure the other will too. Realists doubt such co-operation can be sustained in the absence of coercive power because both countries would have incentives to say they are opening to trade, dump their goods onto the other country's markets, and not allow any imports. Institutionalists, in contrast, argue that institutions—defined as a set of rules, norms, practices and decision-making procedures that shape expectation scan overcome the uncertainty that undermines co-operation.

⁹⁹ Hoffman , John .opcite.pp:80.

First, institutions extend the time horizon of interactions, creating an iterated game rather than a single round. Countries agreeing on ad hoc tariffs may indeed benefit from tricking their neighbors in any one round of negotiations. But countries that know they must interact with the same partners repeatedly through an institution will instead have incentives to comply with agreements in the short term so that they might continue to extract the benefits of co-operation in the long term.

Institutions thus enhance the utility of a good reputation to countries; they also make punishment more credible. Second, Institutionalists argue that institutions increase information about State behaviour. Recall that uncertainty is a significant reason Realists doubt co-operation can be sustained. Institutions collect information about State behaviour and often make judgments of compliance or non-compliance with particular rules.

States thus know they will not be able to ‘get away with it’ if they do not comply with a given rule. Third, Institutionalists note that institutions can greatly increase efficiency. It is costly for States to negotiate with one another on an ad hoc basis. Institutions can reduce the transaction costs of co-ordination by providing a centralized forum in which States can meet.

They also provide ‘focal points’—established rules and norms—that allow a wide array of States to quickly settle on a certain course of action. Institutionalism thus provides an explanation for international co-operation based on the same theoretical assumptions that lead Realists to be skeptical of international law and institutions.

One way for international lawyers to understand Institutionalism is as a rationalist theoretical and empirical account of how and why international law works. Many of the conclusions reached by Institutionalist scholars will not be surprising to international lawyers, most of whom have long understood the role that → reciprocity and reputation play in bolstering international legal obligations. At its best, however, Institutionalist insights, backed up by careful empirical studies of

international institutions broadly defined, can help international lawyers and policymakers in designing more effective and durable institutions and regimes.¹⁰⁰

✧ Instrumentalism :

✓ also called experimentalism

a philosophy advanced by the American philosopher John Dewey holding that what is most important in a thing or idea is its value as an instrument of action and that the truth of an idea lies in its usefulness. Dewey favoured these terms over the term pragmatism to label the philosophy on which his views of education rested. His school claimed that cognition has evolved not for speculative or metaphysical purposes but for the practical purpose of successful adjustment. Ideas are conceived as instruments for transforming the uneasiness arising from facing a problem into the satisfaction of solving it .¹⁰¹

✧ Scientific realism and instrumentalism:

The dispute between scientific realists and antirealists, though often associated with conflicting ontological attitudes toward the unobserved (and perhaps unobservable) entities ostensibly postulated by some scientific theories, primarily concerns the status of the theories themselves and what scientists should be seen as trying to accomplish in propounding them. Both sides are agreed that, to be acceptable, a scientific theory should “save the phenomena”—that is, it should at least be consistent with, and ideally facilitate correct prediction of, such matters of observable fact as may be recorded in reports of relevant observations and, where appropriate, experiments.

The issue concerns whether theories can and should be seen as attempting more than this. Realists, notably including Karl Popper, J.J.C. Smart, Ian Hacking, and Hilary Putnam, along with many others, have claimed that they should be so viewed: Science aims, in its theories, at a literally true account of what the world is like, and accepting those theories involves accepting their ingredient theoretical claims as true descriptions

¹⁰⁰ Slaughter, Anne-Marie. International Relations, Principal Theories. Published in: Wolfrum, R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) www.mpepil.com

¹⁰¹ "instrumentalism." Encyclopædia Britannica. Opcite.

of aspects of reality—perhaps themselves not open to observation—additional to and underlying the phenomena.

Against this, the doctrine of instrumentalism claims that scientific theories are no more than devices, or “instruments” (in effect, sets of inference rules) for generating predictions about observable phenomena from evidence about such phenomena. This claim can be understood in two ways. It could be that theoretical scientific statements are not, despite appearances, genuine statements at all but rules of inference in disguise, so that the question of their truth (or falsehood) simply does not arise.

In this case, instrumentalism is akin to expressivism about ethical statements. Alternatively, it could be that, as far as the aims of science go, what matters when evaluating a scientific theory—given that it meets other desiderata such as simplicity, economy, generality of application, and so on—is only its inferential (or instrumental) reliability; its truth or falsehood is of no scientific concern. A notable development of the latter approach is the constructive empiricism of Bas van Fraassen, according to which science aims not at true theories but at theories which are “empirically adequate,” in the sense that they capture or predict relevant truths about observable matters.

Antirealism about science, both in its earlier instrumentalist form and in van Fraassen's version, clearly relies upon a fundamental distinction between statements which are, and those which are not, wholly about observable entities or states of affairs. Realists frequently deny the tenability of this distinction, arguing that there is no “theory-neutral” language in which observations may be reported, or at any rate that there is no sharp, principled division between what is observable and what is not. Antirealists may acknowledge that a great deal of language, perhaps even all of it, is theory-laden but claim that this does not require acceptance of the theories with which it is infected;

nor does it entail that statements involving theory-infected terms (e.g., “The Geiger counter is reading 7.3”) cannot be true solely in virtue of observable matters. Against the claim that there is no difference in principle between, say, detecting a passing jet airplane by seeing its vapour trail and detecting a subatomic particle by seeing its trace in a cloud chamber, they may reply that indeed there is. While the plane is an

observable object—even though, in this case, only its effect is observed—there is no observing the particle itself, as distinct from its supposed effects.

A further argument commonly advanced in support of realism is that it provides the best, or the only credible, explanation for the success of scientific theories. From an instrumentalist perspective, it is claimed, it must be quite mysterious or even miraculous that the world should behave as if the best scientific theories about it were true. Surely, realists argue.

the obvious and best explanation is that the world behaves in this way because the theories about it are in fact true (or at least approximately true). Although this argument certainly presents antirealists with a serious challenge, it is not clear that they cannot meet it. In particular, van Fraassen argues that, in so far as the demand for an explanation of science's successes is legitimate, that success can be explained in terms of the idea that scientists aim to construct theories which are empirically adequate.¹⁰²

* Jameson :

American scholar Fredric Jameson equated postmodernism with late capitalism (Delaney, 2005; 279). In late capitalism, consumerism and mass media govern the culture. In all the aspects of our lives, whether it is socialization, education or leisure, we get influenced by mass media. He also believes that in case of commodity production, the issue of 'aesthetics' became more important in this postmodern era. He also said that 'our understanding of the world is influenced by the concepts and categories that we inherit from our culture's interpretive tradition' (Delaney, 2005; 281).

However, investigating the knowledge operations in the modern western world, Deleuze and Guattari came up with the analogy of a tree (Klages, 2006). Modernists perceived knowledge like that of a tree which has a centre to tie up. These postmodern scholars held that knowledge is like a fungus. Discarding the tree model they propose rhizome model. The organism of rhizome is that it does not have any beginning point, nor does it have any ending. Their model refers to postmodern idea of deterritorialization (Klages, 2006).

¹⁰² "Realism." Encyclopedia Britannica. *ibid*.

✱ Kant, Immanuel:

(born April 22, 1724, Königsberg, Prussia [now Kaliningrad, Russia] died February 12, 1804, Königsberg)

German philosopher whose comprehensive and systematic work in the theory of knowledge, ethics, and aesthetics greatly influenced all subsequent philosophy, especially the various schools of Kantianism and Idealism.

Kant was the foremost thinker of the Enlightenment and one of the greatest philosophers of all time. In him were subsumed new trends that had begun with the Rationalism (stressing reason) of René Descartes and the Empiricism (stressing experience) of Francis Bacon. He thus inaugurated a new era in the development of philosophical thought.

➤ Critic of Leibnizian Rationalism:

During the 1760s he became increasingly critical of Leibnizianism. According to one of his students, Kant was then attacking Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, was a declared follower of Newton, and expressed great admiration for the moral philosophy of the Romanticist Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

His principal work of this period was Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral (1764; “An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Fundamental Principles of Natural Theology and Morals”). In this work he attacked the claim of Leibnizian philosophy that philosophy should model itself on mathematics and aim at constructing a chain of demonstrated truths based on self-evident premises.

Kant argued that mathematics proceeds from definitions that are arbitrary, by means of operations that are clearly and sharply defined, upon concepts that can be exhibited in concrete form. In contrast with this method, he argued that philosophy must begin with concepts that are already given, “though confusedly or insufficiently determined,” so that philosophers cannot begin with definitions without thereby shutting themselves up within a circle of words. Philosophy cannot, like mathematics, proceed synthetically; it must analyze and clarify. The importance of the moral order, which he had learned from Rousseau, reinforced the conviction received from his study of Newton that a synthetic philosophy is empty and false.

Besides attacking the methods of the Leibnizians, he also began criticizing their leading ideas. In an essay *Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen* (1763), he argued that physical opposition as encountered in things cannot be reduced to logical contradiction, in which the same predicate is both affirmed and denied, and, hence, that it is pointless to reduce causality to the logical relation of antecedent and consequent. In an essay of the same year, Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes, he sharply criticized the

Leibnizian concept of Being by charging that the so-called ontological argument, which would prove the existence of God by logic alone, is fallacious because it confuses existential with attributive statements: existence, he declared, is not a predicate of attribution. Moreover, with regard to the nature of space, Kant sided with Newton in his confrontation with Leibniz. Leibniz' view that space is "an order of co-existences" and that spatial differences can be stated in conceptual terms, he concluded to be untenable.

Some indication of a possible alternative of Kant's own to the Leibnizian position can be gathered from his curious *Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik* (1766). This work is an examination of the whole notion of a world of spirits, in the context of an inquiry into the spiritualist claims of Emanuel Swedenborg, a scientist and biblical scholar.

Kant's position at first seems to have been completely skeptical, and the influence of the Scottish Skeptic David Hume is more apparent here than in any previous work; it was Hume, he later claimed, who first awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers. Yet Kant was not so much arguing that the notion of a world of spirits is illusory as insisting that men have no insight into the nature of such a world, a conclusion that has devastating implications for metaphysics as the Leibnizians conceived it. Metaphysicians can dream as well as spiritualists, but this is not to say that their dreams are necessarily empty; there are already hints that moral experience can give content to the ideal of an "intelligible world." Rousseau thus acted upon Kant here as a counterinfluence to Hume.

➤ Period of the three "critiques":

In 1781 the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (spelled "Critik" in the first edition; *Critique of Pure Reason*) was published, followed for the next nine years by great and original works that in a short time brought a revolution in philosophical thought and established the new direction in which it was to go in the years to come.

○ The Critique of Pure Reason :

The *Critique of Pure Reason* was the result of some 10 years of thinking and meditation. Yet, even so, Kant published the first edition only reluctantly after many postponements; for although convinced of the truth of its doctrine, he was uncertain and doubtful about its exposition.

His misgivings proved well-founded, and Kant complained that interpreters and critics of the work were badly misunderstanding it. To correct these wrong interpretations of his thought he wrote the *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als*

Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783) and brought out a second and revised edition of the first “critique” in 1787.

Controversy still continues regarding the merits of the two editions: readers with a preference for an Idealistic interpretation usually prefer the first edition, whereas those with a Realistic view adhere to the second. But with regard to difficulty and ease of reading and understanding, it is generally agreed that there is little to choose between them. Anyone on first opening either book finds it overwhelmingly difficult and impenetrably obscure.

The cause for this difficulty can be traced in part to the works that Kant took as his models for philosophical writing. He was the first great modern philosopher to spend all of his time and efforts as a university professor of the subject.

Regulations required that in all lecturing a certain set of books be used, with the result that all of Kant's teaching in philosophy had been based on such handbooks as those of Wolff and Baumgarten, which abounded in technical jargon, artificial and schematic divisions, and great claims to completeness. Following their example, Kant accordingly provided a highly artificial, rigid, and by no means immediately illuminating scaffolding for all three of his *Critiques*.

The *Critique of Pure Reason*, after an introduction, is divided into two parts, of very different lengths: A “Transcendental Doctrine of Elements,” running to almost 400 pages in a typical edition, followed by a “Transcendental Doctrine of Method,” which reaches scarcely 80 pages.

The “Elements” deals with the sources of human knowledge, whereas the “. . . Method” draws up a methodology for the use of “pure reason” and its a priori ideas. Both are “transcendental,” in that they are presumed to analyze the roots of all knowledge and the conditions of all possible experience. The “Elements” is divided, in turn, into a “Transcendental Aesthetic,” a “Transcendental Analytic,” and a “Transcendental Dialectic.”

The simplest way of describing the contents of the *Critique* is to say that it is a treatise about metaphysics: it seeks to show the impossibility of one sort of metaphysics and to lay the foundations for another. The Leibnizian metaphysics, the object of his attack, is criticized for assuming that the human mind can arrive, by pure thought, at truths about entities, which, by their very nature, can never be objects of experience, such as God, human freedom, and immortality. Kant maintained, however, that the mind has no such power and that the vaunted metaphysics is thus a sham.

As Kant saw it, the problem of metaphysics, as indeed of any science, is to explain how, on the one hand, its principles can be necessary and universal (such being a condition for any knowledge that is scientific) and yet, on the other hand, involve also a knowledge of the real and so provide the investigator with the possibility of more knowledge than is analytically contained in what he already knows; *i.e.*, than is implicit in the meaning alone.

To meet these two conditions, Kant maintained, knowledge must rest on judgments that are a priori, for it is only as they are separate from the contingencies of experience that

they could be necessary and yet also synthetic; *i.e.*, so that the predicate term contains something more than is analytically contained in the subject. Thus, for example, the proposition that all bodies are extended is not synthetic but analytic because the notion of extension is contained in the very notion of body; whereas the proposition that all bodies are heavy is synthetic because weight supposes, in addition to the notion of body, that of bodies in relation to one another. Hence, the basic problem, as Kant formulated it, is to determine “How [*i.e.*, under what conditions] are synthetic a priori judgments possible?”

This problem arises, according to Kant, in three fields, viz., in mathematics, physics, and metaphysics; and the three main divisions of the first part of the *Critique* deal respectively with these. In the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” Kant argued that mathematics necessarily deals with space and time and then claimed that these are both a priori forms of human sensibility that condition whatever is apprehended through the senses.

In the “Transcendental Analytic,” the most crucial as well as the most difficult part of the book, he maintained that physics is a priori and synthetic because in its ordering of experience it uses concepts of a special sort. These concepts—“categories,” he called them—are not so much read out of experience as read into it and, hence, are a priori, or pure, as opposed to empirical. But they differ from empirical concepts in something more than their origin: their whole role in knowledge is different; for, whereas empirical concepts serve to correlate particular experiences and so to bring out in a detailed way how experience is ordered, the categories have the function of prescribing the general form that this detailed order must take. They belong, as it were, to the very framework of knowledge. But although they are indispensable for objective knowledge, the sole knowledge that the categories can yield is of objects of possible experience; they yield valid and real knowledge only when they are ordering what is given through sense in space and time.

In the “Transcendental Dialectic” Kant turned to consideration of a priori synthetic judgments in metaphysics. Here, he claimed, the situation is just the reverse from what it was in mathematics and physics. Metaphysics cuts itself off from sense experience in attempting to go beyond it and, for this very reason, fails to attain a single true a priori synthetic judgment. To justify this claim, Kant analyzed the use that metaphysics makes of the concept of the unconditioned. Reason, according to Kant, seeks for the unconditioned or absolute in three distinct spheres:

- (1) in philosophical psychology it seeks for an absolute subject of knowledge;
- (2) in the sphere of cosmology, it seeks for an absolute beginning of things in time, for an absolute limit to them in space, and for an absolute limit to their divisibility; and
- (3) in the sphere of theology, it seeks for an absolute condition for all things. In each case, Kant claimed to show that the attempt is doomed to failure by leading to an antinomy in which equally good reasons can be given for both the affirmative and the negative position. The metaphysical “sciences” of rational psychology, rational cosmology, and natural theology, familiar to Kant from the text of Baumgarten, on which he had to comment in his lectures, thus turn out to be without foundation.

With this work, Kant proudly asserted that he had accomplished a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Just as the founder of modern astronomy, Nicolaus Copernicus, had explained the apparent movements of the stars by ascribing them partly to the movement of the observers, so Kant had accounted for the application of the mind's a priori principles to objects by demonstrating that the objects conform to the mind: in knowing, it is not the mind that conforms to things but instead things that conform to the mind.

○ The Critique of Practical Reason :

Because of his insistence on the need for an empirical component in knowledge and his antipathy to speculative metaphysics, Kant is sometimes presented as a Positivist before his time; and his attack upon metaphysics was held by many in his own day to bring both religion and morality down with it. Such, however, was certainly far from Kant's intention. Not only did he propose to put metaphysics “on the sure path of science,” he was prepared also to say that he “inevitably” believed in the existence of God and in a future life.

It is also true that his original conception of his critical philosophy anticipated the preparation of a critique of moral philosophy. The *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788, spelled “Critik” and “practischen”; *Critique of Practical Reason*), the result of this intention, is the standard source book for his ethical doctrines. The earlier *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785) is a shorter and, despite its title, more readily comprehensible treatment of the same general topic. Both differ from *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797) in that they deal with pure ethics and try to elucidate basic principles; whereas the later work is concerned with applying what they establish in the concrete, a process that involved the consideration of virtues and vices and the foundations of law and politics.

There are many points of similarity between Kant's ethics and his epistemology, or theory of knowledge. He used the same scaffolding for both—a “Doctrine of Elements,” including an “Analytic” and a “Dialectic,” followed by a “Methodology”; but the second *Critique* is far shorter and much less complicated.

Just as the distinction between sense and intelligence was fundamental for the former, so is that between the inclinations and moral reason for the latter. And just as the nature of the human cognitive situation was elucidated in the first *Critique* by reference to the hypothetical notion of an intuitive understanding, so is that of the human moral situation clarified by reference to the notion of a “holy will.” For a will of this kind there would be no distinction between reason and inclination; a being possessed of a holy will would always act as it ought. It would not, however, have the concepts of duty and moral obligation, which enter only when reason and desire find themselves opposed.

In the case of human beings, the opposition is continuous, for man is at the same time both flesh and spirit; it is here that the influence of Kant's religious background is most prominent. Hence, the moral life is a continuing struggle in which morality appears to the potential delinquent in the form of a law that demands to be obeyed for its own

sake—a law, however, the commands of which are not issued by some alien authority but represent the voice of reason, which the moral subject can recognize as his own.

In the “Dialectic,” Kant took up again the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. Dismissed in the first *Critique* as objects that men can never know because they transcend human sense experience, he now argued that they are essential postulates for the moral life. Though not reachable in metaphysics, they are absolutely essential for moral philosophy.

Kant is often described as an ethical Rationalist, and the description is not wholly inappropriate. He never espoused, however, the radical Rationalism of some of his contemporaries nor of more recent philosophers for whom reason is held to have direct insight into a world of values or the power to intuit the rightness of this or that moral principle.

Thus, practical, like theoretical, reason was for him formal rather than material—a framework of formative principles rather than a content of actual rules. This is why he put such stress on his first formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Lacking any insight into the moral realm, men can only ask themselves whether what they are proposing to do has the formal character of law—the character, namely, of being the same for all persons similarly circumstanced.

○ The Critique of Judgment :

The *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790: spelled “Critik”)—one of the most original and instructive of all of Kant’s writings—was not foreseen in his original conception of the critical philosophy. Thus it is perhaps best regarded as a series of appendixes to the other two *Critiques*. The work falls into two main parts, called respectively “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” and “Critique of Teleological Judgment.” In the first of these, after an introduction in which he discussed “logical purposiveness,” he analyzed the notion of “aesthetic purposiveness” in judgments that ascribe beauty to something.

Such a judgment, according to him, unlike a mere expression of taste, lays claim to general validity; yet it cannot be said to be cognitive because it rests on feeling, not on argument. The explanation lies in the fact that, when a person contemplates an object and finds it beautiful, there is a certain harmony between his imagination and his understanding, of which he is aware from the immediate delight that he takes in the object. Imagination grasps the object and yet is not restricted to any definite concept; whereas a person imputes the delight that he feels to others because it springs from the free play of his cognitive faculties, which are the same in all men.

In the second part, Kant turned to consider teleology in nature as it is posed by the existence in organic bodies of things of which the parts are reciprocally means and ends to each other. In dealing with these bodies, one cannot be content with merely mechanical principles. Yet if mechanism is abandoned and the notion of a purpose or end of nature is taken literally, this seems to imply that the things to which it applies must be the work of some supernatural designer; but this would mean a passing from the sensible to the suprasensible, a step proved in the first *Critique* to be impossible. Kant answered this objection by admitting that teleological language cannot be avoided

in taking account of natural phenomena; but it must be understood as meaning only that organisms must be thought of “as if” they were the product of design, and that is by no means the same as saying that they are deliberately produced.

○ Last years :

The critical philosophy was soon being taught in every important German-speaking university, and young men flocked to Königsberg as a shrine of philosophy. In some cases, the Prussian government even undertook the expense of their support. Kant came to be consulted as an oracle on all kinds of questions, including such subjects as the lawfulness of vaccination. Such homage did not interrupt Kant's regular habits. Scarcely five feet tall, with a deformed chest, and suffering from weak health, he maintained throughout his life a severe regimen. It was arranged with such regularity that people set their clocks according to his daily walk along the street named for him, “The Philosopher's Walk.” Until old age prevented him, he is said to have missed this regular appearance only on the occasion when Rousseau's *Émile* so engrossed him that for several days he stayed at home.

With the publication of the third *Critique*, Kant's main philosophical work was done. From 1790 his health began to decline seriously. He still had many literary projects but found it impossible to write more than a few hours a day. The writings that he then completed consist partly of an elaboration of subjects not previously treated in any detail, partly of replies to criticisms and to the clarification of misunderstandings.

With the publication in 1793 of his work *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, Kant became involved in a dispute with Prussian authorities on the right to express religious opinions. The book was found to be altogether too Rationalistic for orthodox taste; he was charged with misusing his philosophy to the “distortion and depreciation of many leading and fundamental doctrines of sacred Scripture and Christianity” and was required by the government not to lecture or write anything further on religious subjects. Kant agreed but privately interpreted the ban as a personal promise to the King, from which he felt himself to be released on the latter's death in 1797. At any rate, he returned to the forbidden subject in his last major essay, *Der Streit der Fakultäten* (1798; “The Conflict of the Faculties”).

The large work at which he laboured until his death—the fragments of which fill the two final volumes of the great Berlin edition of his works—was evidently intended to be a major contribution to his critical philosophy. What remains, however, is not so much an unfinished work as a series of notes for a work that was never written.

Its original title was *Übergang von den metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik* (“Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics”), and it may have been his intention to carry further the argument advanced in the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (1786) by showing that it is possible to construct a priori not merely the general outline of a science of nature but a good many of its details as well. But judging from the extant fragments, however numerous they are, it remains conjectural whether its completion would have constituted a major addition to his philosophy and its reputation.

After a gradual decline that was painful to his friends as well as to himself, Kant died in Königsberg, February 12, 1804. His last words were “Es ist gut” (“It is good”). His tomb in the cathedral was inscribed with the words (in German) “The starry heavens above me and the moral law within me,” the two things that he declared in the conclusion of the second *Critique* “fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on.”¹⁰³

✱ **Lacan, Jacques (1901–81):**

The most controversial and influential French psychoanalyst of his generation; the papers collected in his *Écrits* (1966) contributed greatly to the prestige enjoyed by PSYCHO- ANALYSIS in France. The hallmarks of Lacan’s work are a highly literary style, perhaps influenced by his early association with the surrealists, and a close but selective reading of Freud.

Lacan concentrates on Freud’s earlier texts and makes a polemical attack on post-Freudian ego- psychology, which he sees as a quintessentially American deviation. This, together with a controversy over training methods and the length of analytic sessions, led to conflict with the establishment and to Lacan’s departure from the International Psychoanalytic Association.

Lacan exploits the linguistics of SAUSSURE and Jakobson, and the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, to argue that the unconscious is structured like a language, but the emphasis placed on the role of language in the constitution of subjectivity also recalls HEIDEGGER’s dictum that language is the house of being. At the same time, Lacan draws upon HEGELIAN phenomenology, and particularly on the master–slave dialectic, for his theory of the ego and of inter-subjective relations. Thus, intersubjectivity is always founded in a relationship of aggression and identification, whilst the ego is not the central agency of the personality but a false self with which the subject identifies in a dialectic of ALIENATION.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Allen Bird, ,Otto. "Kant, Immanuel." Encyclopædia Britannica.opcite.

¹⁰⁴ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson , J.O.opcite.pp :199.

In 1933, he anticipated the tendency to revise interpretations of Marxism from the standpoint of the works of the early MARX, publishing the first major review of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. In 1934, Marcuse fled from Nazism and emigrated to the United States where he lived for the rest of his life. His first major work in English, Reason and Revolution (1941), traced the genesis of the ideas of Hegel, Marx and modern social theory.

After service for the US government from 1941 to 1950, which Marcuse always claimed was motivated by a desire to struggle against fascism, he returned to intellectual work and published *Eros and Civilization* (1955), which attempted an audacious synthesis of Marx and Freud and sketched the out-lines of a non-repressive society.

In 1958 Marcuse published *Soviet Marxism*, a critical study of the Soviet Union, and in 1964 *One-Dimensional Man*, a wide-ranging critique of both advanced capitalist and communist societies. This book theorized the decline of revolutionary potential in capitalist societies and the development of new forms of social control.

The book was severely criticized by orthodox Marxists and theorists of various political and theoretical commitments. Despite its pessimism, it influenced many in the New Left as it articulated their dissatisfaction with both capitalist societies and Soviet communist societies. *One-Dimensional Man* was followed by a series of books and articles on politics and capitalist societies, including 'Repressive Tolerance' (1965).

An Essay on Liberation (1969), and Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972). Marcuse also dedicated much of his energy to aesthetics and his final book, The Aesthetic Dimension (1979), is a defence of the emancipatory potential of aesthetic form in so-called 'high culture'.

His work in philosophy and social theory generated fierce controversy and polemics, and many studies of his work are highly tendentious and frequently sectarian. Although much of the controversy involved his critiques of contemporary capitalist societies and defence of radical social change, in retrospect, Marcuse left behind a complex and many-sided body of work comparable to the legacies of BLOCH, LUKÁCS, ADORNO, and BENJAMIN.¹⁰⁵

✧ Market:

A concept that is more than economic. Markets can exist in every sphere of society where there is scarcity. It could be argued that wherever they exist, they conceal differences in power and status. Obviously markets relate to the exchange of goods and services, but it has become very fashionable under the influence of the New Right to introduce markets into education and health care in liberal societies. Markets spring up in response to a perceived scarcity, and attempts to suppress the market cannot succeed where goods and service cannot be provided by other institutions in society.

The East European experience under communist party rule has confirmed that where need cannot be met in other ways, people will form a market, however informally or illegally. The presence of the market becomes central in liberal societies and was seen by classical liberals as an autonomous mechanism that is separate from the state, and even from society. This view is now discredited. The problem with the market, it could be argued, is that it masks real differences, so that individuals or groups engaged in exchanges are abstractly equated. The idea that the market is rooted in human nature is ahistorical and implausible, but it is true that markets have been around for thousands of years.

It is argued by theorists on the 'left' that they need to be regulated according to human needs and developments, and their positive side – the emphasis upon agency and

¹⁰⁵ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O. opcite. pp :229.

initiative –should be emphasised as attempts are made to curb the inequalities that markets generate. The transformation of the market is a lengthy process, since markets both precede capitalism and would continue in a post-capitalist society. However, this transformation arises as markets fail to meet human needs, and society has to find other ways of tackling its problems.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Hoffman , John .opcite.pp:109-110.

Metaphysics:

branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of ultimate reality.

Metaphysics is customarily divided into ontology, which deals with the question of how many fundamentally distinct sorts of entities compose the universe, and metaphysics proper, which is concerned with describing the most general traits of reality. These general traits together define reality and would presumably characterize any universe whatever. Because these traits are not peculiar to this universe, but are common to all possible universes, metaphysics may be conducted at the highest level of abstraction. Ontology, by contrast, because it investigates the ultimate divisions within this universe, is more closely related to the physical world of human experience.

The term *metaphysics* is believed to have originated in Rome about 70 BC, with the Greek Peripatetic philosopher Andronicus of Rhodes (flourished 1st century BC) in his edition of the works of Aristotle. In the arrangement of Aristotle's works by Andronicus, the treatise originally called *First Philosophy*, or *Theology*, followed the treatise *Physics*. Hence, the *First Philosophy* came to be known as *meta (ta) physica*, or “following (the) *Physics*,” later shortened to *Metaphysics*. The word took on the connotation, in popular usage, of matters transcending material reality. In the philosophic sense, however, particularly as opposed to the use of the word by occultists, metaphysics applies to all reality and is distinguished from other forms of inquiry by its generality.

The subjects treated in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (substance, causality, the nature of being, and the existence of God) fixed the content of metaphysical speculation for centuries. Among the medieval Scholastic philosophers, metaphysics was known as the “transphysical science” on the assumption that, by means of it, the scholar philosophically could make the transition from the physical world to a world beyond sense perception. The 13th-century Scholastic philosopher and theologian St. Thomas Aquinas declared that the cognition of God, through a causal study of finite sensible beings, was the aim of metaphysics. With the rise of scientific study in the 16th century the reconciliation of science and faith in God became an increasingly important problem.

✧ MetaPhysics Before Kant :

Before the time of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant metaphysics was characterized by a tendency to construct theories on the basis of a priori knowledge, that is, knowledge derived from reason alone, in contradistinction to a posteriori knowledge, which is gained by reference to the facts of experience. From a priori knowledge were deduced general propositions that were held to be true of all things.

The method of inquiry based on a priori principles is known as rationalistic. This method may be subdivided into monism, which holds that the universe is made up of a single fundamental substance; dualism, the belief in two such substances; and pluralism, which proposes the existence of many fundamental substances.

The monists, agreeing that only one basic substance exists, differ in their descriptions of its principal characteristics. Thus, in idealistic monism the substance is believed to be purely mental; in materialistic monism it is held to be purely physical, and in neutral monism it is considered neither exclusively mental nor solely physical.

The idealistic position was held by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley, the materialistic by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, and the neutral by the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza. The latter expounded a pantheistic view of reality in which the universe is identical with God and everything contains God's substance. *See Idealism; Materialism; Pantheism.*

The most famous exponent of dualism was the French philosopher René Descartes, who maintained that body and mind are radically different entities and that they are the only fundamental substances in the universe. Dualism, however, does not show how these basic entities are connected.

In the work of the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the universe is held to consist of an infinite number of distinct substances, or monads. This view is pluralistic in the sense that it proposes the existence of many separate entities, and it is monistic in its assertion that each monad reflects within itself the entire universe.

Other philosophers have held that knowledge of reality is not derived from a priori principles, but is obtained only from experience. This type of metaphysics is called empiricism. Still another school of philosophy has maintained that, although an ultimate reality does exist, it is altogether inaccessible to human knowledge, which is necessarily subjective because it is confined to states of mind. Knowledge is therefore not a representation of external reality, but merely a reflection of human perceptions. This view is known as skepticism or agnosticism in respect to the soul and the reality of God.

✧ The Metaphysics Of Kant:

Several major viewpoints were combined in the work of Kant, who developed a distinctive critical philosophy called transcendentalism. His philosophy is agnostic in that it denies the possibility of a strict knowledge of ultimate reality; it is empirical in that it affirms that all knowledge arises from experience and is true of objects of actual and possible experience; and it is rationalistic in that it maintains the a priori character of the structural principles of this empirical knowledge.

These principles are held to be necessary and universal in their application to experience, for in Kant's view the mind furnishes the archetypal forms and categories (space, time, causality, substance, and relation) to its sensations, and these categories are logically anterior to experience, although manifested only in experience. Their logical anteriority to experience makes these categories or structural principles transcendental; they transcend all experience, both actual and possible. Although these principles determine all experience, they do not in any way affect the nature of things in themselves.

The knowledge of which these principles are the necessary conditions must not be considered, therefore, as constituting a revelation of things as they are in themselves. This knowledge concerns things only insofar as they appear to human perception or as they can be apprehended by the senses. The argument by which Kant sought to fix the limits of human knowledge within the framework of experience and to demonstrate the inability of the human mind to penetrate beyond experience strictly by knowledge to the realm of ultimate reality constitutes the critical feature of his philosophy, giving the key

word to the titles of his three leading treatises, *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, and *Critique of Judgment*.

In the system propounded in these works, Kant sought also to reconcile science and religion in a world of two levels, comprising noumena, objects conceived by reason although not perceived by the senses, and phenomena, things as they appear to the senses and are accessible to material study. He maintained that, because God, freedom, and human immortality are noumenal realities, these concepts are understood through moral faith rather than through scientific knowledge. With the continuous development of science, the expansion of metaphysics to include scientific knowledge and methods became one of the major objectives of metaphysicians.

✧ Meta Physics Since Kant :

Some of Kant's most distinguished followers, notably Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, negated Kant's criticism in their elaborations of his transcendental metaphysics by denying the Kantian conception of the thing-in-itself. They thus developed an absolute idealism in opposition to Kant's critical transcendentalism.

Since the formation of the hypothesis of absolute idealism, the development of metaphysics has resulted in as many types of metaphysical theory as existed in pre-Kantian philosophy, despite Kant's contention that he had fixed definitely the limits of philosophical speculation.

Notable among these later metaphysical theories are radical empiricism, or pragmatism, a native American form of metaphysics expounded by Charles Sanders Peirce, developed by William James, and adapted as instrumentalism by John Dewey; voluntarism, the foremost exponents of which are the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer and the American philosopher Josiah Royce; phenomenalism, as it is exemplified in the writings of the French philosopher Auguste Comte and the British philosopher Herbert Spencer; emergent evolution, or creative evolution, originated by the French philosopher Henri Bergson; and the philosophy of the organism, elaborated by the British mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead.

The salient doctrines of pragmatism are that the chief function of thought is to guide action, that the meaning of concepts is to be sought in their practical applications, and that truth should be tested by the practical effects of belief;

according to instrumentalism, ideas are instruments of action, and their truth is determined by their role in human experience. In the theory of voluntarism the will is postulated as the supreme manifestation of reality.

The exponents of phenomenism, who are sometimes called positivists, contend that everything can be analyzed in terms of actual or possible occurrences, or phenomena, and that anything that cannot be analyzed in this manner cannot be understood. In emergent or creative evolution, the evolutionary process is characterized as spontaneous and unpredictable rather than mechanistically determined. The philosophy of the organism combines an evolutionary stress on constant process with a metaphysical theory of God, the eternal objects, and creativity.

✱ Contemporary Developments;

In the 20th century the validity of metaphysical thinking has been disputed by the logical positivists (*see* Analytic and Linguistic Philosophy; Positivism) and by the so-called dialectical materialism of the Marxists.

The basic principle maintained by the logical positivists is the verifiability theory of meaning. According to this theory a sentence has factual meaning only if it meets the test of observation. Logical positivists argue that metaphysical expressions such as “Nothing exists except material particles” and “Everything is part of one all-encompassing spirit” cannot be tested empirically. Therefore, according to the verifiability theory of meaning, these expressions have no factual cognitive meaning, although they can have an emotive meaning relevant to human hopes and feelings.

The dialectical materialists assert that the mind is conditioned by and reflects material reality. Therefore, speculations that conceive of constructs of the mind as having any other than material reality are themselves unreal and can result only in delusion.

To these assertions metaphysicians reply by denying the adequacy of the verifiability theory of meaning and of material perception as the standard of reality. Both logical

positivism and dialectical materialism, they argue, conceal metaphysical assumptions, for example, that everything is observable or at least connected with something observable and that the mind has no distinctive life of its own.

In the philosophical movement known as existentialism, thinkers have contended that the questions of the nature of being and of the individual's relationship to it are extremely important and meaningful in terms of human life. The investigation of these questions is therefore considered valid whether or not its results can be verified objectively.

Since the 1950s the problems of systematic analytical metaphysics have been studied in Britain by Stuart Newton Hampshire and Peter Frederick Strawson, the former concerned, in the manner of Spinoza, with the relationship between thought and action, and the latter, in the manner of Kant, with describing the major categories of experience as they are embedded in language.

In the U.S. metaphysics has been pursued much in the spirit of positivism by Wilfred Stalker Sellars and Willard Van Orman Quine. Sellars has sought to express metaphysical questions in linguistic terms, and Quine has attempted to determine whether the structure of language commits the philosopher to asserting the existence of any entities whatever and, if so, what kind. In these new formulations the issues of metaphysics and ontology remain vital.¹⁰⁷

✧ Multi-culturalism:

A term that recognizes the reality of con- temporary liberal societies today, in which people exist within communities with many faiths, various ethnicities and diverse cultures. Multi-culturalism implies not merely a recognition of this diversity, but also an acknowledgement that this diversity is positive and empowering. Each group strengthens the other by drawing upon different values and traditions, so that its own identity is in a process of continual change.

Multi-culturalism implies toleration but toleration seen as an attitude that is active, and not simply passive. Multi-culturalism is, it could be argued, in tension with the

¹⁰⁷ "Metaphysics." Microsoft® Encarta®. Opcite.

institution of the state, since it opposes the idea that there is a dominant culture. Diversity cannot be celebrated if one culture is placed in a position of privilege over others.

Multi-culturalism must be based upon emancipation. Traditions that are divisive and undemocratic are problematic so that multi-culturalism is discredited if it becomes a kind of relativism that regards all cultural practices as valid simply because they take place. Underpinning multi-culturalism is a commitment to democracy since cultural practices cannot be empowering if they conflict with democracy and create tension and division.¹⁰⁸

✧ Neo-Platonism:

a philosophical and religious system that both rivaled and influenced Christianity from the 3rd to the 6th century, and was derived from the work of the Greek philosopher Plato (427-347 BCE) along with elements of oriental mysticism. The founder of Neoplatonism was Plotinus (205-270 CE), who constructed an elaborate hierarchy of spiritual levels through which the individual soul could ascend from physical existence to merge with the One. Interest in Neoplatonic philosophy, often associated with magic and demonology, was revived in the *RENAISSANCE.¹⁰⁹

✧ Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844–1900) :

Born in Röcken, Prussia, Nietzsche studied at Leipzig, and became professor at Basle in 1870. His first book was *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). In 1879 he resigned from his Chair because of poor health, and from 1879 to 1889 produced numerous writings, including *The Gay Science* (1882), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–5), *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) and *Twilight of the Idols* (1889). In 1889 his mental health collapsed, and

he did not recover before his death eleven years later. However, during this period his most aggressively anti-theistic book was published, namely *The Antichrist* (1895). early work: the rebirth of dionysian tragedy From the start, Nietzsche sought in

¹⁰⁸ Hoffman, John. op.cite. pp:124.

¹⁰⁹ Baldicks, Chris. op.cite .pp : 169.

Schopenhauer and in ancient Greek tragedy and pre-Socratic philosophy a principle of the affirmation of life.

A basic 'driving' force is not the same as a 'directing' force. He developed this theme further in *The Gay Science*. Driving force can be seen as raw energy in Euripides' tragedy *The Bacchae*. The figure of Pentheus represents the 'Apollonian' principle of restraint, harmony, rationality and moderation.

Through Aristotle's logic and ethics of 'the mean', this had been largely associated with the spirit of ancient Greece. However, Euripides portrays the *Bacchae*, the female worshippers of Bacchus or Dionysius, as 'Dionysian': life-affirming, exotic, frenzied celebrants for whom life is not restraint and rationality, but assertion, joy and self-will. Nietzsche identified himself with the Dionysian, although he concedes that this drive may be focused or harnessed by Apollonian direction or instrumental reason. These two principles reflect Schopenhauer's contrast between will and representation.

From his student days at Leipzig until their friendship ended in 1879 over Nietzsche's cultural and political critique of him, Nietzsche's emphasis on affirmation, life and driving force also drew vitality from Richard Wagner's operas and Wagner's use of mythic sources.

By 1879 Nietzsche was far more radical than Wagner. In Nietzsche's view, Wagner helped to prop up the cultural degeneration that Nietzsche wished to abolish altogether. It should be leading, he believed, through new birth, to nihilism. He termed this 'philosophy with a hammer'. later middle period: the *gay science* (1882), *beyond good and evil* (1886), and the *twilight of the idols* (1889) Both *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spake Zarathustra* look ahead to the end of nihilism, which will follow upon the declaration that 'God is dead'.

During this period Nietzsche not only increasingly emphasizes 'will' over rational systems, but identifies systems of Western philosophy and religion as 'fictions' and 'lies'. Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings, 'always darker emptier, and simpler' (*The Gay Science*). In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche distinguishes between a 'master' morality of self-assertion and a 'slave' morality rooted in resentment and the desire for

compensatory rewards. The ‘master’ morality is worked out in due course in terms of the Will to Power .

These two principles are associated with proportionate drives and directions in different peoples and cultures. Addressing the culture of his day and the traditions of Western philosophy and religions Nietzsche calls for a ‘re-valuation of all values’. Religion, and in particular Christianity, tend towards a servile ‘negation’ that diminishes humankind. It is against this background that Bonhoeffer and especially Moltmann portray an authentic Christianity as ‘Universal Affirmation’ (the subtitle of Moltmann’s *The Spirit of Life*, London: SCM, 1992). Nietzsche insists that ‘Nothing is “given” as real except our world of desires and passions . . . We can rise or sink to no other “reality” than the reality of our drives . . . Thinking is only the relationship of these drives to one another’ (*Beyond Good and Evil*, London: Penguin, 1973 and 1990, sect. 36). If one insisted on an ‘intelligible’ account of this, ‘it would be “will to power” and nothing else’ (ibid.). ‘It is the rulers who determine the concept “good”’ (ibid., sect. 260). last period: further critiques of language and religion ‘All that exists consists of interpretation (*The Will to Power*, vol. 2, aphorism 493, Nietzsche’s italics (in *The Complete Works*, 18 vols., London: Allen & Unwin, 1909–13, vol. 15)).

If this is so, Nietzsche concludes, ‘We shall never be rid of God, so long as we still believe in grammar’ (*The Twilight of the Idols*, in ibid., vol. 16, 22, aphorism 5). This is why he must ‘philosophize with a hammer’.

In *The Antichrist* Nietzsche presses what today we should call an anti-theistic ‘ideological critique’ of language in religion. He writes, ‘The “salvation of the soul” – in plain English “the world revolves around me”’ (ibid., 186, aphorism 43). ‘A priest or a pope not only errs, but actually lies with every word that he utters’ (ibid., 177, aphorism 38). ‘Supreme axiom: “God forgiveth him that repenteth” – in plain English, “him that submitteth himself to the priest”’ (ibid., 161, aphorism 26). Nietzsche has now moved beyond ‘atheistic existentialism’ to an ideological critique of language which prepares the way for the post-modern suspicion of Roland Barthes, Foucault and Derrida.

Nevertheless, in the hands of such theological writers as Bonhoeffer and Moltmann this becomes not a critique that unmasks all theism as illusory, but a selective filter that exposes the illusory, self-deceptive nature of those inauthentic forms of religion that are

motivated by self-assertion and a will-to-power. Just as Nietzsche's early *The Birth of Tragedy* brought to our attention the important contrast in Greek thought between the Apollonian and Dionysian but also involved dubious classical philological scholarship, so also *The Antichrist* brings to our attention a sharp critical tool to distinguish inauthentic religion from authentic religious truth, but is open to the criticism of the very kind of generalizing and mythologizing that it seeks to undermine.¹¹⁰

* Ontology:

A concept that simply refers to a theory of being. Usually contrasted with epistemology as a theory of knowledge. An ontological view of the state, for example, poses the question: does the state actually exist? Being needs to be kept separate from knowledge, since we cannot speak of ideas as a reflection of the material world, if we confuse them. A materialist would argue that ideas are ontologically part of matter since they are the product of a brain, itself a material organ. Epistemologically, however, ideas can be judged true or false depending upon how accurately they reflect the material world.¹¹¹

* oxymoron:

a *FIGURE OF SPEECH that combines two usually contradictory terms in a compressed *PARADOX, as in the word bittersweet or the phrase living death. Oxymoronic phrases, like Milton's 'darkness visible', were especially cultivated in 16th- and 17th-century poetry. Shakespeare has his Romeo utter several in one speech:

Why then, O brawling love, O loving hate,

O anything of nothing first create;

O heavy lightness, serious vanity,

Misshapen chaos of well-seeming forms,

Feather of lead, bright smoke, cold fire, sick health,

¹¹⁰ Thiselton, Anthony. C.A. op.cite. pp:199-201.

¹¹¹ Hoffman, John. op.cite:132.

Still-waking sleep, that is not what it is! ¹¹²

✱ Pareto, Vilfredo (1848–1923):

Born in the year of the European revolutions. He trained as an engineer, and followed J. S. Mill and Spencer in supporting parliamentary reform and the free-market economy. He was intensely critical of the way in which industrialists used the state for their own ends. He initially backed the liberals and acquired a formidable reputation as an economist. He took the chair in political economy at the University of Lausanne in 1894, publishing his Cours d'économie politique (1896, 1897). In 1900 he declared himself an anti-democrat, arguing that the political movements in Italy and France were simply seeking to replace one elite with another.

While he approved of Marx's emphasis upon struggle, he rejected completely the notion that a classless society was possible. In 1906, Pareto published his *Manual of Political Economy*, where he presented pure economics in mathematical form. Croce convinced him that 'rational economic man' did not correspond to reality. Human action is mostly non-logical in character, he argued, and stems from non-rational sentiments and impulses: what Pareto called underlying 'residues'.

In his most important political and sociological work, *The Mind and Society* that he wrote in 1916, he distinguishes between Class I residues, inventive, imaginative capacities, and Class II residues, conservative, persistent tendencies. All government is government by an elite who use a combination of coercion and consent. Class I residues predominate when 'foxes' are in control – manipulative politicians who create consent – and Class II residues when violence is necessary. Each of these residues has its strengths and weaknesses, and the 'circulation of elites' can be explained as 'lions' – those who rule through brute force – replace 'foxes'. He saw in Mussolini a politician with a lion-like character who had displaced wily politicians.¹¹³

¹¹² Ibid.pp:179-180.

¹¹³ Ibid.pp:136-137.

✧ Phenomenology:

a philosophical movement based on the investigation of 'phenomena' (i.e. things as apprehended by consciousness) rather than on the existence of anything outside of human consciousness. Phenomenology was founded in the early years of the 20th century by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl, who hoped to return philosophy to concrete experience and to reveal the essential structures of consciousness.

In an amended form, Husserl's phenomenology was developed by his student Martin Heidegger, and became an important influence on *EXISTENTIALISM and the modern tradition of *HERMENEUTICS. Its impact on literary studies is most evident in the work of the *GENEVA SCHOOL on authors' characteristic modes of awareness; but other kinds of phenomenological criticism such as that of the Polish theorist Roman Ingarden—place more emphasis on the reader's consciousness of literary works.

In this sense, phenomenology has prepared the ground for *RECEPTION THEORY. For a more extended account, consult Robert R. Magliola, *Phenomenology and Literature* (1977).¹¹⁴

✧ Platonism :

the doctrines of the Greek philosopher Plato (Platon, 427-347 BCE), especially the idealist belief that the perceptible world is an illusory shadow of some higher realm of transcendent Ideas or Forms. Despite Plato's hostility to poets as misleading imitators of worldly illusions, Platonic ideas have repeatedly been adopted in Western literature: in the *RENAISSANCE his view of physical beauty as an outward sign of spiritual perfection is prevalent in love poetry, while in the age of *ROMANTICISM his idealist philosophy was absorbed by many poets, notably Percy Bysshe Shelley. The Cambridge Platonists were a group of theologians associated with Cambridge University in the mid-17th century, who sought to reconcile the Anglican faith with human Reason while promoting religious tolerance; their leading writers were Henry More and Ralph Cudworth.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Ibid.pp:191.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.pp:194-195.

✧ Quantum Mechanics:

Max Planck, Albert Einstein and Nils Bohr originally developed Quantum Theory in the early 1900s, to explain the interactions between atoms and radiation. 'Energy' was found to be packaged in finite 'quanta', so that the energy in a tight 'wave' behaved like a stream of 'particles'. In the 1920s de Broglie extended this 'duality' by showing that material 'particles' could behave like waves and a radically new mechanics was created by Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Dirac and von Neumann.

As a formal calculus for predicting experimental results it is astonishingly successful, but its interpretation is racked with controversy. Quantum Mechanics is philosophically interesting because of its implications for DETERMINISM and REALISM, and some argue that it also has implications for LOGIC.

A remarkable body of 'meta-theory' has developed on the question of whether its revolutionary features could be reversed by future science. Quantum Mechanics represents a system by a complex mathematical function which ascribes ranges of potential properties to the component entities in a coordinated fashion.

Which properties are realized when a measurement is performed is a matter of PROBABILITY. Furthermore, certain properties are 'paired' so that, according to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, closer definition of one implies more 'uncertainty' in the other. Since this appears to make precise prediction impossible in principle, quantum mechanics is often taken to have refuted determinism.

Bohr's Complementary Interpretation sets its face against theoretical realism by treating the micro-system and the measuring apparatus as an indivisible whole. Thus properties whose measurement requires mutually exclusive experimental arrangements cannot be simultaneously real. In Quantum Mechanics the HOLISTIC coordination of a system remains even when its components are apparently separate, so a measurement on one 'entity' fixes the state of another.

Alternatives to quantum mechanics, such as that of David Bohm, which treat properties as real, can model this only if they permit instantaneous action-at-a-distance. But can it be measurement which makes properties actual? If Bohr's way of looking at the

situation is applied to an enlarged system which incorporates the observer, then his argument seems to imply that the new system will be undefined until observed by someone else! And so on ad infinitum.

To block this regress Wigner argued that consciousness makes measurement definite, thus committing physics to IDEALISM. Conversely, Everett and Wheeler's Many-Worlds Interpretation rescued realism, but only at the cost of claiming that interactions continually split the world into more and more parallel universes. The theory's technical triumphs only deepen our meta-physical perplexity.¹¹⁶

* Realism:

A concept that is used in a variety of ways in political theory. Sometimes the word is used in place of materialism. A realist is someone who accepts that the world is external to our ideas, and we can measure the truth of our ideas as reflections of, or reconstructions of, this external reality. Realism can also denote a current in international- relations theorising that accepts the state as a given.

Realists in this context may even argue that international relations should be separated from politics, since politics they argue, is about the state, whereas international relations deals with exchanges between states in a world in which there is no global state to regulate affairs.

This approach has been partially discredited by those who see international institutions, whether transnational corporations or agents like the United Nations, as having significant implications for order and the ability of people to govern their own lives. Critics of realism question the equation of politics with the state. Realism poses a challenge. Is reality simply the world as it is, or should we see reality as the world as it is becoming?

The danger with those who consider themselves realists is that they cling to a snapshot view of 'reality' that ignores the change that is occurring. Hence a static conception of

¹¹⁶ Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O. op.cite. pp :323.

realism can distort reality. On the other hand, anti-realists are vulnerable to the charge that their 'ideals' do not relate meaningfully to the external world. It could be argued that realism needs to be woven into utopianism so that the world is seen as a process of transformation, and alternatives are promoted that are rooted in the real world.

✱ Reconstruction:

More than a critique: to reconstruct a concept is to rework it in the light of new circumstances. It is impossible to reconstruct a concept without deconstructing it, that is, criticising it from within. Terms need to be criticised for their abstractness and exclusiveness, but this criticism is not enough.

To reconstruct a concept is to build something new out of the something old, so that we move beyond the past and look to the future. It might be argued that not all concepts can be reconstructed. Only those that are momentum concepts can be reconstructed, for they have a logic that is progressive and emancipatory in character. Static concepts cannot be reconstructed, for they are divisive and imply repression and exclusion. Thus concepts like patriarchy, violence and the state cannot be reconstructed as they are incompatible with an emancipated

world. Reconstruction cannot be taken to mean that a concept is reworked in a way that makes it final, wholly transparent, absolutely true. Reconstruction takes concepts like equality and freedom and gives them a more inclusive content, but it must be stated that this reworking reflects new circumstances that will themselves become old and one-sided. Reconstruction is thus a process that continues into the future, and although reconstructed concepts are more truthful than archaic ones, they cannot be said to be the last word on the subject.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Ibid.pp:156-158.

✧ Relativism:

the denial that there are certain kinds of universal truths. There are two main types, cognitive and ethical. Cognitive relativism holds that there are no universal truths about the world: the world has no intrinsic characteristics, there are just different ways of interpreting it.

The Greek Sophist Protagoras, the first person on record to hold such a view, said, “Man is the measure of all things; of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not.” Goodman, Putnam, and Rorty are contemporary philosophers who have held versions of relativism. Rorty says, e.g., that “ ‘objective truth’ is no more and no less than the best idea we currently have about how to explain what is going on.”

Critics of cognitive relativism contend that it is self-referentially incoherent, since it presents its statements as universally true, rather than simply relatively so. Ethical relativism is the theory that there are no universally valid moral principles: all moral principles are valid relative to culture or individual choice. There are two subtypes: conventionalism, which holds that moral principles are valid relative to the conventions of a given culture or society; and subjectivism, which maintains that individual choices are what determine the validity of a moral principle. Its motto is, Morality lies in the eyes of the beholder. As Ernest Hemingway wrote, “So far, about morals, I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after.”

Conventionalist ethical relativism consists of two theses: a diversity thesis, which specifies that what is considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, so that there are no moral principles accepted by all societies; and a dependency thesis, which specifies that all moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance. From these two ideas relativists conclude that there are no universally valid moral principles applying everywhere and at all times. The first thesis, the diversity thesis, or what may simply be called cultural relativism, is anthropological; it registers the fact that moral rules differ from society to society. Although both ethical relativists and non-relativists typically accept cultural relativism, it is often confused with the normative thesis of ethical relativism.

The opposite of ethical relativism is ethical objectivism, which asserts that although cultures may differ in their moral principles, some moral principles have universal validity. Even if, e.g., a culture does not recognize a duty to refrain from gratuitous harm, that principle is valid and the culture should adhere to it. There are two types of ethical objectivism, strong and weak. Strong objectivism, sometimes called absolutism, holds that there is one true moral system with specific moral rules. The ethics of ancient Israel in the Old Testament with its hundreds of laws exemplifies absolutism. Weak objectivism holds that there is a core morality, a determinate set of principles that are universally valid (usually including prohibitions against killing the innocent, stealing, break- ing of promises, and lying). But weak objectivism accepts an indeterminate area where relativism is legitimate, e.g., rules regarding sexual mores and regulations of property.

Both types of objectivism recognize what might be called application relativism, the endeavor to apply moral rules where there is a conflict between rules or where rules can be applied in different ways. For example, the ancient Callactians ate their deceased parents but eschewed the impersonal practice of burying them as disrespectful, whereas contemporary society has the opposite attitudes about the care of dead relatives; but both practices exemplify the same principle of the respect for the dead.

According to objectivism, cultures or forms of life can fail to exemplify an adequate moral community in at least three ways:

- (1) the people are insufficiently intelligent to put constitutive principles in order;
- (2) they are under considerable stress so that it becomes too burdensome to live by moral principles; and
- (3) a combination of (1) and (2). Ethical relativism is sometimes confused with ethical skepticism, the view that we cannot know whether there are any valid moral principles.

Ethical nihilism holds that there are no valid moral principles. J. L. Mackie's error theory is a version of this view. Mackie held that while we all believe some moral principles to be true, there are compelling arguments to the contrary.

Ethical objectivism must be distinguished from moral realism, the view that valid moral principles are true, independently of human choice. Objectivism may be a form of ethical constructivism, typified by Rawls, whereby objective principles are simply those that impartial human beings would choose behind the veil of ignorance. That is, the principles are not truly independent of hypothetical human choices, but are constructs from those choices.¹¹⁸

✧ Relativity :

The theory of Relativity derives its name from the so-called Principle of Relativity, according to which the same laws of physics obtain whatever frame of reference is adopted. It is primarily due to Albert Einstein (1879–1955), and its philosophical interest lies in the overthrow of what were previously regarded as necessary truths about space and time.

Einstein's Special Relativity Theory (1905) removed a deep conflict between classical mechanics and electromagnetic theory by making the astonishing 'Light Postulate', which states that the velocity of light is invariant, that is, the same in every frame of reference. Einstein explains this postulate by showing that any measurement of velocity requires the synchronization of spatially separated clocks.

His method is based (with benign circularity) on the Light Postulate, which implies that distances and time-intervals are relative to frame of reference. Thus 'relativity' undermines the idea that there is a unique, universal 'flow' of time. Special Relativity Theory was devised in opposition to 'Aether Theories' which attempted to interpret phenomena in terms of picturable mechanisms. Einstein's idea of 'invariance' generated more elegant and more fruitful strategies for theory construction. Contrary to popular belief, the theory does not abolish 'absolute' (i.e. invariant) quantities but creates new, 'four-dimensional', ones (Minkowski 1908).

In General Relativity Theory (1916) Einstein attempted to show that the structure of space is determined by matter, thus eliminating 'Absolute Space' from physics. By taking the paths of light rays in a vacuum to define 'straightest lines', Einstein was able

¹¹⁸ Audi, Robert. *Op.cite*. pp :790.

to treat 'gravitation' as the curvature of space-time, and show that the world has a non-Euclidean geometry.

The theory explained known anomalies and predicts novel effects (most dramatically the Expansion of the Universe). Relativity's success in displacing the entrenched assumptions of Newtonian theory shows how hazardous it is to claim a priori status for concepts in physics, and how easy it is to mistake a long-lived theory for the final truth. Nevertheless some argue that the general outline of Relativity Theory can be deduced a priori, and it seems certain that future developments will not reverse the changes wrought by Relativity.¹¹⁹

✱ Riesman :

American philosopher Riesman, in his work titled 'The Lonely Crowd', also highlighted the dominance of media in our lives. According to him, from being 'inner-directed', people in the society are becoming 'other-directed'. People are no more getting guided by their 'elders' or 'adult authorities', rather they are being guided by the peer groups and mass media.¹²⁰

✱ Rorty, Richard (1931–)

is an American philosopher and critic whose central interest is in METAPHILOSOPHY? Starting from the work of QUINE and others he has developed a comprehensive criticism of ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. In the editorial introduction to his anthology, *The Linguistic Turn* (1967), Rorty argued that 'the entire philosophical tradition' had been put 'on the defensive' in the twentieth century.

'What makes most philosophers in the English-speaking world linguistic philosophers', he wrote, 'is the same thing that makes most philosophers in continental Europe phenomenologists – namely, a sense of despair resulting from the inability of traditional

¹¹⁹ Rée, Jonathan & Urmsen, J.O. op.cite. pp :331.

¹²⁰ Delaney, T. *Classical Sociological Theory: Investigation and Application*, Prentice Hall, N.J. 2004. pp :265.

philosophers to make clear what could count as evidence for or against the truth of their views’.

This raised the question whether modern culture was moving into a ‘post-philosophical’ phase, in which ‘philosophers will have worked themselves out of a job’, and also posed problems for ‘talking about the HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY’. The way forward, Rorty suggested, might lie in overthrowing the ‘spectatorial account of knowledge’ which had dominated philosophy ‘since Plato and Aristotle’.

Rorty detected ‘the beginning of a thoroughgoing rethinking’ in the works of DEWEY, HAMPSHIRE, SARTRE, HEIDEGGER and WITTGENSTEIN. Rorty sought to execute this programme in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1980), which argued that ‘traditional philosophy’ in general is a desperate ‘attempt to escape from history’. Ever since Descartes’ ‘invention of the mind’, philosophers had dreamed of providing timeless ‘foundations’ for knowledge, morality, language, or society; but they had never been able to establish that they were doing anything more than ‘eternalize’ contingent prejudices.

To replace the pretensions of ‘systematic philosophy’, Rorty recommended the ‘edifying philosophy’ which he claimed to find in Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey philosophers who aimed ‘to help their readers, or society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rather than to provide “grounding” for the intuitions and customs of the present’. Philosophy as Rorty conceives it is ‘a voice in a conversation’, rather than ‘a subject’ or ‘a field of professional inquiry’.

He elaborated this conception in *Consequences of Pragmatism* (1982) and drew some political conclusions in *Contingency, Irony, Solidarity* (1989), which argued for social solidarity not as ‘a fact to be recognized’ but ‘a goal to be achieved’. These themes were made more explicit in *Achieving our Country* (1998), a controversial defence of American leftist traditions; while Rorty’s continuing engagement with mainstream philosophy is demonstrated by three volumes of *Collected Papers* (1991–8).¹²¹

¹²¹ Delaney, T. op.cite. pp:333-334.

✱ Saussure, Ferdinand de (1857–1913):

The Swiss philologist Ferdinand de Saussure founded modern structural linguistics with his *Course in General Linguistics* (1916). The book was created after his death, out of various sets of students' notes, by two of his disciples.

To this apocryphal but seminal text we owe above all a theory of the sign, conceived as the union of a signifier (a form) and a signified (an idea). The relationship between these is not natural, but arbitrary; nor is it autonomous: it depends on the network of relationships within language as a whole a sign has a 'value' before it has signification. Thus, language is conceived as a system: the *Course* distinguishes *langue*, the code common to all the speakers of a language, from *parole*, the individual speech act which externalizes the system.

Finally, the object of linguistics is defined as synchronic rather than diachronic: the linguist studies the system in a particular state, without reference to its evolution in time. There is another, darker side to Saussure: the never-published notebooks in which he develops the theory that Latin poets concealed anagrams in their texts. This dubious theory nevertheless anticipates contemporary conceptions of the free play of the signifier.¹²²

✱ Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903) :

Herbert Spencer achieved an enormous popular reputation in England towards the end of the nineteenth century by projecting a 'System of Synthetic Philosophy' which would unify the biological and social sciences by means of a generalized philosophical notion of evolution. In *First Principles* (1862) Spencer maintained that we could have knowledge only of phenomena, but that we could nevertheless infer to an Unknowable, an Incomprehensible Power which is the source of phenomena, the most important of which is the Law of Evolution which he obscurely phrased as follows:

¹²² Rée, Jonathan & Urmson, J.O. op.cite. pp :346.

‘an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity’. He also defined progress as a change from homogeneity; thus he identified evolution and progress and could claim that ‘progress is not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity’. This general conception of evolution is based on the work of German biologists and antedates the publication of DARWIN’s work.

Spencer defined life as a continuous adjustment of the internal to the external environment; to live is to be the sort of thing which continually adapts its own nature to be able to deal better with its environment. This is the fundamental viewpoint of the *Principles of Biology* (1864–7) and *Principles of Psychology* (1870–2).

He claimed in the *Principles of Ethics* (1879–93) that ETHICS has ‘a natural basis’ because moral conclusions follow the general law of evolution. Human beings were capable of indefinite adaptation to circumstances, in particular to the change from wild to settled, civilized life; in this adaptation humanity represses old selfish traits and develops new ones by virtue of a principle of sympathy. Moral principles are rules which aid the harmonious, readjusted life of civilization.

A hedonistic element can be legitimately recognized since ‘pleasure promotes function’ and the law of evolution ensures that those actions we find pleasant will be such as tend to have survival value. Spencer’s attempt to draw ethical conclusions from evolutionary principles still has imitators today .¹²³

¹²³ Ibid.pp:362.

✧ utilitarianism:

This refers to a tradition in ethical theory that links rightness to happiness. The theory was classically formulated by Bentham who argued that acts are right if they promote happiness or pleasure and wrong if they lead to misery and pain. John Stuart Mill sought to modify Bentham's theory by making a distinction between different kinds of pleasure, and arguing that individuals who had experienced both higher as well as lower pleasures would always choose the former over the latter.

Mill sought to link utilitarianism to development, so that individuals could change their preferences as they changed their experiences. Critics worry that without a conception of natural rights the greatest happiness of the greatest number would lead to the oppression of the minority by the majority.

The answer to this problem requires, it could be argued, not the notion of god-given rights, but a view of the individual that stresses the pursuit of pleasures through relationships with others. This would enable rightness to be judged by the happiness of individuals as they relate to one another, so that an action can only be deemed to contribute to happiness if the act of one person increases the happiness of another.

Happiness varies according to time and place. Individuals have a right to whatever can be provided to alleviate pain. Is happiness purely subjective? It appears that happiness is both subjective and objective. If it were simply subjective, then happiness could be an activity that is harmful, either to others, or to individuals themselves. If it were purely objective, then the happiness of individuals could arise from the paternalistic insistence that insists that an individual is 'really' experiencing pleasure when in fact they are in pain.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Hoffman, John. opcite:188-189.

Karl Marx and His Ideology (Marxism) :

➤ **Introduction :**

a body of doctrine developed by Karl Marx and, to a lesser extent, by Friedrich Engels in the mid-19th century. It originally consisted of three related ideas: a philosophical anthropology, a theory of history, and an economic and political program. There is also Marxism as it has been understood and practiced by the various socialist movements, particularly before 1914.

Then there is Soviet Marxism as worked out by Vladimir Ilich Lenin and modified by Joseph Stalin, which under the name of Marxism-Leninism became the doctrine of the communist parties set up after the Russian Revolution (1917). Offshoots of this included Marxism as interpreted by the anti-Stalinist Leon Trotsky and his followers, Mao Zedong's Chinese variant of Marxism-Leninism, and various Marxisms in the developing world. There were also the post-World War II nondogmatic Marxisms that have modified Marx's thought with borrowings from modern philosophies, principally from those of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger but also from Sigmund Freud and others.

✳ **The thoughts of Karl Marx :**

The written work of Marx cannot be reduced to a philosophy, much less to a philosophical system. The whole of his work is a radical critique of philosophy, especially of G.W.F. Hegel's idealist system and of the philosophies of the left and right post-Hegelians.

It is not, however, a mere denial of those philosophies. Marx declared that philosophy must become reality. One could no longer be content with interpreting the world; one must be concerned with transforming it, which meant transforming both the world itself and human consciousness of it.

This, in turn, required a critique of experience together with a critique of ideas. In fact, Marx believed that all knowledge involves a critique of ideas. He was not an empiricist. Rather, his work teems with concepts (appropriation, alienation, praxis, creative labour, value, and so on) that he had inherited from earlier philosophers and economists, including Hegel, Johann Fichte, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill.

What uniquely characterizes the thought of Marx is that, instead of making abstract affirmations about a whole group of problems such as human nature, knowledge, and matter, he examines each problem in its dynamic relation to the others and, above all, tries to relate them to historical, social, political, and economic realities.

✱ Historical materialism:

In 1859, in the preface to his *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy), Marx wrote that the hypothesis that had served him as the basis for his analysis of society could be briefly formulated as follows:

In the social production that men carry on, they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production.

The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and intellectual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence; it is on the contrary their social existence which determines their consciousness.

Raised to the level of historical law, this hypothesis was subsequently called historical materialism. Marx applied it to capitalist society, both in *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* (1848; The Communist Manifesto) and *Das Kapital* (vol. 1, 1867; *Capital*) and in other writings. Although Marx reflected upon his working hypothesis for many years, he did not formulate it in a very exact manner: different expressions served him for

identical realities. If one takes the text literally, social reality is structured in the following way:

1. Underlying everything as the real basis of society is the economic structure. This structure includes (a) the “material forces of production,” that is, the labour and means of production, and (b) the overall “relations of production,” or the social and political arrangements that regulate production and distribution. Although Marx stated that there is a correspondence between the “material forces” of production and the indispensable “relations” of production, he never made himself clear on the nature of the correspondence, a fact that was to be the source of differing interpretations among his later followers.

2. Above the economic structure rises the superstructure, consisting of legal and political “forms of social consciousness” that correspond to the economic structure. Marx says nothing about the nature of this correspondence between ideological forms and economic structure, except that through the ideological forms individuals become conscious of the conflict within the economic structure between the material forces of production and the existing relations of production expressed in the legal property relations.

In other words, “The sum total of the forces of production accessible to men determines the condition of society” and is at the base of society. “The social structure and the state issue continually from the life processes of definite individuals . . . as they are *in reality*, that is acting and materially producing.” The political relations that individuals establish among themselves are dependent on material production, as are the legal relations. This foundation of the social on the economic is not an incidental point: it colours Marx's whole analysis. It is found in *Das Kapital* as well as in *Die deutsche Ideologie* (written 1845–46; *The German Ideology*) and the *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844* (*Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*).

✱ Analysis of society :

To go directly to the heart of the work of Marx, one must focus on his concrete program for humanity. This is just as important for an understanding of Marx as are *The Communist Manifesto* and *Das Kapital*. Marx's interpretation of human nature begins with human need. "Man," he wrote in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*,

is first of all a *natural being*. As a natural being and a living natural being, he is endowed on the one hand with *natural powers, vital powers...*; these powers exist in him as aptitudes, instincts. On the other hand, as an objective, natural, physical, sensitive being, he is a *suffering*, dependent and limited being..., that is, the *objects* of his instincts exist outside him, independent of him, but are the objects of his *need*, indispensable and essential for the realization and confirmation of his substantial powers.

The point of departure of human history is therefore living human beings, who seek to satisfy certain primary needs. "The first historical fact is the production of the means to satisfy these needs." This satisfaction, in turn, opens the way for new needs. Human activity is thus essentially a struggle with nature that must furnish the means of satisfying human needs: drink, food, clothing, the development of human powers and then of human intellectual and artistic abilities. In this undertaking, people discover themselves as productive beings who humanize themselves through their labour. Furthermore, they humanize nature while they naturalize themselves.

By their creative activity, by their labour, they realize their identity with the nature that they master, while at the same time, they achieve free consciousness. Born of nature, they become fully human by opposing it. Becoming aware in their struggle against nature of what separates them from it, they find the conditions of their fulfillment, of the realization of their true stature. The dawning of consciousness is inseparable from struggle.

By appropriating all the creative energies, they discover that "all that is called history is nothing else than the process of creating man through human labour, the becoming of nature for man. Man has thus evident and irrefutable proof of his own creation by himself." Understood in its universal dimension, human activity reveals that "for man,

man is the supreme being.” It is thus vain to speak of God, creation, and metaphysical problems. Fully naturalized, humans are sufficient unto themselves: they have recaptured the fullness of humanity in its full liberty.

Living in a capitalist society, however, the individual is not truly free. He is an alienated being; he is not at home in his world. The idea of alienation, which Marx takes from Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach, plays a fundamental role in the whole of his written work, starting with the writings of his youth and continuing through *Das Kapital*.

In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* the alienation of labour is seen to spring from the fact that the more the worker produces the less he has to consume, and the more values he creates the more he devalues himself, because his product and his labour are estranged from him. The life of the worker depends on things that he has created but that are not his, so that, instead of finding his rightful existence through his labour, he loses it in this world of things that are external to him: no work, no pay. Under these conditions, labour denies the fullness of concrete humanity.

“The generic being (*Gattungswesen*) of man, nature as well as his intellectual faculties, is transformed into a being which is alien to him, into a *means of his individual existence*.” Nature, his body, his spiritual essence become alien to him. “Man is made alien to man.” When carried to its highest stage of development, private property becomes “the product of alienated labour...the *means* by which labour alienates itself (and) the realization of this alienation.” It is also at the same time “the tangible material expression of *alienated human life*.”

Although there is no evidence that Marx ever disclaimed this anthropological analysis of alienated labour, starting with *The German Ideology*, the historical, social, and economic causes of the alienation of labour are given increasing emphasis, especially in *Das Kapital*. Alienated labour is seen as the consequence of market product, the division of labour, and the division of society into antagonistic classes. As producers in society, workers create goods only by their labour. These goods are exchangeable. Their value is the average amount of social labour spent to produce them.

The alienation of the worker takes on its full dimension in that system of market production in which part of the value of the goods produced by the worker is taken

away from him and transformed into surplus value, which the capitalist privately appropriates. Market production also intensifies the alienation of labour by encouraging specialization, piecework, and the setting up of large enterprises.

Thus the labour power of the worker is used along with that of others in a combination whose significance he is ignorant of, both individually and socially. In thus losing their quality as human products, the products of labour become fetishes, that is, alien and oppressive realities to which both the individual who possesses them privately and the individual who is deprived of them submit themselves. In the market economy, this submission to things is obscured by the fact that the exchange of goods is expressed in money.

This fundamental economic alienation is accompanied by secondary political and ideological alienations, which offer a distorted representation of and an illusory justification of a world in which the relations of individuals with one another are also distorted. The ideas that people form are closely bound up with their material activity and their material relations: "The act of making representations, of thinking, the spiritual intercourse of men, seem to be the direct emanation of their material relations." This is true of all human activity: political, intellectual, or spiritual. "Men produce their representations and their ideas, but it is as living men, men acting as they are determined by a definite development of their powers of production." Law, morality, metaphysics, and religion do not have a history of their own.

"Men developing their material production modify together with their real existence their ways of thinking and the products of their ways of thinking." In other words, "It is not consciousness which determines existence, it is existence which determines consciousness."

In bourgeois, capitalist society the individual is divided into political citizen and economic actor. This duality represents his political alienation, which is further intensified by the functioning of the bourgeois state. From this study of society at the beginning of the 19th century, Marx came to see the state as the instrument through which the propertied class dominated other classes.

Ideological alienation, for Marx, takes different forms, appearing in economic, philosophical, and legal theories. Marx undertook a lengthy critique of the first in *Das Kapital* and of the second in *The German Ideology*. But ideological alienation expresses itself supremely in religion. Taking up the ideas about religion that were current in left post-Hegelian circles, together with the thought of Feuerbach, Marx considered religion to be a product of human consciousness.

It is a reflection of the situation of a person who “either has not conquered himself or has already lost himself again” (the individual in the world of private property). It is “an opium for the people.” Unlike Feuerbach, Marx believed that religion would disappear only with changes in society.

✱ Analysis of the economy:

Marx analyzed the market economy system in *Das Kapital*. In this work he borrows most of the categories of the classical English economists Smith and Ricardo but adapts them and introduces new concepts such as that of surplus value. One of the distinguishing marks of *Das Kapital* is that in it Marx studies the economy as a whole and not in one or another of its aspects.

His analysis is based on the idea that humans are productive beings and that all economic value comes from human labour. The system he analyzes is principally that of mid-19th-century England. It is a system of private enterprise and competition that arose in the 16th century from the development of sea routes, international trade, and colonialism. Its rise had been facilitated by changes in the forces of production (the division of labour and the concentration of workshops), the adoption of mechanization, and technical progress. The wealth of the societies that brought this economy into play had been acquired through an “enormous accumulation of commodities.” Marx therefore begins with the study of this accumulation, analyzing the unequal exchanges that take place in the market.

According to Marx, if the capitalist advances funds to buy cotton yarn with which to produce fabrics and sells the product for a larger sum than he paid, he is able to invest the difference in additional production. “Not only is the value advance kept in circulation, but it changes in its magnitude, adds a plus to itself, makes itself worth

more, and it is this movement that transforms it into capital.” The transformation, to Marx, is possible only because the capitalist has appropriated the means of production, including the labour power of the worker. Now labour power produces more than it is worth.

The value of labour power is determined by the amount of labour necessary for its reproduction or, in other words, by the amount needed for the worker to subsist and beget children. But in the hands of the capitalist the labour power employed in the course of a day produces more than the value of the sustenance required by the worker and his family. The difference between the two values is appropriated by the capitalist, and it corresponds exactly to the surplus value realized by capitalists in the market. Marx is not concerned with whether in capitalist society there are sources of surplus value other than the exploitation of human labour—a fact pointed out by Joseph Schumpeter in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942). He remains content with emphasizing this primary source:

Surplus value is produced by the employment of labour power. Capital buys the labour power and pays the wages for it. By means of his work the labourer creates new value which does not belong to him, but to the capitalist. He must work a certain time merely in order to reproduce the equivalent value of his wages. But when this equivalent value has been returned, he does not cease work, but continues to do so for some further hours. The new value which he produces during this extra time, and which exceeds in consequence the amount of his wage, constitutes surplus value.

Throughout his analysis, Marx argues that the development of capitalism is accompanied by increasing contradictions. For example, the introduction of machinery is profitable to the individual capitalist because it enables him to produce more goods at a lower cost, but new techniques are soon taken up by his competitors. The outlay for machinery grows faster than the outlay for wages. Since only labour can produce the surplus value from which profit is derived, this means that the capitalist's rate of profit on his total outlay tends to decline.

Along with the declining rate of profit goes an increase in unemployment. Thus, the equilibrium of the system is precarious, subject as it is to the internal pressures resulting from its own development. Crises shake it at regular intervals, preludes to the

general crisis that will sweep it away. This instability is increased by the formation of a reserve army of workers, both factory workers and peasants, whose pauperization keeps increasing. "Capitalist production develops the technique and the combination of the process of social production only by exhausting at the same time the two sources from which all wealth springs: the earth and the worker." According to the Marxist dialectic, these fundamental contradictions can only be resolved by a change from capitalism to a new system.

✱ Class struggle :

Marx inherited the ideas of class and class struggle from utopian socialism and the theories of Henri de Saint-Simon. These had been given substance by the writings of French historians such as Adolphe Thiers and François Guizot on the French Revolution of 1789. But unlike the French historians, Marx made class struggle the central fact of social evolution. "The history of all hitherto existing human society is the history of class struggles."

In Marx's view, the dialectical nature of history is expressed in class struggle. With the development of capitalism, the class struggle takes an acute form. Two basic classes, around which other less important classes are grouped, oppose each other in the capitalist system: the owners of the means of production, or bourgeoisie, and the workers, or proletariat. "The bourgeoisie produces its own grave-diggers. The fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable" (*The Communist Manifesto*) because

the bourgeois relations of production are the last contradictory form of the process of social production, contradictory not in the sense of an individual contradiction, but of a contradiction that is born of the conditions of social existence of individuals; however, the forces of production which develop in the midst of bourgeois society create at the same time the material conditions for resolving this contradiction. With this social development the prehistory of human society ends.

When people have become aware of their loss, of their alienation, as a universal nonhuman situation, it will be possible for them to proceed to a radical transformation of their situation by a revolution. This revolution will be the prelude to the

establishment of communism and the reign of liberty reconquered. "In the place of the old bourgeois society with its classes and its class antagonisms, there will be an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

But for Marx there are two views of revolution. One is that of a final conflagration, "a *violent* suppression of the old conditions of production," which occurs when the opposition between bourgeoisie and proletariat has been carried to its extreme point.

This conception is set forth in a manner inspired by the Hegelian dialectic of the master and the slave, in *Die heilige Familie* (1845; *The Holy Family*). The other conception is that of a permanent revolution involving a provisional coalition between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie rebelling against a capitalism that is only superficially united. Once a majority has been won to the coalition, an unofficial proletarian authority constitutes itself alongside the revolutionary bourgeois authority. Its mission is the political and revolutionary education of the proletariat, gradually assuring the transfer of legal power from the revolutionary bourgeoisie to the revolutionary proletariat.

If one reads *The Communist Manifesto* carefully one discovers inconsistencies that indicate that Marx had not reconciled the concepts of catastrophic and of permanent revolution. Moreover, Marx never analyzed classes as specific groups of people opposing other groups of people. Depending on the writings and the periods, the number of classes varies; and unfortunately the pen fell from Marx's hand at the moment when, in *Das Kapital* (vol. 3), he was about to take up the question. Reading *Das Kapital*, one is furthermore left with an ambiguous impression with regard to the destruction of capitalism: will it be the result of the "general crisis" that Marx expects, or of the action of the conscious proletariat, or of both at once?

* The contributions of Engels :

Engels became a communist in 1842 and discovered the proletariat of England when he took over the management of the Manchester factory belonging to his father's cotton firm. In 1844, the year he began his close association and friendship with Marx, Engels was finishing his *Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie (Outline of a Critique of Political Economy)* a critique of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and J.-B. Say. This remarkable study contained in seminal form the critique that Marx was to make of bourgeois political economy in *Das Kapital*.

During the first years of his stay in Manchester, Engels observed carefully the life of the workers of that great industrial centre and described it in *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England (The Condition of the Working Class in England)*, published in 1845 in Leipzig. This work was an analysis of the evolution of industrial capitalism and its social consequences.

He collaborated with Marx in the writing of *The Holy Family*, *The German Ideology*, and *The Communist Manifesto*. The correspondence between them is of fundamental importance for the student of *Das Kapital*, for it shows how Engels contributed by furnishing Marx with a great amount of technical and economic data and by criticizing the successive drafts. This collaboration lasted until Marx's death and was carried on posthumously with the publication of the manuscripts left by Marx, which Engels edited, forming volumes 2 and 3 of *Das Kapital*. He also wrote various articles on Marx's work.

In response to criticism of Marx's ideas by a socialist named Eugen Dühring, Engels published several articles that were collected under the title *Herr Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (1878; *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, better known as *Anti-Dühring*), and an unfinished work, *Dialektik und Natur (Dialectics of Nature)*, which he had begun around 1875–76.

The importance of these writings to the subsequent development of Marxism can be seen from Lenin's observation that Engels “developed, in a clear and often polemical style, the most general scientific questions and the different phenomena of the past and

present according to the materialist understanding of history and the economic theory of Karl Marx.”

But Engels was driven to simplify problems with a view to being pedagogical; he tended to schematize and systematize things as if the fundamental questions were settled. The connections that he thus established between some of Marx's governing ideas and some of the scientific ideas of his age gave rise to the notion that there is a complete Marxist philosophy. The idea was to play a significant role in the transition of Marxism from a “critique of daily life” to an integrated doctrine in which philosophy, history, and the sciences are fused.

Anti-Dühring is of fundamental importance for it constitutes the link between Marx and certain forms of modern Marxism. It contains three parts: Philosophy, Political Economy, and Socialism. In the first, Engels attempts to establish that the natural sciences and even mathematics are dialectical, in the sense that observable reality is dialectical: the dialectical method of analysis and thought is imposed by the material forces with which they deal. It is thus rightly applied to the study of history and human society. “Motion, in effect, is the mode of existence of matter,” Engels writes.

In using materialistic dialectic to make a critique of Dühring's thesis, according to which political forces prevail over all the rest in the molding of history, Engels provides a good illustration of the materialistic idea of history, which puts the stress on the prime role of economic factors as driving forces in history. The other chapters of the section Political Economy form a very readable introduction to the principal economic ideas of Marx: value (simple and complex), labour, capital, and surplus value. The section Socialism starts by formulating anew the critique of the capitalist system as it was made in *Das Kapital*.

At the end of the chapters devoted to production, distribution, the state, the family, and education, Engels outlines what the socialist society will be like, a society in which the notion of value has no longer anything to do with the distribution of the goods produced because all labour “becomes at once and directly social labour,” and the amount of social labour that every product contains no longer needs to be ascertained by “a detour.”

A production plan will coordinate the economy. The division of labour and the separation of town and country will disappear with the “suppression of the capitalist character of modern industry.” Thanks to the plan, industry will be located throughout the country in the collective interest, and thus the opposition between town and country will disappear—to the profit of both industry and agriculture. Finally, after the liberation of humanity from the condition of servitude imposed by the capitalist mode of production, the state will also be abolished and religion will disappear by “natural death.”

One of the most remarkable features of *Anti-Dühring* is the insistence with which Engels refuses to base socialism on absolute values. He admits only relative values, linked to historical, economic, and social conditions. Socialism cannot possibly be based on ethical principles: each epoch can successfully carry out only that of which it is capable. Marx had written this in his preface of 1859.

❖ German Marxism after Engels ;

* The work of Kautsky and Bernstein :

The theoretical leadership after Engels was taken by Karl Kautsky, editor of the official organ of the German Social Democratic Party, *Die Neue Zeit*. He wrote *Karl Marx' ökonomische Lehren* (1887; *The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx*), in which the work of Marx is presented as essentially an economic theory. Kautsky reduced the ideas of Marx and Marxist historical dialectic to a kind of evolutionism.

He laid stress on the increasing pauperization of the working class and on the increasing degree of capitalist concentration. While opposing all compromise with the bourgeois state, he accepted the contention that the socialist movement should support laws benefiting the workers provided that they did not reinforce the power of the state.

Rejecting the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, he believed that the overthrow of the capitalist state and the acquisition of political power by the working class could be realized in a peaceful way, without upsetting the existing structures. As an internationalist he supported peace, rejecting war and violence. For him, war was a product of capitalism. Such were the main features of “orthodox”

German Marxism at the time when the “revisionist” theories of Eduard Bernstein appeared.

Bernstein created a great controversy with articles that he wrote in 1896 for *Die Neue Zeit*, arguing that Marxism needed to be revised. His divergence widened with the publication in 1899 of *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (Evolutionary Socialism), to which rejoinders were made by Kautsky in *Bernstein und das Sozialdemokratische Programm: Eine Antikritik* (1899; “Bernstein and the Social Democratic Program”) and the Polish-born Marxist Rosa Luxemburg in *Sozialreform oder Revolution* (Reform or Revolution), both in 1899.

Bernstein focused first of all upon the labour theory of value. Along with the economists of his time he considered it outdated, both in the form expounded by British classical economists and as set forth in *Das Kapital*. He argued, moreover, that class struggle was becoming less rather than more intense, for concentration was not accelerating in industry as Marx had forecast, and in agriculture it was not increasing at all.

Bernstein demonstrated this on the basis of German, Dutch, and English statistical data. He also argued that cartels and business syndicates were smoothing the evolution of capitalism, a fact that cast doubt on the validity of Marx's theory of capitalistic crises. Arguing that quite a few of Marx's theories were not scientifically based, Bernstein blamed the Hegelian and Ricardian structure of Marx's work for his failure to take sufficient account of observable reality.

To this, Kautsky replied that, with the development of capitalism, agriculture was becoming a sector more and more dependent on industry, and that in addition an industrialization of agriculture was taking place. Luxemburg took the position that the contradictions of capitalism did not cease to grow with the progress of finance capitalism and the exploitation of the colonies, and that these contradictions were leading to a war that would give the proletariat its opportunity to assume power by revolutionary means.

✧ The radicals;

One of the most divisive questions was that of war and peace. This was brought to the fore at the outbreak of World War I, when Social Democratic deputies in the German Reichstag voted for the financing of the war. Among German Marxists who opposed the war were Karl Liebknecht and Luxemburg. Liebknecht was imprisoned in 1916 for agitating against the war.

On his release in 1918 he took the leadership of the Spartacus League, which was later to become the Communist Party of Germany. Luxemburg had also been arrested for her antimilitary activities. In addition to her articles, signed Junius, in which she debated with Lenin on the subject of World War I and the attitude of the Marxists toward it (published in 1916 as *Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie* [*The Crisis in the German Social-Democracy*]), she is known for her book *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals* (1913; *The Accumulation of Capital*).

In this work she returned to Marx's economic analysis of capitalism, in particular the accumulation of capital as expounded in volume 2 of *Das Kapital*. There she found a contradiction that had until then been unnoticed: Marx's scheme seems to imply that the development of capitalism can be indefinite, though elsewhere he sees the contradictions of the system as bringing about increasingly violent economic crises that will inevitably sweep capitalism away.

Luxemburg concluded that Marx's scheme is oversimplified and assumes a universe made up entirely of capitalists and workers. If increases in productivity are taken into account, she asserted, balance between the two sectors becomes impossible; in order to keep expanding, capitalists must find new markets in noncapitalist spheres, either among peasants and artisans or in colonies and underdeveloped countries. Capitalism will collapse only when exploitation of the world outside it (the peasantry, colonies, and so on) has reached a limit. This conclusion has been the subject of passionate controversies.

✧ The Austrians:

The Austrian school came into being when Austrian socialists started publishing their works independently of the Germans; it can be dated from either 1904 (beginning of the *Marx-Studien* collection) or 1907 (publication of the magazine *Der Kampf*). The most important members of the school were Max Adler, Karl Renner, Rudolf Hilferding, Gustav Eckstein, Friedrich Adler, and Otto Bauer.

The most eminent was Bauer, a brilliant theoretician whose *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (1906; “The Nationalities Question and the Social Democracy”) was critically reviewed by Lenin. In this work he dealt with the problem of nationalities in the light of the experience of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He favoured the self-determination of peoples and emphasized the cultural elements in the concept of nationhood. Hilferding was finance minister of the German Republic after World War I in the Cabinets of the Social Democrats Gustav Stresemann (1923) and Hermann Müller (1928). He is known especially for his work *Das Finanzkapital* (1910), in which he maintained that capitalism had come under the control of banks and industrial monopolies.

The growth of national competition and tariff barriers, he believed, had led to economic warfare abroad. Hilferding's ideas strongly influenced Lenin, who analyzed them in *Imperializm, kak noveyshy etap kapitalizma* (1917; *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*).

✧ Russian and Soviet Marxism :

Das Kapital was translated into Russian in 1872. Marx kept up more or less steady relations with the Russian socialists and took an interest in the economic and social conditions of the tsarist empire. The person who originally introduced Marxism into Russia was Georgy Plekhanov, but the person who adapted Marxism to Russian conditions was Lenin.

✱ Vladimir Ilich Lenin, 1918:

Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov, or Lenin, was born in 1870 at Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk). He entered the University of Kazan to study law but was expelled the same year for participating in student agitation. In 1893 he settled in St. Petersburg and became actively involved with the revolutionary workers. With his pamphlet *Chto delat?* (1902; *What Is to Be Done?*), he specified the theoretical principles and organization of a Marxist party as he thought it should be constituted.'

He took part in the second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, which was held in Brussels and London (1903), and induced the majority of the Congress members to adopt his views. Two factions formed at the Congress: the Bolshevik (from the Russian word for "larger") with Lenin as the leader and the Menshevik (from the Russian word for "smaller") with L. Martov at the head. The former wanted a restricted party of militants and advocated the dictatorship of the proletariat. The latter wanted a wide-open proletarian party, collaboration with the liberals, and a democratic constitution for Russia.

In his pamphlet *Shag vperyod, dva shaga nazad* (1904; *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*), Lenin compared the organizational principles of the Bolsheviks to those of the Mensheviks. After the failure of the Russian Revolution of 1905, he drew positive lessons for the future in *Dve taktiki Sotsial-Demokraty v demokraticeskoy revolyutsii* (1905; *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*). He fiercely attacked the influence of Kantian philosophy on German and Russian Marxism in *Materializm i empiriokrititsizm* (1908; *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (1908).

In 1912 at the Prague Conference the Bolsheviks constituted themselves as an independent party. During World War I Lenin resided in Switzerland, where he studied Hegel's *Science of Logic* and the development of capitalism and carried on debates with Marxists like Luxemburg on the meaning of the war and the right of nations to self-determination. In 1915 at Zimmerwald, and in 1916 at Kiental, he organized two international socialist conferences to fight against the war. Immediately after the February 1917 revolution he returned to Russia, and in October the Bolshevik coup brought him to power.

The situation of Russia and the Russian revolutionary movement at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th led Lenin to diverge, in the course of his

development and his analyses, from the positions both of “orthodox Marxism” and of “revisionism.” He rediscovered the original thought of Marx by a careful study of his works, in particular *Das Kapital* and *The Holy Family*. He saw Marxism as a practical affair and tried to go beyond the accepted formulas to plan political action that would come to grips with the surrounding world.

As early as 1894, in his populist study *Chto Takoye “Druzya Naroda,” kak oni voyuyut protiv Sotsial-Demokratov? (What the “Friends of the People” Are, and How They Fight the Social-Democrats)*, Lenin took up Marx's distinction between “material social relations” and “ideological social relations.”

In Lenin's eyes the importance of *Das Kapital* was that “while explaining the structure and the development of the social formation seen *exclusively* in terms of its relations of production, (Marx) has nevertheless everywhere and always analyzed the superstructure which corresponds to these relations of production.” In *Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossi (1897–99; The Development of Capitalism in Russia)* Lenin sought to apply Marx's analysis by showing the growing role of capital, in particular commercial capital, in the exploitation of the workers in the factories and the large-scale expropriation of the peasants. It was thus possible to apply to Russia the models developed by Marx for western Europe. At the same time Lenin did not lose sight of the importance of the peasant in Russian society. Although a disciple of Marx, he did not believe that he had only to repeat Marx's conclusions. He wrote:

We do not consider the theory of Marx to be a complete, immutable whole. We think on the contrary that this theory has only laid the cornerstone of the science, a science which socialists must further develop in all directions if they do not want to let themselves be overtaken by life. We think that, for the Russian socialists, an independent elaboration of the theory is particularly necessary.

Lenin laid great stress upon the dialectical method. In his early writings he defined the dialectic as “nothing more nor less than the method of sociology, which sees society as a living organism, in perpetual development (and not as something mechanically assembled and thus allowing all sorts of arbitrary combinations of the various social elements) . . . ” (*Friends of the People*). After having studied Hegel toward the end of

1914, he took a more activist view. Dialectic is not only evolution; it is praxis, leading from activity to reflection and from reflection to action.

✱ The dictatorship of the proletariat:

Lenin also put much emphasis on the leading role of the party. As early as 1902 he was concerned with the need for a cohesive party with a correct doctrine, adapted to the exigencies of the period, which would be a motive force among the masses, helping to bring them to an awareness of their real situation. In *What Is To Be Done?* he called for a party of professional revolutionaries, disciplined and directed, capable of defeating the police; its aim should be to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In order to do this, he wrote in *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, it was necessary “to subject the insurrection of the proletarian and *non-proletarian* masses to our influence, to our direction, to use it in our best interests.” But this was not possible without a doctrine: “Without revolutionary theory, no revolutionary movement.” On the eve of the revolution of October 1917, in *Gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya* (*The State and Revolution*), he set forth the conditions for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the suppression of the capitalist state.

Lenin assigned major importance to the peasantry in formulating his program. It would be a serious error, he held, for the Russian revolutionary workers' movement to neglect the peasants. Even though it was clear that the industrial proletariat constituted the vanguard of the revolution, the discontent of the peasantry could be oriented in a direction favourable to the revolution by placing among the goals of the party the seizure of privately owned land.

As early as 1903, at the third congress of the party, he secured a resolution to this effect. Thereafter, the dictatorship of the proletariat became the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. In 1917 he encouraged the peasants to seize land long before the approval of agrarian reform by the Constituent Assembly.

Among Lenin's legacies to Soviet Marxism was one that proved to be injurious to the party. This was the decision taken at his behest by the 10th congress of the party in the spring of 1921, while the sailors were rebelling at Kronstadt and the peasants were

growing restless in the countryside, to forbid all factions, all factional activity, and all opposition political platforms within the party. This decision had grave consequences in later years when Stalin used it against his oppon

✱ Joseph Stalin, 1950.

It is Joseph Stalin who codified the body of ideas that, under the name of Marxism-Leninism, constituted the official doctrine of the Soviet and eastern European communist parties. Stalin was a man of action in a slightly different sense than was Lenin. Gradually taking over power after Lenin's death in 1924, he pursued the development of the Soviet Union with great vigour.

By practicing Marxism, he assimilated it, at the same time simplifying it. Stalin's Marxism-Leninism rests on the dialectic of Hegel, as set forth in *Istoriya Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (Bolshevikov): Kratky kurs* (1938; *A Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*), and on a materialism that can be considered roughly identical to that of Feuerbach. His work *Voprosy leninizma* (1926; *Problems of Leninism*), which appeared in 11 editions during his lifetime, sets forth an ideology of power and activism that rides roughshod over the more nuanced approach of Lenin.

Soviet dialectical materialism can be reduced to four laws:

(1) History is a dialectical development. It proceeds by successive phases that supersede one another. These phases are not separate, any more than birth, growth, and death are separate. Though it is true that phase B necessarily negates phase A, it remains that phase B was already contained in phase A and was initiated by it.

The dialectic does not regard nature as an accidental accumulation of objects, of isolated and independent phenomena, but as a unified, coherent whole. Furthermore, nature is perpetually in movement, in a state of unceasing renewal and development, in which there is always something being born and developing and something disintegrating and disappearing.

(2) Evolution takes place in leaps, not gradually.

(3) Contradictions must be made manifest. All phenomena contain in themselves contradictory elements. "Dialectic starts from the point of view that objects and natural phenomena imply internal contradictions, because they all have a positive and a negative side." These contradictory elements are in perpetual struggle: it is this struggle that is the "internal content of the process of development," according to Stalin. (4) The law of this development is economic. All other contradictions are rooted in the basic economic relationship. A given epoch is entirely determined by the relations of production.

They are social relations; relations of collaboration or mutual aid, relations of domination or submission; and finally, transitory relations that characterize a period of passage from one system to another. "The history of the development of society is, above all, the history of the development of production, the history of the modes of production which succeed one another through the centuries."

From these principles may be drawn the following inferences, essential for penetrating the workings of Marxist-Leninist thought and its application. No natural phenomenon, no historical or social situation, no political fact, can be considered independently of the other facts or phenomena that surround it; it is set within a whole. Since movement is the essential fact, one must distinguish between what is beginning to decay and what is being born and developing. Since the process of development takes place by leaps, one passes suddenly from a succession of slow quantitative changes to a radical qualitative change.

In the social or political realm, these sudden qualitative changes are revolutions, carried out by the oppressed classes. One must follow a frankly proletarian-class policy that exposes the contradictions of the capitalist system. A reformist policy makes no sense. Consequently (1) nothing can be judged from the point of view of "eternal justice" or any other preconceived notion and (2) no social system is immutable. To be effective, one must not base one's action on social strata that are no longer developing, even if they represent for the moment the dominant force, but on those that are developing.

Stalin's materialist and historical dialectic differs sharply from the perspective of Karl Marx. In *The Communist Manifesto* Marx applied the materialist dialectic to the social and political life of his time. In the chapter entitled "Bourgeois and Proletarians," he studied the process of the growth of the revolutionary bourgeoisie within feudal society, then the genesis and the growth of the proletariat within capitalism, placing the emphasis on the struggle between antagonistic classes.

To be sure, he connected social evolution with the development of the forces of production. What counted for him, however, was not only the struggle but also the birth of consciousness among the proletariat. "As to the final victory of the propositions put forth in the *Manifesto*, Marx expected it to come primarily from the intellectual development of the working class, necessarily the result of common action and discussion" (Engels, preface to the republication of *The Communist Manifesto*, May 1, 1890).

The result of Stalin's dialectic, however, was what he called revolution from above, a dictatorial policy to increase industrialization and collectivize agriculture based upon ruthless repression and a strong centralization of power. For Stalin what counted was the immediate goal, the practical result. The move was from a dialectic that emphasized both the objective and the subjective to one purely objective, or more exactly, objectivist. Human actions are to be judged not by taking account of the intentions of the actor and their place in a given historical web but only in terms of what they signify objectively at the end of the period considered.

✧ Trotskyism :

✧ Leon Trotsky:

Alongside Marxism-Leninism as expounded in the former Soviet Union, there arose another point of view expressed by Stalin's opponent Leon Trotsky and his followers (see Trotskyism). Trotsky played a leading role in both the Russian Revolution of 1905 and that of 1917. After Lenin's death he fell out with Stalin. Their conflict turned largely upon questions of policy, both domestic and foreign.

In the realm of ideas, Trotsky held that a revolution in a backward, rural country could be carried out only by the proletariat. Once in power the proletariat must carry out agrarian reform and undertake the accelerated development of the economy.

The revolution must be a socialist one, involving the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production, or else it will fail. But the revolution cannot be carried out in isolation, as Stalin maintained it could. The capitalist countries will try to destroy it; moreover, to succeed the revolution must be able to draw upon the industrial techniques of the developed countries. For these reasons the revolution must be worldwide and permanent, directed against the liberal and nationalist bourgeoisie of all countries and using local victories to advance the international struggle.

Tactically, Trotsky emphasized the necessity of finding or creating a revolutionary situation, of educating the working class in order to revolutionize it, of seeing that the party remained open to the various revolutionary tendencies and avoided becoming bureaucratized, and finally, when the time for insurrection comes, of organizing it according to a detailed plan.

✧ Variants of Marxism :

✧ Maoism : is Mostly Taken as A point of View Chairmen Mao Presented in His Red book and Diaries .

➤ Mao Zedong:

When the Chinese communists took power in 1948, they brought with them a new kind of Marxism that came to be called Maoism after their leader Mao Zedong. The thought of Mao must always be seen against the changing revolutionary reality of China from 1930 onward. His thought was complex, a Marxist type of analysis combined with the permanent fundamentals of Chinese thought and culture.

One of its central elements has to do with the nature and role of contradictions in socialist society. For Mao, every society, including socialist (communist) society, contained “two different types of contradictions”:

(1) antagonistic contradictions between us (the people) and our enemies (the Chinese bourgeoisie faithful), between the imperialist camp and the socialist camp, and so forth—which are resolved by revolution.

(2) non antagonistic contradictions between the government and the people under a socialist regime, between two groups within the Communist Party, between one section of the people and another under a communist regime, and so forth which are resolved by vigorous fraternal criticism and self-criticism.

The notion of contradiction is specific to Mao's thought in that it differs from the conceptions of Marx or Lenin. For Mao, in effect, contradictions were at the same time universal and particular. In their universality, one must seek and discover what constitutes their particularity:

Every contradiction displays a particular character, depending on the nature of things and phenomena. Contradictions have alternating aspects—sometimes strongly marked, sometimes blurred. Some of these aspects are primary, others secondary. It is important

to define them well, for if one fails to do so, the analysis of the social reality and the actions that follow from it will be mistaken. This is quite far from Stalinism and dogmatic Marxism-Leninism.

Another essential element of Mao's thought, which must be seen in the context of revolutionary China, is the notion of permanent revolution. It is an old idea advocated in different contexts by Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky but lacking, in Mao's formulation, the international dimension espoused by his predecessors. For Mao it followed from his ideas about the struggle of humans against nature (held from 1938, at least); the campaigns for the rectification of thought (1942, 1951, 1952);

and the necessity of struggling against bureaucracy, waste, and corruption in a country then possessing 600 to 700 million inhabitants, where very old civilizations and cultures still permeated both the bourgeois classes and the peasantry, where bureaucracy was thoroughly entrenched, and where the previous society was extremely corrupt. It arose from Mao's conviction that the rhythm of the revolution must be accelerated. This conviction appeared in 1957 in his speeches and became manifest in 1958 in the Great Leap Forward, followed in 1966 by the Cultural Revolution.

Mao's concept of permanent revolution rests upon the existence of non antagonistic contradictions in the China of the present and of the future. The people must be mobilized into a permanent movement in order to carry forward the revolution and to prevent the ruling group from turning bourgeois (as he perceived it had in the Soviet Union).

It is necessary to shape among the masses a new vision of the world by tearing them from their passivity and their century-old habits. This is the background of the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966, following previous campaigns but differing from them in its magnitude and, it would seem, in the mobilization of youth against the cadres of the party.

In these campaigns Mao drew upon his past as a revolutionary Marxist peasant leader, from his life in the red military and peasant bases and among the Red Guards of Yenan, seeking in his past experience ways to mobilize the whole Chinese population against the dangers—internal and external—that confronted it in the present.

The distinguishing characteristic of Maoism is that it represents a peasant type of Marxism, with a principally rural and military outlook. While basing himself on Marxism-Leninism, adapted to Chinese requirements, Mao was rooted in the peasant life from which he himself came, in the revolts against the warlords and the bureaucrats that have filled the history of China. By integrating this experience into a universal vision of history, Mao gave it a significance that flows beyond the provincial limits of China.

In his effort to remain close to the Chinese peasant masses, Mao drew upon an idea of nature and a symbolism found in popular Chinese Daoism, though transformed by his Marxism. It can be seen in his many poems, which were written in the classical Chinese style. This idea of nature is accompanied in his written political works by the Promethean idea of humanity struggling in a war against nature, a conception in his thought that goes back at least to 1938 and became more important after 1955 as the rhythm of the revolution accelerated.

➤ Marxism in Cuba :

The Marxism of Fidel Castro expressed itself as a rejection of injustice in any form—political, economic, or social. In this sense it is related to the liberal democracy and Pan-Americanism of Simón Bolívar in Latin America during the 19th century. In its liberalism, Castro's early socialism resembled the various French socialisms of the first half of the 19th century.

Only gradually did Castroism come to identify itself with Marxism-Leninism, although from the very beginning of the Cuban revolution Castro revealed his attachment to certain of Marx's ideas. Castro's Marxism rejects some of the tenets and practices of official Marxism-Leninism: it is outspoken against dogmatism, bureaucracy, and sectarianism.

In one sense, Castroism is a Marxist-Leninist “heresy.” It exalts the ethos of guerrilla revolution over party politics. At the same time it aims to apply a purer Marxism to the conditions of Cuba: alleged American imperialism, a single-crop economy, a low initial level of political and economic development. One may call it an attempt to realize a synthesis of Marxist ideas and the ideas of Bolívar.

➤ **Marxism in the developing world:**

The emergence of Marxist variants in the developing world was primarily influenced by the undeveloped industrial state and the former colonial status of the nations in question. In the traditional Marxist view, the growth of capitalism is seen as a step necessary for the breakup of precapitalist peasant society and for the rise of the revolutionary proletariat class. Some theorists believed, however, that capitalism introduced by imperialist rather than indigenous powers sustains rather than destroys the feudal structure of peasant society and promotes underdevelopment because resources and surplus are usurped by the colonial powers.

Furthermore, the revolutionary socialist movement becomes subordinate to that of national liberation, which violates Marx's theory of class struggle by uniting all indigenous classes in the common cause of anti-imperialism. For these reasons, many developing countries chose to follow the Maoist model, with its emphasis on agrarian revolution against feudalism and imperialism, rather than the old Soviet one. Another alternative, one specific to the developing world, bypassed capitalism and depended upon the established strength of other communist countries for support against imperialism.

➤ **Marxism in the West :**

There are two main forms of Marxism in the West: that of the traditional communist parties and the more diffuse New Left form, which is also known as Western Marxism. In general, the success of western European communist parties had been hindered by their perceived allegiance to the old Soviet authority rather than their own countries; the secretive, bureaucratic form of organization they inherited from Lenin; the ease with which they became integrated into capitalist society; and their consequent fear of compromising their principles by sharing power with bourgeois parties.

The Western parties basically adhered to the policies of Soviet Marxism until the 1970s, when they began to advocate Euro communism, a moderate version of communism that they felt would broaden their base of appeal beyond the working class and thus improve

their chances for political success. As described by Enrico Berlinguer, Georges Marchais, and Santiago Carrillo, the leaders in the 1970s and '80s of the Italian, French, and Spanish communist parties, respectively, Euro communism favoured a peaceful, democratic approach to achieving socialism, encouraged making alliances with other political parties, guaranteed civil liberties, and renounced the central authority of the Soviet party. By the 1980s, however, Eurocommunism had largely been abandoned as unsuccessful, and communist parties in advanced capitalist nations returned to orthodox Marxism-Leninism despite the concomitant problems.

Western Marxism, however, can be seen as a repudiation of Marxism-Leninism, although, when it was first formulated in the 1920s, its proponents believed they were loyal to the dominant Soviet Communist Party. Prominent figures in the evolution of Western Marxism included the central Europeans György Lukács, Karl Korsch, and Lucien Goldmann; Antonio Gramsci of Italy; the German theorists who constituted the Frankfurt School, especially Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jürgen Habermas; and Henri Lefebvre, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty of France.

Western Marxism has been shaped primarily by the failure of the socialist revolution in the Western world. Western Marxists were concerned less with the actual political or economic practice of Marxism than with its philosophical interpretation, especially in relation to cultural and historical studies. In order to explain the inarguable success of capitalist society, they felt they needed to explore and understand non-Marxist approaches and all aspects of bourgeois culture. Eventually, they came to believe that traditional Marxism was not relevant to the reality of modern Western society.

Marx had predicted that revolution would succeed in Europe first, but, in fact, the developing world proved more responsive. Orthodox Marxism also championed the technological achievements associated with capitalism, viewing them as essential to the progress of socialism.

Experience showed the Western Marxists, however, that technology did not necessarily produce the crises Marx described and did not lead inevitably to revolution. In particular they disagreed with the idea, originally emphasized by Engels, that Marxism

is an integrated, scientific doctrine that can be applied universally to nature; they viewed it as a critique of human life, not an objective, general science.

Disillusioned by the terrorism of the Stalin era and the bureaucracy of the communist party system, they advocated the idea of government by workers' councils, which they believed would eliminate professional politicians and would more truly represent the interests of the working class. Later, when the working class appeared to them to be too well integrated into the capitalist system, the Western Marxists supported more anarchistic tactics. In general, their views are more in accord with those found in Marx's early, humanist writings rather than with his later, dogmatic interpretations.

Western Marxism has found support primarily among intellectuals rather than the working class, and orthodox Marxists have judged it impractical. Nevertheless, the Western Marxists' emphasis on Marx's social theory and their critical assessment of Marxist methodology and ideas have coloured the way even non-Marxists view the world.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ "Marxism." Encyclopedia Britannica. Opcite.

Critics of traditional anthropology view it as a form of colonialism and exploitation. This notion has gained ground as anthropologists have studied the history of their own discipline and reexamined the relationship between the development of anthropology and colonialism. Moreover, traditional anthropology has always been dominated by the ideas, research, and writing of white Europeans and Americans. This, too, is changing, as increasing numbers of people from diverse cultural backgrounds are working in anthropology and cultural studies.

Researchers working in cultural studies have also redefined culture. They tend to view culture as something that people continually negotiate over with each other, rather than as something they share. This view makes sense to a generation of anthropologists who grew up in the 1960s in the United States and Europe. During that time, young people challenged the cultural traditions of their parents and questioned such important problems as racism, sexism, and the violence of modern warfare. They also began to view some of the world's worst problems—such as ethnic violence, poverty, and environmental destruction—as legacies of the colonial era that also gave rise to anthropology.

Many researchers in cultural studies have worked to *deconstruct* (take apart to analyze and critique) traditional ethnographies and other types of anthropological research. Their analyses demonstrate that a good deal of this older research might have misrepresented or negatively affected the cultures described. The practice of critiquing early anthropological work requires no special anthropological training or fieldwork. Thus, the field of cultural studies includes people schooled in such diverse topics as literature, gender studies, sociology, and history.

Some anthropologists have reacted against the anti science critiques of postmodernism. They reject the position that scientific research cannot teach us anything about the nature of the world or humanity. But critiques of traditional anthropological practices may improve the quality of anthropological work by making researchers even more conscious about the methods they use.¹²⁶

Few important personalities how discussed culture and civilization in power and intellectual perspective are coming bellow:

✱ Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) :

British historian, known for his view of the past as a succession of civilizations rather than political entities.

Arnold Joseph Toynbee was born on April 14, 1889, and educated at Balliol College, University of Oxford. From 1912 to 1915 he was a fellow and tutor in ancient history at Balliol College, and he served as professor of Modern Greek and Byzantine history at the University of London from 1919 to 1924.

From 1925 until his retirement in 1955 he was director of studies in the Royal Institute of International Affairs and research professor of international history at the University of London. He served in the Foreign Office of the British government during World War I and World War II and represented the British government at the peace conferences following both wars. He died in York, England, on October 22, 1975.

Of the many books written by Toynbee, the 12-volume series *A Study of History* (1934-61) has had considerable influence on modern attitudes toward history, religion, and international affairs. This monumental work is based on Toynbee's thesis that history reflects the progress of civilizations or societies rather than of nations.

It is a comparative study of 26 civilizations in world history, analyzing their genesis, growth, and disintegration. According to Toynbee's hypothesis, the failure of a civilization to survive was the result of its inability to respond to moral and religious challenges, rather than to physical or environmental challenges.

¹²⁶ Bodley, John H. "Anthropology." Microsoft® Encarta.opcite.

Among the other books written by Toynbee are *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (1922), *The World and the West* (1953), *Acquaintances* (1967), and *Experiences* (1969). Although admired for his vast scholarship and deeply philosophical approach, Toynbee was also criticized for his tendency to generalize and to stress regeneration through religion.¹²⁷

✳ **Edward Said (1935-2003):**

Palestinian American writer and educator. In his writings and lectures, Said was highly critical of Western portrayals of Arabs and of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. For much of his life he was a passionate advocate of the cause of Palestinians displaced by the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. His outspoken views gained him both admirers and fierce critics.

Said was born in Jerusalem into a prosperous Palestinian Christian family. With the partition of Palestine in 1947, his family moved to Cairo, Egypt. He studied at the American School and Victoria College in Cairo before being sent to the United States to complete his education. After receiving an A.B. degree from Princeton University in 1957, Said studied English literature at Harvard University.

He earned an M.A. degree in 1960 and a Ph.D. degree, with a dissertation on Polish-born writer Joseph Conrad, in 1964. Said identified with Conrad's sense of being an exile and took inspiration from Conrad's exploration of colonialism. He joined the faculty of Columbia University in 1963 and remained there for the rest of his life, teaching English and comparative literature.

Said is best-known for his book *Orientalism* (1978), which discusses the attitude of Western intellectuals toward the East, and in particular toward the Middle East. Said argued that Westerners have a limited, oversimplified concept of the Middle East and its history. This view, he said, goes hand in hand with political imperialism.

¹²⁷ "Arnold Toynbee." Microsoft® Encarta.ibid.

Orientalism by Edward Said is a canonical text of cultural studies in which he has challenged the concept of orientalism or the difference between east and west, as he puts it. He says that with the start of European colonization the Europeans came in contact with the lesser developed countries of the east.

They found their civilization and culture very exotic, and established the science of orientalism, which was the study of the orientals or the people from these exotic civilization. Edward Said argues that the Europeans divided the world into two parts; the east and the west or the occident and the orient or the civilized and the, uncivilized. This was totally an artificial boundary; and it was laid on the basis of the concept of them and us or theirs and ours. The Europeans used orientalism to, define themselves. Some particular attributes were associated with the orientals, and whatever the orientals weren't the occidentals were. The Europeans define themselves as the superior race compared to the orientals; and they justified their colonization by this concept.

They said that it was their duty towards the world to civilize the uncivilized world. The main problem, however, arose when the Europeans started generalizing the attributes they associated with orientals, and started portraying these artificial characteristics associated with orientals in their western world through their scientific reports, literary work, and other media sources. What happened was that it created a certain image about the orientals in the European mind and in doing that infused a bias in the European attitude towards the orientals. This prejudice was also found in the orientalist (scientist studying the orientals);

and all their scientific research and reports were under the influence of this. The generalized attributes associated with the orientals can be seen even today, for example, the Arabs are defined as uncivilized people; and Islam is seen as religion of the terrorist.

✧ A brief Summary brief summary of His Book Orientalism:

✧ Chapter 1: The Scope of Orientalism.

In this chapter, Edward Said explains how the science of orientalism developed and how the orientals started considering the orientals as non-human beings. The orientals divided the world into two parts by using the concept of ours and theirs. An imaginary geographical line was drawn between what was ours and what was theirs.

The orientals were regarded as uncivilized people; and the westerners said that since they were the refined race it was their duty to civilize these people and in order to achieve their goal, they had to colonize and rule the orientals. They said that the orientals themselves were incapable of running their own government.

The Europeans also thought that they had the right to represent the orientals in the west all by themselves. In doing so, they shaped the orientals the way they perceived them or in other words they were orientalizing the orientals. Various teams have been sent to the east where the orientals silently observed the orientals by living with them; and every thing the orientals said and did was recorded irrespective of its context, and projected to the civilized world of the west.

This resulted in the generalization. Whatever was seen by the orientals was associated with the oriental culture, no matter if it is the irrational action of an individual. The most important use of orientalism to the Europeans was that they defined themselves by defining the orientals.

For example, qualities such as lazy, irrational, uncivilized, crudeness were related to the orientals, and automatically the Europeans became active, rational, civilized, sophisticated.

Thus, in order to achieve this goal, it was very necessary for the orientalist to generalize the culture of the orientals. Another feature of orientalism was that the

culture of the orientals was explained to the European audience by linking them to the western culture, for example, Islam was made into Mohammadism because Mohammad was the founder of this religion and since religion of Christ was called Christianity; thus, Islam should be called Mohammadism. The point to be noted here is that no Muslim was aware of this terminology and this was a completely western created term, and to which the Muslims had no say at all.

Chapter 2: Orientalist Structures and Restructures

In this chapter, Edward Said points the slight change in the attitude of the Europeans towards the orientals. The orientals were really publicized in the European world especially through their literary work. Oriental land and behaviour was highly romanticized by the European poets and writers and then presented to the western world.

The orientalist had made a stage strictly for the European viewers, and the orientals were presented to them with the colour of the orientalist or other writers perception. In fact, the orient lands were so highly romanticized that western literary writers found it necessary to offer pilgrimage to these exotic lands of pure sun light and clean oceans in order to experience peace of mind, and inspiration for their writing. The east was now perceived by the orientalist as a place of pure human culture with no necessary evil in the society.

Actually it was this purity of the orientals that made them inferior to the clever, witty, diplomatic, far-sighted European; Thus it was their right to rule and study such an innocent race. The Europeans said that these people were too naïve to deal with the cruel world, and that they needed the European fatherly role to assist them.

Another justification the Europeans gave to their colonization was that they were meant to rule the orientals since they have developed sooner than the orientals as a nation, which shows that they were biologically superior, and secondly it were the Europeans who discovered the orientals not the orientals who discovered the

Europeans. Darwin's theories were put forward to justify their superiority, biologically by the Europeans.

In this chapter, Edward Said also explains how the two most renowned orientalist of the 19 century, namely Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan worked and gave orientalism a new dimension. In fact, Edward Said compliments the contribution made by Sacy in the field.

He says that Sacy organized the whole thing by arranging the information in such a way that it was also useful for the future orientalist. And secondly, the prejudice that was inherited by every orientalist was considerably low in him.

On the other hand, Renan who took advantage of Sacy's work was as biased as any previous orientalist. He believed that the science of orientalism and the science of philology have a very important relation; and after Renan this idea was given a lot of attention and many future orientalist worked on in its line.

Chapter 3 : Orientalism Now :

This chapter starts off by telling us that how the geography of the world was shaped by the colonization of the Europeans. There was a quest for geographical knowledge which formed the bases of orientalism. The author then talks about the changing circumstances of the world politics and changing approach to orientalism in the 20 century.

The main difference was that where the earlier orientalist were more of silent observers the new orientalist took a part in the every day life of the orient. The earlier orientalist did not interact a lot with the orient, whereas the new orientalist lived with them as if they were one of them. This wasn't out of appreciation of their lifestyle but was to know more about the orient in order to rule them properly. Lawrence of Arabia was one of such orientalist.

Then Edward Said goes on to talk about two other scholars Massignon and Gibb. Though Massignon was a bit liberal with orientalist and often tried to

protect their rights, there was still inherited biased found in him for the orientals, which can be seen in his work. With the changing world situation especially after, World War 1, orientalism took a more liberal stance towards most of its subjects; but Islamic orientalism did not enjoy this status. There were constant attacks to show Islam as a weak religion, and a mixture of many religions and thoughts. Gibb was the most famous Islamic orientalist of this time. After World War 1 the centre of orientalism moved from Europe to USA.

One important transformation that took place during this time was instances of relating it to philology and it was related to social science now. All the orientalist studied the orientals to assist their government to come up with policies for dealing with the orient countries.

With the end of World War 2, all the Europeans colonies were lost; and it was believed that there were no more orientals and occidentals, but this was surely not the case. Western prejudice towards eastern countries was still very explicit, and often they managed to generalize most of the eastern countries because of it.

For example Arabs were often represented as cruel and violent people. Japanese were always associated with karate where as, the Muslims were always considered to be terrorists. Thus, this goes on to show, that even with increasing globalization and awareness, such bias was found in the people of the developed countries. Edward Said concludes his book by saying that he is not saying that the orientalist should not make generalization, or they should include the orient perspective too, but creating a boundary at the first place is something which should not be done.¹²⁸

✱ In *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) Said drew similar perceptions from works of Western literature—perceptions of the East as the “other,” of peoples barbaric and limited, of Oriental despots, and of cultures both exotic and degenerate.

¹²⁸ (<https://neoenglish.wordpress.com/2010/10/17/chapter-wise-summary-of-orientalism-by-edward-said/>) .

+ "Edward Said." Microsoft® Encarta. opcite.

- ✱ Said argued that these perceptions remain influential today and have an impact on politics, particularly on policies toward the Middle East and on views of Arabs. Said's ideas influenced a rising generation of educators in former colonies and formed the main foundation for the new field of postcolonial studies. His other books include *Covering Islam* (1981), *The Politics of Dispossession* (1994), a memoir of his early years called *Out of Place* (1999), and a collection of essays entitled *Reflections on Exile* (2001). His final critical work, *On Late Style*, was published posthumously in 2006.

➤ Summary of culture and imperialism:

Edward Said, a brilliant and unique amalgam of scholar, literary critic and political activist, examines the roots of imperialism in the Western culture and traces the relationship between culture and imperialism. Imperialism has always fascinated the literary writers and political thinkers as a subject. It was a major theme of nineteenth and twentieth century native and non-native novelists and poets. Different writers have different perception about the phenomenon.

A lot has been written on the subject in the past but Edward's book *Culture and Imperialism* attracted everybody's attention. This book was read and discussed in all parts of the world and was hailed by reviewers and critics as a monumental work.

In the Introduction to *Culture and Imperialism*, Edward states that his previous work *Orientalism* was limited to Middle East, and in the present book he wanted to describe a more general pattern of relationship between the modern West and its overseas territories. This book, he says, is not a sequel of *Orientalism*, as it aims at something different.

According to Edward there are two types of attitudes towards culture. One that considers culture as a concept that includes refining and elevating element, each society's reservoir of best that has been known and thought. The other is the aggressive, protectionist attitude viewing culture as a source of identity that differentiates between 'us and 'them', and power with which we can combat the influences of the foreign cultures.

Such an attitude is opposed to liberal philosophies, as multiculturalism and hybridism, and has often lead to religious and- nationalist fundamentalism. Culture

conceived in this way becomes a protective enclosure that divorces us from the everyday world.

“I have found it a challenge not to see culture in this way- that is, antiseptically quarantined from worldly affiliations, but as an extraordinary field of endeavour.”

Edward Said sees the European writing on Africa, India, Ireland, Far East and other lands as part of European effort to rule distant lands. He says that Colonial and post-Colonial fiction is central to his argument. These writings present the colonised lands as ‘mysterious lands’ inhabited by uncivilized barbarians, who understood only the language of violence, and deserved to be ruled.

This is a misrepresentation of the native people and their cultures, and needs to be redressed. Edward Said finds a connection between these narratives and the imperial process, of which they are a part. These writing ignore the important aspect of the reality- the native people and their culture.

Edward Said refers to two novels in order to explain what he had in mind: Dickens’ *Great Expectations*, and Joseph Conrad’s *Nostromo*. Dickens’ *Great Expectations* is a primarily a story about Pip’s vain attempt to become a gentleman. Early in life Pip helps a condemned convict, Abel Magwitch, who after being transported to Australia, pays back Pip with huge sums of money through his lawyer. Magwitch reappears illegally in London after sometime. Pip does not welcome him and rejects him as an unpleasant criminal. Magwitch is unacceptable being from Australia, a penal colony designed for rehabilitation of English criminals. This is a remarkable novel, according to Said, but the focus of the narrative is London, not Australia.

Dickens did not bother to discuss the plight of the convicts in Australia, from where they could never return. In Said’s judgment the prohibition placed on Magwitch’s return is not only penal but also imperial. These ugly criminals could not be allowed to return to England-the land of decent people.

Conrad’s *Nostromo*, the second example picked up by Said, is set in a Central American Republic, independent, but dominated by outside interests because of its immense silver mines. In this novel Holroyd, the American financier tells Charles Gould, the British owner of a mine:

‘We shall run the world’s business whether the world likes it or not. The world can’t help it- and neither we can, I guess.’ This is the general thinking of the imperialists.

Much of the rhetoric of 'The New World Order' with its self-assumed responsibility of civilizing the world, seems to be originated from this thinking, says Edward Said,

The problem with Conrad is that he writes as a man whose Western view of Non-Western world is so ingrained in as to blind him to other histories, other cultures and other aspirations. He could never understand that India, Africa and South Africa had lives and cultures of their own, not totally controlled by the imperialists.

Conrad allows the readers to see that imperialism is a system and it should work in a proper fashion. There are certain obvious limitations of Conrad's vision. Conrad was both imperialist and anti-imperialist, progressive in rendering the corruption of overseas domination, deeply reactionary in ignoring the fact that Africa and South America had independent history and culture, which the imperialist violently disturbed but by which they were ultimately defeated.

All such works, says Edward Said, seem to argue that source of world's significant action and life was the West, and rest of the world was mind-deadened, having no life, history or integrity of its own. It is not that these westerners had no sympathy for the foreign cultures; their real drawback was their inability to take seriously the alternatives to imperialism. The world has changed since Conrad and Dickens due to imperialistic globalisation.

Now various cultures have a closer interaction and have become interdependent. The colonisers and the colonized do not exist in separate worlds. So, one-sided versions cannot hold for long. Even those who are on the side of those fighting; for freedom from imperialists need to avoid narrow-mindedness and chauvinistic trends. One has to listen to what people are saying on other side of the fence.

(This is what Seamus Heaney says in *Redress Of the Poetry*.) This, says, Said, is a positive development. One should always suspect the impressions of an exclusive consciousness. Most of the Western writers, for example, could never imagine that those 'natives' who appeared either subservient, or uncooperative were one day going to be capable of revolt.

In the last part of the Introduction to 'Culture and Imperialism' Said makes some other points about the book. The purpose of his book, he says, is so trace the relationship between culture, aesthetic forms and historical experience. His aim is not to give a catalogue of books and authors, "Instead, I have tried to look at what I consider to be important and essential things."

My hope is that readers and critics of this book will use it to further the lines of enquiry and arguments about the historical experience of imperialism put forward in it.” Moreover, he has not discussed all the empires. He has focused on three imperial powers: British, French, and American. This book is about past and present, about ‘us’ and ‘them’, he says.

Said says that the origin of current American policies can be seen in the past. All powers aspiring for global domination have done the same things. There is always the appeal to power and national interest in running the affairs of ‘lesser peoples’, and the same destructive zeal when the going goes rough. America made the same mistake in Vietnam and Middle East.

The worst part of the whole exercise has been the collaboration of intellectuals, artists and journalists with these practices. Said hopes that a history of imperial adventure rendered in cultural terms might serve some deterrent purpose.

Said makes it clear that the criticism on imperialism does exempt the aggrieved colonized people from criticism. The fortunes and misfortunes of nationalism, of what can be called separatism and nativism, do not always make a flattering story. Narrow and dogmatic approach to culture can be as dangerous to culture as is imperialism. Secondly, culture is not the property of the East or the West.

Edward Said, by necessity, was in a position to be objective in his approach, as he lived most part of his life in exile and had the personal experience of both the cultures. He was born in Middle East and lived as an exile in America, where he wrote this book. He sums up his position in following works.

“The last point I want to make is that this is an exile’s book. Ever since I remember, I have felt that I belonged to both the Worlds, without being completely of either one or the other”, He says.¹²⁹

On the political front, Said was a powerful voice expressing the plight of the Palestinians as a people dispossessed of their homeland. Although critical of Israel and Israeli policy in the occupied territories, he recognized Israel’s right to exist. Elected in 1977 to the Palestine National Council (PNC), the parliament of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Said supported a Palestinian state and helped pave the way for

¹²⁹ <https://neoenglish.wordpress.com/2010/10/17/what-is-culture-and-what-is-imperialism-and-how-does-said-relate-the-two-in-the-literary-context-p-u-2003/>

secret peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Oslo, Norway. However, he became deeply critical of the Oslo Accords, a declaration he felt was heavily biased in Israel's favor. Said resigned from the PNC in 1991.

Said was diagnosed with leukemia (cancer of the blood cells) in 1992. In the late 1990s, as he grew frail, he turned to music. An accomplished pianist, he had a passion for classical music. With his close friend, Israeli conductor Daniel Barenboim, Said established a summer program to bring together young Arab and Israeli musicians. A collection of conversations between Said and Barenboim was published as *Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society* (2002).

Although he never taught any courses on the Middle East, Said wrote numerous books and articles in his support of Arab causes and Palestinian rights. He was especially critical of U.S. and Israeli policy in the region, and this led him into numerous, often bitter, polemics with supporters of those two countries. He was elected to the Palestine National Council (the Palestinian legislature in exile) in 1977, and, though he supported a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he became highly critical of the Oslo peace process between the Palestine Liberation n addition to his political and academic pursuits, Said was an accomplished musician and pianist.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ "Said, Edward." Encyclopedia Britannica..opcite

✱ Fukuyama, Francis (b. 1952):

American writer and political theorist, perhaps best known for his belief that the triumph of liberal democracy at the end of the Cold War marked the last ideological stage in the progression of human history.

Fukuyama studied classics at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. (B.A., 1974), and political science at Harvard University (Ph.D., 1981). In 1979 he began a long-term association with the research organization RAND Corporation, in Santa Monica, Calif., and Washington, D.C.

He later helped shape foreign policy for the U.S. Department of State (1981–82), specializing in Middle Eastern affairs and serving as a delegate to an Egyptian-Israeli conference on Palestinian autonomy. In 1987 he co edited *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades*, and two years later he rejoined the State Department to focus on European political and military issues. He held a chair as professor at George Mason University, Fairfax, Va., from 1996 to 2001.

✓ Major works :

Fukuyama's first major work, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), earned international acclaim and was widely read by both the mainstream public and academics. His thesis—introduced as a magazine article in 1989, when communism in eastern Europe was collapsing—posited that Western-style liberal democracy not only was the victor of the Cold War but marked the last ideological stage in the long march of history. He traced parallel tracks with his follow-up books:

Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995), which was popular in the business market; and *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (1999), a conservative look at American society in the second half of the 20th century. After the September 11 attacks in 2001, critics of his thesis argued that Islamic fundamentalism threatened the hegemony of the West. Fukuyama dismissed

them, however, by arguing that the attacks were part of “a series of rearguard actions” against what he believed was the prevailing political philosophy of the new globalism.

In 2001 Fukuyama became a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington.

Shortly thereafter he published *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* (2002), which examines the potential role biotechnology, could play in the course of human development. The work reveals the dangers of preselecting human traits, extending average life spans, and an overreliance on mood-altering drugs. As a member of the President's Council on Bioethics (2001–05), Fukuyama argued for tight federal regulation of genetic engineering. He later wrote *State-Building: Governance and the World Order in the 21st Century* (2004), in which he discussed how fledgling democratic nations could be made to succeed.

Although long considered a major figure in neo-conservatism, Fukuyama later distanced himself from that political movement. He also became an opponent of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, a war he had initially supported . In *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (2006), he criticized neoconservatives and Pres. George W. Bush and his administration's policies after the September 11 attacks.¹³¹

* influenced of Kojève Over Fukuyama :

He is influenced by *Kojève, whose book *The End of History and the Last Man*, 1992, argued that history has been shaped by the constant conflict between the desire to dominate and the need for recognition. The demand to dominate has been defeated by the economic triumphs of capitalist democracy, which gives each person a sovereign sphere of his own.

Moreover, with the fall of communism, and the near universal adoption of democratic and egalitarian ideas of political order, the available forms of domination have been destroyed, along with the ideology that supported them.

¹³¹ "Fukuyama, Francis." Encyclopædia Britannica.opcite.

Hence history has come to an end. The ensuing non-conflictual order will be increasingly international, and also exhibit a steady loss of high culture, distinction and virtue, as we approach the condition of *Nietzsche's 'last man'. In subsequent writings, notably *On Trust*, 1996, Fukuyama has given trenchant defences of the capitalist economy, arguing that it both generates and also depends upon an extensive *social capital in the form of trust.

✱ End of history:

Thesis associated with the Hegelian philosopher *Kojève, and adopted by *Fukuyama, according to which history is a process of attrition, whereby conflicts, local concentrations of power and hierarchical structures give way under the pressure of the demand for equal respect. The arrival of global democracy and universal equality of status signals the end of history.¹³²

¹³² Scruton, Roger. *op.cite*. pp:212,264.

✳ **Samuel Phillips Huntington :**

born April 18, 1927, New York, N.Y., U.S./died Dec. 24, 2008, Martha's Vineyard, Mass.

American political scientist, consultant to various U.S. government agencies, and important political commentator in national debates on U.S. foreign policy in the late 20th and early 21st century.

Huntington earned a bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1946 and then served in the U.S. Army. Afterward he attended the University of Chicago, where he received a master's degree in 1948, and Harvard University, where he earned a doctorate in 1951 and joined the faculty.

In 1959 Huntington became associate director of the Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, but he returned to Harvard in 1962. At Harvard he served as chairman of the Department of Government (1967–69; 1970–71) and was director of the Center for International Affairs (1978–89) and of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies beginning in 1989. From 1996 to 2004 he served as chair of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies.

Although Huntington began his career as a specialist in American politics, his research and analysis branched into comparative politics, foreign policy, international relations, and modernization.

✓ **major works :**

His first major work, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957), examined the relationship between military professionalism and political power and the contradiction between American liberalism and military conservatism and helped to set the terms of debate about the proper form of civil-military relations. Perhaps his most important work is *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), in which he argued that in developing countries political decay and instability were at least as likely as the development of liberal democracy and that the “most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.”

Huntington founded the journal *Foreign Policy* in 1970 and later served as president of the American Political Science Association (1986–87). He was an adviser to Vice President Hubert Humphrey during Humphrey's unsuccessful 1968 presidential campaign, chairman of the Democratic Party's Foreign Policy Advisory Committee in the mid-1970s, and coordinator of security planning in the National Security Council (1977–79) during the administration of President Jimmy Carter.

Emphasizing the rise of East Asia and Islam, he argued in the controversial *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996) that conflict between several large world civilizations was replacing conflict between states or ideologies as the dominant cleavage in international relations. Although he cautioned against intervention in non-Western cultures in *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington was generally identified with hawkish opinions on foreign policy and had been a target of leftist student protesters during the Vietnam War.

He published major works on various subjects, including national security strategy, defense policy making, American political ideology, transnational organizations, conservatism, the governability of democracies, processes of democratization, and the comparison of U.S. and Soviet governments. His books include *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (1961); *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981), which assessed periodic attempts to make American political institutions and behaviour conform to the traditional national creed of liberty, equality, and hostility to authority; *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991), which explained the process of widespread democratization of countries in the 1970s and '80s and compared it with previous historical periods; and *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (2004), which examined sources of U.S. political culture and emerging threats to unified national identity.¹³³

, he argues that the conflict of the cold war will be replaced by a violent and disorderly clash of civilizations, as the Islamic world reacts to the global transfer of Western attitudes, Western technology and Western secularization. In *Who Are We?*, 2002, Huntington addresses the question of American identity, in the wake of the terrorist atrocities of 11th September 2001.

¹³³ "Huntington, Samuel P." Encyclopedia Britannica. opcite.

Huntington's argument centers on what he calls the American Creed, which he believes to derive from the 'Anglo-Protestant' culture of the original settlers. And he marshals the evidence of recent historical scholarship, which sees the development of American political institutions, and the forging of the American national idea, as continuous with the Protestant 'Awakenings' that repeatedly swept across the continent. To separate this religious inheritance from the idea of America, to reconstitute as a purely secular body politic what began life as a sacred pledge, would be to deny the most vigorous input into the American experience.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Scruton, Roger. *op.cite*. pp:312.

※ Spengler, Oswald :

born May 29, 1880, Blankenburg, Germany / died May 8, 1936, Munich

German philosopher whose reputation rests entirely on his influential study *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, 2 vol. (1918–22; *The Decline of the West*), a major contribution to social theory.

After taking his doctorate at the University of Halle (1904), Spengler worked as a schoolmaster until 1911, when he went to live in Munich on a small inheritance and began work on *Der Untergang*. The first volume, published in 1918, won him immediate acclaim from the general public. The second volume followed in 1922, and a revised edition of the first a year later. From 1919 onward, Spengler tried to turn his reputation to account as a political commentator, but he met with little success.

Der Untergang is a study in the philosophy of history. Spengler contended that because most civilizations must pass through a life cycle, not only can the historian reconstruct the past but he can predict “the spiritual forms, duration, rhythm, meaning and product of the still unaccomplished stages of our Western history.” Unlike Arnold Toynbee, who later held that cultures are usually “apparented” to older cultures, Spengler contended that the spirit of a culture can never be transferred to another culture. He believed that the West had already passed through the creative stage of “culture” into that of reflection and material comfort (“civilization” proper, in his terminology) and that the future could only be a period of irreversible decline. Nor was there any prospect of reversing the process, for civilizations blossomed and decayed like natural organisms, and true rejuvenation was as impossible in the one case as the other.

Spengler's work won scant approval from professional scholars, who were scandalized by his unorthodox methods and contemptuous of his errors of fact. He was also criticized by the National Socialist Party, despite some affinity between his political ideas and Nazi dogma, and, after Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Spengler lived in isolation until his death.

Among his other works, *Der Mensch und die Technik* (1931; *Man and Technics*) stands out.¹³⁵

His book, presents in Wagnerian imagery a compendious vision of world history, as the 'comparative morphology' of cultures. Each culture has a life cycle of about 1000 years, and Western culture is now at its end, entering the period of 'civilization' where administration and technology take over from the flowering of the spirit in its summer forms.

The Western spirit is 'Faustian', consisting in a constant urge to reach out into infinite space and fill it with significances it is this spirit that explains the soaring gothic cathedrals, the perspectival paintings, the ever expanding contrapuntal forms of music. The ancient Graeco-Roman spirit, by contrast, was 'Apollonian', confined in a local finite space, practising the severe circumscribed life of the *polis. Spengler's vision was unscholarly and impetuous, but his very modern version of the cyclical theory of history proved influential and his poetry was captivating to a

Generation that had seen the crimes committed in the name of progress. His later adulation of the 'beast of prey' and the nobility of the 'irrational' man lent some support, or at least hot air, to the Nazi ideology, although he himself disapproved of Nazism, arguing, in reference to Hitler, that Germany stood in need of a hero, not a heroic tenor. The conception of the 'Faustian' spirit was shared with *Sombart, who put it to comparable use.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ H. Stuart Hughes. "Spengler, Oswald." *Encyclopedia Britannica*. opcite.

¹³⁶ Scruton, Roger. opcite. pp:658.

German economist and social historian, known for his systematic approach to world history and the development of Western civilization.

Challenged by the Marxist theory of economic determinism, Weber combined his interest in economics with sociology in an attempt to establish, through historical study, that historical causation was not influenced merely by economic considerations.

In one of his best-known works, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904-1905; trans. 1930), he tried to prove that ethical and religious ideas were strong influences on the development of capitalism. He expanded on this theme in *The Religions of the East* series (3 volumes, 1920-1921; trans. 1952-1958), in which he postulated that the prevailing religious and philosophical ideas in the Eastern world prevented the development of capitalism in ancient societies, despite the presence of favorable economic factors.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ "Max Weber (economist)." Microsoft® Encarta.opcite.

✓ The Freiburg address:

The high point of his early scholarly career was his inaugural address at Freiburg in 1895, in which he pulled together some five years of study on the agrarian problems of Germany east of the Elbe into a devastating indictment of the ruling Junker aristocracy as historically obsolete. In Weber's view, however, the existing liberal parties were in no position to challenge and replace the Junkers. Nor was the working class ready to accept the responsibilities of power.

Only the nation as a whole, educated to political maturity by a conscious policy of overseas imperial expansion, could bring Germany to the level of political maturity attained by the French in the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras and by the British in the course of their imperial expansion in the 19th century. Weber's Freiburg address thus advanced an ideology of "liberal imperialism," attracting to its support such important liberal publicists as Friedrich Naumann and Hans Delbrück.

In the months following his father's death in August 1897, an increasing nervousness plagued the young scholar. His return to teaching in the autumn brought a brief respite, which ended in early 1898 with the first signs of the nervous collapse that would incapacitate him between mid-1898 and 1903. For five years he was intermittently institutionalized, suffering sudden relapses after slow recoveries and vain efforts to break such cycles by traveling. He resigned his professorship at Heidelberg at the height of his illness.

✓ Later works :

In 1903 Weber was able to resume scholarly work, and an inheritance in 1907 made him financially independent. He did not teach again until after World War I. The nature of his most important work after his partial recovery suggests that his prolonged agony had led him to develop brilliant insights into the relationship of Calvinist morality and compulsive labour, into the relationship between various religious ethics and social and economic processes, and into many other questions of lasting importance. Indeed, Weber produced his most important work in the 17 years between the worst part of his illness and his death.

Weber's intellectual breadth in the study of societies can hardly be overestimated; it surpassed that of his predecessors, mainly Karl Marx and Émile Durkheim. Dissatisfied with the intellectual traditions of the social sciences and law in German and Western universities, Weber sought to develop a scientific approach that overcame their deficiencies.

Although he never fully defined a systematic research program explaining his comparative methodology, his essays on the historical development of Eastern and Western societies suggest what such an approach might entail. Weber demonstrated that the comparative method was essential because the behaviour of institutions in societies could not be understood in isolation. (Even his popular work on the connection between Puritanism and the development of capitalism in the West cannot be fully understood without reference to his work on comparative institutions—e.g., his studies of Asiatic religions and ancient Judaism.)

In preparation for work that he contemplated but never completed, Weber developed the ideal type as a methodological tool for comparative sociology. In analyzing the history of Western societies, Weber focused on rationalism as a unique and central force shaping all Western institutions, including economics, politics, religion, family, stratification systems, and music. These typologies have had a decisive impact on the development of subsequent, more specialized sociological inquiries.

A brief glance at *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (1904–05; *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*), Weber's best known and most controversial work, illustrates the general trend of his thinking. Weber began by noting the statistical correlation in Germany between interest and success in capitalist ventures on the one hand and Protestant background on the other.

He then attributed this relationship between capitalism and Protestantism to certain accidental psychological consequences of the notions of predestination and calling in Puritan theology.

In Calvin's formulation the doctrine of predestination stated that sinful humanity could know neither why nor to whom God had extended the grace of salvation. Weber inferred that the psychological insecurity that this doctrine imposed on Calvin's

followers, stern believers in hellfire, was such that they began to look for signs indicating the direction of God's will in daily life.

The consequence was an ethic of unceasing commitment to one's worldly calling (any lapse would indicate that one's state of grace was in doubt) and ascetic abstinence from any enjoyment of the profit reaped from such labours. The practical result of such beliefs and practices was, in Weber's estimation, the most rapid possible accumulation of capital.

Weber had published his thesis on the Protestant ethic in the journal he had just begun to edit, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. From 1905 to 1910 he published a number of exchanges between himself and critics of his thesis in the *Archiv*. He never denied his critics' claims that highly developed capitalist enterprises existed centuries before Calvin.

Weber was also aware of other preconditions, both material and psychological, that contributed to the development of modern capitalism. He responded to these criticisms by arguing that, before Calvinism, capitalist enterprise and wealth accumulation were always fettered by the passive or active hostility of the prevalent religious order.

If some capitalists were, by virtue of their skepticism, able to escape the guilt feelings that the prevailing religious ethos dictated, it was nevertheless a fact that no other religious tradition had ever caused people to see the accumulation of capital (saving money) as a sign of God's everlasting grace.

The Puritans, Weber argued, had accepted the cloak of worldly asceticism voluntarily, as a means of alleviating otherwise unbearable spiritual burdens. In so doing, however, they helped to create the enormous structure of the modern economic institution, which proceeded to determine the life and values of everyone born into it.

Around the time he published his work on the Protestant ethic, the middle-class German culture in which Weber had been nurtured experienced its first spasms of disintegration. The Protestant morality that he had come to accept as inescapable destiny came under attack from the youth movement, from avant-garde literary circles such as the one centred on the poet Stefan George, from Neoromantics influenced by

Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, and from Slavic cultural ideals, exemplified in the works of Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. In this setting Weber developed his political sociology, which makes the crucial distinction between charismatic, traditional, and legal forms of authority.

Charismatic authority, or charisma, refers to the gift of spiritual inspiration underlying the power of religious prophets or extraordinary political leaders. In probing charisma Weber touched, sometimes explicitly, on themes that had first been broached by Nietzsche.

His acute interest in social phenomena such as mysticism, which are antithetical to the modern world and its underlying process of rationalization, paralleled a late awakening of Weber's aesthetic and erotic faculties. In 1910, amid the crumbling social order of European middle-class society, Weber began a series of important discussions with George and his close disciple, the poet Friedrich Gundolf. At roughly the same time, Weber began an extramarital affair, probably his first experience of sexual intimacy; one of his most brilliant later essays ("Theorie der Stufen und Richtungen religiöser Weltablehnung," 1916; "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions") contains an analysis of the conflicting relationships between eroticism, ascetic and mystical modes of religiosity, and the general process of rationalization.

During this same period Weber attempted to build respect for sociology as a discipline by defining a value-free methodology for it and by analyzing the religious cultures of India and China for comparison with the Western religious tradition. Also of critical importance in his last decade was his stoic examination of the conditions and consequences of the rationalization of political and economic life in the West in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1922; *Economy and Society*) and journal articles.

Indeed, Weber's most powerful impact on his contemporaries came in the last years of his life, when, from 1916 to 1918, he argued powerfully against Germany's annexationist war goals and in favour of a strengthened parliament. He stood bravely for sobriety in politics and scholarship against the apocalyptic mood of right-wing students in the months following Germany's defeat in World War I. After assisting in

the drafting of the new constitution and in the founding of the German Democratic Party, Weber died of a lung infection in June 1920.¹³⁸

Webers: The Protestant Ethic, the Spirit of Capitalism, and Perceptions of Poverty

This page provides a brief summary of the key points of Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Next, it discusses the Protestant Ethic and how it often is used illogically to blame persons living in poverty for their living in poverty.

*** The Protestant Reformation :**

These are the basic tenets of the Protestant Reformation:

1. Every person is born into sin and faces the possibility of being enslaved by sin.
2. Jesus, the only son of God, sacrifices himself to allow for the atonement of sin and the possibility of being granted everlasting life in heaven.
3. Everlasting life depends upon God's mercy, which is based upon one's faith and good works.

A key point of the Protestant Reformation of importance here is its focus upon individualism. The Protestant Reformation placed more responsibility and accountability on the individual to attain salvation (i.e., rather than achieving salvation by birthright or by membership in the Catholic Church). Weber argues that this emphasis upon individualism in relation to salvation helped foster the advancement of capitalism in that capitalism depended upon a focus upon individualism in economic relationships with others.

¹³⁸ Mitzman, Arthur. "Weber, Max." Encyclopedia Britannica..opcite.

***The Dilemma of Life and the Hope for Salvation :**

Weber summarized the central points of Calvinism within three concepts: predestination, dualism, and inner-worldly asceticism.

1. **Predestination:** God has a plan for each of us, including knowledge about whether we are among the saved.
2. **Dualism:** Because we can never know God's true plan, no person knows for certain whether they are among the saved.
3. **Inner-worldly asceticism:** Given this dilemma of life, people focus upon living a righteous life and look for indications they are among the saved, among those blessed by God.

***The Solution: The Protestant Ethic:**

1. One approach to being in God's good graces is to behave oneself: to work hard, stay sober, obey the law, save/invest money, and delay gratification of desires not immediately required.
2. The Protestant Ethic thereby provides a template for living the good life, one that God will bless.

***The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism :**

1. By engaging in inner-worldly asceticism, one increases their likelihood of profiting in business.
2. Therefore, being successful and acquiring profit serves as an indication that one is in God's good graces. ("Thank God, I was successful at...")
3. Acquiring profit, once seen as a sin, now becomes an indication of being in God's good graces. ("He must be blessed by God because he has been very successful.")
4. From Weber's argument, showing off one's profit once was viewed as sinful, thereby discouraging investment in capitalist ventures. Later, with acceptance of

the Protestant Ethic, capital investment, accumulation of wealth, and even "conspicuous consumption" becomes a more accepted way to show that one was among the saved.

The Protestant Ethic and Perceptions of Persons Living in Poverty

Although the Protestant Ethic provides an excellent template for living a good life, it unfortunately can be misused to cast blame persons living in poverty. To understand how this inappropriate application of the Protestant Ethic can affect those persons living in poverty we need to explore a logical fallacy called "confusion of the inverse."

*** Logic and False Conclusions :**

Consider this logical fallacy, termed "confusion of the inverse":

- If A, then B.
- Not B.
- Therefore: Not A.

***False Conclusions and Perceptions of Poverty**

Apply the fallacy of "confusion of the inverse" to the relationship between the Protestant Ethic and living in poverty.

- If one adheres to the Protestant Ethic, one is more likely to escape living in poverty.
- John is living in poverty.
- Therefore, John must not be adhering to the Protestant Ethic.

The logical fallacy is that John might be adhering closely to the Protestant Ethic, but still live in poverty for many reasons: he has a low-wage job, he has high expenses (i.e., large family, high health-care bills), or some combination of low wages and high expenses.

***Blaming Persons Living in Poverty :**

Because most Americans believe in the principles of the Protestant Ethic, they find it easy to believe that persons living in poverty must be to blame for not following the rules of the Protestant Ethic. We tend to look for personal reasons that someone lives in poverty, in part to protect our belief that it will never happen to us. ¹³⁹

¹³⁹ <http://www.soc.iastate.edu/sapp/soc235ProtEthic.html>

✧ Zakaria, Fareed :

✓ Back Ground :

was born and raised in Bombay (now Mumbai), India before moving to the United States to attend university. His father was a politician and his mother a newspaper editor. Zakaria was raised a Muslim and his father was a prominent Muslim scholar. Nevertheless, Zakaria's religious upbringing was liberal and diverse.

He grew up celebrating Hindu, Muslim and Christian holidays and despite being widely tagged as a Muslim as well as being one of America's most trusted middle men between the Muslim world and the West, he's actually not a religious person. He said, expressing slight discomfort at being America's go-to Muslim commentator:

I do know a lot about the world of Islam in an instinctive way that you can't get through book learning. I occasionally find myself reluctant to be pulled into a world that's not mine, in the sense that I'm not a religious guy.

And in response to accusations that his commentary didn't always paint Muslims in a favorable light, he said:

By and large, there is a suspicion that I'm betraying my roots, whatever that means. The only way I can respond is to say I've simply never been defined by religious identity, so I can't be defined by that now just because it has come into the question.

There appears to be some speculation that Zakaria is an atheist, though I can't find anything definitive to corroborate that.

Politics in the real world :

There are two ways to look at the political views of Fareed Zakaria: 1) It has changed over time, or 2) he's sees the world in all its complexity, realizing that nations rise and fall in their endless jockeying for power and resources and won't subscribe to any prefabricated ideology. I tend to lean toward number two. People might assume he's a flip-flopper considering he was a self-professed Reaganite in the 80's, something he chalked up to being raised in India:

People often say, 'How could you, living in India, end up a Reaganite?' Well, the answer is, live in India... the degree to which a highly regulated economy produces masses of corruption because it empowers bureaucrats. It just has to be seen to be believed.

So, Republican then? Not so fast. He said in 2008:

The Republican Party has gone insane on national security issues in general and needs to have a kind of nervous breakdown... The Republicans have lost their essential moorings and morphed into a party whose heart seems focused entirely on religion, hyper-nationalism and a kind of xenophobia.

This probably explains why he endorsed Obama for president that year. Zakaria explains that it's not him that's changing, it's the world. He's dubbed himself a "centrist" and was particularly disturbed by what he saw as a general "shift to the right" in American politics during the Bush years. Zakaria's books, perhaps most notably *The Post-American World*, illustrate how globalism, the rise of industry, enterprise and innovation in countries other than the U.S.

could end up leaving the once-great superpower behind—but not if America can let go of its exceptionalist attitudes and open its collective mind to change and adaptations. In this sense, I see Zakaria as a bit of a patriot, with a truly realistic view of society and global politics. He roots for America in his own way, cheering her on to hard truths and tough realizations in hopes for redemption.¹⁴⁰

✱ Zakaria's Major Contribution:

Zakaria's books include *The Future of Freedom* and *The Post-American World*. *The Future of Freedom* argues that what is defined as democracy in the Western world is actually "liberal democracy", a combination of constitutional liberalism and participatory politics.

Zakaria points out that protection of liberty and the rule of law actually preceded popular elections by centuries in Western Europe, and that when countries only adopt elections without the protection of liberty, they create "illiberal democracy". *The Post-American World*, published in 2008 before the financial crisis, argued that the most

¹⁴⁰ <http://hollowverse.com/fareed-zakaria>.

important trend of modern times is the "rise of the rest," the economic emergence of China, India, Brazil, and other countries.

From 2006, Zakaria has also criticized what he views as "fear-based" American policies employed not only in combating terrorism, but also in enforcing immigration and drug smuggling laws, and has argued in favor of decriminalization of drugs and citizenship for presently illegal immigrants to the United States of all backgrounds. Referring to his views on Iran, Leon Wieseltier described Zakaria as a "consummate spokesman for the shibboleths of the White House and for the smooth new worldliness, the at-the-highest-levels impatience with democracy and human rights as central objectives of our foreign policy, that now characterize advanced liberal thinking about America's role in the world."¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fareed_Zakaria

✱ The Social Contractual Trinity Of A Classical Modern State :

Social contract theory was especially important around the time of the European Enlightenment, the most famous exponents being Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The main purpose of these theories was to provide a sound logical base for the particular polity most favored by the individual theorists on the basis of an appeal to the rational self-interest of ordinary people.

Historically the tradition arose because, with the Enlightenment, the possibility of justifying a political system by reference to tradition or to some theological argument in terms of God's will or the divine right of kings vanished. The basic argument always took the same form: assume that people are living without any government at all. That is, they are free and autonomous individuals, but also subject to all the difficulties and dangers of living in a state of anarchy. Would such free people wish to have a government? What sort of government would they wish to see set up, and under what conditions would they give up just what proportion of their independence for the benefits of such a government? The answers which come out of this particular thought-experiment depend very much on the description of the anarchical set-up (usually called the state of nature) put in.

Hobbes, for example, painted the state of nature as so awful that he thought it likely that consent would freely be given to the most authoritarian and draconian of governments. Locke, however, argued that the state of nature was only mildly awkward, and thus derived a very liberal and weak state from his social contract. It was not necessarily assumed that the social contract had ever been an actual historical event;

the emphasis was much more on a logical defense of a hypothetical state by suggesting what would happen were people free to make such a choice. The method of theorizing became unfashionable for a long time, being replaced by utilitarian arguments which tended to get to much the same conclusions from a different approach. Since the 1960s

modified versions of social contract theories have reappeared, especially in the work of the most important of all modern political philosophers, John Rawls.¹⁴²

¹⁴² Robertson, David. *Op.cite*. pp:447-448.

✧ Hobbes, Thomas :

born April 5, 1588, Westport, Wiltshire, Eng. died Dec. 4, 1679, Hardwick Hall, Derbyshire.

English philosopher, scientist, and historian, best known for his political philosophy, especially as articulated in his masterpiece *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes viewed government primarily as a device for ensuring collective security. Political authority is justified by a hypothetical social contract among the many that vests in a sovereign person or entity the responsibility for the safety and well-being of all. In metaphysics, Hobbes defended materialism, the view that only material things are real. His scientific writings present all observed phenomena as the effects of matter in motion. Hobbes was not only a scientist in his own right but a great systematizer of the scientific findings of his contemporaries, including Galileo and Johannes Kepler. His enduring contribution is as a political philosopher who justified wide-ranging government powers on the basis of the self-interested consent of citizens.

➤ Early life:

Hobbes's father was a quick-tempered vicar of a small Wiltshire parish church. Disgraced after engaging in a brawl at his own church door, he disappeared and abandoned his three children to the care of his brother, a well-to-do glover in Malmesbury. When he was four years old, Hobbes was sent to school at Westport, then to a private school, and finally, at 15, to Magdalen Hall in the University of Oxford, where he took a traditional arts degree and in his spare time developed an interest in maps.

For nearly the whole of his adult life, Hobbes worked for different branches of the wealthy and aristocratic Cavendish family. Upon taking his degree at Oxford in 1608, he was employed as page and tutor to the young William Cavendish, afterward the second earl of Devonshire.

Over the course of many decades Hobbes served the family and their associates as translator, traveling companion, keeper of accounts, business representative, political adviser, and scientific collaborator. Through his employment by William Cavendish, the first earl of Devonshire, and his heirs, Hobbes became connected with the royalist side in disputes between the king and Parliament that continued until the 1640s and that culminated in the English Civil Wars (1642–51). Hobbes also worked for the marquess of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, a cousin of William Cavendish, and Newcastle's brother, Sir Charles Cavendish. The latter was the centre of the "Wellbeck Academy," an informal network of scientists named for one of the family houses at Wellbeck Abbey in Nottinghamshire.

➤ Intellectual development:

The two branches of the Cavendish family nourished Hobbes's enduring intellectual interests in politics and natural science, respectively. Hobbes served the earls of Devonshire intermittently until 1628; Newcastle and his brother employed him in the following decade. He returned to the Devonshires after the 1640s. Through both branches of the Cavendish family, and through contacts he made in his own right on the Continent as traveling companion to various successors to the Devonshire title, Hobbes became a member of several networks of intellectuals in England. Farther afield, in Paris, he became acquainted with the circle of scientists, theologians, and philosophers presided over by the theologian Marin Mersenne. This circle included René Descartes.

Hobbes was exposed to practical politics before he became a student of political philosophy. The young William Cavendish was a member of the 1614 and 1621 Parliaments, and Hobbes would have followed his contributions to parliamentary debates. Further exposure to politics came through the commercial interests of the earls of Devonshire.

Hobbes attended many meetings of the governing body of the Virginia Company, a trading company established by James I to colonize parts of the eastern coast of North America, and came into contact with powerful men there. (Hobbes himself was given a small share in the company by his employer.) He also confronted political issues through his connection with figures who met at Great Tew; with them he debated not only theological questions but also the issues of how the Anglican church should be led and organized and how its authority should be related to that of any English civil government.

In the late 1630s Parliament and the king were in conflict over how far normal kingly powers could be exceeded in exceptional circumstances, especially in regard to raising money for armies. In 1640 Hobbes wrote a treatise defending King Charles I's own wide interpretation of his prerogatives. Royalist members of Parliament used arguments from Hobbes's treatise in debates, and the treatise itself circulated in manuscript form. *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic* (written in 1640, published in a misedited unauthorized version in 1650) was Hobbes's first work of political philosophy, though he did not intend it for publication as a book.

The development of Hobbes the scientist began in his middle age. He was not trained in mathematics or the sciences at Oxford, and his Wiltshire schooling was strongest in classical languages. His interest in motion and its effects was stimulated mainly through his conversation and reading on the Continent, as well as through his association with the scientifically and mathematically minded Wellbeck Cavendishes.

In 1629 or 1630 Hobbes was supposedly charmed by Euclid's method of demonstrating theorems in the *Elements*. According to a contemporary biographer, he came upon a volume of Euclid in a gentleman's study and fell in love with geometry. Later, perhaps in the mid-1630s, he had gained enough sophistication to pursue independent research in optics, a subject he later claimed to have pioneered. Within the Wellbeck Academy, he exchanged views with other people interested in the subject. And as a member of Mersenne's circle in Paris after 1640, he was taken seriously as a theorist not only of ethics and politics but of optics and ballistics. Indeed, he was even credited with

competence in mathematics by some very able French mathematicians, including Gilles Personne de Roberval.

Self-taught in the sciences and an innovator at least in optics, Hobbes also regarded himself as a teacher or transmitter of sciences developed by others. In this connection he had in mind sciences that, like his own optics, traced observed phenomena to principles about the sizes, shapes, positions, speeds, and paths of parts of matter.

His great trilogy—*De Corpore* (1655; “Concerning Body”), *De Homine* (1658; “Concerning Man”), and *De Cive* (1642; “Concerning the Citizen”)—was his attempt to arrange the various pieces of natural science, as well as psychology and politics, into a hierarchy, ranging from the most general and fundamental to the most specific. Although logically constituting the last part of his system, *De Cive* was published first, because political turmoil in England made its message particularly timely and because its doctrine was intelligible both with and without natural-scientific preliminaries. *De Corpore* and *De Homine* incorporated the findings of, among others, Galileo on the motions of terrestrial bodies, Kepler on astronomy, William Harvey on the circulation of the blood, and Hobbes himself on optics. The science of politics contained in *De Cive* was substantially anticipated in Part II of *The Elements of Law* and further developed in *Leviathan; or, The Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* (1651), the last—and in the English-speaking world the most famous—formulation of Hobbes's political philosophy (see below Hobbes's system).

➤ Exile in Paris :

When strife became acute in 1640, Hobbes feared for his safety. Shortly after completing *The Elements of Law*, he fled to Paris, where he rejoined Mersenne's circle and made contact with other exiles from England. He would remain in Paris for more than a decade, working on optics and on *De Cive*, *De Corpore*, and *Leviathan*. In 1646 the young prince of Wales, later to become Charles II, sought refuge in Paris, and Hobbes accepted an invitation to instruct him in mathematics.

➤ Political philosophy :

Hobbes presented his political philosophy in different forms for different audiences. *De Cive* states his theory in what he regarded as its most scientific form. Unlike *The Elements of Law*, which was composed in English for English parliamentarians—and which was written with local political challenges to Charles I in mind—*De Cive* was a Latin work for an audience of Continental savants who were interested in the “new” science—that is, the sort of science that did not appeal to the authority of the ancients but approached various problems with fresh principles of explanation.

De Cive's break from the ancient authority par excellence—Aristotle—could not have been more loudly advertised. After only a few paragraphs, Hobbes rejects one of the most famous theses of Aristotle's politics, namely that human beings are naturally suited to life in a polis and do not fully realize their natures until they exercise the role of citizen.

Hobbes turns Aristotle's claim on its head: human beings, he insists, are by nature unsuited to political life. They naturally denigrate and compete with each other, are very easily swayed by the rhetoric of ambitious men, and think much more highly of themselves than of other people. In short, their passions magnify the value they place on their own interests, especially their near-term interests. At the same time, most people, in pursuing their own interests, do not have the ability to prevail over competitors. Nor can they appeal to some natural common standard of behaviour that everyone will feel obliged to abide by.

There is no natural self-restraint, even when human beings are moderate in their appetites, for a ruthless and bloodthirsty few can make even the moderate feel forced to take violent preemptive action in order to avoid losing everything. The self-restraint even of the moderate, then, easily turns into aggression. In other words, no human being is above aggression and the anarchy that goes with it.

War comes more naturally to human beings than political order. Indeed, political order is possible only when human beings abandon their natural condition of judging and pursuing what seems best to each and delegate this judgment to someone else. This delegation is effected when the many contract together to submit to a sovereign in return for physical safety and a modicum of well-being. Each of the many in effect says to the other: "I transfer my right of governing myself to X (the sovereign) if you do too." And the transfer is collectively entered into only on the understanding that it makes one less of a target of attack or dispossession than one would be in one's natural state. Although Hobbes did not assume that there was ever a real historical event in which a mutual promise was made to delegate self-government to a sovereign, he claimed that the best way to understand the state was to conceive of it as having resulted from such an agreement.

In Hobbes's social contract, the many trade liberty for safety. Liberty, with its standing invitation to local conflict and finally all-out war—a "war of every man against every man"—is overvalued in traditional political philosophy and popular opinion, according to Hobbes; it is better for people to transfer the right of governing themselves to the sovereign.

Once transferred, however, this right of government is absolute, unless the many feel that their lives are threatened by submission. The sovereign determines who owns what, who will hold which public offices, how the economy will be regulated, what acts will be crimes, and what punishments criminals should receive.

The sovereign is the supreme commander of the army, supreme interpreter of law, and supreme interpreter of scripture, with authority over any national church. It is unjust—a case of reneging on what one has agreed—for any subject to take issue with these arrangements, for, in the act of creating the state or by receiving its protection, one agrees to leave judgments about the means of collective well-being and security to the sovereign. The sovereign's laws and decrees and appointments to public office may be unpopular; they may even be wrong. But unless the sovereign fails so utterly that subjects feel that their condition would be no worse in the free-for-all outside the state, it is better for the subjects to endure the sovereign's rule.

It is better both prudentially and morally. Because no one can prudently welcome a greater risk of death, no one can prudently prefer total liberty to submission. Total liberty invites war, and submission is the best insurance against war. Morality too supports this conclusion, for, according to Hobbes, all the moral precepts enjoining virtuous behaviour can be understood as derivable from the fundamental moral precept that one should seek peace that is to say, freedom from war—if it is safe to do so. Without peace, he observed, man lives in “continual fear, and danger of violent death,” and what life he has is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” What Hobbes calls the “laws of nature,” the system of moral rules by which everyone is bound, cannot be safely complied with outside the state, for the total liberty that people have outside the state includes the liberty to flout the moral requirements if one's survival seems to depend on it.

The sovereign is not a party to the social contract; he receives the obedience of the many as a free gift in their hope that he will see to their safety. The sovereign makes no promises to the many in order to win their submission. Indeed, because he does not transfer his right of self-government to anyone, he retains the total liberty that his subjects trade for safety. He is not bound by law, including his own laws. Nor does he do anything unjustly if he makes decisions about his subjects's safety and well-being that they do not like.

Although the sovereign is in a position to judge the means of survival and well-being for the many more dispassionately than they are able to do themselves, he is not immune to self-interested passions. Hobbes realizes that the sovereign may behave iniquitously. He insists that it is very imprudent for a sovereign to act so iniquitously that he disappoints his subjects's expectation of safety and makes them feel insecure. Subjects who are in fear of their lives lose their obligations to obey and, with that, deprive the sovereign of his power. Reduced to the status of one among many by the defection of his subjects, the unseated sovereign is likely to feel the wrath of those who submitted to him in vain.

Hobbes's masterpiece, *Leviathan* (1651), does not significantly depart from the view of *De Cive* concerning the relation between protection and obedience, but it devotes much more attention to the civil obligations of Christian believers and the proper and improper roles of a church within a state. Hobbes argues that believers do not endanger their prospects of salvation by obeying a sovereign's decrees to the letter, and he maintains that churches do not have any authority that is not granted by the civil sovereign.

Hobbes's political views exerted a discernible influence on his work in other fields, including historiography and legal theory. His political philosophy is chiefly concerned with the way in which government must be organized in order to avoid civil war. It therefore encompasses a view of the typical causes of civil war, all of which are represented in *Behemoth; or, The Long Parliament* (1679), his history of the English Civil Wars. Hobbes produced the first English translation of *Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War*, which he thought contained important lessons for his contemporaries regarding the excesses of democracy, the worst kind of dilution of sovereign authority, in his view.

Hobbes's works on church history and the history of philosophy also strongly reflect his politics. He was firmly against the separation of government powers, either between

branches of government or between church and state. His ecclesiastical history emphasizes the way in which power-hungry priests and popes threatened legitimate civil authority. His history of philosophy is mostly concerned with how metaphysics was used as a means of keeping people under the sway of Roman Catholicism at the expense of obedience to a civil authority. His theory of law develops a similar theme regarding the threats to a supreme civil power posed by common law and the multiplication of authoritative legal interpreters.

➤ Return to England :

There are signs that Hobbes intended *Leviathan* to be read by a monarch, who would be able to take the rules of statecraft from it. A specially bound copy was given to Prince Charles while he was in exile in Paris. Unfortunately, Hobbes's suggestion in *Leviathan* that a subject had the right to abandon a ruler who could no longer protect him gave serious offense to the prince's advisers.

Barred from the exiled court and under suspicion by the French authorities for his attack on the papacy (*see below*), Hobbes found his position in Paris becoming daily more intolerable. At the end of 1651, at about the time that *Leviathan* was published, he returned to England and made his peace with the new regime of Oliver Cromwell. Hobbes submitted to that authority for a long time before the monarchy was restored in 1660.

From the time of the Restoration in 1660, Hobbes enjoyed a new prominence. Charles II received Hobbes again into favour. Although Hobbes's presence at court scandalized the bishops and the chancellor, the king relished his wit. He even granted Hobbes a pension of £100 a year and had his portrait hung in the royal closet. It was not until 1666, when the House of Commons prepared a bill against atheism and profaneness, that Hobbes felt seriously endangered, for the committee to which the bill was referred was instructed to investigate *Leviathan*. Hobbes, then verging upon 80, burned such of his papers as he thought might compromise him.

➤ Optics :

Hobbes's most significant contributions to natural science were in the field of optics. An optical theory in his day was expected to pronounce on the nature of light, on the transmission of light from the Sun to the Earth, on reflection and refraction, and on the workings of optical instruments such as mirrors and lenses. Hobbes took up these topics in several relatively short treatises and in correspondence, including with Descartes on the latter's *Dioptrics* (1637). The most polished of Hobbes's optical works was *A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques* (1646).

In its mature form, Hobbes's optical theory held that the dilations and contractions of an original light source, such as the Sun, are transmitted by contact with a uniform, pervading ethereal medium, which in turn stimulates the eye and the nerves connected to it, eventually resulting in a “phantasm,” or sense-image, in the brain. In Hobbes's theory, the qualities of a sense-image do not need to be explained in terms of the qualities of a perceived object. Instead, motion and matter—the motion of a light source, the disturbance of a physical nervous system, and sensory membranes are all that have to be invoked.

In contrast, traditional optics—optics as developed within Aristotle's framework—had held that seeing the colour of something—the redness of a strawberry, for example—was a matter of reproducing the “form” of the colour in the sense organs; the form is then abstracted from the sense organs by the mind. “Sensible forms,” the characteristic properties transmitted by objects to the senses in the act of perception, were entirely dispensed with in Hobbes's optics.

➤ Hobbes's system:

Theories that trace all observed effects to matter and motion are called mechanical. Hobbes was thus a mechanical materialist: He held that nothing but material things are real, and he thought that the subject matter of all the natural sciences consists of the motions of material things at different levels of generality.

Geometry considers the effects of the motions of points, lines, and solids; pure mechanics deals with the motions of three-dimensional bodies in a full space, or plenum; physics deals with the motions of the parts of inanimate bodies insofar as they contribute to observed phenomena; and psychology deals with the effects of the internal motions of animate bodies on behaviour. The system of the natural sciences described in Hobbes's trilogy represents his understanding of the materialist principles on which all science is based.

The fact that Hobbes included politics as well as psychology within his system, however, has tended to overshadow his insistence on the autonomy of political understanding from natural-scientific understanding. According to Hobbes, politics does not need to be understood in terms of the motions of material things (although, ultimately, it can be); a certain kind of widely available self-knowledge is evidence enough of the human propensity to war. Although Hobbes is routinely read as having discerned the “laws of motion” for both human beings and human societies, the most that can plausibly be claimed is that he based his political philosophy on psychological principles that he thought could be illuminated by general laws of motion.

➤ Last years and influence:

Although he was impugned by enemies at home, no Englishman of the day stood in such high repute abroad as Hobbes, and distinguished foreigners who visited England were always eager to pay their respects to the old man, whose vigour and freshness of intellect remained unquenched. In his last years Hobbes amused himself by returning to the classical studies of his youth. The autobiography in Latin verse with its playful humour, occasional pathos, and sublime self-complacency was brought forth at the age of 84. In 1675 he produced a translation of the *Odyssey* in rugged English rhymes, with a lively preface, “Concerning the Virtues of an Heroic Poem.” A translation of the *Iliad* appeared in the following year. As late as four months before his death, he was promising his publisher “somewhat to print in English.”

Hobbes's importance lies not only in his political philosophy but also in his contribution to the development of an anti-Aristotelian and thoroughly materialist conception of natural science. His political philosophy influenced not only successors who adopted the social-contract framework—John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, for example—but also less directly those theorists who connected moral and political decision making in rational human beings to considerations of self-interest broadly understood. The materialist bent of Hobbes's metaphysics is also much in keeping with contemporary Anglo-American, or analytic, metaphysics, which tends to recognize as real only those entities that physics in particular or natural science in general presupposes.

➤ Major Works :

The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic (composed c. 1640, published in two parts as *Humane Nature; or, The Fundamental Elements of Policie* and *De Corpore Politico; or, The Elements of Law, Moral & Politick*, 1650); *Elementorum Philosophiae: Sectio Tertia de Cive* (1642; Eng. trans., *Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society*, 1651); *Leviathan; or, The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill* (1651); *Elementorum Philosophiae: Sectio Prima de Corpore* (1655; Eng. trans., *Elements of Philosophy*, 1656); *Elementorum Philosophia: Sectio Secunda de Homine* (1658; Eng. trans. appears in *Man and Citizen*, ed. by Bernard Gert, 1972).¹⁴³

¹⁴³ "Hobbes, Thomas." *Encyclopedia Britannica*. opcite.

✧ Locke, John :

Born : August 29, 1632, Wrington, Somerset, England-died :October 28, 1704, High Laver, Essex.

English philosopher whose works lie at the foundation of modern philosophical empiricism and political liberalism. He was an inspirer of both the European Enlightenment and the Constitution of the United States. His philosophical thinking was close to that of the founders of modern science, especially Robert Boyle, Sir Isaac Newton, and other members of the Royal Society. His political thought was grounded in the notion of a social contract between citizens and in the importance of toleration, especially in matters of religion. Much of what he advocated in the realm of politics was accepted in England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89 and in the United States after the country's declaration of independence in 1776.

➤ Early years :

Locke's family was sympathetic to Puritanism but remained within the Church of England, a situation that coloured Locke's later life and thinking. Raised in Pensford, near Bristol, Locke was 10 years old at the start of the English Civil Wars between the monarchy of Charles I and parliamentary forces under the eventual leadership of Oliver Cromwell. Locke's father, a lawyer, served as a captain in the cavalry of the parliamentarians and saw some limited action. From an early age, one may thus assume, Locke rejected any claim by the king to have a divine right to rule.

After the first Civil War ended in 1646, Locke's father was able to obtain for his son, who had evidently shown academic ability, a place at Westminster School in distant London. It was to this already famous institution that Locke went in 1647, at age 14. Although the school had been taken over by the new republican government, its headmaster, Richard Busby (himself a distinguished scholar), was a royalist.

For four years Locke remained under Busby's instruction and control (Busby was a strong disciplinarian who much favoured the birch). In January 1649, just half a mile away from Westminster School, Charles was beheaded on the order of Cromwell. The boys were not allowed to attend the execution, though they were undoubtedly well aware of the events taking place nearby.

The curriculum of Westminster centred on Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, mathematics, and geography. In 1650 Locke was elected a King's Scholar, an academic honour and financial benefit that enabled him to buy several books, primarily classic texts in Greek and Latin. Although Locke was evidently a good student, he did not enjoy his schooling; in later life he attacked boarding schools for their overemphasis on corporal punishment and for the uncivil behaviour of pupils. In his enormously influential work

Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), he would argue for the superiority of private tutoring for the education of young gentlemen (see below Other works).

➤ Oxford :

In the autumn of 1652 Locke, at the comparatively late age of 20, entered Christ Church, the largest of the colleges of the University of Oxford and the seat of the court of Charles I during the Civil Wars. But the royalist days of Oxford were now behind it, and Cromwell's Puritan followers filled most of the positions. Cromwell himself was chancellor, and John Owen, Cromwell's former chaplain, was vice-chancellor and dean. Owen and Cromwell were, however, concerned to restore the university to normality as soon as possible, and this they largely succeeded in doing.

Locke later reported that he found the undergraduate curriculum at Oxford dull and unstimulating. It was still largely that of the medieval university, focusing on Aristotle (especially his logic) and largely ignoring important new ideas about the nature and origins of knowledge that had been developed in writings by Francis Bacon (1561–1626), René Descartes (1596–1650), and other natural philosophers.

Although their works were not on the official syllabus, Locke was soon reading them. He graduated with a bachelor's degree in 1656 and a master's two years later, about which time he was elected a student (the equivalent of fellow) of Christ Church. At Oxford Locke made contact with some advocates of the new science, including Bishop John Wilkins, the astronomer and architect Christopher Wren, the physicians Thomas Willis and Richard Lower, the physicist Robert Hooke, and, most important of all, the eminent natural philosopher and theologian Robert Boyle. Locke attended classes in iatrochemistry (the early application of chemistry to medicine), and before long he was collaborating with Boyle on important medical research on human blood. Medicine from now on was to play a central role in his life.

The restoration of the English monarchy in 1660 was a mixed blessing for Locke. It led many of his scientific collaborators to return to London, where they soon founded the Royal Society, which provided the stimulus for much scientific research. But in Oxford the new freedom from Puritan control encouraged unruly behaviour and religious enthusiasms among the undergraduates. These excesses led Locke to be wary of rapid social change, an attitude that no doubt partly reflected his own childhood during the Civil Wars.

In his first substantial political work, *Two Tracts on Government* (composed in 1660 but not published until 1967), Locke defended a very conservative position: in the interest of political stability, a government is justified in legislating on any matter of religion that is not directly relevant to the essential beliefs of Christianity. This view, a response to the perceived threat of anarchy posed by sectarian differences, was diametrically opposed to the doctrine that he would later expound in *Two Treatises of Government* (1690).

In 1663 Locke was appointed senior censor in Christ Church, a post that required him to supervise the studies and discipline of undergraduates and to give a series of lectures. The resulting *Essays on the Law of Nature* (first published in 1954) constitutes an early statement of his philosophical views, many of which he retained more or less unchanged for the rest of his life. Of these probably the two most important were, first, his commitment to a law of nature, a natural moral law that underpins the rightness or wrongness of all human conduct, and, second, his subscription to the empiricist principle that all knowledge, including moral knowledge, is derived from experience and therefore not innate. These claims were to be central to his mature philosophy, both with regard to political theory and epistemology.

➤ Association with Shaftesbury :

In 1666 Locke was introduced to Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper, later 1st earl of Shaftesbury, by a mutual acquaintance. As a member and eventually the leader of a group of opposition politicians known as the Whigs, Ashley was one of the most powerful figures in England in the first two decades after the Restoration. Ashley was so impressed with Locke at their first meeting that in the following year he asked him to join his London household in Exeter House in the Strand as his aide and personal physician, though Locke did not then have a degree in medicine. Politically, Ashley stood for constitutional monarchy, a Protestant succession, civil liberty, toleration in religion, the rule of Parliament, and the economic expansion of England. Locke either shared or soon came to share all these objectives with him, and it was not long before a deep—and for each an important—mutual understanding existed between them.

Locke drafted papers on toleration, possibly for Ashley to use in parliamentary speeches. In his capacity as a physician, Locke was involved in a remarkable operation to insert a silver tube into a tumour on Ashley's liver, which allowed it to be drained on a regular basis and relieved him of much pain. It remained in place for the remainder of Ashley's life. Locke also found a suitable bride for Ashley's son.

By 1668 Locke had become a fellow of the Royal Society and was conducting medical research with his friend Thomas Sydenham, the most distinguished physician of the period. Although Locke was undoubtedly the junior partner in their collaboration, they worked together to produce important research based on careful observation and a minimum of speculation.

The method that Locke acquired and helped to develop in this work reinforced his commitment to philosophical empiricism. But it was not only medicine that kept Locke busy, for he was appointed by Ashley as secretary to the lords proprietors of Carolina, whose function was to promote the establishment of the North American colony. In that role Locke helped to draft *The Fundamental Constitutions for the Government of Carolina* (1669), which, among other provisions, guaranteed freedom of religion for all save atheists.

Throughout his time in Exeter House, Locke kept in close contact with his friends. Indeed, the long gestation of his most important philosophical work, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689), began at a meeting with friends in his rooms,

probably in February 1671. The group had gathered to consider questions of morality and revealed religion (knowledge of God derived through revelation). Locke pointed out that, before they could make progress, they would need to consider the prior question of what the human mind is (and is not) capable of comprehending. It was agreed that Locke should prepare a paper on the topic for their next meeting, and it was this paper that became the first draft of his great work.

➤ Exile in France :

In 1672 Ashley was raised to the peerage as the 1st earl of Shaftesbury, and at the end of that year he was appointed lord chancellor of England. He was soon dismissed, however, having lost favour with Charles II. For a time Shaftesbury and Locke were in real danger, and it was partly for this reason that Locke traveled to France in 1675. By this time he had received his degree of bachelor of medicine from Oxford and been appointed to a medical studentship at Christ Church.

Locke remained in France for nearly four years (1675–79), spending much time in Paris and Montpellier; the latter possessed a large Protestant minority and the most important medical school in Europe, both of which were strong attractions for Locke. He made many friends in the Protestant community, including some leading intellectuals. His reading, on the other hand, was dominated by the works of French Catholic philosophers.

But it was his medical interests that were the major theme of the journals he kept from this period. He was struck by the poverty of the local population and contrasted this unfavourably with conditions in England and with the vast amounts that the French king (Louis XIV) was spending on the Palace of Versailles. From time to time Locke turned to philosophical questions and added notes to his journal, some of which eventually found a place in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

Back in England, Shaftesbury had been imprisoned for a year in the Tower of London but was released in February 1678. By the time Locke returned to England in 1679, Shaftesbury had been restored to favour as lord president of the Privy Council. The country, however, was torn by dissension over the exclusion controversy—the debate over whether a law could be passed to forbid (exclude) the succession of Charles II's brother James, a Roman Catholic, to the English throne. Shaftesbury and Locke strongly supported exclusion.

The controversy reached its apex in the hysteria of the so-called Popish Plot, a supposed Catholic conspiracy to assassinate Charles and replace him with James. The existence of the plot was widely accepted and resulted in the execution of many innocent people before its fabricator, the Anglican priest Titus Oates, was discredited.

➤ *Two Treatises of Government* :

When Shaftesbury failed to reconcile the interests of the king and Parliament, he was dismissed; in 1681 he was arrested, tried, and finally acquitted of treason by a London jury. A year later he fled to Holland, where in 1683 he died. None of Shaftesbury's known friends was now safe in England. Locke himself, who was being closely watched, crossed to Holland in September 1683.

Out of this context emerged Locke's major work in political philosophy, *Two Treatises of Government* (1690). Although scholars disagree over the exact date of its composition, it is certain that it was substantially composed before Locke fled to Holland. In this respect the *Two Treatises* was a response to the political situation as it existed in England at the time of the exclusion controversy, though its message was of much more lasting significance.

In the preface to the work, composed at a later date, Locke makes clear that the arguments of the two treatises are continuous and that the whole constitutes a justification of the Glorious Revolution, which brought the Protestant William III and Mary II to the throne following the flight of James II to France.

It should be noted that Locke's political philosophy was guided by his deeply held religious commitments. Throughout his life he accepted the existence of a creating God and the notion that all humans are God's servants in virtue of that relationship. God created humans for a certain purpose, namely to live a life according to his laws and thus to inherit eternal salvation; most importantly for Locke's philosophy, God gave humans just those intellectual and other abilities necessary to achieve this end.

Thus, humans, using the capacity of reason, are able to discover that God exists, to identify his laws and the duties they entail, and to acquire sufficient knowledge to perform their duties and thereby to lead a happy and successful life. They can come to recognize that some actions, such as failing to care for one's offspring or to keep one's contracts, are morally reprehensible and contrary to natural law, which is identical to the law of God. Other specific moral laws can be discovered or known only through revelation—e.g., by reading the Bible or the Qur'ān.

The essentially Protestant Christian framework of Locke's philosophy meant that his attitude toward Roman Catholicism would always be hostile. He rejected the claim of papal infallibility (how could it ever be proved?), and he feared the political dimensions of Catholicism as a threat to English autonomy, especially after Louis XIV in 1685 revoked the Edict of Nantes, which had granted religious liberty to the Protestant Huguenots.

➤ The first treatise:

The first treatise was aimed squarely at the work of another 17th-century political theorist, Sir Robert Filmer, whose *Patriarcha* (1680, though probably written in the 1630s) defended the theory of divine right of kings: the authority of every king is divinely sanctioned by his descent from Adam—according to the Bible, the first king and the father of humanity. Locke claims that Filmer's doctrine defies “common sense.” The right to rule by descent from Adam's first grant could not be supported by any historical record or any other evidence, and any contract that God and Adam entered into would not be binding on remote descendants thousands of years later, even if a line of descent could be identified. His refutation was widely accepted as decisive, and in any event the theory of the divine right of kings ceased to be taken seriously in England after 1688.

➤ The second treatise:

Locke's importance as a political philosopher lies in the argument of the second treatise. He begins by defining political power as a

right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws and in defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Publick Good.

➤ The state of nature and the social contract :

Locke's definition of political power has an immediate moral dimension. It is a “right” of making laws and enforcing them for “the public good.” Power for Locke never simply means “capacity” but always “morally sanctioned capacity.” Morality pervades the whole arrangement of society, and it is this fact, tautologically, that makes society legitimate.

Locke's account of political society is based on a hypothetical consideration of the human condition before the beginning of communal life. In this “state of nature,” humans are entirely free. But this freedom is not a state of complete license, because it is set within the bounds of the law of nature. It is a state of equality, which is itself a central element of Locke's account. In marked contrast to Filmer's world, there is no natural hierarchy among humans. Each person is naturally free and equal under the law of nature, subject only to the will of “the infinitely wise Maker.” Each person, moreover, is required to enforce as well as to obey this law.

It is this duty that gives to humans the right to punish offenders. But in such a state of nature, it is obvious that placing the right to punish in each person's hands may lead to injustice and violence. This can be remedied if humans enter into a contract with each other to recognize by common consent a civil government with the power to enforce the

law of nature among the citizens of that state. Although any contract is legitimate as long as it does not infringe upon the law of nature, it often happens that a contract can be enforced only if there is some higher human authority to require compliance with it. It is a primary function of society to set up the framework in which legitimate contracts, freely entered into, may be enforced, a state of affairs much more difficult to guarantee in the state of nature and outside civil society.

➤ Property :

Before discussing the creation of political society in greater detail, Locke provides a lengthy account of his notion of property, which is of central importance to his political theory. Each person, according to Locke, has property in his own person—that is, each person literally owns his own body. Other people may not use a person's body for any purpose without his permission. But one can acquire property beyond one's own body through labour.

By mixing one's labour with objects in the world, one acquires a right to the fruits of that work. If one's labour turns a barren field into crops or a pile of wood into a house, then the valuable product of that labour, the crops or the house, becomes one's property. Locke's view was a forerunner of the labour theory of value, which was expounded in different forms by the 19th-century economists David Ricardo and Karl Marx .

Clearly, each person is entitled to as much of the product of his labour as he needs to survive. But, according to Locke, in the state of nature one is not entitled to hoard surplus produce—one must share it with those less fortunate. God has “given the World to Men in common...to make use of to the best advantage of Life, and convenience.” The introduction of money, while radically changing the economic base of society, was itself a contingent development, for money has no intrinsic value but depends for its utility only on convention.

Locke's account of property and how it comes to be owned faces difficult problems. For example, it is far from clear how much labour is required to turn any given unowned object into a piece of private property. In the case of a piece of land, for example, is it sufficient merely to put a fence around it? Or must it be plowed as well? There is, nevertheless, something intuitively powerful in the notion that it is activity, or work, that grants one a property right in something.

➤ Organization of government :

Locke returns to political society in Chapter VIII of the second treatise. In the community created by the social contract, the will of the majority should prevail, subject to the law of nature. The legislative body is central, but it cannot create laws that violate the law of nature, because the enforcement of the natural law regarding life, liberty, and property is the rationale of the whole system. Laws must apply equitably to all citizens and not favour particular sectional interests, and there should be a division of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

The legislature may, with the agreement of the majority, impose such taxes as are required to fulfill the ends of the state—including, of course, its defense. If the executive power fails to provide the conditions under which the people can enjoy their rights under natural law, then the people are entitled to remove him, by force if necessary. Thus, revolution, in extremis, is permissible—as Locke obviously thought it was in 1688.

The significance of Locke's vision of political society can scarcely be exaggerated. His integration of individualism within the framework of the law of nature and his account of the origins and limits of legitimate government authority inspired the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776) and the broad outlines of the system of government adopted in the U.S. Constitution. George Washington, the first president of the United States, once described Locke as “the greatest man who had ever lived.” In France too, Lockean principles found clear expression in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and other justifications of the French Revolution of 1789.

➤ An Essay Concerning Human Understanding :

Locke remained in Holland for more than five years (1683–89). While there he made new and important friends and associated with other exiles from England. He also wrote his first Letter on Toleration, published anonymously in Latin in 1689, and completed *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

➤ Theory of ideas :

A dominant theme of the *Essay* is the question with which the original discussion in Exeter House began: What is the capacity of the human mind for understanding and knowledge? In his prefatory chapter, Locke explains that the *Essay* is not offered as a contribution to knowledge itself but as a means of clearing away some of the intellectual rubbish that stands in the way of knowledge.

He had in mind not only the medieval Scholastics and their followers but also some of his older contemporaries. The Scholastics—those who took Aristotle and his commentators to be the source of all philosophical knowledge and who still dominated teaching in universities throughout Europe—were guilty of introducing technical terms into philosophy (such as *substantial form*, *vegetative soul*, *abhorrence of a vacuum*, and

intentional species) that upon examination had no clear sense—or, more often, no sense at all. Locke saw the Scholastics as an enemy that had to be defeated before his own account of knowledge could be widely accepted, something about which he was entirely right.

Locke begins the *Essay* by repudiating the view that certain kinds of knowledge—knowledge of the existence of God, of certain moral truths, or of the laws of logic or mathematics—are innate, imprinted on the human mind at its creation. (The doctrine of innate ideas, which was widely held to justify religious and moral claims, had its origins in the philosophy of Plato [428/427–348/347BCE], who was still a powerful force in 17th-century English philosophy.) Locke argues to the contrary that an idea cannot be said to be “in the mind” until one is conscious of it.

But human infants have no conception of God or of moral, logical, or mathematical truths, and to suppose that they do, despite obvious evidence to the contrary, is merely an unwarranted assumption to save a position. Furthermore, travelers to distant lands have reported encounters with people who have no conception of God and who think it morally justified to eat their enemies. Such diversity of religious and moral opinion cannot not be explained by the doctrine of innate ideas but can be explained, Locke held, on his own account of the origins of ideas.

In Book II he turns to that positive account. He begins by claiming that the sources of all knowledge are, first, sense experience (the red colour of a rose, the ringing sound of a bell, the taste of salt, and so on) and, second, “reflection” (one’s awareness that one is thinking, that one is happy or sad, that one is having a certain sensation, and so on). These are not themselves, however, instances of knowledge in the strict sense, but they provide the mind with the materials of knowledge. Locke calls the materials so provided “ideas.” Ideas are objects “before the mind,” not in the sense that they are physical objects but in the sense that they represent physical objects to consciousness.

All ideas are either simple or complex. All simple ideas are derived from sense experience, and all complex ideas are derived from the combination (“compounding”) of simple and complex ideas by the mind. Whereas complex ideas can be analyzed, or broken down, into the simple or complex ideas of which they are composed, simple ideas cannot be.

The complex idea of a snowball, for example, can be analyzed into the simple ideas of whiteness, roundness, and solidity (among possibly others), but none of the latter ideas can be analyzed into anything simpler. In Locke’s view, therefore, a major function of philosophical inquiry is the analysis of the meanings of terms through the identification of the ideas that give rise to them. The project of analyzing supposedly complex ideas (or concepts) subsequently became an important theme in philosophy, especially within the analytic tradition, which began at the turn of the 20th century and became dominant at Cambridge, Oxford, and many other universities, especially in the English-speaking world.

➤ Primary and secondary qualities :

In the course of his account, Locke raises a host of related issues, many of which have since been the source of much debate. One of them is his illuminating distinction between the “primary” and “secondary” qualities of physical objects. Primary qualities include size, shape, weight, and solidity, among others, and secondary qualities include colour, taste, and smell.

Ideas of primary qualities resemble the qualities as they are in the object—as one's idea of the roundness of a snowball resembles the roundness of the snowball itself. However, ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble any property in the object; they are instead a product of the power that the object has to cause certain kinds of ideas in the mind of the perceiver. Thus, the whiteness of the snowball is merely an idea produced in the mind by the interaction between light, the primary qualities of the snowball, and the perceiver's sense organs.

➤ Personal identity :

Locke discussed another problem that had not before received sustained attention: that of personal identity. Assuming one is the same person as the person who existed last week or the person who was born many years ago, what fact makes this so? Locke was careful to distinguish the notion of sameness of person from the related notions of sameness of body and sameness of man, or human being.

Sameness of body requires identity of matter, and sameness of human being depends on continuity of life (as would the sameness of a certain oak tree from acorn to sapling to maturity); but sameness of person requires something else. Locke's proposal was that personal identity consists of continuity of consciousness. One is the same person as the person who existed last week or many years ago if one has memories of the earlier person's conscious experiences. Locke's account of personal identity became a standard (and highly contested) position in subsequent discussions.

➤ Association of ideas:

A further influential section of Book II is Locke's treatment of the association of ideas. Ideas, Locke observes, can become linked in the mind in such a way that having one idea immediately leads one to form another idea, even though the two ideas are not necessarily connected with each other. Instead, they are linked through their having been experienced together on numerous occasions in the past.

The psychological tendency to associate ideas through experience, Locke says, has important implications for the education of children. In order to learn to adopt good habits and to avoid bad ones, children must be made to associate rewards with good behaviour and punishments with bad behaviour. Investigations into the associations that people make between ideas can reveal much about how human beings think.

Through his influence on researchers such as the English physician David Hartley (1705–57), Locke contributed significantly to the development of the theory of associationism, or associationist psychology, in the 18th century. Association has remained a central topic of inquiry in psychology ever since.

➤ Language :

Having shown to his satisfaction that no idea requires for its explanation the hypothesis of innate ideas, Locke proceeds in Book III to examine the role of language in human mental life. His discussion is the first sustained philosophical inquiry in modern times into the notion of linguistic meaning. As elsewhere, he begins with rather simple and obvious claims but quickly proceeds to complex and contentious ones.

Words, Locke says, stand for ideas in the mind of the person who uses them. It is by the use of words that people convey their necessarily private thoughts to each other. In addition, Locke insists, nothing exists except particulars, or individual things. There are, for example, many triangular things and many red things, but there is no general quality or property, over and above these things, that may be called “triangle” (“triangularity”) or “red” (“redness”) (see universal). Nevertheless, a large number of words are general in their application, applying to many particular things at once. Thus, words must be labels for both ideas of particular things (particular ideas) and ideas of general things (general ideas). The problem is, if everything that exists is a particular, where do general ideas come from?

Locke's answer is that ideas become general through the process of abstraction. The general idea of a triangle, for example, is the result of abstracting from the properties of specific triangles only the residue of qualities that all triangles have in common—that is, having three straight sides. Although there are enormous problems with this account, alternatives to it are also fraught with difficulties.

➤ Knowledge :

In Book IV of the *Essay*, Locke reaches the putative heart of his inquiry, the nature and extent of human knowledge. His precise definition of knowledge entails that very few things actually count as such for him. In general, he excludes knowledge claims in which there is no evident connection or exclusion between the ideas of which the claim is composed. Thus, it is possible to know that white is not black whenever one has the ideas of white and black together (as when one looks at a printed page), and it is possible to know that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles if one knows the relevant Euclidean proof. But it is not possible to know that the next stone one drops will fall downward or that the next glass of water one drinks will quench one's thirst, even though psychologically one has every expectation,

through the association of ideas, that it will. These are cases only of probability, not knowledge—as indeed is virtually the whole of scientific knowledge, excluding mathematics. Not that such probable claims are unimportant: humans would be

incapable of dealing with the world except on the assumption that such claims are true. But for Locke they fall short of genuine knowledge.

There are, however, some very important things that can be known. For example, Locke agreed with Descartes that each person can know immediately and without appeal to any further evidence that he exists at the time that he considers it. One can also know immediately that the colour of the print on a page is different from the colour of the page itself—i.e., that black is not white—and that two is greater than one.

It can also be proved from self-evident truths by valid argument (by an argument whose conclusion cannot be false if its premises are true) that a first cause, or God, must exist. Various moral claims also can be demonstrated—e.g., that parents have a duty to care for their children and that one should honour one's contracts. People often make mistakes or poor judgments in their dealings with the world or each other because they are unclear about the concepts they use or because they fail to analyze the relevant ideas. Another great cause of confusion, however, is the human propensity to succumb to what Locke calls “Enthusiasm,” the adoption on logically inadequate grounds of claims that one is already disposed to accept.

One major problem that the *Essay* appeared to raise is that if ideas are indeed the immediate objects of experience, how is it possible to know that there is anything beyond them—e.g., ordinary physical objects? Locke's answer to this problem, insofar as he recognized it as a problem, appears to have been that, because perception is a natural process and thus ordained by God, it cannot be generally misleading about the ontology of the universe. In the more skeptical age of the 18th century, this argument became less and less convincing. This issue dominated epistemology in the 18th century.

The *Essay's* influence was enormous, perhaps as great as that of any other philosophical work apart from those of Plato and Aristotle. Its importance in the English-speaking world of the 18th century can scarcely be overstated. Along with the works of Descartes, it constitutes the foundation of modern Western philosophy.

Other works :

Locke's writings were not confined to political philosophy and epistemology. *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693), for example, remains a standard source in the philosophy of education. It developed out of a series of letters that Locke had written from Holland to his friend Edward Clarke concerning the education of Clarke's son, who was destined to be a gentleman but not necessarily a scholar.

It emphasizes the importance of both physical and mental development—both exercise and study. The first requirement is to instill virtue, wisdom, and good manners. This is to be followed by book learning. For the latter, Locke gives a list of recommended texts on Latin, French, mathematics, geography, and history, as well as civil law, philosophy, and natural science. There should also be plenty of scope for recreation, including dancing and riding.

Locke's *The Reasonableness of Christianity*(1695) is the most important of his many theological writings. Central to all of them is his belief that every individual has within him the abilities necessary to comprehend his duty and to achieve salvation with the aid of the Scriptures. Locke was constantly trying to steer a course that would allow individuals to accept the essential doctrines of Christianity while retaining a certain freedom of conscience. According to Locke, all Christians must accept Jesus as the Messiah and live in accordance with his teachings. Within this minimum framework, however, differences of worship could and should be tolerated. Locke was thus in many ways close to the Latitudinarian movement and other liberal theological trends. His influence on Protestant Christian thought for at least the next century was substantial.

Locke wrote no major work of moral philosophy. Although he sometimes claimed that it would be possible in principle to produce a deductive system of ethics comparable to Euclid's geometry, he never actually produced one, and there is no evidence that he ever gave the matter more than minimal attention. He was quite sure, however, that through the use of reason human beings can gain access to and knowledge of basic moral truths, which ultimately arise from a moral order in "the soil of human nature." As he expressed the point in *Essays on the Law of Nature* (1664), an early work expressing a position from which he never diverted,

since man has been made such as he is, equipped with reason and his other faculties and destined for this mode of life, there necessarily result from his inborn constitution some definite duties for him, which cannot be other than they are.

Just as one can discover from the nature of the triangle that its angles equal two right angles, so this moral order can be discovered by reason and is within the grasp of all human beings.

➤ Last years and influence :

Locke remained in Holland until James II was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution. Indeed, Locke himself in February 1689 crossed the English Channel in the party that accompanied the princess of Orange, who was soon crowned Queen Mary II of England. Upon his return he became actively involved in various political projects, including helping to draft the English Bill of Rights, though the version eventually adopted by Parliament did not go as far as he wanted in matters of religious toleration.

He was offered a senior diplomatic post by William but declined. His health was rarely good, and he suffered especially in the smoky atmosphere of London. He was therefore very happy to accept the offer of his close friend Damaris Masham, herself a philosopher and the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, to make his home with her family at Oates in High Laver, Essex. There he spent his last years revising the *Essay* and other works, entertaining friends, including Newton, and responding at length to his critics. After a lengthy period of poor health, he died while Damaris read him the Bible. He was buried in High Laver church.

As a final comment on his achievement, it may be said that, in many ways, to read Locke's works is the best available introduction to the intellectual environment of the modern Western world. His faith in the salutary, ennobling powers of knowledge justifies his reputation as the first philosopher of the Enlightenment. In a broader context, he founded a philosophical tradition, British empiricism, that would span three centuries. In developing the Whig ideology underlying the exclusion controversy and the Glorious Revolution, he formulated the classic expression of liberalism, which was instrumental in the great revolutions of 1776 and 1789. His influence remains strongly felt in the West, as the notions of mind, freedom, and authority continue to be challenged and explored.

➤ Major Works :

Philosophy, religion, and education

An Essay Concerning Humane [sic] Understanding (dated 1690 but actually available from late 1689, with a further four editions to 1705); *Epistola de Tolerantia* (1689; "A Letter Concerning Toleration," trans. by William Popple, 1689); *A Second Letter Concerning Toleration* (1690); *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693); *The Reasonableness of Chistianity as Delivered in the Scriptures* (1695); *A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity* (1697); *Of the Conduct of the Understanding in Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke* (1706).

➤ Political philosophy and economics :

Two Treatises of Government (1689); *Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money* (1692); *Short Observations on a Printed Paper, Intituled, for Encouraging the Coining Silver Money in England, and After for Keeping It Here* (1695); *Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money* (1695).¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Rogers, Graham A.J. "Locke, John." Encyclopedia Britannica. Ibid.

✧ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques :

Born : June 28, 1712, Geneva, Switz. -died : July 2, 1778, Ermenonville, France.

swiss-born philosopher, writer, and political theorist whose treatises and novels inspired the leaders of the French Revolution and the Romantic generation.

Rousseau was the least academic of modern philosophers and in many ways was the most influential. His thought marked the end of the Age of Reason. He propelled political and ethical thinking into new channels. His reforms revolutionized taste, first in music, then in the other arts.

He had a profound impact on people's way of life; he taught parents to take a new interest in their children and to educate them differently; he furthered the expression of emotion rather than polite restraint in friendship and love. He introduced the cult of religious sentiment among people who had discarded religious dogma. He opened men's eyes to the beauties of nature, and he made liberty an object of almost universal aspiration.

➤ Formative years :

Rousseau's mother died in childbirth and he was brought up by his father, who taught him to believe that the city of his birth was a republic as splendid as Sparta or ancient Rome. Rousseau senior had an equally glorious image of his own importance; after marrying above his modest station as a watchmaker, he got into trouble with the civil authorities by brandishing the sword that his upper-class pretensions prompted him to wear, and he had to leave Geneva to avoid imprisonment. Rousseau, the son, then lived for six years as a poor relation in his mother's family, patronized and humiliated, until he, too, at the age of 16, fled from Geneva to live the life of an adventurer and a Roman Catholic convert in the kingdoms of Sardinia and France.

Rousseau was fortunate in finding in the province of Savoy a benefactress named the Baronne de Warens, who provided him with a refuge in her home and employed him as her steward. She also furthered his education to such a degree that the boy who had arrived on her doorstep as a stammering apprentice who had never been to school developed into a philosopher, a man of letters, and a musician.

Mme de Warens, who thus transformed the adventurer into a philosopher, was herself an adventuress—a Swiss convert to Catholicism who had stripped her husband of his money before fleeing to Savoy with the gardener's son to set herself up as a Catholic missionary specializing in the conversion of young male Protestants. Her morals distressed Rousseau, even when he became her lover. But she was a woman of taste, intelligence, and energy, who brought out in Rousseau just the talents that were needed to conquer Paris at a time when Voltaire had made radical ideas fashionable.

Rousseau reached Paris when he was 30 and was lucky enough to meet another young man from the provinces seeking literary fame in the capital, Denis Diderot. The two soon became immensely successful as the centre of a group of intellectuals—or “Philosophes”—who gathered round the great French Encyclopédie, of which Diderot was appointed editor. The Encyclopédie was an important organ of radical and anticlerical opinion, and its contributors were as much reforming and even iconoclastic pamphleteers as they were philosophers. Rousseau, the most original of them all in his thinking and the most forceful and eloquent in his style of writing, was soon the most conspicuous.

He wrote music as well as prose, and one of his operas, *Le Devin du village* (1752; *The Cunning-Man*), attracted so much admiration from the king and the court that he might have enjoyed an easy life as a fashionable composer, but something in his Calvinist blood rejected this type of worldly glory. Indeed, at the age of 37 Rousseau had what he called an “illumination” while walking to Vincennes to visit Diderot, who had been imprisoned there because of his irreligious writings. In the *Confessions*, which he wrote late in life, Rousseau says that it came to him then in a “terrible flash” that modern progress had corrupted instead of improved men. He went on to write his first important work, a prize essay for the Academy of Dijon entitled *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750; *A Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts*), in which he argues that the history of man's life on earth has been a history of decay.

This *Discourse* is by no means Rousseau's best piece of writing, but its central theme was to inform almost everything else he wrote. Throughout his life he kept returning to the thought that man is good by nature but has been corrupted by society and civilization. He did not mean to suggest that society and civilization were inherently bad but rather that both had taken a wrong direction and become more harmful as they had become more sophisticated.

This idea in itself was not unfamiliar when Rousseau published his *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts*. Many Roman Catholic writers deplored the direction that European culture had taken since the Middle Ages. They shared the hostility toward progress that Rousseau had expressed. What they did not share was his belief that man was naturally good. It was, however, just this belief in man's natural goodness that Rousseau made the cornerstone of his argument.

Rousseau may well have received the inspiration for this belief from Mme de Warens; for although that unusual woman had become a communicant of the Roman Catholic Church, she retained—and transmitted to Rousseau—much of the sentimental optimism about human purity that she had herself absorbed as a child from the mystical Protestant Pietists who were her teachers in the canton of Bern. At all events, the idea of man's natural goodness, as Rousseau developed it, set him apart from both conservatives and radicals. Even so, for several years after the publication of his first *Discourse*, he remained a close collaborator in Diderot's essentially progressive enterprise, the Encyclopédie, and an active contributor to its pages. His speciality there was music, and it was in this sphere that he first established his influence as reformer.

➤ Controversy with Rameau :

The arrival of an Italian opera company in Paris in 1752 to perform works of *opera buffa* by Pergolesi, Scarlatti, Vinci, Leo, and other such composers suddenly divided the French music-loving public into two excited camps, supporters of the new Italian opera and supporters of the traditional French opera. The Philosophes of the *Encyclopédie*—d'Alembert, Diderot, and d'Holbach among them entered the fray as champions of Italian music, but Rousseau, who had arranged for the publication of Pergolesi's music in Paris and who knew more about the subject than most Frenchmen after the months he had spent visiting the opera houses of Venice during his time as secretary to the French ambassador to the doge in 1743–44, emerged as the most forceful and effective combatant. He was the only one to direct his fire squarely at the leading living exponent of French operatic music, Jean-Philippe Rameau.

Rousseau and Rameau must at that time have seemed unevenly matched in a controversy about music. Rameau, already in his 70th year, was not only a prolific and successful composer but was also, as the author of the celebrated *Traité de l'harmonie* (1722; *Treatise on Harmony*) and other technical works, Europe's leading musicologist. Rousseau, by contrast, was 30 years younger, a newcomer to music, with no professional training and only one successful opera to his credit. His scheme for a new notation for music had been rejected by the Academy of Sciences, and most of his musical entries for Diderot's *Encyclopédie* were as yet unpublished.

Yet the dispute was not only musical but also philosophical, and Rameau was confronted with a more formidable adversary than he had realized. Rousseau built his case for the superiority of Italian music over French on the principle that melody must have priority over harmony, whereas Rameau based his on the assertion that harmony must have priority over melody. By pleading for melody, Rousseau introduced what later came to be recognized as a characteristic idea of Romanticism, namely, that in art the free expression of the creative spirit is more important than strict adherence to formal rules and traditional procedures. By pleading for harmony, Rameau reaffirmed the first principle of French Classicism, namely, that conformity to rationally intelligible rules is a necessary condition of art, the aim of which is to impose order on the chaos of human experience.

In music, Rousseau was a liberator. He argued for freedom in music, and he pointed to the Italian composers as models to be followed. In doing so he had more success than Rameau; he changed people's attitudes. Gluck, who succeeded Rameau as the most important operatic composer in France, acknowledged his debt to Rousseau's teaching, and Mozart based the text for his one-act operetta *Bastien und Bastienne* on Rousseau's *Devin du village*. European music had taken a new direction. But Rousseau himself composed no more operas. Despite the success of *Le Devin du village*, or rather because of its success, Rousseau felt that, as a moralist who had decided to make a break with worldly values, he could not allow himself to go on working for the theatre. He decided to devote his energies henceforth to literature and philosophy.

➤ Major works of political philosophy :

As part of what Rousseau called his “reform,” or improvement of his own character, he began to look back at some of the austere principles that he had learned as a child in the Calvinist republic of Geneva. Indeed he decided to return to that city, repudiate his Catholicism, and seek readmission to the Protestant church. He had in the meantime acquired a mistress, an illiterate laundry maid named Thérèse Levasseur. To the surprise of his friends, he took her with him to Geneva, presenting her as a nurse. Although her presence caused some murmurings, Rousseau was readmitted easily to the Calvinist communion, his literary fame having made him very welcome to a city that prided itself as much on its culture as on its morals.

Rousseau had by this time completed a second *Discourse* in response to a question set by the Academy of Dijon: “What is the origin of the inequality among men and is it justified by natural law?” In response to this challenge he produced a masterpiece of speculative anthropology. The argument follows on that of his first *Discourse* by developing the proposition that natural man is good and then tracing the successive stages by which man has descended from primitive innocence to corrupt sophistication.

Rousseau begins his *Discours sur l'origine de l'inegalité* (1755; *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*) by distinguishing two kinds of inequality, natural and artificial, the first arising from differences in strength, intelligence, and so forth, the second from the conventions that govern societies. It is the inequalities of the latter sort that he sets out to explain. Adopting what he thought the properly “scientific” method of investigating origins, he attempts to reconstruct the earliest phases of man's experience of life on earth. He suggests that original man was not a social being but entirely solitary, and to this extent he agrees with Hobbes's account of the state of nature. But in contrast to the English pessimist's view that the life of man in such a condition must have been “poor, nasty, brutish and short,” Rousseau claims that original man, while admittedly solitary, was healthy, happy, good, and free. The vices of men, he argues, date from the time when men formed societies.

Rousseau thus exonerates nature and blames society for the emergence of vices. He says that passions that generate vices hardly exist in the state of nature but begin to develop as soon as men form societies. Rousseau goes on to suggest that societies started when men built their first huts, a development that facilitated cohabitation of males and females; this in turn produced the habit of living as a family and associating with neighbours.

This “nascent society,” as Rousseau calls it, was good while it lasted; it was indeed the “golden age” of human history. Only it did not endure. With the tender passion of love there was also born the destructive passion of jealousy. Neighbours started to compare their abilities and achievements with one another, and this “marked the first step towards inequality and at the same time towards vice.” Men started to demand consideration and respect; their innocent self-love turned into culpable pride, as each man wanted to be better than everyone else.

The introduction of property marked a further step toward inequality since it made it necessary for men to institute law and government in order to protect property. Rousseau laments the “fatal” concept of property in one of his more eloquent passages, describing the “horrors” that have resulted from men's departure from a condition in which the earth belonged to no one. These passages in his second *Discourse* excited later revolutionaries such as Marx and Lenin, but Rousseau himself did not think that the past could be undone in any way; there was no point in men dreaming of a return to the golden age.

Civil society, as Rousseau describes it, comes into being to serve two purposes: to provide peace for everyone and to ensure the right to property for anyone lucky enough to have possessions. It is thus of some advantage to everyone, but mostly to the advantage of the rich, since it transforms their de facto ownership into rightful ownership and keeps the poor dispossessed. It is a somewhat fraudulent social contract that introduces government since the poor get so much less out of it than do the rich.

Even so, the rich are no happier in civil society than are the poor because social man is never satisfied. Society leads men to hate one another to the extent that their interests conflict, and the best they are able to do is to hide their hostility behind a mask of courtesy. Thus Rousseau regards the inequality between men not as a separate problem but as one of the features of the long process by which men become alienated from nature and from innocence.

In the dedication Rousseau wrote for the *Discourse*, in order to present it to the republic of Geneva, he nevertheless praises that city-state for having achieved the ideal balance between “the equality which nature established among men and the inequality which they have instituted among themselves.” The arrangement he discerned in Geneva was one in which the best men were chosen by the citizens and put in the highest positions of authority.

Like Plato, Rousseau always believed that a just society was one in which everyone was in his right place. And having written the *Discourse* to explain how men had lost their liberty in the past, he went on to write another book, *Du Contrat social* (1762; *The Social Contract*), to suggest how they might recover their liberty in the future. Again Geneva was the model; not Geneva as it had become in 1754 when Rousseau returned there to recover his rights as a citizen, but Geneva as it had once been; *i.e.*, Geneva as Calvin had designed it.

The Social Contract begins with the sensational opening sentence: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains,” and proceeds to argue that men need not be in chains. If a civil society, or state, could be based on a genuine social contract, as opposed to the fraudulent social contract depicted in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, men would receive in exchange for their independence a better kind of freedom, namely true political, or republican, liberty. Such liberty is to be found in obedience to a self-imposed law.

Rousseau's definition of political liberty raises an obvious problem. For while it can be readily agreed that an individual is free if he obeys only rules he prescribes for himself, this is so because an individual is a person with a single will. A society, by contrast, is a set of persons with a set of individual wills, and conflict between separate wills is a fact

of universal experience. Rousseau's response to the problem is to define his civil society as an artificial person united by a general will, or *volonté générale*. The social contract that brings society into being is a pledge, and the society remains in being as a pledged group. Rousseau's republic is a creation of the general will—of a will that never falters in each and every member to further the public, common, or national interest—even though it may conflict at times with personal interest.

Rousseau sounds very much like Hobbes when he says that under the pact by which men enter civil society everyone totally alienates himself and all his rights to the whole community. Rousseau, however, represents this act as a form of exchange of rights whereby men give up natural rights in return for civil rights. The bargain is a good one because what men surrender are rights of dubious value, whose realization depends solely on an individual man's own might, and what they obtain in return are rights that are both legitimate and enforced by the collective force of the community.

There is no more haunting paragraph in *The Social Contract* than that in which Rousseau speaks of “forcing a man to be free.” But it would be wrong to interpret these words in the manner of those critics who see Rousseau as a prophet of modern totalitarianism. He does not claim that a whole society can be forced to be free but only that an occasional individual, who is enslaved by his passions to the extent of disobeying the law, can be restored by force to obedience to the voice of the general will that exists inside of him. The man who is coerced by society for a breach of the law is, in Rousseau's view, being brought back to an awareness of his own true interests.

For Rousseau there is a radical dichotomy between true law and actual law. Actual law, which he describes in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, simply protects the status quo. True law, as described in *The Social Contract*, is just law, and what ensures its being just is that it is made by the people in its collective capacity as sovereign and obeyed by the same people in their individual capacities as subjects. Rousseau is confident that such laws could not be unjust because it is inconceivable that any people would make unjust laws for itself.

Rousseau is, however, troubled by the fact that the majority of a people does not necessarily represent its most intelligent citizens. Indeed, he agrees with Plato that most people are stupid. Thus the general will, while always morally sound, is sometimes mistaken. Hence Rousseau suggests the people need a lawgiver—a great mind like Solon or Lycurgus or Calvin—to draw up a constitution and system of laws. He even suggests that such lawgivers need to claim divine inspiration in order to persuade the dim-witted multitude to accept and endorse the laws it is offered.

This suggestion echoes a similar proposal by Machiavelli, a political theorist Rousseau greatly admired and whose love of republican government he shared. An even more conspicuously Machiavellian influence can be discerned in Rousseau's chapter on civil religion, where he argues that Christianity, despite its truth, is useless as a republican religion on the grounds that it is directed to the unseen world and does nothing to teach citizens the virtues that are needed in the service of the state, namely, courage, virility, and patriotism. Rousseau does not go so far as Machiavelli in proposing a revival of pagan cults, but he does propose a civil religion with minimal theological content designed to fortify and not impede (as Christianity impedes) the cultivation of martial virtues. It is understandable that the authorities of Geneva, profoundly convinced that

the national church of their little republic was at the same time a truly Christian church and a nursery of patriotism, reacted angrily against this chapter in Rousseau's *Social Contract*.

By the year 1762, however, when *The Social Contract* was published, Rousseau had given up any thought of settling in Geneva. After recovering his citizen's rights in 1754, he had returned to Paris and the company of his friends around the *Encyclopédie*. But he became increasingly ill at ease in such worldly society and began to quarrel with his fellow Philosophes. An article for the *Encyclopédie* on the subject of Geneva, written by d'Alembert at Voltaire's instigation, upset Rousseau partly by suggesting that the pastors of the city had lapsed from Calvinist severity into unitarian laxity and partly by proposing that a theatre should be erected there. Rousseau hastened into print with a defense of the Calvinist orthodoxy of the pastors and with an elaborate attack on the theatre as an institution that could only do harm to an innocent community such as Geneva.

➤ Years of seclusion and exile :

By the time his *Lettre à d'Alembert sur les spectacles* (1758; Letter to Monsieur d'Alembert on the Theatre) appeared in print, Rousseau had already left Paris to pursue a life closer to nature on the country estate of his friend Mme d'Épinay near Montmorency. When the hospitality of Mme d'Épinay proved to entail much the same social round as that of Paris, Rousseau retreated to a nearby cottage, called Montlouis, under the protection of the Maréchal de Luxembourg.

But even this highly placed friend could not save him in 1762 when his treatise on education, Émile, was published and scandalized the pious Jansenists of the French Parlements even as *The Social Contract* scandalized the Calvinists of Geneva. In Paris, as in Geneva, they ordered the book to be burned and the author arrested; all the Maréchal de Luxembourg could do was to provide a carriage for Rousseau to escape from France. After formally renouncing his Genevan citizenship in 1763, Rousseau became a fugitive, spending the rest of his life moving from one refuge to another.

The years at Montmorency had been the most productive of his literary career; besides *The Social Contract* and *Émile*, *Julie: ou, la nouvelle Héloïse* (1761; Julie: or, The New Eloise) came out within 12 months, all three works of seminal importance. *The New Eloise*, being a novel, escaped the censorship to which the other two works were subject; indeed of all his books it proved to be the most widely read and the most universally praised in his lifetime. It develops the Romanticism that had already informed his writings on music and perhaps did more than any other single work of literature to influence the spirit of its age.

It made the author at least as many friends among the reading public—and especially among educated women—as *The Social Contract* and *Émile* made enemies among magistrates and priests. If it did not exempt him from persecution, at least it ensured that his persecution was observed, and admiring femmes du monde intervened from time to time to help him so that Rousseau was never, unlike Voltaire and Diderot, actually imprisoned.

The theme of *The New Eloise* provides a striking contrast to that of *The Social Contract*. It is about people finding happiness in domestic as distinct from public life, in the family as opposed to the state. The central character, Saint-Preux, is a middle-class preceptor who falls in love with his upper-class pupil, Julie. She returns his love and yields to his advances, but the difference between their classes makes marriage between them impossible. Baron d'Étange, Julie's father, has indeed promised her to a fellow nobleman named Wolmar. As a dutiful daughter, Julie marries Wolmar and Saint-Preux goes off on a voyage around the world with an English aristocrat, Bomston, from whom he acquires a certain stoicism. Julie succeeds in forgetting her feelings for Saint-Preux and finds happiness as wife, mother, and chatelaine. Some six years later Saint-Preux returns from his travels and is engaged as tutor to the Wolmar children. All live together in harmony, and there are only faint echoes of the old affair between Saint-Preux and Julie.

The little community, dominated by Julie, illustrates one of Rousseau's political principles: that while men should rule the world in public life, women should rule men in private life. At the end of *The New Eloise*, when Julie has made herself ill in an attempt to rescue one of her children from drowning, she comes face-to-face with a truth about herself: that her love for Saint-Preux has never died.

The novel was clearly inspired by Rousseau's own curious relationship—at once passionate and platonic—with Sophie d'Houdetot, a noblewoman who lived near him at Montmorency. He himself asserted in the *Confessions* (1781–88) that he was led to write the book by “a desire for loving, which I had never been able to satisfy and by which I felt myself devoured.”

Saint-Preux's experience of love forbidden by the laws of class reflects Rousseau's own experience; and yet it cannot be said that *The New Eloise* is an attack on those laws, which seem, on the contrary, to be given the status almost of laws of nature. The members of the Wolmar household are depicted as finding happiness in living according to an aristocratic ideal. They appreciate the routines of country life and enjoy the beauties of the Swiss and Savoyard Alps. But despite such an endorsement of the social order, the novel was revolutionary; its very free expression of emotions and its extreme sensibility deeply moved its large readership and profoundly influenced literary developments.

Émile is a book that seems to appeal alternately to the republican ethic of *The Social Contract* and the aristocratic ethic of *The New Eloise*. It is also halfway between a novel and a didactic essay. Described by the author as a treatise on education, it is not about schooling but about the upbringing of a rich man's son by a tutor who is given unlimited authority over him. At the same time the book sets out to explore the possibilities of an education for republican citizenship. The basic argument of the book, as Rousseau himself expressed it, is that vice and error, which are alien to a child's original nature, are introduced by external agencies, so that the work of a tutor must always be directed to counteracting those forces by manipulating pressures that will work with nature and not against it. Rousseau devotes many pages to explaining the methods the tutor must use. These methods involve a noticeable measure of deceit, and although corporal punishment is forbidden, mental cruelty is not.

Whereas *The Social Contract* is concerned with the problems of achieving freedom, *Émile* is concerned with achieving happiness and wisdom. In this different context religion plays a different role. Instead of a civil religion, Rousseau here outlines a personal religion, which proves to be a kind of simplified Christianity, involving neither revelation nor the familiar dogmas of the church. In the guise of *La Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard* (1765; *The Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar*) Rousseau sets out what may fairly be regarded as his own religious views, since that book confirms what he says on the subject in his private correspondence.

Rousseau could never entertain doubts about God's existence or about the immortality of the soul. He felt, moreover, a strong emotional drive toward the worship of God, whose presence he felt most forcefully in nature, especially in mountains and forests untouched by the hand of man. He also attached great importance to conscience, the “divine voice of the soul in man,” opposing this both to the bloodless categories of rationalistic ethics and to the cold tablets of biblical authority.

This minimal creed put Rousseau at odds with the orthodox adherents of the churches and with the openly atheistic Philosophes of Paris, so that despite the enthusiasm that some of his writings, and especially *The New Eloise*, excited in the reading public, he felt himself increasingly isolated, tormented, and pursued. After he had been expelled from France, he was chased from canton to canton in Switzerland. He reacted to the suppression of *The Social Contract* in Geneva by indicting the regime of that city-state in a pamphlet entitled *Lettres écrites de la montagne* (1764; *Letters Written from the Mountain*). No longer, as in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, was Geneva depicted as a model republic but as one that had been taken over by “twenty-five despots”; the subjects of the king of England were said to be free men by comparison with the victims of Genevan tyranny.

It was in England that Rousseau found refuge after he had been banished from the canton of Bern. The Scottish philosopher David Hume took him there and secured the offer of a pension from King George III; but once in England, Rousseau became aware that certain British intellectuals were making fun of him, and he suspected Hume of participating in the mockery. Various symptoms of paranoia began to manifest themselves in Rousseau, and he returned to France incognito. Believing that Thérèse was the only person he could rely on, he finally married her in 1768, when he was 56 years old.

➤ The last decade :

In the remaining 10 years of his life Rousseau produced primarily autobiographical writings, mostly intended to justify himself against the accusations of his adversaries. The most important was his Confessions, modeled on the work of the same title by St. Augustine and achieving something of the same classic status.

He also wrote *Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques* (1780; “Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques”) to reply to specific charges by his enemies and *Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire* (1782; *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*), one of the most moving of his books, in which the intense passion of his earlier writings gives way to a gentle lyricism and

serenity. And indeed, Rousseau does seem to have recovered his peace of mind in his last years, when he was once again afforded refuge on the estates of great French noblemen, first the Prince de Conti and then the Marquis de Girardin, in whose park at Ermenonville he died.

➤ Major Works :

Novels :

Julie: ou, la nouvelle Héloïse (1761; *Julie: or, The New Eloise*, trans. by Judith H. McDowell, 1968); *Émile: ou, de l'éducation* (1762; *Emile: or, On Education*, trans. by Allan Bloom, 1979).

Autobiographical works :

Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques: dialogue (1780); *Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire* (1782; *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, trans. by Charles E. Butterworth, 1979); *Les Confessions* (1782–89; *The Confessions*, trans. by J.M. Cohen, 1953).

➤ Essays :

Discours qui a remporté le prix à l'Académie de Dijon en l'année 1750; sur cette question proposée par la même académie si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs (1750; "Discourse on the Sciences and Arts," trans. by Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters, in *The First and Second Discourses*, 1964); *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755; *Discourse on Inequality*, trans. by Maurice Cranston, 1984); *Du Contrat social* (1762; *The Social Contract*, trans. by Maurice Cranston, 1968); *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne* (1782; *The Government of Poland*, trans. by Willmoore Kendall, 1972); *Lettres élémentaires sur la botanique* (1780; *Letters on the Elements of Botany*, trans. by Thomas Martyn, 1785).

➤ Letters :

J.J. Rousseau, citoyen de Genève, à M. d'Alembert, sur son article Genève dans le septième volume de l'Encyclopédie, et particulièrement sur le projet d'établir un Théâtre de Comédie en cette ville (1758; *Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre*, trans. by Allan Bloom, 1960); *Lettres écrites de la montagne* (1764).

➤ Collected works :

Oeuvres complètes, ed. by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (1959–), will eventually be the definitive collected edition. Four carefully annotated volumes have been published so far. *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. by Michel Launay, 3 vol. (1967–71), is the most comprehensive contemporary edition, but far from complete. In some earlier editions of Rousseau's collected works, published at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, material can be found that has not been reprinted in the 20th-century collections.

The *Correspondance complète de Jean Jacques Rousseau: édition critique*, ed. by R.A. Leigh (1965–), of which 43 volumes have so far appeared, wholly supersedes the *Correspondance générale de J.-J. Rousseau*, 20 vol., ed. by Théophile Dufour and Pierre P. Plan (1924–34).¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ "Rousseau, Jean-Jacques." Encyclopedia Britannica.

Appendix

Thomas Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* during the so-called English Revolution (1640-1660) a time of great upheaval and disorder. Noting the excesses of parliamentary rule and the lack of a strong central authority, Hobbes advocated a form of government by which the ruled handed over all authority to the ruler. As the following passage shows, Hobbes saw the ruler as the only disinterested party in society who could rise above selfish interest to preserve justice and establish unity. This passage is often cited as a prime example of Hobbes's somber view of human nature. The language, punctuation, and spelling reflect the conventions of the time.

(1)

➤ From Leviathan : By Thomas Hobbes :

Of the NATURALL CONDITION of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to him selfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto.

That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain concept of ones owne wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the

Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.

And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.

Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of grieve) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a shoure or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no

account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short ...¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Encarta : Source: Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997.

The ideas of 17th-century English philosopher and political theorist John Locke greatly influenced modern philosophy and political thought. Locke, who is best known for establishing the philosophical doctrine of empiricism, was criticized for his “atheistic” proposition that morality is not innate within human beings. However, Locke was a religious man, and the influence of his faith was overlooked by his contemporaries and subsequent readers. Author John Dunn explores the influence of Locke’s Anglican beliefs on works such as *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690).

(ii)

✱ The Essay Concerning Human Understanding

➤ BOOK II: OF IDEAS :CHAPTER I : Of Ideas in General, and Their Original

John Locke

1. *Idea is the object of thinking.*—Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their mind several ideas, such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others:

it is in the first place then to be inquired, How he comes by them? I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas and original characters stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the foregoing book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind; for which I shall appeal to everyone's own observation and experience.

2. *All ideas come from sensation or reflection.*—Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal

operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

3. *The object of sensation one source of ideas.*—First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions.

This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call *sensation*.

4. *The operations of our minds the other source of them.*—Secondly, the other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we, being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses.

This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this *reflection*, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection, then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding.

These two, I say, viz., external material things as the object of sensation, and the operations of our own minds within as the objects of reflection, are, to me, the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term *operations* here, I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

5. *All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.* The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External objects* furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and *the mind* furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, [combinations, and relations,] we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways.

Let anyone examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding, and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind considered as objects of his reflection; and how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted, though perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

5. *Observable in children.*—He that attentively considers the state of a child at his first coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas that are to be the matter of his future knowledge.

It is by degrees he comes to be furnished with them; and though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: and, if it were worth while, no doubt a child might be so ordered as to have but a very few even of the ordinary ideas till he were grown up to a man.

But all that are born into the world being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them, variety of ideas, whether care be taken about it or not, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colors are busy at hand everywhere when the eye is but open; sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit their proper senses, and force an entrance to the mind; but yet I think it will be granted easily, that if a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but black and white till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster or a pineapple has of those particular relishes.

6. *Men are differently furnished with these according to the different objects they converse with.*—Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety; and from the operations of their minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For, though he that contemplates the operations of his mind cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them; yet, unless he turn his thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it.

The picture or clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made of, till he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular.

7. *Ideas of reflection later, because they need attention.*—And hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives: because, though they pass there continually, yet like floating visions, they make not deep impressions enough to leave in the mind, clear, distinct, lasting ideas, till the understanding turns inwards upon itself, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the objects of its own contemplation.
8. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them,

forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so, growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all.

9. *The soul begins to have ideas when it begins to perceive.*—To ask, at what time a man has first any ideas, is to ask when he begins to perceive; *having ideas*, and *perception*, being the same thing. I know it is an opinion, that the soul always thinks; and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body: which if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man's ideas is the same as to inquire after the beginning of his soul. For by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.

10. *The soul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.*—But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after, the first rudiments or organization, or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think, than for the body always to move; the perception of ideas being, as I conceive, to the soul, what motion is to the body: not its essence, but one of its operations; and, therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action. That, perhaps, is the privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of all things, 'who never slumbers nor sleeps;' but it is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man.

We know certainly, by experience, that we sometimes think; and thence draw this infallible consequence—that there is something in us that has a power to think. But whether that substance perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured than experience informs us. For to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and

inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this that 'the soul always thinks,' be a self-evident proposition, that everybody assents to on first hearing, I appeal to mankind. [It is doubted whether I thought all last night, or no; the question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring as a proof for it an hypothesis which is the very thing in dispute; by which way one may prove anything; and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think, and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night.

But he that would not deceive himself ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact because of his hypothesis; that is, because he supposes it to be so; which way of proving amounts to this,—that I must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive that I always do so.

But men in love with their opinions may not only suppose what is in question, but allege wrong matter of fact. How else could anyone make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep? I do not say, there is no soul in a man because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; but I do say, he cannot think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it will always be, necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.]

11. *It is not always conscious of it.*—I grant that the soul in a waking man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake; but whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration; it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it.

If the soul doth think in a sleeping man without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery? I am sure the man is not, no more than the bed or earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body is

sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments, and concerns, its pleasure or pain, apart, which the man is not conscious of, nor partakes in, it is certain that Socrates asleep and Socrates awake is not the same person; but his soul when he sleeps, and Socrates the man, consisting of body and soul, when he is waking, are two persons; since waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul, which it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps, without perceiving anything of it, no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity.

➤ Chapter II :Of Simple Ideas :

1. *Uncompounded appearances.*—The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are *simple*, and some *complex*.

Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed.

For though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas—as a man sees at once motion and color, the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax —yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses; the coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily, or as the taste of sugar and smell of a rose: and there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but *one uniform appearance or conception in the mind*, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

3. *The mind can neither make nor destroy them.*—These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz., sensation and reflection.

When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to *invent* or *frame* one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding *destroy* those that are there: the dominion of man in this little world of his own understanding, being much-what the same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being.

The same inability will everyone find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understanding any simple idea not received in by his senses from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have anyone try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt; and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath *ideas* of colors, and a deaf man true, distinct notions of sounds.

4. *Only the qualities that affect the senses are imaginable.*—This is the reason why, though we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five as they are usually counted, which He has given to man; yet I think it is not possible for anyone to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made with but four senses, the qualities then which are the objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense can possibly be; which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a great presumption to deny.

He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things, but will consider the immensity of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in

other mansions of it there may be other and different intelligible beings, of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension, as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or understanding of a man; such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses, though perhaps there may be justly counted more; but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

English philosopher John Locke anonymously published his *Treatises on Government* (1690) the same year as his famous *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. In the *Second Treatise*, Locke described his concept of a “civil government.” Locke excluded absolute monarchy from his definition of civil society, because he believed that the people must consent to be ruled. This argument later influenced the authors of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.

(iii)

From *The Second Treatise on Government*: Chapter VII : Of Political or Civil Society.

By John Locke :

77. GOD, having made man such a creature that, in His own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination, to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children, to which, in time, that between master and servant came to be added.

And though all these might, and commonly did, meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family, each of these, or all together, came short of 'political society,' as we shall see if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these.

78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman, and though it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation, yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their common offspring, who have a right to be nourished and maintained by them till they are able to provide for themselves....

84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely in the foregoing chapter that I shall not here need to say anything of it; and I think it is plain that it is far different from a politic society.

85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those of far different condition; for a free man makes himself a servant to another by selling him for a certain time the service he undertakes to do in exchange for wages he is to receive; and though this commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof, yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them. But there is another sort of servant which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war are, by the right of Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties, and lost their estates, and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property....

87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property- that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men, but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto punish the offences of all those of that society, there, and there only, is political society where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it.

And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, and by understanding indifferent rules and men authorized by the community for their execution, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right, and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society with such penalties as the law has established; whereby it is easy to discern who are, and are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide

controversies between them and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another; but those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of Nature, each being where there is no other, judge for himself and executioner; which is, as I have before showed it, the perfect state of Nature.

88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society (which is the power of making laws), as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members by any one that is not of it (which is the power of war and peace); and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man entered into society has quitted his power to punish offences against the law of Nature in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences which he has given up to the legislative, in all cases where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given up a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called to it, which, indeed, are his own judgements, they being made by himself or his representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws how far offences are to be punished when committed within the commonwealth; and also by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated, and in both these to employ all the force of all the members when there shall be need.

89. Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society. And this is done wherever any number of men, in the state of Nature, enter into society to make one people one body politic under one supreme government:

or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made. For hereby he authorises the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him as the public good of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of Nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth with

authority to determine all the controversies and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth, which judge is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it. And wherever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of Nature.

90. And hence it is evident that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted for the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be not form of civil government at all. For the end of civil society being to avoid and remedy those inconveniences of the state of Nature which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey. Wherever any persons are who have not such an authority to appeal to, and decide any difference between them there, those persons are still in the state of Nature. And so is every absolute prince in respect of those who are under his dominion.

91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive, power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whence relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconveniency that may be suffered from him, or by his order. So that such a man, however entitled, Czar, or Grand Signior, or how you please, is as much in the state of Nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind. For wherever any two men are, who have no standing rule and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of Nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woeful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince.

That whereas, in the ordinary state of Nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, according to the best of his power to maintain it; but whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but, as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or defend his right, and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of Nature, is yet corrupted with flattery and armed with power.

93. In absolute monarchies, indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes; he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind who should go about to take it away.

But whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt. For this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may, and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting or destroying one another who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him.

For if it be asked what security, what fence is there in such a state against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler, the very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws, and judges for their mutual peace and security. But as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has a power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it.

To ask how you may be guarded from or injury on that side, where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and rebellion. As if when men, quitting the state of Nature, entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one should be under the restraint of laws; but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of Nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think that men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what mischief's may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.

94. But, whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's understandings, it never hinders men from feeling; and when they perceive that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society they are of, and that they have no appeal, on earth, against any harm they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of Nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as

they can, to have that safety and security, in civil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it.

And therefore, though perhaps at first, as shall be showed more at large hereafter, in the following part of this discourse, some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; yet when time giving authority, and, as some men would persuade us, sacredness to customs, which the negligent and un-foreseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government as then it was (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of property), could never be safe, nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislative was so placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please, by which means every single person became subject equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority, avoid the force of the law, when once made, nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.

No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it. For if any man may do what he thinks fit and there be no appeal on earth for redress or security against any harm he shall do, I ask whether he be not perfectly still in the state of Nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society, unless any one will say the state of Nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.

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PART :II

⊕ An Epistemological Foundation of Political Economy :

While Schumpeter begins his History from Greeco-Roman times he traces the emergence of economics as a separate science from the middle of the seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century appearing as a broadly self-contained system of assumptions, theories and techniques in the Wealth of Nations (1961 p.51).

The Kantian – Humean roots of classical economics are evident in its commitment to individualism despite its recognition of distinct social classes. Society was seen as being based on an economic – not on political or religious-foundations.

In Smith for example the mode of subsistence is regarded as the determinant of moral sentiments, forms of government and social institutions. The division of labor is the mechanism through which society evolves through four stages, hunting, pastorage, agriculture and commerce.

➤ The Moral Role of state in Commercial Society :

The state is an instrument for the promotion / protection of the moral sentiments and the property form appropriate to a particular mode of subsistence (Meek 1976). The moral order is strictly subordinate to the economic order a means for ensuring the later's reproduction. In Smith's "commercial society" the primary rule of the state is to secure human rights and to promote the marketization of social relations.

Such a society is sustained by human nature – "the propensity to truck, barter and exchange" – but requires the protection of a liberal state. While the pursuit of self-interest creates a powerful impetus for the material progress of society, social harmony is based on the technological dependence of the three great classes – labourers, landowners and "owners of stock" (capitalists) – for the furtherance of the division of labour and the expansion of the market. All classes benefit from and therefore support accumulation.

Accelerating the rate of accumulation is thus a requirement of social justice which the liberal state can ensure by promoting universal self-interestedness.

Self-oriented individuation and social harmony are thus seen as mutually reinforcing tendencies in capitalist society. Social harmony requires that the individual be oriented to the pursuit of his self-interest and capitalist society is justified on the grounds of material progress. Protecting the natural and inalienable right of capitalist property is thus an essential element in the construction of a just order.

Ricardo completed Smith's system by formally basing economic analysis on the labor theory of value which equates the value of a commodity with the labor time used up in its production. This labor theory of value also provides the basis for Locke's justification of human rights and of representative democracy.

➤ Capital Justice :

The value concept is thus emptied of its moral content and firmly grounded on a materialized basis. The concept of a just price becomes meaningless and capitalist justice is merely equating costs and revenues (allowing for normal profits). Capitalist society was theorized as resting on a rationalist, naturalist base and interference with the market on the basis of moral prohibitions and injunctions (halal and haram) were delegitimized.

The legislative proposals put forward by the classical economists were thus based on class interests and not as moral considerations – Smith and Ricardo's only "moral" commitment was to the growth of capital, which was explicitly seen as an end in itself.

➤ Reason Of a Consumption and Production In modern Age :

Modern economic analysis begins with the abstract alienated individual who uses his reason to maximize his consumption or his profit. He finds himself “thrown” (in a Heideggerian sense) into a system of relationships with other individuals who manifest the same behavior patterns. Economics never asks:

where did this system come from? Production and exchange are seen as strictly technical processes and their ‘moral’ content – the commitment to self-interest and the trivialization of moral concerns – is deliberately concealed. Thus the social relations of capitalism are presented as natural and the formal expressions of human rationality – rationality is dedicated to the fulfillment of self-interest and it is unnatural / irrational to use rationality for achieving any other ends.

Self-interest commits the (abstract) individual to accumulation / freedom – i.e. to a continuous never ending amassment of means for realizing one’s ends. All ends are devoid of moral content and hence trivial for as Kant teaches the self cannot be known nor its ends evaluated except on the basis of the universalizability criterion. Accumulation is therefore the only end in itself in capitalist order and necessarily becomes the basis for ascribing value to all practices.

Economics sees the individual as free in two fundamental senses. First he possesses capitalist property.

Secondly he must be free of all moral constraints. Constitutional arrangements and legal regulation are means for expanding the individual’s realm of freedom. Law and the constitution are thus means for subjugating the individual to capitalist property (most essentially his body and its desires) and freeing him from morality.

Expanding the realm of freedom requires the organization of production and exchange on the basis of the circulation of capitalist money – money dedicated to accumulation and registering the exchange value of practices in terms approximate to their contribution to accumulation. Capitalist money possesses the power of self-expansion – that is why interest is the life blood of capitalism (Maududi 1961 p74) and this is what distinguishes it from non capitalist money.

➤ formation Of Money in Capitalism :

Money takes the form of capital in the process of self-expansion and self-expansion of money becomes the purpose of the circulation of money among economic practices. Those who control the process of accumulation are not the owners but the agents of capital – the devils of avarice and covetousness are in possession of their souls.

That is why managers – and not shareholders – control and organize production and exchange in capitalist society and as Meszaros (1995) shows even the wealthiest shareholder has no power to defy/reject capitalist rationality – he must accept resource allocation in accordance with the need for capital accumulation or go bankrupt.

In capitalist society people are – in principle – equally free i.e. equally committed to the universalization of avarice and covetousness (takkathur). The history of Europe and America shows that practical freedom is capital accumulation. It is nothing else. Freedom is the possession/subjugation of man by capital (individually or collectively).

Capitalist society remains harmonious (and can be reproduced) as long as individuals committed to the universalization of equal freedom (avarice and covetousness) remain legitimately dominant – either because most people are committed to equal freedom or because people holding non capitalist values do not have the power to legitimately challenge the capitalist elite.

It is particularly important to realize that distributional struggles – struggles for example for the establishment of a welfare state sanctioned by Keynesianism or for communism – cannot transcend capitalism for they do not challenge the doctrine and practice of the universalizability of equal freedom (avarice and covetousness).

➤ the Value System Of Capitalism :

The capitalist elite recognizes the possibility of a systemic challenge based on value change and a particular concern of traditional sociology has been to generate pro capitalistic solidaristic sentiments through secular education and encouragement of civil society institutions Promoting liberal values has been a central project of social science and it is in this sense that Herbert Spenser called sociology ‘a moral science’ (1904 p88). But since the late 19th century economics has moved away from advocacy and this task has been monopolized by mainstream sociology.

The dominant paradigm within economics during the last century and a quarter has been that of marginalism, pioneered by Jevons, Walras and Mengerlxvi. The marginalists used a new method of economic analysis and applied the calculus to the determination of prices.

They also rejected the possibility of the objective determination of exchange value by abandoning the labour theory of value. In the marginalist perception relative prices were determined by utility (not costs of production) and utility of commodities and practices was subjectively determined on the basis of preferences that marginalist economics took as given.

Marginalism and modern economics base their claim of value neutrality on the grounds that they take preference as given and do not ostensibly adjudicate among them. Nevertheless, modern economics is based on a quite specific theory of individuality and society and provides a materialistic justification for capitalist order.

Economics is not a positive science in any sense. It is not a technology applicable to any end. It presumes the equal triviality of all ends and preference orderings. Without accepting this presupposition, the claim that economic rationality enables the optimization of preference fulfillment in meaningless.

This is so because economic rationality structures transactions to prioritize accumulation and such a society necessarily articulates a preference for preference itself. The dominance of the preference for preference negates all other value claims and the market, through its rationality, colonizes both individual being and the whole of the life of society.

➤ Kantian roots Of Economics :

Modern economics has Kantian roots. It insists on a rigorous separation of facts and values but advocates freedom (avarice and covetousness) and accumulation as an end in itself disguised as a means for the satisfaction of ends. Maximization of freedom is garbed in the robes of optimum allocation of resources for the elimination of scarcity and policy prescriptions (specially concerning the extent and form of government intervention) are derived for achieving this end.

Capitalist rationality and capitalist institutions are justified on this basis. Economics argues that capitalist institutions are natural and secure the general interest. Economics assumes that every rational individual is committed to the maximization of freedom (avarice and covetousness).

Economic rationality seeks to show how this can be achieved in an ideal world characterized by perfect knowledge, perfect foresight, pure rationality and perfect competition. Economics is not concerned with showing how prices are determined in any actually existing capitalism but in evaluating actually existing capitalism on the basis of its ideal of pure rationality (i.e. total and unreserved commitment to the maximization of freedom).

It is this unreserved commitment to freedom maximization which makes scarcity the central problem which economics addresses. Only scarce goods have exchange value – since air is not scarce, it's marginal unit has no value. Economics assumes that Everyman seeks to escape scarcity and maximize utility.

In seeking utility maximization within the market each individual is faced with given exchange ratios (prices). To maximize utility, the relative marginal utilities of goods possessed by the individual must correspond to the prices (exchange ratios) in which they stand.

Under conditions of perfect rationality and perfect competition it can be shown that the prices which prevail will clear all markets. These prices will correspond to the free and rational choices of all individual members of society seeking utility (freedom) maximization in conditions of scarcity.

Economics thus abstracts both from the process of preference formation and the process of production. Given preferences and given production technology (which in this perspective alone determine production relations) rational (utility/profit maximizing) individuals make the optimum use of resources under conditions of scarcity. Prices of production services ('factors' of production) are determined in a manner analogous to the determination of the prices of commodities – i.e. on the basis of correspondence of the marginal contribution of each 'factor' of production to the final utility generated in the production process.

➤ **Labor and Profit Maximization:**

Return to ‘capital’, labor and land are thus shown to correspond to their respective contribution to utility as estimated by the subjectively determined preferences of utility maximizing consumers. Assuming perfect knowledge, foresight, rationality (i.e. utility / profit maximizing behavior) and competition factor markets can also be shown to clear (i.e. eliminate excess supply and demand).

As these are abstract models they necessarily ignore historical specifics. They are not positive as they merely assume and cannot justify utility/profit maximization. They provide justification for the existence of capitalist property, capitalist money and capitalist markets on the basis of the presumed necessity / durability of utility / profit maximization.

These institutions are required for both structuring social decisions on the basis of utility maximization and for the estimation of utility in outcomes of individual practices. Within this framework the prices that arise are a consequence of the spontaneous and unconstrained expressions of capitalist rationality – a rationality committed to utility/profit maximization.

All institutions, of both the market and the state, can then be theorized as technical instruments enabling free utility and profit maximizing individuals to practice their economic rationality. Prices are thus optimal in two senses. First they provide rational opportunities for calculating utility outcomes of utility/profit maximizing practices. Secondly they permit technically efficient social institutionalization at the level of the market and the state.

“Distorting” prices frustrate utility maximizing decisions of autonomous individuals. It is both technically inefficient (in that it reduces aggregate utility/profit maximization) and unjust. Such “distortion” may however be justified on two grounds.

* Competition in the market is not perfect and intervention is necessary to reduce monopoly. Here prices are being “corrected” to approach competitive levels

* The initial endowments on the basis of which free utility/profit maximizing individuals enter the markets are such that some individuals can influence the process of price formation. Intervention is then justified on grounds of correcting inequality.

*

➤ Social democratic and communist regimes:

Social democratic and communist regimes (China) justify interventions on the basis of such considerations. They therefore do not achieve a transcendence of capitalism – although both social democratic and communist regimes do constrain (but do not in principle negate) human rights. Social democracy and communism objects to marginalism separation of the analysis of the pricing of “factors of production” from its analysis of the efficiency and equity of the (initial) distribution of endowments and for treating the distributive shares of ‘capital’ and labour in the social product as natural categories.

But they do not object to the capitalist ideal of a society which offers the most perfect expression of the preferences of the rational (utility/profit maximizing) members of that society – that is why the incumbent Chinese leadership can continue to laud the “socialist market economy”. The essential affinity between orthodox economists and their social democrat (including Keynesian) and communist critics is that both propose measures for reducing monopoly and enhancing equality within the context of a freedom maximizing society.

Thus the neo classical economist Frederich Von Wieser advocated encouragement of trade unionism, worker protective legislation, compulsory insurance, housing subsidies, control of speculation, land reform and establishment of state and municipal enterprises as necessary reforms for correcting power distributional inequalities generated by capitalist order (1927).

Also both orthodox economists and their social democrat and communist critics recognize the manager as the most efficient representative of capital and ultimate controller of capitalist property – that is why in liberal social democratic and communist organization the worker's subordination to management has always been accepted as legitimate.

Social democratic and communist practices change form not the content of capitalist property. In both liberal and communist manifestations of the capitalist system private property is abolished. Control of capitalist property has necessarily to be vested in the representative of capital, state enterprises or corporate managers. Legal owners of capitalist property – whether shareholders or citizens of communist countries – do not have the power to resist capitalist rationality and hence concentration (of authority and information) cannot be restricted without reducing capital accumulation.

Capitalist society whether liberal or communist is necessarily fractured into an increasing mass of powerless people and a decreasing elite of more and more powerful controllers. Subordination of the powerless to the powerful is maintained essentially through labor market relationships and growth in inequalities is a means for sustaining the scarcity without which utility/profit maximizing rationality would loose its *raison d'être*.

➤ **Capitalist Rationality:**

The capitalist system produces abundance in the form of overproduction of agricultural goods and manufactures waste, obsolete equipment and technology and increased masses of unemployed and pensioned citizens. But for the capitalist system to be sustainable men must not recognize this abundance.

They must be obsessed by avarice and covetousness. They must want more, and more than others. Capital is the concrete form of freedom insatiable avarice and limitless covetousness. While consumption of cars, computers, rice and haircuts is necessarily limited there is no limit to the accumulation of pure quantity in the form of financial assets.

Capitalist rationality perpetuates scarcity in that those subject to capitalist order always need more capital. Capitalist institutions in the market and the state are not spontaneous or natural unintended consequences of human behavior. They are specifically designed to sustain and promote the universalization of avarice and covetousness. These vices must possess human bodies, societies and states for the continuing reproduction of capitalist order.

Capitalist rationality – the universal dominance of avarice and covetousness – has to be constructed. It can come to dominate man's being in the world only in specific circumstances. Capitalist rationality thus describes man's potential for becoming what he ought to be according to Kantian and utilitarian philosophers. It is in this sense that capitalism has a history – a sequence of epistemological, social and political interventions through which man is shown his “natural” potential and taught and enabled to practice avarice and covetousness.

In the Enlightenment and the Romantic traditions, the crucial epistemological transformation is the replacement of abdiyat by freedom as man's fundamental conviction. Capitalist man is irrevocably committed to freedom and the repudiation of Allah's

sovereignty. Unreserved commitment to avarice and covetousness require a prior commitment to man's autonomy and equality (the two necessary attributes of freedom).

Constructing capitalist individuality is the central project of modernist and post modernist philosophy and aesthetics (Rizvi 2002). It is necessarily a project which requires the DE legitimization of religion's ontological accounts of being and of the world. The construction of capitalist individuality requires the construction of capitalist markets and capitalist states.

➤ Capital Market and Non formal Capitalist Order :

Capitalist markets invariably emerge from non-capitalist social formations – this is true even of the United States where for example Jaynes (1986) has documented the legislative acts and policy measures adopted to create a labor market after the abolition of slavery in the decades after the civil war. The US government after 1865 enforced a legal political system that effectively disenfranchised the blacks, reduced their economic power and shaped the labor market.

There was thus little “spontaneity” in the development of capital labor relations in the America South in the second half of the nineteenth century. Today legislative and policy making measures adopted by the World Trade Organization are similarly constructing technology markets by universalizing the US patent system. Once again there is nothing spontaneous or automatic about the processes of legitimization which reduce the access of developing countries to the new technologies.

Capitalist markets and capitalist property forms are thus historical constructions in the specific sense that capitalist laws and practices are required for their emergence and their sustenance. Outcomes of course need not have been as intended but a certain easily definable ethos motivated the actions which led to the development of capitalist property.

These markets are premised on the existence of ideologically sanctioned property rights ,rights about ownership, exchange and unrequited transfer with respect to human bodies, life forms, water, land and artifacts. Similarly, a property-defining authority must be ideologically sanctioned. Since such sanctioning requires an exercise of political power, the state necessarily plays a major role in defining and enforcing the legitimization of a particular conception of property rights.

Capitalist markets structure price-based decision-making between anonymous individuals. Social positions do not define exchange relationships. Non capitalist exchange is contextualized by a set of rules and traditions which restrict the scope for price based choices. Similarly, exchanges between citizen and government of even the most mature capitalist state in history do not constitute a market relationship because a citizen cannot directly choose the services he receives or the taxes he pays to government.

Non-market exchanges are, however, increasingly exceptional in capitalist (civil) societies and price-based exchange among anonymous buyers and sellers usually dominate. Market relations are the main determinant of the pace and pattern of economic activity.

Capitalist states like capitalist society (“civil society”) are historical constructs. Their primary purpose is the continued reproduction of capitalist property and its associated relationships. This is achieved through a “regime of accumulation”. Today the global regime of accumulation requires the construction of a capitalist state, which can legitimize.

(a) The subordination of national public transport, energy, communication, and financial sectors to global capital.

(b) The marketization of public sector wage contracts.

(c) The determination of wage levels within processes of international competition leading to a widening of wage differentials in national economies.

- (d) Enhanced systemic mobility of capital (but not of labour since there is no relaxation of immigration controls at the global level).
- (e) Abandonment of full employment as a goal of macroeconomic policy.
- (f) Abandonment of state regulation of financial markets and increased dependence on foreign financial flows.
- (g) Higher financial returns in both capital and money markets.
- (h) The dominance of financial markets – and therefore of national economies-by non-bank financial intermediaries, which specialize in dividing risk associated with market finance into their elementary components and making them negotiable. Risk sales of this sort have led to the emergence of colossal markets in global liquidity. States increasingly articulate accommodative macro strategies to fall in line with the preferences of these new global financial giants.
- (i) The growth of individualism and the weakening of collective expression of individual aspirations.
- (j) The new compartmentalization of the work process associated with the increased application of information technology.

➤ **Post Fordist Regimes:**

Neo liberalism both justifies and provides a governance technology for this “Post Fordist” regime of accumulation. Since the late 1970s, there have been several important methodological advances in mainstream theory and as Fine puts it “the political is being put back into economic analysis” (1997 p. 145), through for example segmented labor market theory and analysis of rent seeking behavior. But such broadening of scope does not amount to a departure from methodological individualism.

The “givenness” of preferences and the compulsion to maximize are retained as assumptions underlying the analysis of household behavior, educational choice and trade union action. Methodological individualism now occupies those sub-disciplines (development, urban and labor economics for example) from which it was previously (partially) excluded.

The state itself is viewed as an individual with given preferential tradeoffs between potential policy outcomes. Institutional economics (in particular) has also developed theories explaining the collective behavior of optimizing agents. Both the new political economy and institutional economics represent a major advance in colonization of other social sciences (industrial relations, law, sociology and multi-disciplinary approaches such as analytical Marxism).

Endogenous growth theory has also sought to open up the black box of the technological residual in a typical Solow-Dennison type production function. This has partially legitimized “capacity building” policy initiatives at the micro and macro levels – without calling into question the relevance of rational expectations “in the last instance”. The emphasis laid on the role of human capital (Lucas 1988), producer durables and “ideas” (Roemer 1996) creates a possibility of going beyond equilibrium analysis and developing a deeper understanding of (optimizing) choices. But the policy prescriptions of endogenous growth theory have not been validated by empirical evidence. As Ruttan argues, why

“capability building is more successful in specific cases is not adequately explained by endogenous growth theory. It does not have the capacity to reach behind the “proximate” causes of growth and understand “pre-conditions “and “take off” stages (or processes)” (1998 p. 24-25). Ruttan seems to believe that by modifying assumptions (regarding for example homothetic preferences and neutral technical change) and “adding on” variables such as changes in the structure of production, demographic transition patterns, environmental constraints etc. these weaknesses could be addressed.

But it is the commitment to methodological individualism (commitment to the “givenness” of preferences and the “universality” of optimizing behavior) which is the primary dominant constraint on indigenous growth theory’s ability to understand capitalist process. This theory – like all other manifestations of the “new” economics – accepts as unproblematic the “universal permanent” character of capitalist expectations, markets and governance processes. It is thus inevitable that it can say little about possibilities/strategies for ensuring or undermining the continued universal, permanence of capitalist order.

➤ Universal Capitalist Permanence:

Economic theory’s commitment to the non-problematized universal permanence of capitalist order is reflected in its commitment to a premise of homogeneity. Economics is inspired by liberal political thought and aspires to describe a “pure” economy governed ultimately by Natural Law (Keat 1993). In this perspective, Riffat is committed to a supposed universal rationality (optimizing discounted consumption flows over a finite lifetime).

Commitment to such rationality and the added assumption of competitive equilibrium also implies Riffat’s awareness of the (total) web of (human and natural) relationships which structure/constrain her use of resources. In this sense a general equilibrium system is completely centralized in that the characteristics of the system are in the minds of all interacting individuals and they all effectively behave as a single individual (Riffat is alone in her own empty universe). This commitment to homogeneity necessarily rules out the

possibility of policy effectiveness – as rational expectations based models have so often demonstrated.

Actually existing capitalism (in all its historical states) is characterized by both heterogeneity and coherence. Riffat's behavior is often "irrational" (non-optimizing and or based on imperfect information). Yet, there is sustainable coherence of behavior patterns reflected in the normal practices of markets and states.

Economics explains this coherence by attempts to identify the micro economic foundations of the macro economy the macro economy is treated effectively as an aggregated micro economy. "Adding up" micro level outcomes and systematically ignoring relational complexities at and between economic levels is seen as unproblematic by (at least) neo classical economics.

➤ Capitalism in Twenty First Century :

Twenty first century capitalism is likely to be characterized by increased heterogeneity. Differential access to information creates asymmetries of influence and power. Moreover, increased externalities are also limiting the homogenization effects of market allocative processes.

Externalities blur the distinction between public and private goods and prioritize collective (co-operative) over competitive action. Thus, market equilibrium systems cannot be used to describe (macro) economies in cases where externalities significantly influence distributional processes.

Competitive equilibrium cannot exist in a world characterized by significant informational asymmetries and externalities – in such a world competitive behavior may be disadvantageous from the perspective of (even) self-interested individuals and the policy coordinating role of markets may therefore be limited.

In capitalist order money is the primordial link between individuals – it is the key to membership of capitalist society and the medium from the legitimate settlement of obligations incurred in the pursuit of differentiated individual ends coherence in capitalist society is ensured by the universal commitment to settle debts in the form of money.

Money value of income may make the settlement of obligations impossible even over a life time and the mismatch of payment ability and payment obligations (both measured in money) creates the possibility of crises. Capitalism is essentially a monetary system. Power is expressed in the ability of capital's managers to create and circulate money in a form, which permits accumulation. Economic value is the relative assessment expressed in money terms of each individual economic act by capitalist society.

These assessments reflect the act's contribution (direct or indirect) to accumulation. In non-capitalist society, assignment of value reflects adherence to transcendental moral conceptions (Christian, Islamic) or to a trans-historical conception of human needs. Capitalism defines such norms with reference to accumulation alone. The achievement of the maximum satisfaction of needs (maximization of aggregate utility) and of its associated justices is seen to be a consequence of efficient accumulation alone. Money thus becomes the symbol of the sovereignty of a citizen who believes in capitalism's norms and it is the adherence to these norms which necessarily sub-ordinates the capitalist state to capitalist civil society.

➤ **The Nexus of Money and Power :**

Since money is the basis of capitalist order accumulation of capital is the accumulation of power – the desire to accumulate money/power infinitely is universally dominant in capitalist order. The movement of money capital determines the division of labor, structures the employer – employee relationship and dominates both “capitalists” and “laborers”. This dominance of money capital is a pre-requisite for assigning relative value to economic activities in accordance with their (relative) contribution to accumulation. Capitalist order thus requires:

- a. Universal dominance of the desire to accumulate capitalist money/power
- b. Continued expectation of increased access to capitalist money/power.

Subordination to the desire to accumulate takes places most formally at the level of the enterprise: this subordination has a collective character. Collectively laborers are subordinated to the authority of managers – individually Riffat is free to pursue private ends and work for whom she chooses.

Collectively managers are dependent on consumers. Individually they are free to compete. Accumulation necessitates the systematic taking of risks to bring about structural changes in the division of labor. Investment risks cannot be taken without the enhancement of indebtedness – hence the universality of the continual buying and selling of debts and rights to capital use and the evaluation of these claims in financial markets within capitalist order.

These evaluations are speculations on the future. Doubts about solvency of risk takers and their financiers may lead to major changes in financial evaluations by firms, banks and macro-economic managers. Hence sustaining capitalist orders also requires.

c. Efficient mediation to ensure compatibility between financial claims and obligations for continuing accumulation.

Policy is required to ensure the continued existence of (a) (b) and (c). Capitalist order is not spontaneously generated in the spheres of production and finance or within the social sphere, and it is not self-perpetuating hence the possibility of crises emerging from the non-realization of (a) and/or (b) and / or (c).

Policy may be regarded as successful if it strengthens the social dominance of the desire to accumulate money/power, facilitates such accumulation by dominant individuals in different social groups and articulates an effective debt management strategy. Policy is a means for linking different segments of the micro-economy within the context of a particular macroeconomic coherence.

➤ The Coordination Between Micro and Macro Economies :

In capitalism enterprises (firms and banks) are important coordinating links between the micro and macro economy. The enterprise structures rules of payments, flows of goods and financial relationships into a hierarchy relating stake holders with claims/obligations on the collectively produced added values. These structures are created by collective – and therefore necessarily political – actions.

The political nature of the mediation process is a reflection of the underlying tension between the continuing need to accumulate and the continuing need to legitimate particular forms of accumulation. The maintenance of social cohesion requires this continuing legitimization and it usually takes the form of democratization of decision making processes at the inter enterprise level.

In the twentieth century, successful mediation has taken the form of the creation of a high wage society. this has often entailed rising fiscal costs but has given collective purpose to

the pursuit of private interests. In twentieth century capitalism of the “Butskellist” variety subordination at the level of production of the individual worker was legitimized by the provision of collective rights. This form of mediation was established not spontaneously but through continuing political negotiations between the representatives of capitalists and laborers, this was “Fordism”.

➤ **Fordism :**

Breakdown of a mediation regime, (say Fordism) may be interpreted as the consequence of a breakdown of interactions between mediation mechanisms which are concerned with balancing divergent aspects of regimes of accumulation. Thus, Fordist organization facilitated both security and (limited) mobility.

It was compatible with pluralist order, which has space for personal autonomy. But tensions are necessarily involved in managing autonomy and subordination and the possibility of the emergence of a recurrent sub-optimal equilibrium (recession) or disequilibrium (crisis) cannot be ruled out.

The literature attributes several reasons for the breakdown of Fordist order (Lash and Urry 1987, Hirst and Thompson 1997, Agleitta 1999). These include:

- (a) globalization of production and financing systems.
- (b) changes in production and exchange technology.
- (c) de-proletarianisation of the labor class.
- (d) atomization of social life (and destruction of communities) specially in the OECD countries.

“Post Fordist” order is characterized by growing full time unemployment, increased maldistribution of income (especially in the United States) the spread of consumerism to many third world countries, the growth of part time employment, cheapening of the cost of

financial and technological transfer across national frontiers, widening of differentials in inter sectoral productivity growth rates and changes in demographic structures.

Effective mediation processes are required for sustaining “post Fordism” – it is not a self-sustaining order. Fordist mediation structures are collapsing but in Europe at least social rights remains a constituent element of citizenship – though political commitment to these collective rights is weakening. Similarly, mediation within the work process continues with collective bargaining being replaced by human resource management. As monopolistic competition increases organizational changes in firms and state bureaucratic decision making structures facilitate outsourcing, “automation” and the growth of “flexible specialization”.

All these are mediated, not spontaneous, responses. A new compatibility between the accumulation regime and the social commitment to capital’s hegemony is being created and needs to be sustained.

It is important to stress however that post Fordism – like all other phases of capitalism – is a political choice. The political forces sustaining financial liberalization have been identified. International financial liberalization has been an explicit political choice of the metropolitan states. Capital account liberalization by the OECD governments is attributable to the growing political influence of international banks in the United States, Germany and Britain.

Under this political pressure advanced country governments, chose not to implement more effective capital controls when they had both the legal right and the technical expertise to do so. Financial liberalization is a political not a technical imperative. States continue to have the technical resources to regulate capital markets but they choose not to do so for political reasons. Governments are not forced to liberalize for technical reasons but choose to do so because the political representatives of international finance dominate them.

In recent years, a large literature has been produced to show that capital controls retain high effectivity in present circumstances. The choice not to use capital controls reflects a

political willingness to bear the domestic costs of the international integration of financial markets.

➤ **Bretton Woods Period :**

Thus Webb (1994) attributes the greater financial instability of the 1980s and 1990s not to a decline of US hegemony but to increased international financial integration fostered by the policy support of the US government. In the post Bretton Woods period the financial power of the United States vis-à-vis other states has not declined.

It has declined with respect to the international financial markets because the representatives of international finance have captured the US states and have become a systemically privileged force within it. As domestic political costs of adjusting to international financial market integration increase, policy co-ordination becomes a matter of imposing a larger proportion of such costs on the weaker open states – such as those of East and South Asia.

In this sense, international financial market integration increases the vulnerability of the weak states, which rely on forcing capital (Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia). Failure on the part of these states to subordinate their fiscal and monetary policies to those of the Western powers is heavily punished by the speculators dominating world financial markets.

Legitimizing post Fordism thus requires political mediation Post Fordism is characterized by:

- (a) globalization of capital markets.
- (b) a shrinking of the authority and the scope of state mediation processes.
- (c) an increasing threat to collective identities.

Symptoms of these structured imbalances are (a) persistent high unemployment in Europe (b) increased income/wealth related distribution inequality in America. (Mosley 1999) and (c) crisis and fundamental restructuring leading to subordination in advanced third world countries and stagnation in the rest.

➤ **Decline Of Fordism :**

The growth of individualism, the globalization of capital markets and the retreat of the state has initiated a process for the destruction of Fordist mediation regimes which combined a degree of social insurance with rising accumulation by limiting labor market competition through collective bargaining and state subsidization of both investment and labor markets.

A new structure of mediation seems required to reconcile the need for accumulation and social cohesion. Capitalist order must continue to provide (at least the prospects for) a high and rising real wage for its typical citizen.

Whether it can do so depends on the nature of the transition from Fordism. This leads to the question whether the capitalist system as a whole (and not just some of its constituent parts) is experiencing or is likely to experience a “crisis”. Post Marxist analysts – and – others continue to argue that capitalism has been experiencing a secular downturn since the breakdown of Fordism.

This is so even for the United States where as Mosley (1999) shows during 1965-1997 productivity growth has slowed down to 1 percent per annum (as against two per cent per annum during 1950-65) and average real wages have fallen by 15 percent.

The downturn since 1965 has been quite unexpected – thus Herman Kahn had expected US average real wages to triple by 2000. Moreover, there has been stagnation in profits measured as a proportion of net capital stock.

This ratio equaled 15 percent in 1994 as in 1970 – thus the increase in profits since 1980 has merely led to a making up of the ground “lost” during the 1970s when wages had risen sharply in 1948 the profits to net capital stock ratio stood at 22 percent: The breakdown of the high wage society is also reflected in the rise in the percentage of workers in low paid jobs – up from 23 percent in 1973 to 31 percent in 1996 (Mishel 1997 p136).

Living standards have been maintained by a massive growth of personal debt – this has grown from 70% of annual personal income in 1975 to 100 percent in 1996 (Mishel 1997 p147). Heavily indebted people are very vulnerable to economic downturn and increase in interest rates. The introduction of the new information related technology has not significantly raised productivity or profits in the United States. There is therefore no likelihood that the low wage strategy will be abandoned in the near future (Mosley 1999).

The relatively better growth performance of the US during the 1990s (now hotly disputed by economists such as Krugman and Brenner) is explained by the increase in foreign capital inflow – these rose from \$56 billion in 1993 to over \$260 billion in 1997 and represented one fourth of total private investment in the United States in that year. This accelerated inflow allowed the US to reduce government deficits and stimulated growth.

It also led to a substantial increase in stock market prices and had a pronounced wealth effect in sustaining high consumption levels. But increased dependence on foreign capital has created problems – an inability by Asian banks to settle their rescheduled debt commitments can lead to significant falls in US stock values and rises in interest rates – and this will have a serious impact on a larger proportion of US householders – those who finance consumption by borrowing and those with significant investment on the capital markets. A recession in the United States is thus not improbable in the present decade.

The 1980s, 1990s and the first half of the present decade have seen a protracted recession in Africa and several crises (followed by recession) in Latin America and East Asia. The mainstream (World Bank inspired) literature attributes this to “cronyism” and lack of good governance which is defined as a political mismanagement of economic decision making processes (Keily 1998).

While being forced to acknowledge the existence of periodic crisis in several parts of the Third World the conventional literature can offer no coherent strategy for creating a new set of mediation mechanisms to deal with the type of problems associated with the decline of Fordism. Instead IMF reform programs implemented in East Asia represented an

orthodox dismantling of Fordist policy – market constraining institutional arrangements of a type that are common in Europe were explicitly targeted by the IMF and the pace of disbursement was deliberately slowed down to force compliance with policy dismantling conditionalities.

IMF policies were heavily criticized by even usually sympathetic commentators (Dornbusch 1994). Subsequent revisions incorporated no innovations however but a mere slowing down of Fordist policy dismantling. This enabled many Asian countries to pursue mild expansionist policies and make use of capital controls. The IMF however continues to argue for speeded up liberalization and enjoys strong US support for these initiatives.

Amendment to the Fund's articles of agreement is being sponsored by the US to enable the IMF to mandate capital accounts convertibility for all its members. This will significantly enhance the IMF's systemic power and reduce state capacities to articulate national mediation initiatives for sustaining post Fordist accumulation regimes. There is however no evidence that removing capital controls stimulates accumulation or addresses any of the other typical imbalances of a post Fordist mediation regime (Rodrik 1998).

➤ Systematic Capitalist Transition :

Capitalism today is experiencing systemic transition. This transition is reflected in changes such as the increased international dependence of the world's only rogue super power and the set backs suffered by capitalism's most dynamic economies in East Asia. Slowdown in world economic growth has persisted since the mid-1970s and there are no signs of a major upturn in the OECD economies.

Several authors have identified what they consider to be the major structural causes underlying this protracted downturn. Thus Brenner (1998) argues that overcapacity and over production in manufacturing has led to a secular decline in profits and in the rate of accumulation. Restructuring of manufacturing involving a reduction of excess capacity and elimination of obsolete technology is resisted by the old monopolists who dominate these

branches and systematically obstruct new entrants. Hence gains from economies of scale and scope cannot be realized.

Falling profits are a consequence not of rising wages but of inter capitalist competition. Policies which break up the old monopolies and increase the power of new entrant latest technology utilizing capital are required to stimulate growth. In the absence of such policy, there is co-ordination failures for while not investing is optimal for a firm (due to overcapacity) investment leading to restructuring is optimal from the point of view of the macro economy.

Capitalist crisis may be understood as a short, sharp turnaround in the business cycle. It involves widespread bankruptcies, bank failures, shooting up of interest rates; collapsing exchange rates and monetary panics. Recessions on the other hand are long drawn phases of persistent high levels of unemployment and low or negative output growth.

System wide crisis have become uncommon since the late 19th century but capitalism has witnessed several recessions in the twentieth century – national crisis on the other hand have been common in Latin America, East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Recessions are mediated through credit chains linking domestic economic sectors and the national economy to world financial markets. Recessions have the potential to change the course of capitalism's historical development.

But neither crisis nor recession are sufficient causes of transition from capitalism such a transition requires a comprehensive break down of capitalist order specially its political mediation processes and a wholesale man rejection of capitalist values, avarice and competition.

Crisis are triggered by speculation. Scope for speculation within a capitalist economy is created by the link between the credit (trade and banking) system and the accumulation regime. Inter-linkages between credit claims (usually of a speculative nature) ensure increased danger of an escalation of bankruptcies in mature financial systems. During

crisis, there is a rapid switch from credit to monetary assets: This triggers the bankruptcies of many financially viable firms.

➤ **Crisis In Institutional Financial Structures :**

It is in this sense that a capitalist crisis is necessarily a monetary phenomenon involving a collapse of credit. The institutional financial structure is thus very important in the determination of the intensity and duration of crisis and recession. In ‘main banking’ financial system (such as Japan) cross shareholding makes mergers and acquisitions (M and A) difficult and facilitate long term commitment of bank capital to industry.

In recession, such banks are willing to tolerate long periods of non-payment of interest. In the US such bank tolerance of interest nonpayment is unheard of and there is swift capital restructuring through M and A. In the main banking system, industrial and financial policy are inter-linked and the state plays an explicitly counter-cyclical “governance” role. In Anglo-Saxon financial systems on the other hand, state institutions are essentially lenders of the last resort.

Internationalization of financial markets must involve the creation of a new financial “architecture” which subordinates national financial governance regimes – during the 1990s this has involved universalization of financial liberalization practice but while financial efficiency has increased world wide manufacturing productivity growth has stagnated – even in the United States (Mosley 1999).

Financial sector growth has not been accompanied by increased accumulation in world industry. Industry has lost the role of capital’s primary source of accumulation that it occupied in the most advanced countries since the decline of agriculture – and specially in the Fordist era (Kay 1975). Now much financial surplus generated in industry is channeled into speculation and other investments on the financial markets. Liberalized finance capital has asserted a new found autonomy vis-à-vis both the nation state and world industry. This is surely a major watershed in capitalism’s history.

Finance capital prefers growth restrictionist (“conservative”) policies and this inhibits industrial restructuring. Thus, an important policy concern for capitalism’s managers must be to reconcile financial liberalization with the need to maintain industrial sector dynamism. Modern economic theory’s new found concern with strategic behavior, informational asymmetries and co-ordination failure retain its commitment to methodological individualism.

Its foolish search for the microeconomic roots of the macro economy severely limits its ability to understand the mediation processes which serve the purpose of reconciling harmonious behavior patterns and preferences within the context of a deliberately created and precariously sustained coherent accumulation regime.

Economics, as a discipline, is increasingly ineffective in legitimating the practices of actually existing capitalisms – its usefulness as a source of appropriate capitalist governance technology is also limited. Institutions such as the IMF the World Bank and the WTO and central banks and national finance ministries do however draw upon, economics as a source of regulatory practices for maintaining national and imperialist capitalist order.

As we argue in economics methodology cannot be used to legitimate or govern a non capitalist order.

➤ The Phenomena Of Islamic Banking:

The Islamic economists attempt to articulate Islamic policy on the basis of theorization within the economics paradigm leads to a subordination of Islamic norms, regulation procedures and transaction forms to capitalist order. It cannot lead to a transcendence of capitalism.

⊕ Summary: Economics and Capitalism

- ✓ * Economics first appears in the thought of French and Scottish Enlightenment thinkers of the 18th century.
- ✓ * Economics' Kantian – Humean roots are evident in its commitment to methodological individualism.
- ✓ * Economists regards society as being based on material foundations, production and subsistence, – not on political or religious grounds. In Smith the modes of subsistence determine moral sentiments and forms of governance.
- ✓ * Each 'mode of subsistence' requires a specific set of moral sentiments and the state must promote this and its associated property form. In Smith's 'commercial society the primary role of the state is to promote human rights and the marketization of society.
- ✓ * Capitalist order is justified on naturalistic grounds – it is based on human nature, social harmony is based on the technological mutual interdependence of the three classes, in the classical perspective. All classes benefit from the expansion of the division of labour and accumulation. Accelerating accumulation is a requirement of social justice.
- ✓ * According to the classical / neo classical perspective self interested individuation and social harmony are mutually reinforcing tendencies. Capitalist property is seen as the terrain for reconciling the particular (individualist) and the general interest through accumulation.
- ✓ * The naturalistic justification for capitalist property is provided by the labour theory of value. The body is seen as the primary instrument dedicated to accumulation.
- ✓ * When value is based on labor time it is emptied of any moral content and based on materialist foundations: Capitalist society is seen as based on a naturalistic/materialist basis and interfering with price formation is seen as

interfering with nature. Restricting economic practices through halal/haram injunctions is thus unjust.

- ✓ * The only legitimate objective is accumulation for its own sake.
- ✓ * Economic analysis begins with the isolated individual who dedicates his rationality to accumulation. Production and exchange are seen as technical processes.
- ✓ * Man is naturally immoral (all ends of accumulation are trivial) and capitalist social institutions are free expressions of human immoral rationality. Accumulation is the only end in capitalism and necessarily becomes the basis for ascribing value to all economic practices.
- ✓ * Economics sees the individual as free since (a) he possesses capitalist property (b) he is not subject to external moral constraints. Capitalist regulation subjects the individual to freedom (accumulation) and therefore to capitalist property. It frees him from morality.
- ✓ * Domination of society by accumulation is dominance by finance and capitalist money – self expanding money. The contribution of a practice to the self-expansion of money determines its value. As long as such value determination remains legitimate capitalist order can be self-sustaining.
- ✓ * Capitalism is threatened not by distributional struggles (social democracy) or struggles for possession of capitalist property (communism) but by value change. Generating pro capitalist solidarity has been the central concern of mainstream sociology.
- ✓ * The dominant economics paradigm since the late 19th century – marginalism – justifies liberal values by the use of a new methodology. Here value is determined not by labor time incorporated in a commodity but by its utility – its ability to satisfy preferences of consumers. The marginalists took preferences as given. Marginalists do not adjudicate among preference. They justify the preference for preference itself.
- ✓ * Economics seeks the maximization of the satisfaction of preferences in conditions of scarcity. The optimum / most efficient pattern of resource allocation is that which achieves this end.

- ✓ * Economics sees capitalist institutions as natural technical means for facilitating the maximization of freedom / output. In an ideal world of perfect knowledge and perfect competition capitalist institutions need no regulation.
- ✓ * Actual outcomes are measured with reference to the ideal world of perfect competition / knowledge. Policies are advocated to move the actual to the ideal world.
- ✓ * Scarcity is the central problem of economics because of its unreserved commitment to freedom maximization.
- ✓ * Prices in markets characterized by perfect competition and perfect rationality reflect the free choices of all individuals in condition of scarcity. Because of this markets will clear.
- ✓ * Economics does not ask (a) what are the right preferences (b) where does production technology come from.
- ✓ * Pricing in factor markets is analogous to pricing in goods markets – determined by the contribution of each factor of production to utility.
- ✓ * For capitalist markets to function both capitalist money and capitalist property must exist. Capitalist property and capitalist money are seen as natural / technical and all institutions supporting capitalist property and money are also natural / technical means for enabling individuals to make free choices.
- ✓ * Distorting prices frustrates utility maximization. This is both inefficient and unjust.
- ✓ * Social democrats and communists justify intervention in markets on grounds of efficiency and distribution both related to monopoly.
- ✓ * Social democracy/communism does not transcend capitalism because it endorses freedom despite rejecting individuation. Socialist reforms are means for maximizing freedom and individual preferences are seen as distorting resource allocation patterns.
- ✓ * Both liberals and communists recognize managers as representatives of capital. Both endorse capitalist property and worker subjugation. Both liberal and communist capitalism abolishes private property.

- ✓ * Capitalist rationality is imposed on the people. Both liberal and communist capitalist societies are fractured into the powerless and the controllers.
- ✓ * Subordination is maintained through the labour and financial markets and increasing relative poverty is a means for sustaining the inequality without which freedom loses meaning.
- ✓ * Capitalism produces abundance of commodities and leisure. But for capital (avarice/covetousness) to exist abundance should not be recognized and every one should want more and more than others. This means dominance of financial markets.
- ✓ * This requires creation/regulation of specific institutions which can universalize avarice/covetousness. Capitalist rationality has to be socially constructed. Capitalist order teaches man to seek freedom reject abdiyat.
- ✓ * Capitalist markets are created by capitalist states – WTO is creating a world technology market – through capitalist law and regulation. Capitalist law transforms the whole of society into a market. It universalizes the wage form and sanctions the value determining role of the financial market.
- ✓ * Regulation has to be historically specific and that is why (a)capitalism evolves (b) there are many capitalisms.
- ✓ * Post Fordist (globalized) regulatory regime must legitimize.
 - . dominance of energy, communication and finance by global capital.
 - . international market determination of wage contracts
 - . abandonment of national financial sovereignty
 - . marketization of technology flows
- ✓ . individualization of work form from collective bargaining to HRM
- ✓ * . Recent developments in economic theory and policy seek to do this but their success in legitimating and providing an appropriate governance technology for capitalism remains limited.

⊕ Essence of Modern and Post Modern Political Science :

➤ Political Science As a Tool of Capitalist Order:

Both sociology and political science are concerned with the legitimation of capitalist order. Political science is concerned principally with state regulation, while sociology primarily addresses issues related to the regulation of capitalist society (civil society).

Political science originates in the work of the French encyclopedists of the eighteenth century. Central to their work was a rejection of Christian metaphysics and a commitment to empiricism. Empiricism naturally focuses attention on this world and the world to come necessarily loses significance as a source of knowledge and value. Political science thus delegitimizes claims based on divine authority.

Human happiness in this world becomes the criterion establishing the efficacy and justice of political institutions. Political science is thus based on individualist and utilitarian prejudices. Political science is empiricist to the core – indeed it is in this sense that it claims to be a “science” (King et al 1994).

➤ **Rational Basement OF Political Science :**

It's value claims are supposedly grounded on empirical observation. Mainstream political science represented by the institutionalists is also intuitionist – an empirical generalization on observation of particulars. It seeks the inductive discovery of regularities in the political world.

Political science supposedly proceeds from the observation of facts to the generalization of hypotheses which when empirically verified observations yield, scientific laws on the basis of which explanations of past and predictions of future events can be made.

Even Popper (1971) recognizes that the inductive method is incapable of guaranteeing the validity of scientific knowledge – as we have seen Hume pointed this out in the 18th century.

Empiricism can never establish necessary connections between events. Moreover observation is never passive – the observer imposes his presumptions upon the observed. All theories (including political science theories) are necessarily based on non observable phenomenon and propositions.

Therefore, the validation of the scientific method (and its application to political events) has to fall back upon. Popper's falsification criterial . Currently Popperion conceptions of scientific method dominate political science. The Popperian methodology is committed to incrementalism and to problem solving. The Popperian approach is forced to admit that it's commitment to pluralism entails an acceptance of relativism and an admission that there can be no rational justification of values.

Popperian analysis takes political preferences as given and are often modeled upon the market studying the unintended consequences of a mass of separate actions and not on the intention of political actors. In post Popperian analysis there is a pragmatic switch from concern with truth to a concern with 'what works'.

Given this approach it is natural/inevitable that the present political system of the West provides the criterion for evaluating other political ideas and institutions by Popperian analysts.

➤ **Political Falsification and Hermeneutics:**

Thus ideas and institutions are falsified if they fail to conform to Western conceptions of the political good but the possibility of the falsification of Western political conceptions are remote – as post positivist investigations have shown falsification of dominant paradigms can easily be avoided (Rice 1984) Western practices are viewed by political scientists as ‘natural, real, reasonable and same’ and anti-Western practices as ‘deviant, unnatural, impractical, irrational, insane’.

These pre judgments underlie political science – these pre judgments constitute political science’s ‘hermeneutic circle’ These pre judgments must remain fixed if they are to provide criteria for assessing other practices.

Critical reflection is possible only within the hermeneutic circle of political science. The pre suppositions underlying the conception of meaning, relevance, experience and explanation in political science reflect Western conventions traditions and norms.

These presuppositions are evident in the Western definition of politics – Aristotle for example distinguishes between ruling and politics and regards politics as being possible only as a relation among equals (1955).

➤ **Realm Of Freedom :**

He also insisted that politics could exist only in a “realm of freedom”. Politics, in this perception is the activity by which equally free citizens define values and create institutions to enable them to live the sort of life they wish to lead. Political knowledge on the other hand is a means for defining the good and the method for achieving it.

This knowledge may reveal a truth which is not actualized by the free political activity of a community of equals – and the political thinkers who realize the truth may not have the power to actualize it Aristotle thus recognizes an unbridgeable distance between political practitioners (equal citizens) and political theorists.

The truth revealed in Aristotelian thought is the human telos – the purpose for the attainment of which freedom is a legitimate end. Post enlightenment political science ostensibly eschews any concern with teleology and concentrates on description and analysis of state institutions – the institutionalist, positivist and pluralist methodologies are explicitly empiricist.

➤ Institutionalist Constitutional Concerns:

The central concern of the institutionalists has been the examining of constitutional provisions to identify structures of governance and distribution of powers in different polities. Politics is thus identified with constitutionally sanctioned behaviour, within the context of government institutions – the executive, legislature and judiciary. Anti-constitutional movements – such as those of revolutionaries are thus delegitimized.

Realist political scientists such as Laswell (1950) stress that politics is a study of the distribution of power. Political actors are self-interested “power maximizers” and the market model is therefore relevant to an analysis of political behavior.

In this perception the ‘will to power’ determines political action and values used for political mobilization are masks concealing this ‘reality’. Pluralists and institutionalists contend that manipulation of democratic ideals to realize selfish ends is constrained by severe limits in constitutional regimes.

➤ **The Pluralist Perspective:**

Politics in the pluralist perspective is an activity through which diverse interests and values are balanced and reconciled – some political actors may pursue power, but others seek the promotion of distributional equality – and the constitutional regime provides a framework for balancing the orderly pursuit of these diverse and conflicting ends through bargaining, negotiation, and compromise (Lindbolm1965). The good of politics is merely the achievement of this balancing of divergent (equally trivial) conceptions of the good which individuals are free to pursue.

The freedom maximizing principle in the pluralist perception is the coalition building and sustaining principle. Pluralism like institutionalism is status quo maintenance oriented and anti-constitutional activity is necessarily delegitimized for such activity is based on the premises that some interests are irreconcilable within the context of a constitutional regime.

Pluralism endorses what has been described as the emotivist conception of value (Hudson 1970). Political values reflect the sentiments and feelings of political participants and not conceptions of truth.

There can be no rational debate about political values since they are a consequence of subjective preference and political science (like economics) has nothing to say about preference formation. Nevertheless, pluralism endorses freedom as the ultimate ideal for it like mainstream economics) conceives of the self as choosing its identity and ends arbitrarily.

Indeed, freedom appears as the in liberal society permitting the reconciliation of diverse private ends. In reality freedom/capital accumulation alone is recognized as possessing value and all private ends are trivialized (MacIntyre 1981).

➤ **The Capitalist Subservience:**

The functionalist political scientists (Easton 1971) explicitly recognize the subservience of liberal politics to capital accumulation. Both structural functionalists and systems analysts conceive of liberal politics as a self-regulating systemic component of capitalist economy and society fulfilling systems maintenance 'necessary tasks'. Political science identifies these necessary tasks and conceptualizes efficient methods for their performance.

Functional structuralists recognize that legitimating capitalist order requires cultural contextualization Japanese capitalism is different from American capitalism as far as its socio-political organization is concerned.

➤ **The Task Of Political culturist :**

The task of systemic cultural political studies is to generate a scientific understanding of the demands made upon a political system (in terms of state building, redistribution of resources, sustaining national identity consciousness etc.) of specific cultures for the reproduction of capitalist order.

The issue of the transition from capitalism remains inconceivable in this context. Functionalist-structuralists and systems analysts (like other major political science schools) participate in the project of universalizing capitalist order by justifying freedom/capital accumulation as the sole legitimate value – the telos of political order. Modernization / democratization theory is an inheritor of the functionalist approach.

The universalization of liberal democratic practices is seen as both desirable and the inevitable for the universalization of capitalism. Modernization / democratization theorists argue that there is a two-way causative relationship between participation in capitalist markets on the one hand and the fostering of liberal values and commitment to representative democracy on the other.

➤ Political Science resists Challenge to Capitalist Order :

Political organization and movements – specially fundamentalism – which challenge capitalist norms and the democratic organization of society are viewed as irrational. Modernization / democratization theory is a central theoretical initiative for furthering human rights imperialism. Modernist/democratic theorists advocate the suppression of anti-capitalist, anti-democratic tendencies on functionalist grounds – such activity is ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘de-stabilizing’ and most importantly liberalism has no argument for its delegitimation.

✓ As Dreben – Rawls’ leading apologist – states ☹ Kills These Rascals ? .

“We are arguing for a constitutional, liberal democracy. If one cannot see the benefits of living in a liberal constitutional democracy, then I do not know how to convince him. What do you say to (him)? The answer is nothing. You shoot him you do not try to reason with him. Reason has no bearing on this question” (2003 p328-329).

Rawls also describes ideologies which reject constitutional democracy as akin to contagious diseases and advocates that they should be suppressed (1985 p64). Political science thus advocates the universalization of capitalist norms as the substance of an inevitable social development.

World Bank and Asian Development Bank programs for promoting ‘good governance transfer this ‘knowledge’ to the Muslim world. Modernist political science abandons claims of value neutrality and claims regarding the operationalization of analysis in a non-prescriptive manner.

It abandons the institutional claim that research methodologies are neutral techniques for the organization and collection of data. Modernization / democratization theory argues that the value of freedom, / capital accumulation, is reason's telos and attempts at transcending freedom through the universalization of abdiyat are necessarily irrational.

➤ Self-Claimed Political values : and Post Modern Enlightenment .

Political science creates a world in its own image and uses concepts of passivity, neutrality and objectivity to disguise the fact that this is not the only possible world. Those who seek to destroy this world must therefore be suppressed. They cannot be argued with.

Post modernism is a critique of Enlightenment but not a repudiation or rejection of freedom. Indeed, it criticizes the Enlightenment project for its failure to achieve / understand freedom (specially as a process). Postmodernism rejects the Enlightenment metanarratives for the realization of freedom (Lyotard 1979). It questions the universalizability of Enlightenment values and methods.

It argues that Enlightenment categories (public/private, subject/object, appearance/reality) are not universal or necessary. They can however serve particular historical projects of legitimation of specific configurations of power. That this is not a repudiation of the Enlightenment project is reflected in Foucault's recognition of the need for "continued faith in Enlightenment and the pursuit of patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty" (1984 p50).

The post-modernist remains attached to the 'truths' of the Enlightenment and does not recognize any alternative to freedom. Rather the key concern is with its boundaries and pushing back the limits which restrict the operationalization of freedom.

Post-modernist discourses focus on the restrictions on freedom imposed by Enlightenment sanctioned technologies of power and knowledge. Post modernism displays a basic

incredulity regarding the Enlightenment's emancipatory claims. Post modernism signals a legitimacy crisis in the epistemological, cultural and political life of modern Western societies.

These societies cannot rationally defend their conception of the true, the just or the good. Post modernists such as Rorty argue that there is no need for a rational defense of these conceptions. Knowledge and politics should be concerned with identifying "what works"?

This "pragmatic turn" makes post-modernism an appropriate apology for globalized capitalism. There are pragmatic grounds for belief in science, reason, democracy and progress – but even in Nietzsche (1973) there is a realization that these beliefs do not lead to freedom.

Coles (1997) shows that the view that man is continuously progressing towards the achievement of freedom is a means by which we conceal our response to the other – the quest for freedom leads to tyranny and domination as do attempts to transcend the perspectivist limits to understanding. Attempts to grasp the totality of experience – universalizing perspectives – suppress heterogeneity.

➤ The Myth Of Knowledge As Power :

The pursuit of knowledge / power is "the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will "(Foucault 1984b). All knowledge's, economic, cultural, sexual provide conduits for the exercise of power.

Power is productive of specific truths for "truth is a thing of this world. It is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraints. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth" (Foucault 1980 p131). Transcendence of power (i.e. of capitalism) is not possible.

Foucault insists that there is no outside of power. This idea is also reflected in Heidegger's conception of Dasein which questions being and the a priori claims about being made by Enlightenment philosophy, from a distinctly this worldly perspective. Dasein is pre-eminently being in the world limited by specific time and space. Derrida's work shows that it is also limited by its necessary disavowal of the other. Derrida analysis the violence immanent to this disavowal of otherness.

➤ DE -constructivists Responses:

Deconstruction asserts the essential relatedness of the subject and suggests a consequential instability built into selfhood. The self can never be fully separated from the other despite its experience of differentiation and deferral . Attempts at differentiation and deferral which always remain incomplete obscure meaning (Holland 1997) and frustrate the Enlightenment project of narrative closure through systematic accumulation of knowledge. Meaning always remains indeterminate and freedom remains an ultimately unachievable objective. According to Derrida (1976) politics provides space for the exercise of dominance and violence in the quest for meaning. Politics makes possible the assertion of an ever elusive mastery.

That this recognition of the impossibility of an achievement of freedom is not a rejection of freedom / capital accumulation as an ideal can be seen for example in the work of feminist post modernists who argue that sexual difference and oppression is produced within the context of certain relations of power and symbolic configurations.

This recognition is seen as a liberating experience for it enables women to understand how they are psychically and socially acculturated as sexed figures and how they might resist the hetero normative narratives that follow from assumptions about immutability of sexed identities within political order (Irigaray 1985 Butler 1997)lxxxvi .

Post-modernist politics are typically articulated in single issue movements – women, queer, ecology, disarmament, anti-racist.

➤ Post Moderns do not Rejects liberal Freedom ?:

They are not a rejection of freedom / capital but an exploration of the limits to which disciplines and their associated dominations can be stretched. Post modernism does not seek to transcend freedom / capital. Its acknowledgement of difference is not an abandonment of the Western claims of superiority. Rather as Rorty argues there is no need to defend the postmodernist preference for liberties on rational grounds. America's only duty is "to please itself" (1998 p18) and the preference for post Christian Western life styles is based on esthetic grounds.

Freedom may be seen as a way of regulating and administering a society that depends on the capacities of free (i.e. utility / profit maximizing) individuals. Creating a free society – in post-Communist Europe, or post Islamic Afghanistan – involves first of all teaching people methods of calculating and managing that make profit and utility maximization possible. Values of consumerism, competition and accumulation have to be fostered and values of tawakkul, zuhd and sabr have to be delegitimized through the reform of the educational system.

Psychotherapists have to supplant the ulema and the soofia to enable people to endure the misery of freedom and the tyranny of capital. Men are not born free. They are made free by turning them into agents of capital. The rationalities of freedom are pre-eminently economic rationalities.

➤ **Market As a church Of Freedom :**

The market is the prime locale for the practice of freedom. The practice of freedom involves the marketization of not just society but of the individual, Economic man values choice for its own sake –he chooses only freedom/capital. To him life is meaningful only to the extent that it yields freedom/capital and freedom/capital acquirement is therefore the only criteria for valuing all acts and relationships.

This economic based individuality must become a norm for evaluating political programs and social arrangements in capitalist society. Promoting freedom obsessed individuality is therefore the telos of capitalist governance.

➤ **Governmental Technologies:**

It is also an instrument of capitalist governmentality inspiring the creation of a variety of governance technologies. These technologies enable the socialization of freedom in a manner consistent with its individuation. Liberalism may be seen as perhaps the most successful (to date) technology of governance which links the socialization and the individuation of freedom.

Liberalism responsiblizes its subjects – they are taught to discipline themselves for the sake of freedom/capital accumulation. They are made to be “willing to do their bit in maintaining the system that defines and delimit them. They must play their parts in a game whose intelligibility and limits they take for granted” (Rajshman 1991). Freeing people – turning them into subjects of capital – necessarily involves their responsiblization,

their voluntary acceptance of the discipline of a particular accumulation regime. Liberalism equips the free individual with specific techniques of self understanding and self mastery

which internalize capitalist rationality and transfer human being into human capital. Freeing the individual thus involves

- (a) the universalization of wage labour.
- (b) the establishment of the dominance of the financial markets as valuers of all social practices.

Accepting the discipline of the workplace and the money and capital markets is thus a crucial element in the freeing of individuals – in the construction of capitalist subjectivity. Nurturing capitalist individuality involves the normalization of the individual. The rationality and practices of freedom in the West were technologized through the re-institutionalization of culture.

New spaces had to be created where the free individual could be subjected to normative gazes. Regulation of urban life through police, medical services infrastructural support systems involved the calculated use of architecture in the promotion of regulated liberty. Museums, hospitals, prisons, department stores and exhibitions were designed to discipline and regulate the conduct of the urban masses – and to circumvent and subvert the discipline of religious institutions.

➤ Political Face Of Individualism:

The free individual is enmeshed in a web of visibilities of public codes. The family is torn from its communal moorings – the joint family is destroyed and initially the nuclear family, bearer of capitalist values takes its place. The nuclear family is the focus of the deployment of technologies of private responsabilization in early capitalism. (Rose 1987).

The nuclear family is subjected to the gaze and discipline of experts – doctors, social workers, marriage counselors, psychiatrists. These experts sanction modes of behavior which are bearers of capitalist rationality. Experts determine modes for the care of the body, the child, the spouse, the old as means not for serving God but for facilitating capital

accumulation. It is these ulema replacing experts who define the norms of personal behaviour in capitalist society and produce free individuality.

Free individuals are governable – they freely accept subjection to capital. To be free is to be attached to capitalist order where certain modes of conducting one's existence are considered as normal by experts espousing capitalist rationality. The norms sanctioned by the experts are the basis on which the free individual judges himself. Secular educational institutions, the school and the university, play a key role in producing responsabilized capitalist subjectivity in the form of the free individual. The essential purpose of liberal education is to create the civilized sensibilities which subvert and ridicule religious consciousness.

The greater the self-subjection of the individual to capitalist rationality (through the development of appropriate sensibilities) the less the need to subject him to formal structures of governance. Liberalism is distinguishable from anarchism due to its recognition that self-subjection to capitalist rationality can never be complete and the need to police, regulate, discipline and govern can never be eliminated.

The increasing mass of marginalized people unwilling or unable to practice capitalist rationality would always need to be subjected to the formal authority of capitalist institutions parliaments, prisons, social security agencies, mental asylums, hospitals, schools, universities etc. Normal citizens are also in need of being assigned duties, assigned rights, and assured of the authority of experts. This can be achieved more effectively by agitprop agencies of capital – public and private media and educational institutions – but formal governance processes cannot be dispensed with as far as the performance of this function is concerned.

➤ **Freedom and Individualism :**

Freedom exists in capitalist order – and in it alone. Capitalist order requires a de legitimization and disintegration of community. Even the community of labour which had been a product of the dominance of capitalism is destroyed and this destruction is justified by the New Right.

Freedom here is individuation – the establishment of an identity through a shaping of everyday life. This identity is created by the use of two distinct technologies of governance – technologies of consumption and psychological technologies. The self of the free individual is constructed by the marketers of products the free individual is induced to desire. Products are imbued with a subjective meaning and associated with a desirable life style.

The free individual identifies his self with commodities not ideologies, beliefs or political systems. Identities are purchased in the market. Since all of society becomes a market one is forced to choose and the only possible expression of choice / freedom is the purchase of one commodity rather than another.

Self realization in capitalist order is the comodification of life – of work, play, sex, childbearing, health, education etc. Psychology elaborates the know how of this perveted self realization. Psychologists possess the specialized knowledge of the commodified self (and of its commodification). Freedom is the unending search for the animal sources, secrets and truths of this perverse self. One frees oneself through the application of a rational technology of the self. The free individual frees himself through subordination to a psychotherapist.

➤ **Freedom Ultimate goal Is to Negates God :**

To live as a free individual, he must learn new technologies for practicing upon himself the rationalities of freedom. Freedom is liberation from religion and subjection to a new priesthood which advocates and legitimates the practice of lust and greed. The aspiration for freedom converts the subject of God into the subject of capital. This conversion is expressed in an unreserved commitment to human rights.

Human rights entail duties of capitalist states to ensure the development of capitalist individuality, civil society and some form of republicanism (preferably though not necessarily a representative democracy).

➤ **Islamic response To Human Rights:**

Islam rejects the humanist claim that man has rights by virtue of his belonging to a particular biological specie, homo sapiens. Human rights are no such rights – they are merely means for constructing capitalist individuality, civil society and some form of republicanism so that the duty of capital accumulation (promotion of avarice and jealousy) may be legitimated and continuously performed.

There are no rights one acquires merely by the biological fact of being a homo sapiens. There are no grounds for situating human rights in human “nature”. Human rights are a doctrine legitimizing the rule of capital i.e. the dominance of individuality, society and state by the vices of avarice and jealousy. That is why human rights are specific to the era of capitalism and are universal only to the extent of the universality of the rule of capital.

It is important to stress that human rights are held by individuals against the state. They are held that is by the individual in his personal / private capacity against his public capacity as a citizen. It is thus quite wrong theoretically to argue – as for example the arrogant.

American human rights apologist Jack Donnelly (1988) does – that human rights entail no duties.

The “enjoyment” of human rights by the private individual requires that in his public life he implements the rule and the law of capital and continuously constructs capitalist societies and capitalist states. The autonomous individual is not free to reject freedom, to reject the organization of the market and the state in accordance with the law which actualizes the prioritization of capital accumulation – the universal dominance of avarice and jealousy. Subordinating human nature to the vices of avarice and jealousy is thus a capitalist project. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists the duties of states for creating capitalist individuality obsessed with avarice and jealousy. The often stressed commitment by the UN and liberal and social democratic authors to the inalienability of human rights is important in that it shows capitalism’s unwillingness to recognize as human an individuality, which rejects autonomy.

➤ Adultery (zina) As a Human right :

An individual whose life is not dominated by avarice and jealousy and who does not prioritize the practice of freedom is not recognized as a human being. Similarly, a state which does not perform the duty of constructing capitalist individualities and civil society loses legitimacy. The state must ensure that its’ citizens remain human – i.e. committed to the systemic prioritization of capital accumulation. Other social groups specially the family also have the duty to promote capitalist, greed and jealousy obsessed individuality.

In capitalist order families have no right to prevent the practice of Zina by their children for as Western practice has shown the universalization of Zina is an important means for the construction of capitalist individuality, and civil society.

What duties must the state perform to ensure the continuing construction of capitalist individuality and civil society? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights derives its list of human rights from the Dworkinan conception of human beings as autonomous individuals equally entitled to “concern and respect”.

➤ **Human rights and Property:**

These include the Lockean / Jeffersonian rights of life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness. Recognition that the property less individual must be inclusively integrated into capitalist order has led to the social democratic insistence on widening the list of universal human rights so that the property less, also become the subjects of capital. Political and eco-social rights are inter related in that the state must perform duties in both areas for constructing and nurturing capitalist individuality.

Both sorts of rights emerged as a consequence of the conquest of state power by elites committed to autonomy. Liberal elites overthrew authoritarian rule by constructing civil societies and republican states. Social democratic elites incorporated the mass of ordinary people into capitalist order by encumbering the states with Keynesian duties (“welfare rights”).

Constructing capitalist order requires commitment to two central values – autonomy and equality. This essentially requires that the state does not constrain liberty on the grounds that one citizen’s conception of the good is superior to another’s. Treating each person with “equal concern and respect” implies taking all ends as of equal value – i.e. of no value at all.

The only valuable end is freedom – the right to choose any equally valueless end – and to increase resources (Rawls’ primary goods) for the exercise of this absurd choice. Accumulation is thus an end in itself and the subject of accumulation losses all moral worth for all his choices are equally valueless.

In this fantasy of evil the equality and autonomy “enjoyed” by the citizen is purely formal. In theory he can choose any way of life in practice he is compelled to choose a way of life that priorities accumulation (avarice and jealousy) for it is this (substantive) choice alone which makes possible the (formal) choice of any way of life. It is in this sense that Foucault often spoke of the “compulsions of freedom”.

A capitalist life is a necessarily rational choice for all (normal) individuals in capitalist order. A religious life is necessarily a life of surrender (Kant would call it heteronomy). If this surrender is not restricted to the “private” life of the individual (i.e. to the level of a trivial merely esthetic, valueless choice) it makes the construction of civil society and a constitutional republic impossible.

The capitalist state is therefore necessarily anti-religious in that its law obligates its subject to confine his moral valuations to his personal life. As citizen, his valuation is necessarily immoral – in that it assigns worth to acts in accordance only to their contribution to increasing the resources for freedom (capital accumulation).

The capitalist state refrains from “enforcing a particular version of the good life” only as far as valueless personal choices are concerned – i.e. choices to which value cannot be assigned by capitalist valuation processes. At the public level it ruthlessly enforces the capitalist way of life with all the force that it can command. Enforcing human rights is a means for ensuring:

- (a) that (private) moral valuations of individuals are rendered equally trivial and barred from affecting (immoral) public choices.
- (b) public choices are valued systemically in terms of their contribution to capital accumulation (i.e. evil) alone. The autonomy / dignity of the individual is defined in terms of his commitment to the equal triviality of all moral evaluations on the one hand and to capitalist rationality on the other.

➤ Divine Rights, Individualism and Property :

In this order the divine right of the king is substituted by the divine right of the individual but the individual is king only if he is committed to capitalist rationality at the public level and committed to the trivialization of all moral evaluations. Equally autonomous individuals publicly sanction all ends made possible by capital accumulation.

In public life capital accumulation is the only “end in itself”. Capitalist rationality rejects the possibility of a moral evaluation of capital accumulation – the operation of capitalist markets (commodity, money, shares) articulate this impossibility. The universalization of human rights is a necessary consequence of the globalization of capitalist markets.

The popular demand for the recognition of universal human rights is thus based on a prior acceptance of the legitimacy of capitalist property (i.e. property dedicated to accumulation for its own sake). In societies, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where capitalist property is not socially legitimated there is no popular demand for universal human rights. As against this there is a popular demand for human rights practice in urban and Seized parts of China where people yearn for full participation in capitalist property relationships.

The concept of capitalist property is based on the premises that man is an owner of himself. But in a fundamental sense the Lockean “Law of Nature” (Reason) requires that this possession be forfeited to capital. In Locke’s system “the right to self-preservation” is best articulated in the individual’s right to unlimited private property.

Locke argues that the purpose of civil society is to preserve property (1967, 3.1-3, 85, 15-16, 173, 6-8). One’s Body is one’s property (Locke 1967, 179.2-3). This conception of the Body as individual property lies at the base of Locke’s (and subsequently Ricardo’s and Marx’s) labor theory of value.

The Body thus is the basis of capitalist property since the purpose of being (individual and social) is to preserve Freedom. Locke recognizes a duty to labor productively (1967, 32.1). Hence the Body is capitalist property because it provides a basis for (and ought to be used for) unlimited accumulation (Freedom) Locke argues that capitalist money which can be accumulated without limit removes the natural law constraints on individual accumulation (1967, p 46 28-30). Locke justifies the massacre of the Red Indians and the seizure of their lands as a means for making unlimited accumulation possible (1967 36-18, 41, 1-3, passim).

Accumulation is justified however only if the property appropriated (by the slaughter of the Red Indians in America) is put to “use” – i.e. used for further accumulation. Rawls and Dworkin are firmly in the Lockean tradition when they suggest that use must involve egalitarian concerns since without this unlimited accumulation cannot be “used” to construct a fully inclusive capitalist order.

The all-encompassing (inclusive) nature of capitalist property is graphically illustrated by Locke’s definition of property Locke writes:

“He seeks out and is willing to enjoy in society with others.... for the natural. Preservations of the Lives, Liberties and Estates which I call by the general name Property” (1967: 123, 14-17, Emphases in original).

The individual’s Body, liberty and estates all are Property in the sense that all are instruments for useful production and society’s over riding purpose is the ‘enjoyment of Property’ – i.e. accumulation. Both “negative” and “positive” rights are recognized by liberal governments for the purpose of “the enjoyment of Property” Locke writes “Law is.... the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest ... the end of Law is to preserve and enlarge Freedom” (1967, 57, 10-13, 17-18). As we have seen Freedom is merely the “enjoyment of Property”. The “enjoyment of Property” is thus the end served by the rule of law. The rule of law is thus an instrument for the Rule of Capital.

The Second Treatise only recognizes one positive right, the right to property. This is because property is a precondition for autonomy. In the market property owners are enabled to autonomously construct contracts.

From a liberal perspective there are no property-less individuals in a capitalist market – for every individual possesses his Body the original repository of Property. Formally equal contracts can be constructed as long as the ‘right to work’ – the willingness of an owner of estates to enter into a contact with an owner of a Body on terms of formal equality – exists.

It is only the unemployed (rigorously speaking the unemployable) who are property-less and excluded from the circuit of capital. Welfare rights are recognized by social democrat regimes and theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin as necessary for extending capitalist property to the growing multitude of stateless individuals in civil society and to eliminate unemployment. It is in the social democratic states that the domination of capital is most comprehensive though this comprehensiveness often has to be “purchased” at the cost of deceleration in the rate of capital accumulation.

The doctrine of the divinity and omnipotence of man is the essence of human rights ideology. It has always been a revolutionary ideology.

➤ Liberalism and Revolts:

That is why Locke’s Second Treatise concludes with a defense of the right to revolt. Liberalism is essentially a revolt against Allah’s sovereignty for it sees universal human nature as committed to self-creation and to the creation of the world through labor leading to the accumulation of property.

Liberalism revolts against regimes which do not prioritize the accumulation of property by performing the duties required for the universal practice of human rights. Liberalism demands that all conceptions of human nature which reject the autonomy of the individual be abandoned.

➤ **The HR Core Purpose:**

The central purpose of human rights ideology is to delegitimize all political regimes based on the concept of Allah's sovereignty and to replace them by regimes committed to the sovereignty of capital. Property as conceived by Locke and Kant and Paine resides essentially in the Body which actualizes its Freedom by accumulation of Money. The Body is thus an instrument of capital (avarice and jealousy) and asserting the sovereignty of the equal and autonomous avaricious and jealous individual, his right to make his self and the world his creation is asserting the sovereignty of capital. It is nothing else.

➤ **Capitalism and Genocide:**

Capital is evil (Badiou 2001). Typically, men do not naturally submit to it enemies'. An influential group of evil men possessed by the devils of avarice and jealousy seize control of the apparatus of governance – specially legitimization discourses – and establish the sovereignty of capital on unwilling populations. This can be seen most clearly by seeking to understand the organic and unbreakable link between liberalism and imperialism.

The presently dominant universal human rights regime was born in America in the late 18th century. America had been the theatre of the mass slaughter of Red Indians – fifteen million of whom perished during three centuries (Dee 1970). In a fundamental sense it was this slaughter and the theft and plunder of an entire continent which made the construction of a constitutional regime possible. George Washington was aware of this and repeatedly felt compelled to justify the mass slaughter of the Red Indians on the grounds that "Red Indian tribes are wolves in human clothing and the survival of human civilization depends on their extermination" (Dec. 1970 p.41).

➤ American Declaration Of Independence and Federalist papers as a Foundation of Human Rights:

The American Declaration of Independence (1776) is the world's first political document legitimizing national sovereignty on the basis of human rights ideology. The American constitution incorporates this commitment to human rights.

The anti-federalists who opposed the constitution did so specifically on the grounds that its' enactment would lead to the rule of capitalists and financiers over America (Elster 1993 p463).

The most important objective of the constitution was to protect the (capitalist) minority from the tyranny of the majority. The Federalists did not claim that the constitution reflected the will of the people nor was the constitution ever endorsed by a popular referendum. The authors of the Federalist Papers saw themselves as "political scientists" with access to a superior knowledge, which identifies the "true good" of the people and the means for attaining it.

The American constitution is based on this "true knowledge". It is not based on the will of the people (Rousseau's "will of all"). The American constitution is seen by the authors of the Federalist Papers as based on an authentic reading of the Book of Nature which enunciates eternally valid and immutable principles of governance for the establishment of justice. John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are reiterating these claims when they argue for the universalization of human rights.

➤ **The Fictitious Book Of Nature:**

The fictitious Book of Nature (which has replaced the Books of Allah as the source of hidayat) ordains that the achievement of freedom / abundance requires the rule of the capitalists for it is they alone who can organize the market and the state for the achievement of abundance.

Therefore, the particular interest of the capitalists (and their representatives) is the interest not only of America but of all of mankind. It is the universal interest and America has the duty to ensure it's universal dominance through the universalization of human rights i.e. of global capitalist order.

Human rights are thus in a very important sense prior to democracy. Duties associated with them must be imposed upon a state before it can be allowed to practice democracy. This is because human rights construct autonomous (avarice and jealousy obsessed) individuality on the one hand and protect the capitalist minority from the “tyranny of the majority” on the other.

That is why the UN Charter of Human Rights is modeled on the American Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence. The Charter, the Bill and the Declaration all proclaim the equal autonomy of the individual. This commits democratic – and all other republican – regimes to an acceptance of the doctrine of self-creation which is the fountainhead of capitalist order. A religious state cannot be considered legitimate in the perspective of human rights ideology for such a state necessarily denies man's capability of self and world creation. There is simply no basis in Islam or Christianity for recognizing human rights. That is why Locke could not substantiate his claim that God wills human self-determination by direct reference to the Bible.

The only legitimate regime according to human rights ideology is a constitutional – not necessarily a democratic -republic. Such a republic proclaims man's sovereignty in

principle and the sovereignty of capital in practice. This is because a constitutional regime accords value only to freedom i.e. the accumulation of means for the satisfaction of any equally trivial ends.

It necessarily rejects morality by “taking the difference between persons seriously” and regarding all private valuations as equally worthless. Treating the individual with “concern and respect” amounts to equalization / trivialization of all moral choices and therefore necessarily, valuing outcomes / choices solely in terms of their contribution towards accumulation of resources for the satisfaction of equally trivial and valueless ends. It is therefore not surprising that constitutional republics are necessarily dominated by capitalist oligarchs whose personal choices (leading a life of avarice and covetousness) coincide with the preferences of the socially valued way of life.

In practice it is capitalist norms and values that are imposed upon all citizens – indeed one is a citizen only to the extent one considers legitimate the social prioritization of accumulation. Human rights ideology and its practice makes it impossible that an alternative social prioritization be articulated.

➤ Repression And UHR (Universal Human Rights) :

Repression is thus necessarily part of the agenda of universal human rights. Such repression is usually justified in the name of “the people” – this was first done by the authors of the American constitution. The mass slaughter of fifteen million Red Indians, the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo, the atomic attacks on Hiroshima, the napalming of Vietnam, the use of daisy cutter bombs in Afghanistan, the constant state terrorism leading to the death of millions of Iraqi children and the occupation of Iraq and Palestine – all these are the legitimate acts of a liberal regime which justifies them on the basis of human rights ideology, in the name of “we, the people”.

➤ **Relationship between Liberal Democracy and Genocide :**

o Democracy is Best Revenge.

o Democracies Don't Makes war with each Other's.

(claimed By Pakistani Democrats)

Michael Mann has argued that there is a relationship between liberal democracy and genocide (1999). Liberal democracies continuously commit ideologically legitimated genocide (Vietnam, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan) argues Mann.

The greater the commitment to homogenize behaviour through the acceptance of human rights as a universal norm and the consequent (equal) trivialization of personal ends, the greater the temptation to murder those who refuse to accept these norms.

This “other” has to be coerced or induced to assimilate i.e. to submit to the sovereignty of capital. Submission to capital / human rights is a necessary condition for survival in liberal order. Human rights ideology does not advocate peaceful coexistence. Races such as the Red Indian and states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, which do not submit to the sovereignty of capital, have to be exterminated.

The edifice of liberal America was built on the corpses of fifteen million slaughtered Red Indians and the preservation of global order requires the mass slaughter of the Afghans and Iraqis. Mann is conscious of liberalism's compulsive commitment to exterminate “outsiders” when he discusses the behaviour of settler communities in eighteenth century North America – “the greater the democracy among the perpetrators the greater the genocide “(1999 p.26)”.

The (liberal) rule of “we the people” thus necessarily requires the elimination of the other. That is why “ethnic cleansing, murder, deporting, genocide was central to the liberal modernity of the New World “(Mann 1999 p. 27)”.

The ethnic cleansing of the whole of Asia and Africa has never been a viable project – Cecil Rhodes and Lord Macaulay came to this conclusion centuries ago. It becomes increasingly unviable as the share of the European races in world population continues to fall – (UN 2000) – and as the European races age. Repression must therefore take the form of imposing the rule of capital through universalizing human rights and destroying state authority in Asia and Africa.

⊕ Summary: Political Science and Capitalism :

- ✓ * Purpose – legitimization of capitalist order with particular reference to the state.
- ✓ * Originates in the work of the French Encyclopedists of the 18th century which rejected Christian metaphysics and emphasized empiricism.
- ✓ * This implies reliance on this world (and not the world to come) as the source of knowledge and value. Political institutions are justified not with reference to divine law but in terms of their contribution to human happiness in this world. Political science is essentially utilitarian.
- ✓ * Political science methodology claims to be inductionist – generalizations are supposed to be basis on empirical observation of particulars. Such inductionism yields laws which supposedly explain past events and predict the future.
- ✓ * However scientific knowledge is not generated by inductionism (Hume, Popper). Empiricism can never establish necessary connections between events. Moreover, the observer necessarily imposes his theoretical categories on the observed. All theories based on non-observable phenomena.
- ✓ * The Popperian methodology which dominates political analysis holds that theories should be held on to until falsified by observation of facts. It is committed to incrementalism and problem solving. Ultimate values can never be justified. Hence preferences have to be taken as given in political science as in economics and the market is often a model for political science analysis.
- ✓ * Present post Popperian political analysis is concerned not with truth but with ‘what works within the context of Western capitalist polities which therefore provide the criteria for evaluating all political ideas/institutions.
- ✓ * If non Western political idea/institution do not conform to Western ones, they are falsified. But Western political ideas/institutions cannot be falsified since they represent the dominant paradigm and the dominant paradigm related practices are ‘natural, rational’ whereas non Western practices are “irrational, unnatural”. Western norms are political science’s prejudgments which must remain fixed if they are to provide assessment criteria. Critical assessment is only possible within the

dominant paradigm. The presuppositions underlying the dominant paradigm are all based on Enlightenment norms and Western practices.

- ✓ * These pre suppositions are reflected in Western definitions of politics Aristotle defines politics as “a relation among equals” (no riaya¹) and possible only within a “realm of freedom”. Equally free citizens define values and establish institutions to enable them to lead the life they value. This is politics. Political knowledge defines the good and identifies the method to achieve it.
- ✓ * In Aristotle’s thought freedom is a means to human flourishing. Mainstream institutionalist, pluralist, positivist political science identifies flourishing with freedom and describes/evaluates institutions on this basis. Approved politics is constitutionally sanctioned behavior. Anti-constitutional activities are delegitimized.
- ✓ * The realist school sees political actors as power maximizers. They use the market model in analyzing behavior. Political institutions are masks concealing ‘the will to power’.
- ✓ * Pluralists, institutionalists and realists endorse the constitutional regime as providing a legitimate framework for the pursuit of power and of diverse interests. Freedom/power is maximized when balancing of diverse interests is effectively sustained.
- ✓ * The presumption is that all interests are reconcilable within a constitutional regime and anti-constitutionalist activities are therefore de-legitimized. The constitutional regime makes possible the arbitrary choice of identity and ends by every self and freedom is the modus vivendi which makes possible the pursuit of diverse private ends. These ends are trivial and freedom alone has political value.
- ✓ * Functionalists recognize the subservience of liberal politics to capital. System theorists and structuralists conceive of the political system as a self-regulatory component of capitalist economy/society. System maintenance is its necessary task.
- ✓ * Functionalists recognize that legitimizing capitalist order requires cultural contextualisations – different capitalist governance systems (US, Japan) and cultures may impose different requirements on state institutions, resource distribution, identity consciousness etc. and these must be reconciled with the need

¹ Inhabitants without civil rights and property.

for capital accumulation. System cultural political studies address this issue. They show that capital accumulation is possible in different cultural contexts and transition from capitalism is impossible / undesirable.

- ✓ * Modernisation / democratization theory is a follow up of functionalism. It seeks the universalization of liberal practices and capitalism. It sees a relationship between participation in markets, acceptance of liberal values and participation in liberal institutions. Opposing representative democracy / capitalism is viewed as irrational. It advocates suppression of all anti liberal activities. It cannot justify liberal democracy. Good governance programs should be seen in this context. These programs promote the knowledge that there is no alternative to capitalist development / liberal institutions.
- ✓ * Modernisation theory is aggressively non neutral about values. It sees freedom as reason's telos and attempts at transcending freedom as irrational.
- ✓ * Political science creates a world in its own image and like economics, uses concepts of neutrality and objectivity to disguise the fact that this is not the only possible world.
- ✓ * Post modernism is a critique of Enlightenment but not a rejection of freedom. It criticizes Enlightenment for its failure to achieve / understand freedom. It rejects Enlightenment metanarratives, methods and categories and regards them as non universal and non necessary.
- ✓ * These methods / projects, can serve particular projects of legitimating specific configurations of power. The concern is to expand the realm of liberty within the order of capital. The post-modernist does not recognize any alternative to freedom and capitalism. Post modernists seek to reduce restrictions imposed on freedom by Enlightenment technologies of power and knowledge.
- ✓ * Post modernism recognizes that Enlightenment conceptions of the true and the good cannot be rationally defended but Rorty argues that there is no need for such defense. They are justified on esthetic and pragmatic grounds. And we should be concerned with what works. This makes post modernism an appropriate apology for globalized capitalism.

- ✓ * Post modernists argue that plurality is to be encouraged for it is a means for expanding the boundaries of freedom and does not constitute a threat to capital. Transcendence of capitalism is not possible. 'There is no outside of power' (Foucault) Heiddeger and Derida also emphasize the impossibility of transcending capitalism.
- ✓ * Derida stresses the impossibility of separating the self from the other despite difference. This makes freedom an ultimately unachievable objective. Politics according to Derida provides space for asserting dominance in the name of freedom.
- ✓ * Movements inspired by post-modernist politics such as anti-globalization, feminism etc. are seeking an expansion of the limits of freedom. Thus feminist politics seeks liberation from hetro-normality (Irrigary). The feminist preference for the post Christian life does not need to be defended on rational grounds according to the post modernists.
- ✓ * Freedom is a method for regulating a capitalist society. People have to be taught the utility calculus. Values of consumerism and competition have to be fostered and the value of Tawakkal / Zuhd delegitimised. Psychoanalysts have to show people how to bear the misery of freedom and the tyranny of capital.
- ✓ * Men are made free by their subjection to capital. Both the individual and society has to be marketised. Man must be taught to value choice for its own sake and to accept freedom/capital as the only criteria for valuing all acts / relationships. This provides the basis for valuing politics.
- ✓ * The telos of governance is the promotion of capitalist individuality. Liberalism is the most successful governmentality technology for linking the socialization and the individuation of freedom. Liberalism teaches the individual how to discipline himself for capital accumulation. The individual willingly submits to the discipline of capital. He accepts capitalist order as rational / inevitable. Techniques of self understanding/self mastery are promoted which internalize capitalist rationality and convert human being into human capital.
- ✓ * This requires:
 - . universalization of avarice /jealousy
 - . establishment of financial markets as valuers of all practices.

- . acceptance of the discipline of the work place.
- ✓ * Creating capitalist individuality requires the creation of a hedonist / anti-religious culture. Establishment of the authority of the police, the psychiatrist, the doctor, the department store, the museum.
- ✓ * The family is torn from its communal base and becomes a bearer of capitalist values. The family is subjected to the gaze / discipline of experts who sanction models of behavior specifying modes for the care of the body and the child for enhancing capital accumulation. Capitalist individuality is produced by the doctor, the marketer, the psychiatrist, the social worker, the policeman who define normal behavior. Such normalization makes individuals governable.
- ✓ * The free individual judges / disciplines himself on the basis of the norms specified by experts specially in schools/universities. The essential purpose of secular education is to create the sensibilities which subvert /ridicule/deform religious consciousness
- ✓ * Liberalism recognizes that self-subjection to capitalist rationality can never be complete. Normalized citizens must be subjected by the assignment of duties / rights. But mass media makes capitalist governmentality easy.
- ✓ * Freedom exists in capitalist order through individualization but this destroys communities (including that of labor). The free self is constructed through psychological technologies and technologies of consumption. The free individual identifies himself with products not ideologies. Identities are purchased in the market Freedom is merely choosing one commodity rather than another. Capitalist self-realization is commodification of all of life. Psychologists possess the specialized knowledge of the commodified self. They reveal the truths of the animal self. This legitimizes the practice of lust and greed. This is the basis for the universalization of human rights.
- ✓ * Human rights entail the duties of capitalist states to ensure the development of capitalist individuality and civil society for capital accumulation.
- ✓ * Human rights legitimate the universalization of avarice / covetousness. That is why they are specific to capitalism.

- ✓ * Human rights are the public duty of the free individual to uphold the law of capital in the form of the free market and the capitalist state.
- ✓ * The UN Declaration refuses to recognize as human, individuals and states which reject freedom / capital accumulation. Both state and society must promote the universalization of avarice / jealousy
 - specially Zina for without this construction of capitalist individuality and civil society is impossible.
- ✓ * Constitutional and welfare rights subject the individual to capitalist property. This entails that acts are valued only to the extent to which they contribute to accumulation. All other choices / acts are valueless / trivial. Capitalist order is therefore necessarily anti-religious.
- ✓ * Enforcing human rights requires (a) acceptance of personal moral choices as equally trivial (b) subjecting all public acts to the criteria of accumulation (avarice / jealousy).
- ✓ * Popular demand for human rights exists only where capitalist property is considered legitimate.
- ✓ * Capitalist property is based on the acceptance of the Body as belonging to man. But according to Locke the owner of this property must dedicate it to accumulation. The Body is thus capitalist property because the purpose of Being in to promote Freedom. There is thus a duty to labor productively to accumulate.
- ✓ * Locke justifies the massacre of the Red Indians because this facilitated accumulation and Freedom is only the Enjoyment of Property. The rule of law (rights) is thus a means for the rule of capital.
- ✓ * There is only one human right – the right to property. The right to life can be respected only if the Body is recognized as property. Revolt is justified against states which do not recognize man's ownership / sovereignty over his Body and therefore over the world. Liberalism is a revolt against Allah's sovereignty. Capital alone is sovereign and the Body is its instrument.
- ✓ * Men do not naturally submit to capital. They have to be forced to be free. That is why liberalism is linked to imperialism. The mass murder of the Red Indians made possible the establishment of America – the first constitutional regime. The

American constitution justifies the creation of the state on the basis of human rights and the anti-federalists argued that this was in the interest of capitalists. The authors of the constitution saw themselves as political scientists who possessed knowledge of the true good of the people, this requires the rule of the capitalists who alone can ensure freedom / abundance. America thus has the duty to uphold the law of capital globally to ensure the universalization of freedom.

- ✓ * America is committed to the universalization of human rights and the destruction of states which reject human sovereignty. Democracy is a means for universalisability human rights, capitalist order. It is not an end in itself.
- ✓ * In constitutional regimes freedom is prioritized which necessarily means promotion of avarice / jealousy. The bearer of these values dominate society and all other values are trivialized. Those who reject these dominant values must be repressed. Liberal regimes massacred and celebrate the massacre of Red Indians, Vietnamese, Afghanistanee, Iraqis. Liberal regimes commit ideologically legitimated genocide. They have universalized human rights and homogenized behaviour through genocide and plunder.
- ✓ * Ethnic cleansing of Asia/Africa is not practical so these states must be dominated through subjecting them to the sovereignty of global financial markets and universal standardization of rules of state behaviour which makes possible the limitless expansion of capital. International organizations work for America and for the American dominance of the global capitalist system. Non-territorial imperialism functions through the Americanization of the socio-political system of dominated countries. Within these countries American ideologies and governance processes alone are recognized as legitimate and reasonable. State elites in dominated countries legitimize Americanization.
- ✓ * America recognizes as legitimate only constitutional regimes for they alone can integrate into global capitalist order. All other regimes must be subjected to genocide for human rights imperialism demands total, unconditional and final surrender to capital.

⊕ Marxist Social Theory :

➤ The Relation ship between Marxist Social Theory and Capitalist Order:

This section concentrates on showing the relationship between Marxist social theory and capitalist order. I do not look at sociology as a discipline because sociology's role in legitimating and providing a governance technology for capitalist order is obvious and self evident. Legitimating and providing tools for the management of capitalist social order is the telos of all sociological theoretical schools.

This is most clearly evident in Habermas' first major statement in this field made in the late 1960s. Habermas' main concern in this work was to challenge the hegemony of positivistic sociological approaches and to show that access to the symbolically structured object domain of social hegemony called for an interpretative and phenomenological approach. Habermas however emphatically rejected "hermeneutic idealism"

. He explicitly recognized the usefulness of positivist studies (while questioning their methodological framework) and sought in integration between 'explanatory' and interpretative approaches (1991 p17-30). He found functionalism useful in understanding the objective interconnection of social actions.

➤ Habermas And Functionalism:

In Habermas' view functionalism does furnish important tools for analyzing the objective interconnection of actions. But functionalism ignores or obscures the hermeneutic dimensions of social analysis. Interpretive and phenomenological accounts supplement and complete functionalist analysis by providing space for a recognition of "repressed needs

which are not absorbed into social roles, transformed into motivations and sanctioned” (1991 p64).

➤ Habermas Historicism

Thus Habermas vision of a historically oriented theory of society, a “systematically generalized history” reflectively grasping the formative processes of society and reconstructing it with reference to a specific anticipated future is similar to that of the orthodox social theorists such as Durkheim and Pareto. Interpretivist and phenomenologists merely deepen this analysis.

Habermas does this by using psychoanalysis as a model for re-conceptualizing and reintegrating functionalist and interpretative approaches Habermas views psycholanic theory as a general interpretative scheme of psychodynamic development.

Its reconstruction of individual life histories makes possible a combination of causal explanations and interpretative understanding (Habermas 2001). Building upon Freud’s methods and insights Habermas calls for “a hermeneutically enlightened historically oriented functionalism.... guided by an emancipatory cognitive interest that aims at reflection ... (from) an anticipated point of view” (1992 p134).

➤ Habermas Symbolic Interaction:

It is clear that there is room within Habermas’ system, for modified versions of symbolic interactionism, functionalism and ethnomethodology. His universal pragmatics and attempts to situate social scientific inquiries in a theory of language may be viewed as something of a retreat in methodological terms (reflected in his inability to justify universalizability and human rights) but he continues to find something of value in all the major sociological schools of thought. This is amply evident for example in Habermas’ Post National Constellation.

Habermas can eclectically synthesize all mainstream sociological schools and find something of value in all of them because he views capitalist norms, regulatory procedure and

transitory forms as natural and eternal (that he cannot justify them is another matter). There is no need to transcend capitalism because unconstrained communication will universalize freedom i.e. unconstrained capital accumulation.

➤ Marxists Social Theory and Enlightenment :

Marxist social theory is the Enlightenment inspired paradigm which claims to reject capitalist order. We now turn to an investigation of this claim. Habermas of course began of as a Marxist – a student of Adorno and Horkheimer, a member of the Frankfurt school. Is he a traitor? Habermas' frequent trips to Iran are surreptitiously organized by the American CIA (as are Chomsky's world lecture tours).

Much of Habermas' research – and that of his acolytes – is funded by the Rand Foundation. His advice is eagerly sought for by the commissioners of the European Union. But is Habermas a traitor to Marxism? To answer this question we must present Marx's social theory. Marx's critique of capitalism was grounded in his theory of alienation.

Capitalist society is so organized that it allows private proprietors to appropriate the fruits of the labor of others through the determination of value in the market. Abolishing the market would abolish the 'private appropriation' of others' labour and thus overcome alienation. Abolishing the market is possible because in Marx's view certain features of the capitalist organization of production are not natural (as the classical and new classical economists argue) but social historical.

➤ **Marx and capitalism :**

Capitalist society is ridden with contradiction and is (partially) irrational. It cannot achieve its avowed objective of a 'state of abundance' (maximization of production) so that the principle of 'from each according to his ability to each according to his need' can become operational. Marx endorses this principle and the rationality of the objective of seeking to achieve a state of abundance.

Marx rejects the classical / neo classical formulation of the relations of production as merely technical means for the efficient maximization of output (Marx 1966). The labour time which determines a commodity's (exchange) value is not embodied labour but 'socially necessary labour'. Value is labour for others, alienated labour – labour socially recognized as the essence of a commodity.

Value is homogenized labour whose qualities have been reduced to the single quality of duration. Value realized through exchange (i.e. in markets) has (non natural) social foundations (Marx 1971). It is the social organization of production through the market which gives labour its 'value form'.

Marx sees capitalist property in the (narrow) sense that the individual participates in production for himself and not for serving explicit social needs. The capitalist system seeks to co-ordinate the activities of 'private producers' which are nevertheless not producing for themselves but for others. These 'private producers' necessarily alienate their own labour and appropriate the alienated labour of others.

In a commodity producing (market dominated) society needs can be satisfied only through the production of (exchange) value. The division of labour is regulated through the exchange of commodities as value.

The (exchange) value of a commodity thus expresses the social relations of the people who produce and exchange. The value form of the product of labour is the most universal expression of the capitalist mode of production according to Marx (1971 p571-2). Transcending this value form is a crucially important means for the overthrow of capitalist order.

Marx criticizes classical political economy for abstracting from the social context in which labour appears as value form. He criticizes the conception of isolated capitalist individuality and the conception of production and exchange as essentially technical processes necessary for the realization of the state of abundance.

Thus the social relations of capitalist production are naturalized and presented as the free expression of rationality. The individual is free to choose 'his ends and the efficient functioning of market processes ensures that means for achieving these ends are being optimally produced and distributed. Classical political economy presumes that the individual is free in two senses.

He is endowed with capitalist property and is not encumbered by external moral claims and obligations. These are necessary presuppositions for rational judgment of self interest according to the classical economists.

➤ Realm Of Freedom :

Society ought to be organized to promote individual capitalist endowment and man's freedom from external moral obligations (heteronomy). Capitalist society claims to be the very Eden of the imamate rights of man.... the exclusive realm of Freedom Equality, Property and Bentham (Marx 1971 p280). But argues Marx capitalist society is not a relation between abstract private individuals.

In Marx's view capitalist society is a dense network of social relationships between 'private' property owners. However the 'private' act production is necessarily contextualized by a social division of labour expressed in the totality of capitalist relations of production and exchange. 'Private' property, according to Marx, is a specific form of the social relations of capitalist production and exchange. The commodity is not merely a thing, It is also a social relation.

➤ **The Value Of property In Capitalism : And Marxism**

In capitalist society 'private' property establishes a relation between an individual and a value. For the commodity is produced as bearer of (exchange) value and not merely as a thing. If the commodity is seen as a social relation between 'propertied' and 'property less' individuals, capitalist relations of production cannot be viewed as relations between isolated individuals.

They must be seen as relations between possessors and non possessors of 'private' property. Production organized for the purpose of producing surplus value which can be privately appropriated is according to Marx a barrier to the free development of the production forces, a barrier which comes to the surface in crises' (Marx 1966 part II p527-528).

Marx defines capital as 'value in process, money in process' (1971 p256). He sees capital as a process in which money / value acquires the power of self-expansion (1973 p 258). The capitalist form of the labor process allows the capitalist to 'privately' appropriate the total value produced, to pay the laborer a wage equivalent to the value of labor power purchased and to retain 'surplus value' (1971 p291-292).

➤ **Marx on Labor:**

This retention is possible according to Marx because the capitalist ‘owns’ the means of production and subsistence which can be accessed by labor only through the sale of his labor power. The capitalist can / must control the laborer because the capitalist ‘owns’ the means of production and subsistence. The purpose of capitalist production is the production of surplus value and the production of use value is merely a mean to this end.

From this Marx concluded that increased production would be accompanied by increased deprivation of the workers (Marx 1966 pt. 1 p377-380). This (expected) deprivation is a consequence of the continuing separation of the labourer from capitalist property in the process of production.

The labourer loses his substantive freedom and equality by being separated from and subjection to capitalist property (Marx 1971 p729-30, 733-41). It is “the monopolization of the means of production by a certain section of society confronting (workers) as labour power (embodied) in products and working condition rendered independent of labour power” (Marx 1974 p793-794) which creates and reproduces the deprivation and alienation of labour.

If the labourer could appropriate the whole of the product, alienation / deprivation would end. Locke recognized this but he also recognized the labourer’s right to assign his right to another in return for a fixed wage. Justice requires an equivalence between the value of the wage and the value of the product. Such an equivalence is impossible in what Marx calls “the capitalist mode of production” where the production of surplus value and its private appropriation is the purpose of all economic activity.

By endorsing value and class as the fundamental concepts underlying his theory of capitalist order Marx is announcing his acceptance of Enlightenment, ontological assumptions. More

accepts Enlightenment values, freedom and equality, and endorses the quest for abundance. He rejects the claims of classical political economists and sociologists regarding the natural / rational character of capitalist institutions – market, factory, “private” property, money, finance etc. Capitalist institutions and capitalist order as a whole is irrational according to Marx because it prevents the achievement of abundance and freedom.

Market allocative efficient does not generate freedom / abundance or equality. On the contrary it generates deprivation / alienation for the masses because of the ‘private’ appropriations of surplus product in the form of surplus value. It is not the production of surplus in ever expanding volume to which Marx objects – Marx is a materialist primarily because he accepts the quest for abundance as the essential force enabling social transformation.

➤ Marx and Surplus value :

Marx objects to the production of surplus in the form of surplus value and to the “private” appropriation of this surplus value Marxism seeks an abolition of the ‘market and of the private appropriation of surplus as a means for the achievement of abundance / freedom.

As history has shown this is a strategy for a reorganization of capitalist order not a means for its overthrow. The common metaphysical roots of liberalism and socialism – Marxist or otherwise – are obvious. They become even more manifest when we examine Marx’s vision of communist society, the state of abundance at the end / beginning of history.

➤ Rational Influenced Over Karl Marx

Marx was tremendously influenced by the same rational and romantic thinkers who inspired the founders of liberalism. To begin with it is striking to note that in his description of ideal society Marx pays so little attention to the associations and institutional forms that will replace the structures of capitalism. He concentrates almost exclusively on describing the qualities of the “species man” whose evolution under communism finally coincides with the evolution of each individual. The communist individual, according to Marx.

1. Is interested in and able to carry out a wide range of tasks.
2. Is highly and consistently co-operative.
3. Has a masterful control over nature.
4. Regulates his activities without externally imposed laws, customs and rules.
5. Is indistinguishable from other communist men when viewed from the perspective of social divisions race, religion occupation, family etc.)

The construction of the personality of this “species being”, is begin by the dictatorship of the proletariat and is completed under full blown communism. Marx believes tin the potential divinity, there is no other word for it, of man. He believes that each individual is driven by an inner urge to realize this potential and that the overall fulfillment of the potential of each individual requires the simultaneous fulfillment of all others.

Liberalism shares at least the first two of these assumptions and although most liberals would regard the third as unrealistic there is a never ending liberal search for social forms which reconcile the search for individual fulfillment with the quest for maximum social welfare.

That is why the overwhelming majority of the non American, non vulgar critiques of Marxism presented by liberals question not the values underlying Marxism but the social processes – revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, organization of communist society- through which they are to be realized.

As far as ultimate values are concerned there is much that is common between socialism and liberalism. In order to unearth the individualist basis of Marx's thought one has to focus on the relationship of the work of Kant and Hegel.

➤ Individualism has Objective Value:

Kant asserts that the individual has objective value in himself and hence the particular life chosen by him necessarily embodies this value. But the particular will must respect the equal value of the particular life chosen by the other. Since the particular will in the Kantian conception has value, has an immediate embodiment of the single individual's absolute will, it cannot as a particular will be concerned with anything but its own life – certainly not with realizing the absolute value that lies in the other.

There is thus an unsurmountable separation and opposition between the particular and the universal dimensions of individual life. Kant argues that if freedom is to be realized pure reason in virtue of which the individual is of absolute value must itself be practical. Pure reason must be capable of determining the particular will in accordance with substantive laws that are purely rational.

➤ **Kant Huge Failure and Hegel Pure reason :**

Kant failed to show however how substantive moral laws are derivatives of pure reason. Within the ‘Kantian system pure reason and absolutely free will remain empty concepts incapable of determining practical, empirical life. Hegel attempts to address this weakness of the Kantian system and to show how the self determination of a free rational will is actualized in nature and history.

In Hegel’s thought pure reason and the free will is an infinite spirit that realizes its absolute value in coming to see in the world of particulars a structure which is perfectly rational because it is purely the product of Spirit’s drive to realize its own absolutely and inherently free nature. Spirit known itself as the creator (Khaliq) and sustainer (Rab) of the world.

Spirit achieves this self-knowledge in the fully developed consciousness of the individual human being. The individual realizes himself as infinite spirit through his own particular life. God. – or what Hegel prefers to call Geist – is man and achieves self realization through man. God is not a transcendental, external force as conceived by the higher religions.

The self-realization of the free will involves the deliberate alienation of the universal will from the particular. The universal will seek a particular determinate content for its self-realization. It goes into the world of particulars seeking the actualization of its own nature – namely freedom.

➤ **Hegelian Freedom:**

Freedom is to be understood “as the free will which wills the free will” (Hegel 1979 sec 27). The determinate content which the universal needs for its self-realization is a system of purely rational laws and institutions.

They constitute ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit) and Hegel’s claim is that the ethical forms he specifies are demanded by the activity of pure reason (universal will) in its drive for self realization. The self determination of the universal will is the movement of pure reason in developing the rational forms of its own being out of itself.

This Hegel calls “dialectical thought” the movement of the dialectic is powered in the sphere of practical reason by the alienation of pure reason in particular will and its attempt to find itself in such latitude. Movement occurs when there is a realization of the inadequacy of the initial unity of the universal and the particular.

This initial conception is conceived by Hegel as that of “individuality”. It is a necessary element in the universal will’s self-enfolding and must be preserved but the full attainment of freedom requires the development of a larger whole – a “community” (the sphere of the operation of purely rational laws and institutions).

When particular men come to pursue their lives as means to the realization of the universal in them, as embodied in the rational laws and institutions of the community “the will is then universal because all restriction and all particularity has been absorbed within it”.

The metaphysical assumption underlying this vision is that of the unity of the universal and the particular will. The particular will is the human individual realizing the absolute value inherent in himself as a free being and thus overcoming particularity and finitude. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel seeks to identify existents embodying the free will.

Hegel calls such existents Right. What are fully adequate forms of Right? To begin with Hegel endorses the individualist conception of right: the right of individuals to appropriate the world as an essentially and immediately free singular personality – this is the right of (capitalist) property.

➤ Self-Realization and Property :

This right of property and contract is regarded as a necessary element in the free will's self-realization. Other individualist rights are also endorsed on the grounds that the free universal will can be objectified only through the wills of individuals who enjoy the whole range of the rights of persons, as conceived by individualist theories.

However, these rights are inadequate embodiments of the universal for the particular contents of the wills of persons are not determined by the universal. Thus Hegel argues there is no way in which a group of individuals whose particular wills are determined by their own interests can overcome their reciprocal externality. This cannot be overcome by contract.

The common will it creates is only the contingent unity of particular wills (and not a universal will because a common self-consciousness is not produced). In order for freedom to be actualized the individual must not conceive himself as being immediately free (i.e. irrespective of the content of his particular will) but only in so far as he himself determines the content of his particular will in accordance with what is objectively good and universally valid – a will which so determines its' particular content is described as the 'moral will' (Hegel 1979 Sec. 107).

➤ **The Sphere Of Morality:**

But the objective good is external to the moral will which is the will of single individuals. The individual will have aimed at the good cannot yield a substantive and objective content – hence the essential emptiness of the Kantian conception of the good will.

In the sphere of morality, we are concerned with the rights of the individual, to determine the particular contents of his will (in accordance with the objective good) and to be held responsible only for what he has so determined. This right has a twofold aspect: it entails a right to welfare as well as the right of (capitalist) property and contract.

The good, that is to be pursued (and in accordance with which the particular content of the will of the individual is to be determined) must balance (capitalist) property and welfare rights, since they necessarily limit each other. Through the process of dialectical thought the subjective will recognizes itself as an embodiment of the universal.

The subjective will wills the universal and chooses a particular life in accordance with the objective good which harmonizes the pursuit of abstract right (property) and welfare for all. Hence the self-realization of free will as the subjective will pursuing a particular good is identical with the realization of the good of a whole i.e. a community.

Thus the self-realization of free will is the self-realization of the will of a community in the determination of its good in a system of balanced property and welfare (capitalist) rights but only in and through the wills of its individual members. The individual is free to the extent to which he can see himself as the vehicle for the existence of this system.

The freedom and individuality of a person consists in his grasping in his existence a consciousness of the unity of absolute value with particular life. The objective ethical order which alone is permanent contains three purely rational institutions: family, civil society and state. Each of these institutions embody the unity of the objective order of the community with the subjective wills of its members.

➤ Family And Individualism:

This is most clearly evident in the family, where the individual does not distinguish his own particular aim from the good of the family and seeks to realize them. But the particular family cannot suffice for the full personal development of the individual. For this there is the institution of civil society in which the abstract right of the particular (the right of capitalist property) has its fullest development – the good of the whole is not present in the consciousness of its members who pursue their private end (although in co-operation with each other).

For the adequate conceptualization of the relation of particular individuality to the whole the development of a state is necessary. The state is the whole community – “the actuality of concrete freedom (where) personal individuality achieve(s) complete development and pass (es) over of (its) own accord into the interest of the universal and knows and wills the universal” (Hegel 1979 Sec. 260).

The individual sees the realization of his particular ends as the realization of universal ends in the state. Hegel idealized the Bismarkian state, although he did not go so far as to assert its infallibility or immortality.

Its structures showed the way towards the achievement of perfect harmony between the particular and the universal but actual freedom can only be grasped in the theoretical realm of the pure self-activity of dialectical thought and not in the course of world history and the actual empirical development of the state.

➤ Marx criticism to Hegel :

The unity of the particular and the universal wills cannot be grasped in practice – Hegel concedes this to Kant and we may note in anticipation that Hegel was less of an idealist and less of an optimist than was Marx. Marx criticizes Hegel for restricting freedom – the harmonization of particular and universal interests – to the level of the state. In the ideal communist society the state withers away and private property is totally abolished i.e. civil society is liquidated.

These twin “withering’s” are essential for the absorption of the particular into the universal – the becoming of man into a species being. This is the central ethical idea of communist society. Marx takes his conception of specie being from Feuerbach who argued that “the true object of infinite value is man and what he worships in God or Pure Reason is his species’ own essential powers” (Feuerbach 1954 p117).

It is the species which creates the individual. The species is unlimited-for ever conquering nature, surmounting limits-and immortal. However, in capitalist society man is alienated from his species because he is alienated from his productive activity as expressive of his essential powers.

The abolition of ‘private’ property, allows for “the re-appropriation of the specie essence by man and the return of man out of religion, family, state etc. into his human i.e. social being”. Marx rejects the view that there is separation in the human being’s conception of his individuality and his sociability.

“However much he is a particular individual, man is just as much the ideal totality, the subjective existence of society as something thought and felt. (Marx 1967 p150). The individual’s particularity is merely in terms of its being a particular mode of existence of the species or of social life.

➤ **Un Problematic Self-consciousness and Religion :**

This leads to the very important conclusion that for Marx (as for Feuerbach) individual self-consciousness is unproblematic. Now self-consciousness is problematic. To possess individuality man must become conscious of his single existence as a self-constituted whole separate both from the Creator (Allah) and other created beings.

The problem of individuality is the problem of determining the value of one’s individual existence in terms of one’s relationship with God and other creatures. In the Christian conception this problem is “solved” by postulating the immediate unity of the finite and the infinite (the human and the divine) in the person of Christ.

Liberalism builds its theory of democracy and justice on the belief that every individual is Christ. Every individual is of objective value. There is an immediate inseparable unity of the absolute value that is present in man as such with the value that is present in each and every individual.

This value resides in the “life plan” formulated by self-determining autonomous individuals and the social good is a concatenation of these individual life plans – each of which are of equal value. Hence in the liberal conception individuality is understood as the particular beings’ consciousness of himself as of objective value identical with his consciousness of himself as a specie being.

➤ Divinity Of Humanism:

Hegel and Marx accept the liberal belief in the divinity of humanity (this is based on Kant's metaphysical theory) but deny that the individual to be conscious of himself needs to constitute himself as an end by separating himself from society. such separation / alienation is the process through which spirit or dialectical thought uses the individual as a vehicle for the realization of the absolute good which is nothing but the species will.

In communist (un-alienated) society individual ends are social/specie ends and there can be no conflict between them. Communism, therefore necessarily denies all forms of particularity-family , civil society, state-and in this sense can be described as empty of moral content. Morality consists of revolutionary practice in capitalism aimed at heightening individual consciousness of man's social ends. Once permanent revolution is transcended (at the end of the era of the dictatorship of the poletariat) morality too must wither away.

Communist man faces neither scarcity nor evil. He behaves as he behaves because the scientific truth on how to maximize individual and social happiness stands fully revealed. There is as little possibility of denying this truth as of denying that two plus to make four.

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Is Marx an individualist? Some Marxists such as Tucker and Gould and Kameneka would affirm this view and no-one can deny that freedom is the central value of the Marxist doctrine "the category which serves to unify Marxist theories of history and nature" (Gould 1980 p.182).

Even Croce and Hilferding who interpret Marx as essentially an unethical thinker cannot deny that to Marx man is not the product but the creator of social relations and that abstract social forces-technology, class struggle-have no causal status independent of human activity.

Freedom of course presupposes similarity or Equality and the Marxist ethical system necessarily enshrines this value: equality characterizes the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat and is the means for the elimination of differentiation and particularity in the communist heaven.

Freedom and equality are thus the common values of liberalism and socialism. Liberalism asserts that the good of the state consists in the maximum individual freedom of every member and in the equal valuing of their individual life plans: society is a concatenation not an ordering of individual ends and social justice requires that each be provided equal opportunity for the pursuit of his ends with special care being taken to ensure that the relative disadvantage of the poorest section of society is gradually reduced over time.

This is the view of Rawls (1971), modern liberalism's most noted political philosopher and may also be regarded as a consensual view. It will be readily seen that this common acceptance by liberalism and socialism of freedom and equality as the ultimate value is rooted in the common Kantian origins of these two doctrines. Both liberalism and socialism accept the Kantian conception of man as a self-determining being. Liberalism asserts that separation of phenomenal and nomenal wills identified by Kant is illusory:

the nomenal self is merely a concatenation of individual phenomenal wills. Socialism argues that the duality of the nomenal and the phenomenal wills is overcome in history with the coming into being of the perfect society where scarcity is abolished, evil and good is impossible and every man is God.

➤ **Values in Liberalism and Socialism:**

Liberalism and socialism differ not in terms of absolute values or ends but about the means for the realization of these absolute values. What is desired above all is freedom and equality as a means for the realization of freedom.

The liberals from Locke to Rawls believe that social arrangements which permit the individual to pursue his life plan and expand the social opportunity for him to do so are ideal for the realization of freedom and equality. Marx and other socialists argue that these social arrangements increase inequality, inhibit material progress and make freedom impossible for subordinate classes.

The realization of freedom requires the abolition of all differentiation and particularities especially those associated with the existence of 'private' property. The dictatorship of the proletariat integrates the life plan of individuals into a comprehensive social (national) plan and is an instrument for overcoming the material conditions which make alienation necessary.

A people who respond to the Marxist da'wah do not abandon the Enlightenment/Romantic values of freedom and equality. They reject merely the liberal doctrine that realization of these values requires marketised, social arrangements.

They put their belief in the Marxist claim that the dictatorship of the proletariat and comprehensive social planning are necessary means for the achievement of freedom and equality. The acceptance of this claim has historically been falsified in Russia and East Europe and China by a number of factors.

➤ **Liberalism And Material Development:**

The single most important of these is the fact that the realization of liberal freedom requires a high level of material development-an abundance of wealth which calls forth avarice and greed and dissolves communitarian ties. Individuals in societies, which responded positively to the Marxist message, did not have highly differentiated “life plans” and their history and their culture prepared them for participation in a social revolution which promised expanded social opportunities and heightened social consciousness, as a means for self-realization.

The emphasis which socialism lays on this strengthening of communitarian ties establishes a natural affinity between its teachings and that of nationalism. The success of a socialist revolution and the establishment of a communist regime does lead to a subjugation of the market by the plan and to the abolishing of private property. But private property is also abolished by the operation of the money and the capital markets and Lenin (1962) himself – not just Bernstein, Otto Bauer and Bukharin took note of this fact.

Abolition of private property – whether through the plan or through the financial markets – establishes the social hegemony of capital, which is neither a social process nor a stock of money by a vice, takkathur.

○ **Takkathur:**

Our master Maulana Muhammad Marmouduke Pickthall (may Allah exalt his heavenly status) defined takkather as “rivalry in worldly increase” (1959 p473). This formulation captures the twin vices of avarice (accumulation) and covetousness (competition).

Men who are avarice and jealousy obsessed necessarily surrender to the representatives of capital for the representatives of capital – whether ‘private’ corporate managers or communist delegates – are the true representatives of a freedom worshipping people. In such a society the dominant rationality must be the rationality of capital – for however surplus is produced and appropriated accumulation for its own sake alone guarantees abundance.

A communist revolution leads to a change in the structure of capitalist order. It does not lead to an overthrow of capitalist order for liberalism and communism are routes to the same end – the state of abundance in which man proclaims his divine right to will what he wills and to reign as the sole sovereign lord of the universe.

⊕ Summary: Marxist Social Theory and Capitalism:

✓ Legitimizing and providing a governance technology for capitalism is the telos of all sociological theoretical schools □ Despite Habermas' criticism of positivistic sociological approaches and his emphasis on adopting phenomenology and interpretive approaches for understanding the symbolically structured domain of sociology, he sought an integration between 'explanatory' a interpretative theories.

- ✓ He found functionalism useful in understanding the objective interconnection of social action.
- ✓ Interpretative accounts can complement functionalist analysis by providing space for a recognition of 'repressed' needs.
- ✓ Habermas' view of a historically oriented theory of society and reconstructing it with respect to specific anticipated futures is not dis-similar to that of orthodox sociologists such as Weber.
- ✓ Interpretivists and phenomenologists mainly "deepen" sociological analysis. Habermas uses psycholoanalysis as a model for integrating functionalism and interpretives approaches and ethno methodology.
- ✓ Habermas can seek such an integration and find something of value in all sociological schools because he accepts norms, processes and transaction structures of capitalism as rational.
- ✓ Marxist theory is the Enlightenment inspired paradigm which claims to reject the rationality of capitalist order.
- ✓ □ In Marx's view the irrationality of capitalism emerges from the 'private' appropriation of surplus produced by labour in the form of surplus value.

✓

- ✓ Abolition of private property and market relations is necessary for eliminating alienation and the achievement of a state of abundance.
- ✓ According to Marx capitalism is irrational because capitalist relation of production obstructs the achievement of abundance. The achievement of abundance is accepted as an objective by Marx.
- ✓ Marx rejects the classical / neo classical analysis of capitalist relations of production as technical means for the maximization of efficient production.
- ✓ The determination of exchange value (value for others) in markets has social foundations under capitalism. It gives labour a value form which ensures that needs can only be met by producing value (for others) and appropriating value (produced by others). Abolition of this value form is transcending capitalism according to Marx.
- ✓ □ The abolition of capitalist relations of production (the embodiment of labour in the value form) is necessary for the universalisation of freedom.
- ✓ Capitalist social relations constrain freedom by requiring isolated individuals to participate in the transformation of labour into the value form as the only means for the satisfaction of their needs. Capitalist relations are relations between: propertied and 'property-less' (unequal and unfree) individuals.
- ✓ Capitalist crises according to Marx reflect the production relation's incompatibility with realizing abundance. This is because in capitalism production is a means for the generation of surplus value and not a means for the satisfaction of needs. Indeed according to Marx increase production of surplus value is usually accompanied by increased deprivation for the workers. The labourer loses his substantive freedom and equality by separation from and subjection to capitalist property.

- ✓ In capitalist society the individual is not able or free to define his self interest because he is forced to transform his labour into values and is part of a class Capitalist institutions – property, money, etc. – are not natural / rational but designed to serve the interests of the bourgeoisie whose quest from maximizing surplus value creates increasing deprivation (un-freedom) for the proletariat.
- ✓ Marx endorses the Enlightenment values of freedom and equality. He objects not to the production of surplus in ever increasing quantity but to its production in the form of value and surplus value. Marx is a materialist in that he accept an increase in production as the primary cause of the transformation of social relations. Marxism seeks an abolition of the market and the “private” appropriation of surplus value for the achievement of freedom and abundance.
- ✓ There are many similarities between Marxist and liberal visions of the ideal society . Despite his acceptance of the dialectical methods and much else in Hegelian theory Marx has often been seen as an individualist. In communism all collectivities – family, class, nation, state – wither away and the individual is complete master of nature. Enlightenment values are fully realized in communist society.
- ✓ A socialist revolution leads to a restructuring of capitalism not to its overthrow. The plan takes the place of the market and private property is abolished by the state rather than by the financial markets (as in capitalism). Abolition of private property establishes the social hegemony of capitalism in both liberal and communist regimes.
- ✓ Capital is not a stock of money nor a social process. It is the vice of takkathur, the universalization of avarice and covetousness. Both liberal and communist societies are dominated by jealousy and greed – i.e. by capital. Both liberalism and communism are routes to some end – abundance and freedom the worship of desire and the proclamation of man’s sovereignty and his rebellion against God.

PART :III

SOME CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY

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Despite the fact that we are confronted with the phenomenon of the "Inflation of democracy", at the intellectual level, voter turnout rate is decreasing all over the world. Hobsbawm notes that people are legitimately withdrawing from citizenship. "The state's powers and functions have been undermined by the size of supranational and infranational forces... this can best be described as the withdrawal of its inhabitants from citizenship" (1996 p. 73). The weakening of the state is accompanied by the increased dominance of market forces. This domination of the circuit of capital over the circuit of citizenship is a manifestation of what I call "the internal contradiction of capitalist democracy".

What are the reasons behind this withdrawal from the sphere of citizenships. Has the enlightenment's claim of anthropocentricity and the sanctity of the right of self-determination become irrelevant for the new generation? What are the underpinning factors behind this legitimate withdrawal from the sphere of citizenship?

When we look at the present western political system in global perspective, two important tendencies are evident.

- (a) *Successful accumulation of capital is not of a domestic nature rather it is intrinsically global. That also leads to an increase in the concentration of capital.*
- (b) *Political and cultural communities are disintegrating throughout the western world. Political theorists believe that these tendencies be countered by the development of "civil society".*

The idea of civil society contrasts itself from that of religious society. Civil society is supposed to emerge due to the establishment of a contract among equally rational, free and self-interested individuals. In such a society individuals are "held together by impersonal bonds of interest rather than ties of kin and blood" (Ignatieff 1995 p. 130), or faith. Civil society provides a fair procedure which helps individuals to pursue their own conception of the good. It presumes the existence of a self-sustaining mechanism, ordered by an efficient and systematically organised legal framework. It provides "...a self-correcting mechanism in which the selfish actions of myriad individuals brought together only by the rule of law, manages to produce an orderly and dynamic accumulation of prosperity unprecedented in human history" (Ignatieff p. 130). The paradigm of the market is constantly expanding. "The economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behaviours". (Escobar 1995 p. 151) Becker's work on population represents all social and personal relationships as capable of marketisation. In modern political economy, the sole criteria for the determination of what ought to be and what

ought not to be is that of the market. Modern political economy presumes market activity to be self-justificatory. The state is not expected to play any part in the determination of value.

Civil society and free market economy reinforce each other. "Even as a welfare agency the state does not work against the market" (Berthoulet 1955 p. 73). The presumption behind "this neo-liberal frame work is that economic growth without any redistribution at all should allow us to solve the dramatic problem of poverty throughout the world without the smallest contribution imposed upon the rich" (Berthoulet p. 73). Gellner considers civil society as "a profane society, a society that explicitly sought to put the lowest of human desires to productive uses". Mandeville acknowledges that, in such a society, "private vices make public virtues. The profane is purified by demonstrating that capitalist individuals are more likely to promote the public good when they looked exclusively to their private interest (both quoted in & Ignatieff 1995 p. 130). In a nutshell, we can say that it is presumed that the market can produce an equitable and just redistributive system and civil society could also be a moral order spontaneously and unintentionally generated by the operation of market forces.

But the accumulation of global capital has historically depended upon the strengthening of the nation state. Today, this nation state is being weakened through decentralisation. Hobsbawm identifies three basic reasons for the decentralisation of nation states.

"First, the creation of a supranational (or rather transnational) economy, whose transactions are largely uncontrolled or even uncontrollable by states, restricts the capacity of states to direct national economies... Second, the state has been weakened by the rise of regional or global institutions such as the European Union and the international banking institutions... Third, territorial borders have been made largely irrelevant by the technological revolution in transport and communications" (1996 p. 272).

Decentralisation is being promoted globally. Small communities are actually performing two functions, one is intentional and the other which is more important and disastrous is unintentional.

Firstly, the international function is to sustain the sphere of citizenship which is shrinking because of the individual's legitimate voluntary withdrawal from the sphere of citizenship at the national level. "the decline in ideological mass parties, politically mobilising electoral machines or other organisations for mass civic activity (such as labour unions) is (an indication of this); another is the spread of the values of consumer individualism, in an age when the satisfactions of rising consumption are both widely available and constantly advertised". (Hobsbawm 1996 p. 273) Civil society is basically a capitalist institution of instrumental nature. Its functions is to sustain liberal public order which is disintegrating, because of the politically and socially dangerous growth of inequality between regions and individuals. That free market policies, uncorrected by public redistribution create social inequalities needs no proof after the dramatic increase in the inequality of income since the 1980s. (Hobsbawm 1996 p. 275). We observe that the economic concessions (social benefits and welfare) granted previously have no justification in current liberal thought. The claim that the state must prevent the least privileged from incurring losses has now become obsolete. And the situation is that: about 300 million people in the third world were unemployed or under-employed in the late

970s', as were about 22 million people in the industrialised capitalist countries. By 2000, it is estimated that well over one billion people will be seeking employment in the third world alone (Gursoy 1998 p. 4). Due to the incapacity of the state, the liberal promoters of civil society are providing support to non-governmental organisations and trying to delegitimise the state's social interventions. It is important to note that civil society presumes a free market economy, but the inevitable consequence of the flourishing of the market mechanism is that the state gets weaker and weaker. Thus a strong civil society creates a weak state.

Secondly, the unintentional consequence of decentralisation is that it legitimates capital accumulation and concentration. The only instrument which a modern political economy has to counter the hegemony of capital, is the nation state. But because of the development of the free market economy and civil society the state gets weaker and weaker so that the possibility of the performance of the redistribute function becomes increasingly difficult.

The basic category of the liberal state is citizenship, and such a state is basically a representative of the citizen, but who is a citizen? In principle (according to classical liberal political theory) the citizen is the sovereign and he has a divine right. Since he has a divine right, he is free to choose whatever he wants, or whatever he wills. In this context the state is an instrument through which he can realise or actualise his desires and wants which are necessarily legitimate because he is sovereign, rational and free. Thus the liberal conception of citizenship presumes every individual to be equally free and rational that is why on the one hand at the private level everybody has a right to pursue his own conception of the good. On the other hand, everybody has equal right of vote, irrespective of his religious, social, cultural, political, educational upbringing. The vote is an absolute form of freedom. Since the citizen legitimately surrenders his sovereignty to the state therefore it is necessary for the state to legitimise that relinquishment. The state must effectively and honestly perform a redistributive function so that even disadvantaged citizens can realise their desires. The redistributive function of the nation state is in actuality an important instrument which sustains the sphere of liberal citizenship. Otherwise the commitment of the people to the state in principle become illegitimate. This reveals an important aspect of the relation between liberal socio-political theory and the idea of citizenship.

The market is basically the sphere of non-citizenship. In the market we are not equal individuals, or in other words we are not citizens, nor are we men, or women, or black, or white or Hindu or Muslim. We are consumers or producers or labourers or managers. In short the market is not subordinate to political democratic morality. It is not just a moral but immoral. In *Social Limits to Growth* (1976) Fred Hirsch dealt at length with what he called "the depleting moral legacy of capitalism". He argued that the market undermines the moral values that are its own essential underpinnings, values that have been inherited from preceding socio-economic moral orders, specifically Christianity.

Thus the market is the sphere of oppression and selfishness. The rationale of the market is purely consequentialist, "the seductive power of the market is so powerful today that aid is no longer viewed as a moral policy. With the failure of the centralised planning model and the rise of the new market mentality, aid is quite explicitly designed in purely utilitarian terms". (Berthoin 1995 p. 731). The market is not the sphere of

citizenship it is that of capital. Capital is the surplus extracted out of the circuit of production. Capital is something which is constantly searching for itself. This is one of the reasons that in a capitalist economy the goods market is superseded by the money market, and the real evaluative centres of the economy are the financial markets. The objective of all economic activity is accumulation for its own sake, the amassment of pure quantity. The driving force behind financial markets is normally speculation and not investment for the satisfaction of human needs. In the market capital compels individuals to accumulate for the sake of accumulation.

Thus, according to liberal political theory the market is the sphere of capital while the state is the sphere of citizenship. In the realm of citizenship, the individual is sovereign. He has the divine right to desire what ever he wants, whereas in the sphere of capital all one can desire, is capital accumulation which is an end in itself. The dilemma of Liberal theory is, that these different spheres of sovereignties normally clash with each other.

The sovereignty of the citizen clashes with the sovereignty of capital. The question arises as to why this happens? What is the justification of this confrontation? The enlightenment claim of anthropocentricity presumes the project of the enhancement of freedom. When this project is concretised in political, economic discourse, we find two aspects of the realisation of freedom.

- (a) *The abstract form of freedom = vote (circuit of citizenship)*
- (b) *The concrete form of freedom = capital (circuit of capital)*

Theoretically the individual is free to desire, anything he desires. But the irony is that the only desire he must have is the desire for capital accumulation because capital is the concrete form of freedom. In a capitalist economy, the individual is compelled to accept the sovereignty of capital because he does not have any instrument other than capital through which he can realise his freedom (remember Rawl's primary goods). Because of this internal contradiction of liberal political theory, we are experiencing the legitimate withdrawal from the sphere of citizenship and the extension of the circuit of capital. This withdrawal from the sphere of citizenship puts democracy at risk. But a threat to democracy is also a threat to capitalism for the pursuits of enlightened self-interest requires commitment to the ideology of antecedent individuality and the divine right of the citizen.

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The Living Death of Modernity and the Poverty of Post-modernity in the Time of Terror

Abdul Wahab Suri

Introduction

The rise of post-modernity has been interpreted by Rorty¹ as the victory of poetry over philosophy, that is, the domination of aesthetics over universally valid reason. Post-modernity idealizes contingency, relativity and differences which is the refutation of modern urge of absoluteness, objectivity and universality. It has generally been argued that the post-modern discourse has questioned the intellectual legitimacy of the universalization of grand narratives particularly the meta-ethical narrative derived from the historical experience of Enlightenment thought.

Since the universality of the modern theory and its corresponding institutions has ruthlessly been criticized by dominant philosophical discourse of our times i.e. post-modernism, therefore, it has been interpreted by the non-Western post-colonial intelligentsia as an internal critique of not just the universality of modernity but also the critique of cosmopolitan internationalization i.e. liberal cosmopolitanism. They believe that the post-modern argument justifies the legitimacy of cultural particularity and historical specificity of all meta-ethical narratives and by virtue of the incommensurability of different meta-ethical

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¹ Richard Rorty (1931-2007) is an eminent American philosopher. He has been acknowledged as anti-foundationalist who denies the philosophical legitimacy of transcendental basis of all kind of grand narratives. That is why he has been categorized as the post-modern philosopher of our times.

narratives de-legitimizes the universal imposition of any specific meta-ethical narrative. Thus, it provides an anti-foundationalist justification of the peaceful co-existence of mutually incommensurable particularities, state structures, social orders and religious particularities.

Contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism which is presumed to be the leading ideological framework in the War against Terror is (by implication) questioned by the post-modern discourse. In this paper we will try to argue that post-modernity cannot provide any substantive theoretical basis to counter American urge to impose liberal values and its corresponding institutions to the non-liberal, underdeveloped, pre-modern post-colonial societies. The paper will be divided into two sections: in the first section, we will try to provide initial exposition of the argument that how post-modern anti-foundationalism can be instrumentalized to counter the hegemony of unipolar world order in the time of terror. In the second section we will try to establish that the post-modern critique against the universality of ground narrative can be instrumentalized to justify American invasions all around the world.

The central idea of this paper is that the post-modernist argument to counter liberal cosmopolitanism is not only inappropriate to legitimize pre-modern, non-liberal collectivities rather it also has the potential to be instrumentalized to justify American liberal imperialism in the War against Terror. The major assumptions of this paper are:

a) The Western world in general and the US in particular are committed to liberal values and their corresponding socio-political and economic institutions. It means they are not only interested in safeguarding their

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national interests in the War against Terror but they also have a substantive commitment with liberal grand narratives too.

b) Liberal cosmopolitanism is not a conspiracy against non-liberal communities; rather it is a thought which rests upon the assumption that the Enlightenment intellectual tradition provides reasonable foundation to standardize as to how man, society, and the state should be?

c) Post-modern thinkers have posed substantive intellectual challenge to the universalistic foundations of modern political theory in general and liberal political theory in particular. It is difficult to defend the universality of liberal grand narrative on epistemological and ontological grounds in post-modern discourse.

d) The traditionally religious non-liberal communities and statecraft are not ready to accept liberal cosmopolitanism comprehensively. Moreover, they need an indigenous theoretical framework of their own in order to legitimize their non-liberal particularities.

e) Some of the non-liberals presume that post modernist anti-foundationalism can be theoretically instrumentalized for justifying their historically derived socio-cultural particularities against the dictatorial arrogance of American foreign policy framework.

Section-A

We, in the underdeveloped world belong to nations whose imports exceed their exports with trade deficit the intrinsic aspect of our collective existence. We import everything, i.e., from consumer items to weapons of mass destructions, medicines to diseases, from ideas to conflicts. We import wars, from Cold war to War against Terror and enjoy export subsidies to bleed and burn our people. The contemporary intellectual arena is constantly announcing the victory of post-modernity over modernity or in Rorty's

words the victory of poetry over philosophy, i.e., the dominant philosophical discourse is acknowledging the limitations and fundamental incoherences in Modern-Enlightenment project and its corresponding grand-narratives.

The contemporary international order is no doubt, intrinsically modern as far as its institutional dynamics are concerned but in contemporary philosophical discourse the modern philosophical foundations, i.e., its ontological, epistemological, axiological and moral foundationalist essentialism have not only been questioned but their absoluteness, certainties and universality have been damaged theoretically by the emerging post-modern thought.

The question is why does pre-modern underdeveloped post-colonial intelligentsia are so excited by the post-modern relativity, contingency and nihilism? What solution does it offer to cure the miseries of Muslims both inside and outside the Western World? The rise of post-modernity is not a recent phenomena but the need of post-modern relativism (instrumentally) to respond to the question (that *how man should be?*) during the time of terror appears to be a more pragmatic response to justify oxymoronic positions of Muslim populations worldwide, i.e., protect the Islamic fundamentals without being intellectually marginalized by the rise of anti-modernist forces in the Muslim world.

The most ironic aspect of modern Muslim intelligentsia and Islamic modern intellectual discourse is that, Islamic modernism is losing ground in the Muslim world due to the rise of post-modern literature, because what they were offering to their people as a universally acknowledged solution to all their problems (which has a potential to erode their traditional religious framework too)

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has been challenged and up to some extent has intellectually been defeated in the Western world. Hence, they are trapped in an intellectual dilemma and the gravity of their irony is that their modern agenda has not been properly institutionalized and the vast majority of these Muslim areas are living in underdeveloped pre-modern cultural structures.

Globalization has either been presented as an evolutionary phenomenon or as an unintended consequence of modern techno-scientific development. But from the non-liberal perspective it is an ongoing process of delegitimization of the live-world which is derived from pre-liberal or non-liberal intellectual sources. Its values, socio-political institutions in fact the whole live-world will be redefined from the emerging trends of cosmopolitan liberalism. According to Peter Gowan, globalization is the "radicalization of the earlier forms of liberalism."² The War against Terror has generally been presented as a clash between Islam and the West. This claim will be true if we reduce the whole Western intellectual discourse into the realm of liberalism. There is no doubt that contemporary War against Terror is not only led by the liberal statecraft but they are also interested in imposing liberal political agenda through the institutionalization of cosmopolitan liberalism via cosmopolitan governance, rather than the formalization of global state. The contemporary world order is interested in "cosmopolitan governance that is, cosmopolitan rules and norms, not about everything."³

There are two fundamental tendencies which are noticeable in the contemporary unipolar globalized world.

² Peter Gowan, 'The State, Globalization and the New Imperialism: A Roundtable Discussion', *Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist Theory* 9, (Autumn 2001): 4.

³ Ibid.

The liberal states are expanding liberal values and their corresponding institutions through national, regional and global actors and institutions. Secondly, the capital accumulation process has exceeded the limits of the traditional nation-state, i.e., markets are globalized and an inherent antagonistic relation between *national capital* and *capital in general* has emerged. In Gowan's words, "Globalization deals with what you might call the market side of liberalism and liberal cosmopolitanism deals with the political side of liberalism."⁴

It implies that contemporary global trends, i.e., both political and market dimensions of liberalism are not only globalizing themselves but also complementing each other. According to Gowan, the old Westphalian state order has been delegitimized which acknowledges "the absolute right of states"⁵ and now state legitimacy criterion is conditioned with the institutionalization of "minimal human rights and democratic rights."⁶ There is a growing concern in the Western world that democratic political procedure has been instrumentalized in the non-Western world to protect illiberal socio-cultural and religious practices. Democracy and liberalism which were "interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing constitutional liberalism is not."⁷ Zakaria believes that a liberal dictatorship is relatively more preferable than illiberal democracy. "Economic, civil, and religious liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity. If a government with limited democracy steadily expands those freedoms, it should not be branded as a

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', *Foreign Affairs* 76 (November-December, 1997): 23.

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dictatorship.”⁸ He thinks that both the political and market “pressure of global capitalism can push the process of liberalization forward as they have in China.”⁹

Zakaria is interested in the justification of liberal cosmopolitanism. He thinks that liberalization of constitution will provide substantive foundation to transform traditional illiberal democracies. He claims that the democratic process should be conditioned with liberal constitutionalism. “We need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the over emphasis on pure democracy is that little effort is given to creating imaginative constitutions for transitional countries.”¹⁰

There is a growing concern regarding the axiological strength of religion to influence the socio-political order of a given live-world. Generally, religious fundamentalism has been associated with extremism, intolerance, lack of civility, source of discrimination and polarization by the dominant discourse of cosmopolitan liberalism. It considers secularism and process of secularization as a fundamental criterion to judge the level of civility of a given public order. It is because of this reason that “fundamentalist ... claim to be victims of stereotyping and cultural marginalization.”¹¹ It has also been acknowledged that although the fundamentalists “lack status and respectability in important centers of cultural power”¹² but even then religion has far better capacity of its pigmentation with tribal, ethnic, national and communal

⁸ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom Liberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 156.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Stephen Macedo, ‘Liberalism, Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God Vs J. Rawls?’, *Ethics* 105 (April 1995): 469.

¹² Ibid.

particularities to "function as a mobilizing oppositional ideology."¹³ The cosmopolitan liberalism considers itself as anti-perfectionist and claims to offer a public order which is neutral regarding the prioritization of any specific conception of a good form of life. This apparently presumed de-ontological foundation of liberal public order claims to guarantee difference and diversity. The religious fundamentalists are not satisfied with this domain of difference and diversity which is circumscribed by the predominantly liberal modern theoretical framework.

Nomi Stolzenberg has defended the plausibility of the fundamentalist charge that teaching "diverse view points in a tolerant and objective mode threatens the survival of their culture."¹⁴ Liberal cosmopolitanism considers itself as a conflict resolving mechanism and claims to provide a public order in which assimilation of apparently incommensurable conceptions of Good is possible. This imposed liberal public order and assimilation has been interpreted by many religious fundamentalists as a new kind of totalitarianism in which assimilation cannot be possible without the disintegration of one's specific communitarian particularities. According to Stolzenberg "a liberal means of assimilation, "cousin of totalitarianism."¹⁵

The fundamentalists' charge on the totalitarian aspect of liberal cosmopolitanism reveals that fundamentalists accept the legitimate constraints of a given public order. It appears that contemporary fundamentalists just want to be acknowledged of their existence as legitimate form of life. For instance, Khurshid Ahmed claims that, "an

¹³ Jeff Haynes, 'Religion, Secularization and Politics: A Post Modern Conspectus', *Third World Quarterly* 18 (September 1997): 709.

¹⁴ Stephen Macedo, 'Liberalism, Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism', 469.

¹⁵ Ibid.

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open and just world would have to be genuinely pluralistic with link ups and inter-relations that enable all people, societies and states to reap benefits through cooperation as much as healthy competition.”¹⁶ There is no doubt that religious fundamentalists, are committed with their conception of Good and believe in the priority of *Good over Right*. The religious fundamentalist cannot conceive of a live-world which is devoid of sacred and spiritual predications. They are not satisfied with the secularization model imposed by liberal cosmopolitanism to transform Islamic live-world. They believe that the incorporation of spiritual issues in contemporary live world is such a need which has also been acknowledged in the Western world. For instance, Fogel¹⁷ claims, “new set of egalitarian reforms that adhere to the urgent spiritual needs of our age, secular as well as sacred. Spiritual (or immaterial) inequality is now as great a problem as material inequality perhaps even greater.”¹⁸ Fogel’s analysis regarding the significance of the spiritual aspect of human existence in the formation of the socio-political order of the given live-world is apparently contrary to that of Fareed Zakaria’s thesis of illiberal democracies. According to him, religious intervention in the political domain transforms democracies into illiberal democracies and considers it as the menace of the age. He believes that the organic relation between liberalism and democracy has been disentangled. “The two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric

¹⁶ Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective’, *Policy Perspectives* 1 (April 2004): 7.

¹⁷ R. Fogel is The Nobel Laureate for Economics 1993. He acknowledges the significance of spirituality in the development of a sustained live world.

¹⁸ R. Fogel, *The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1. Quoted in Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective’, 8.

are coming apart.”¹⁹ This dis-entanglement is not accidental rather it is also being properly theorized by many 20th century Muslim intellectuals. However, he claims that “Islamic theocracy appeals only to a fanatical few.”²⁰ On the other hand, Fogel believes that we cannot and we should not insulate moral and political life from our spiritual concerns. He thinks that, “The democratization of intellectual life will broaden debates and insinuate spiritual issues more deeply into political life.”²¹ According to Ahmed, “Islam cannot detach itself from the political sphere”; Islam, according to him, “Stands for faith in the Prophet (peace be upon him) as a model and source of guidance. It demands firm commitment among its followers to live in obedience to the Divine will and Guidance. Sharia’h (literally the Path) is a set of norms, values and laws that go to makeup the Islam way of life.”²²

The rising trend of unipolar cosmopolitan liberal order considers every form of life as a threat to global peace which is driven by non-liberal, anti-capitalist theoretical foundations. One of the most important aspects of contemporary War against Terror particularly in post- 9/11 scenario, is that each party considers itself as a response to the offensive expression of the other. The Islamists consider liberal cosmopolitanism as a form of “neo-liberal imperialism.”²³ They claim that Islamic societies are not totalitarian societies; however, they are also not liberal in the sense as liberal cosmopolitanism demands them to be.

¹⁹ Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, 23.

²⁰ Zakaria ‘*The Future of Freedom: Democracy Home and Abroad*’, 13.

²¹ Fogel, *The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism*, 242.

²² Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective’, 12.

²³ Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Empire: The Incongruous Nature of Islamist Anti-imperialism,’ *Socialist Register* (2008), 38.

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Islam, according to Ahmed, "spells out a genuinely pluralistic religion and cultural landscape for man kind. It is free will and dialogue that ideological borders can be crossed."²⁴ The idea of reasonable pluralism expounded by Rawls, according to Ahmed, acknowledges the incorporation of Muslim societies within the framework of the law of people.²⁵ Hierarchical societies which are not intrinsically liberal, according to Rawls, should not be excluded from the realm of the law of the people. He claims "other decent people whose basic structure does not fit my description of a consultative hierarchy, but who are worthy of membership of a society of people."²⁶

The dominant cosmopolitan liberalism is more concerned with the universalistic potential of contemporary discourse of Islamism. The Islamists, according to liberals, consider their ideology as universal. "Islam is a universal religion and the Muslim Ummah is a global community. Faith is the foundation that defines the global nature of Islam for the Muslim Ummah. *Tawhid* (Oneness of God) establishes the unity of the universe, the oneness of humanity, the unity of life and the universality of law."²⁷ These universalistic theoretical foundations of political Islam have been interpreted by liberal policy framework as a threat to their global design. "Rightist circles are clear that Islamism is a regressive anti-modern and violent movement that poses the greatest threat to the free world."²⁸ The

²⁴ Khurshid Ahmad, 'The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective', 13.

²⁵ John Rawls, *The Law of the People with the Idea of Public Reason Revisited* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999). Quoted in Khurshid Ahmad, 'The Challenge of Global Capitalism', 11.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁷ Khurshid Ahmad, 'The Challenge of Global Capitalism', 12.

²⁸ Asef Bayat, 'Islamism and Empire: The Incongruous Nature of Islamist Anti-imperialism', 38.

liberal foreign policy framework acknowledges Islam based anti-globalization trend along with the rhetoric of universal Islamic values as a fundamental value threat to the globalization of liberal values and their corresponding socio-political and economic institutions.

The contemporary War against Terror may be a new phenomenon for liberal capitalist unipolar order but for the Islamists it is the unintended consequence of their continuous struggle against different forms of oppressions and imperialism. Their ideological foundations do not rest upon the vulgarized interpretation and war strategies of so called Al-Qaeda (which is actually an engineering firm) rather it is embedded in the historicity of Muslim community founded in the state of Madina-tul-Munawara by the Prophet (Peace-be-upon-him). This impetus to rise against invincible, hegemonic oppression is interwoven into the historical fabric of Muslim community. Islamic history is full of many disproportionate but successful combats (both militant, cultural and civilizational) by apparently weak and ill-equipped Muslims. They have a long history of successful struggles. Within 50 years of *hijra*, they did not only defeat the most powerful nations or civilizations (for example, the Egyptians, Persians and Romans) but they also converted them to Islam. Both Egyptians and Persians are now proud to be Muslim despite the fact that they had a glorious history of their own before the advent of Islam. It will be a superficial understanding of the anti-imperialist tendency of Islamists from the perspective of Al-Qaeda. "A cursory survey of the discourses and practices of Islamists reasonably foregrounds critical and anti-imperialist tendencies."²⁹ There are hundreds and thousands of historical foundations an Islamist can provide to theoretically legitimize the struggle against the hegemony of

²⁹ Ibid., 41.

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global cosmopolitan liberalism and capitalism. The collapse of Abbasids due to Mongolian intervention, the rise of Salahuddin against the Crusaders, the plundering of colonial imperialism, the post-colonial rejuvenation of Islamic forces, the Russian collapse, Afghan war and emancipation of Muslim majority states due to Soviet disintegration, the Iranian revolution in which Islam was used as the ultimate mobilizing force against the puppet regime of the USA, i.e., the Shah of Iran.

This multi-dimensional discourse of Islamism has different manifestations. For instance, it has bred revolutionary movements like Intifada, Taliban, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir etc. It has liberation or separatist movements like East-Turkistan movement in China, Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir, Islamic Chechen Separatist Movement, etc. It has resistance movements like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Jamat-e-Islami etc. It has reactionary movements like Al-Qaeda. It has reformist movements like Tablighi Jamat, Dawat-e-Islami, Minhaj ul Quran etc. Moreover, there are hundreds and thousands of non-state actors and militant wings, hundreds of political parties, NGOs, charity organizations, Sufi institutions which are part of the multi-faceted Islamic world. Apart from their differences Islam is the common denominator in all those different socio-political, cultural and moral manifestations of Islamism.³⁰ All some way or the other represents different manifestations of Islamism.

³⁰ Hizb-ut-Tahrir is basically a Sunni revolutionary cum pan-Islamic political organization working for the establishment of Caliphate.

Taliban: It means "Student". It is a political cum militant group which ruled a large part of Afghanistan. They are influenced by the Deobandi interpretation of Islam. They emerged as the dominant political and militant group

The liberal foreign policy framework should acknowledge that the imposition of modern liberal cosmopolitan order through direct or indirect political and economic sanctions (both through national and international institutions) to counter Islamism will be counter productive, particularly in such an intellectual environment where post-modern thinkers are delegitimizing the universal foundation of modern grand narratives.

Section-B

No doubt that there is a fundamental contradiction between traditionally religious and modern theory regarding the issue of *how man should be*? The theoretical antagonism

during Afghan civil war in the post 1989 Russian evacuation from Afghanistan.

East Turkistan Movement: Although these are multiple separatist groups both secular and religious who are struggling to emancipate themselves from Chinese state authoritarianism but there is no doubt about the fact that apart from its ethno-centric foundations, Islam does play an important role in its political resistance particularly in Southern Xinjiang.

Islamic Salvation Front: Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah lil-Inqadh (Front Islamique du Salut): The fundamental object of this Algerian based movement is to develop an Islamic state.

Islamic Chechen Separatist Movement has many sub-divisions but their commitment with Islam despite their ethno-centric foundations is unquestionable.

Hamas: Harkat-al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya: Islamic-Resistance Movement. It was founded in 1987. It is basically a sub-division of Ikhwan-al-Muslimin and was founded by Shaikh Ahmed Yaseen.

Hezbollah: It means "Party of Allah". It is a Shiite Islamic militant party which was initially based in Lebanon. It was founded in 1985 by Hasan Nasrallah.

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between the traditionally religious authoritarianism and modernism is not just of epistemological nature which is generally being discussed in term of the dichotomy between faith and reason; rather it has metaphysical and axiological foundations too. If we try to conceptualize modernism under the framework of Enlightenment, i.e., Aufklärung, from which it has been derived, then we will be able to understand the gravity of antagonism between pre-Enlightenment theoretical framework and Aufklärung because the latter is an attempt to determine, "....., what we are, what we think, and what we do today?"³¹ The modern philosophy is the explication and modernism is the institutionalization of Aufklärung. In Foucault's words, "Modern Philosophy is the philosophy that is attempting to answer the question raised so imprudently two centuries ago: Was ist Aufklärung?"³²

The question arises why do we consider Aufklärung (i.e. Enlightenment) as unconventional (i.e. in traditionally religious context) way to understand who we are? The answer is evident from the usage of the term "Aufklärung". It is according to Kant, "neither a world era to which one belongs, nor an event whose signs are perceived, nor the dawning of an accomplishment... [Rather] as an Ausgang, "an exist", a "way out,"³³ unlike the conventional way of understanding which focuses on similarity with respect to the continuity or the practices of our ancestors or the words of the God revealed.

The colonization of modern discursive reason, according to Marcuse, has transformed a free man into "one

³¹ Michel Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment', in *Ethics Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works 1954- 1984*, Vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: New Press, 2006), 303.

³² Ibid., 304.

³³ Ibid., 305.

dimensional man.”³⁴ The institutionalization of modern discursive practices has developed an “all encompassing method of control.”³⁵ The “Great Refutation”³⁶ will be the reasonable solution against the prevailing domination of capitalist rationality and its corresponding institutions and methodologies of social repression. Pseudo needs have been generated among the masses via digitally constructed world of mass media. It performs two functions simultaneously; on the one hand, it softly compels the individual to accept the order of global capital; on the other hand, it delegitimizes the revolutionary potential of disenchanted masses. In other words, it keeps their trust on the modern mechanism of social control as an ultimate source of human freedom. This is what Marcuse called repressive desublimation.³⁷

Unlike critical theorists, the post-modernists are far more committed with the idea of the Great Refutation. They have questioned the intellectual legitimacy of all kinds of grand narratives, including that of Lyotard who considers “incredulity towards meta-narratives”³⁸ as a condition of post-modernism. Haynes believes that although there are certain wishful thinking and expectations of religious people regarding the global resurgence of religion but we accept that due to the rise of post modernism more theoretical space is available for non-modern intellectualism. On the one hand, it has delegitimized the modern monologue regarding the mastery over nature as the non-contestable

³⁴ Herbert Marcuse, *One dimensional Man. Studies in Ideology of Advanced Industrial Societies*, Second Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), xi.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Lyotard, *The Post-modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979). Quoted in Haynes J., *Religion Secularization and Politics*, 716.

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"telos" (purpose) emerging from the Enlightenment historical experience. And, on the other hand, it refers "to change in the means of orientation and identity structure. Postmodernism... directs our attention to changes taking place in contemporary cultures."³⁹ Post-modernism has cracked the modern guide and has provided the intellectual possibility of non-modern solutions to our contemporary world. Post-modern anti-foundationalism prefers the local and particularistic resolution of our modern-day challenges rather than a centralized, universal and predominantly bureaucratized mechanism to resolve our problems. According to Akbar S. Ahmed, post-modernism "encourages the rejection of centers and systems, engenders the growth of local identity, makes available information and thus teaches people to demand their rights...fosters ideas of freedom and eclecticism [and] challenges, the State."⁴⁰ These expectations have been celebrated by Ahmed because of the decentralizing capacity of post-modern discourse which in fact neutralizes the dictatorial dynamic of modern discursive practices. The post-modern argument regarding the exposition of philosophical incoherences in modern universalistic project has the potential to be instrumentalized to theoretically justify non-modern ways of life. Rosenau considers this de-centralization of modern authoritative mechanism as counter productive because it can be pragmatically instrumentalized by the regressive anti-western forces. "This decay can be discerned in the pocket of disaffection with the scientific rationalism of

³⁹ Mike Featherstone, 'In Pursuit of Postmodernism: An Introduction', *Theory Culture and Society* 5 (1988): 195-216. Quoted in Haynes *Religion, Secularization and Politics*, 716.

⁴⁰ Akber S. Ahmed, *Post-modernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 129.

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subjugating autonomous form of collective life of state control."⁴⁵ Haynes has tried to differentiate religious pluralism from that of religious fundamentalism. The former presumes the legitimacy of multiple religious interpretations while the latter presumes only one religious interpretation which leads to perfectionism and will eventually generate anti-liberal socio-political consequences.⁴⁶ Haynes believes that post-modernism accommodates religious pluralism rather than fundamentalism. He believes that religious pluralism is compatible with the history of Islam, Christianity and Buddhism.

Despite the fact that modernism has generally been presented as a binary opposition to religious authoritarianism, there are certain fundamental coherences between the two. These fundamental paradigmatic similarities between the two enable modern thought to become an ultimate alternative of religious authoritative societies. Historically, religious intelligentsia in such societies theorized their religious and theological foundations through such frameworks which are paradigmatically quite similar to that of modernism.

Since religious authoritarianism (both Christian and Islamic) were pre-modern, therefore, it is quite reasonable to imply that the modern vocabulary must be influenced by the religious linguistic jargon and conceptual formation. The initial expositions of the history of ideas reveal the obvious replication of the core theoretical concerns of religious authoritarianism by modernism. This replication has generally been identified for contrasting the conceptual

⁴⁵ Haynes, *Religion, Secularization Politics*, 718.

⁴⁶ G. Hyden, 'Governance and the study of Politics', in *Governance and Politics in Africa*, ed. G. Hyden and M. Bratton (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 1-26. Quoted in Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin 1992), 4.

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the legitimate domain of knowledge, but it does not mean that it has ignored the centrality of metaphysical subject, i.e., "rational will" for the appropriate execution of moral duty which is actually the domain of the self. It is because of this reason that he called the "common moral consciousness", the center of the self."⁴⁹

This mystification of self is the legacy of Christian mysticism and sacred vocabulary has influenced the secular discourse derived from Enlightenment intellectual tradition. According to Rorty, "Ever since Kant's day, however, romanticism and moralism, the insistence on individual spontaneity and private perfection and the insistence on universally shared social responsibility have warred with each other."⁵⁰

One of the most important and fundamental tendencies which is common in both discourses (i.e. religious authoritarianism and modernism) is the commitment with one's teleological foundations. The ontologically grounded and epistemologically defended teleological parameters are presumed to be fundamental for the determination of the conditions of meaning, i.e., discourse. These teleological assumptions are clearly explicated and elucidated in religious theory as well as in practice, but in modern thought it is not as clear as in religious discourse but in practice it is more substantively expressed and institutionalized as compared to religion.

Religious authoritarianism is generally criticized by the modern intelligentsia because of its theologically determined homogeneity of socio-cultural existence. The organic whole of salvation, spiritual purification, moral

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

uplift and self sacrifice is natural telos derived from the consciousness of being with God. The telos not only determines the value structure of a religious authoritarianism but also suppresses any other alternative meaning or purpose of human existence which is in conflict with this ontologically determined telos. The non-contestability of telos is rested upon the assumption that it reflects the ultimate essence of human being. Thus, it abandons the possibility of diversity, spontaneity, novelty and autonomy regarding the determination of the meaning of one's own existence, according to modernists.

There is no doubt that this teleologically determined foundationalism of religious authoritarianism has provided a theoretical content for modern Enlightenment to stretch the possibility of possibilities and to present "will to freedom" as an alternative telos against the religious ideal of 'self-negation', so that the transition from God centrality to anthropocentricity can be possible. But the history of ideas reveals that modernist commitment regarding the excavation of true essence of human beings is the reciprocation of religious authoritarianism. They have claimed to discover the true nature of human being by the application of scientific methodological framework. The "death of the God"⁵¹ is celebrated by Aufklärung and anthropocentricity is the logical corollary of the birth of modern man. "The God then started to disappear in the popular conception of the universe and all possibilities were opened to human subject, author of his own development,

⁵¹ See Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Gay Science' in *Cambridge Text In the History of Philosophy*, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), in which he has announced the madman announcement that now the God is Dead, we have killed the God. This allegorical expression of Nietzsche explicates the refutation of God centrality in favor of anthropocentricity.

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emancipated from the divine design.”⁵² The “entwicklung” has been institutionalized as fundamental policy framework. The works of Darwin, Hegel and Marx have provided the philosophical and pseudo-scientific foundations of progress or development as the ultimate telos, which is the result of human intellectual evolution. The evolutionary theorists have tried to establish that the “historical process....unfolds with the same necessary character of natural laws.”⁵³ This scientifically determined teleological perspective although has critically been evaluated by many thinkers like Schopenhauer, Bergson, Nietzsche, Dilthey and most importantly Gadamer. This telos has been accommodated by almost all grand narratives emerging from modern intellectual process. The politicization of the modern vocabulary, along with the aggressive process of colonization made industrial way of life an ultimate fruit of modernism. “The industrial mode of production which was no more than one among many forms of social life became the definition of the terminal stage of unilinear way of social evolution.”⁵⁴

This theorization of modern telos and its corresponding institutional order has not just provided a new discourse through which one can determine the meaning of life but most importantly it claims to have an Archimedean reference for the determination of absolute, certain and universal values. The prioritization of this Archimedean reference point as a neutral spectacle to understand and experience the confronting reality compels non-Western world to acknowledge that modern live-world is the most superior expression (both in content and form) of human existence. The modern “stage came to be seen as the

⁵² Gustavo Estava, ‘Development, in *Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge and Power* ed. Wolfgang Sachs (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993), 9.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

natural culmination of the potentials already existing in Neolithic man, as his logical evolution.”⁵⁵ The process of modernization has been introduced in our part of the world under colonial rule. It has been presented as a neutral perspective to justify one’s true faith.

Post-modernism not only delegitimized modern authoritarianism and its universal, teleological inwardness and transcendence, in short, the universality of modern discursive practices, rather it has the potential to contest any absolutist or universalistic formulation of religion too. “The post modern era rather than being dominated by fundamentalism alone is a period of wider religious reinterpretation, where popular religion challenges mainstream religious organization.”⁵⁶ Religious pluralism will eventually undermine the absolutist potential of religious fundamentalism and extremism. In this way, it in fact serves the interests of liberal democracy to develop a pluralistic society. Haynes acknowledges that Muslims both in Western and non-Western Third World have learned how to replace traditional social matrix (which was derived from kinship and tribal ethnic particularities) from new social solidarity networks. “Muslim community organizations... often appear to “rescue” those who are drifting in the urban milieu.”⁵⁷

He considers post-modernism as one of the most effective theoretical frameworks to counter the religious fundamentalism which is actually the result of the failure of modernism in the non-Western world. He claims that the potential receivers of post-modern pluralism in non-Western world are different from that of Western world, because the

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ J. Haynes, *Religion, Secularization and Politics*, 717.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 719.

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nature and manifestation of fundamentalism is different in Third World from that of the industrialized West. For instance, in the Western world Christian fundamentalists are predominantly found among the most affluent, successful members of society. Clearly it would be absurd to argue that alienation explains the existence of such people in the USA⁵⁸ whereas in the Third World, "Post modernism is synonymous with poverty, leading poor especially receptive to fundamentalist arguments which supply the mobilizing ideology."⁵⁹ In this way post-modernism has the potential to heal the wounds of both the disenchanted poor in the Third World and alienated affluent in the West. Thus, it replaces religious fundamentalism from more emancipatory, diversified, novel religious pluralism.

The Muslim community and its corresponding socio-cultural settings are generally being acknowledged as anti-liberal therefore cosmopolitan liberalism is presumed to be a normative framework to determine *how man, society and state should be?* Post-modern intellectualism is one of the most important philosophical paradigms to counter or delegitimize cosmopolitan liberal grand narrative and provides an intellectual space to any community or individual to define oneself independent of any presumed grand narrative that has been derived from the Enlightenment historical experience. *How man should be?* cannot be answered without having any specific foundationalist, essentialist conception of reality. It is quite reasonable to imply that the philosophical delegitimation of liberal grand narrative by virtue of post-modern critique will provide a theoretical bedrock to justify Islamic socio-political and cultural order if not as an ideal then at least a reasonable, decent alternative from of life.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 720.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 719.

However, it is very important to understand, whether post-modern rejection of grand narrative is just the rejection of modern ground narrative or the rejection of grand narrative per se. Secondly, the post-modern delegitimation of modern conception of self, morality and prudence is just the rejection of modern ontological, axiological and epistemological foundations or is it the rejection of foundationalist, ontological, axiological and epistemological perspectives per se. There is no doubt that post-modern rejection of grand narrative and foundationalist essentialism is the rejection of all forms of comprehensive philosophical and of course theological doctrines.

Kantian transcendentalism cannot be questioned without rejecting the idea of transcendental subject which reconciles the distinction between prudence and morality by virtue of universalizability principle. This historical dimension of Kantian tradition legitimizes liberal values with respect to liberal meta-narratives. The Hegelian historicism has questioned this transcendentalism to satisfy the urge of absoluteness, objectivity and universality and most importantly an attempt to answer the question, "How man should be"? Hegelian immanence acknowledged the role of communities and historical particularities regarding the determination of *what ought to be*?

Rorty has tried to provide an initial exposition that how this traditional distinction between morality and prudence has been reinterpreted by the anti-foundationalist post-modern bourgeois liberals. "[Such] liberals might convince our society that loyalty to itself is morality enough and that such loyalty no longer needs an a-historical backup."⁶⁰ According to Rorty, the liberal commitment with

⁶⁰ Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 199.

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liberal values is not undermined by post-modern relativism. He acknowledges that the contemporary "post-modernist bourgeois liberalism sounds oxymoronic."⁶¹ It is oxymoronic in the sense that despite acknowledging that they have transcended from the pre-conditions of liberal grand narrative they also "think of themselves as having opted out of the bourgeoisie."⁶² On the other hand, they are not able to detach themselves from capitalist liberal institutions and their corresponding vocabulary, i.e., the vocabulary derived from the Enlightenment intellectual tradition. "This vocabulary is built around a distinction between morality and prudence."⁶³ Rorty believes that "the traditional philosophical distinction between absoluteness, relativism, morality and prudence etc. are just the "remnants of a vocabulary we should try to replace."⁶⁴ This reinterpretation of the status of liberal community is rested upon a conception of self which is basically a "network of belief, desires and emotions with nothing behind it, no substrate behind the attribute."⁶⁵ This molecular representation of self provides a rationale to justify "moral and political deliberation and conversation"⁶⁶ without relying on any specific meta-ethical narrative or universalizing principle. It means that although one cannot provide ultimate ontologically grounded and epistemologically consistent argument to justify the priority of relativity over absoluteness but he tries "to make the vocabulary in which these objections phrased look bad, thereby changing the subject rather than granting the objector his choice of weapons and terrain by meeting his criticisms."⁶⁷ He claims

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 44.

⁶⁵ Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativisms and Truth*, 199.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 44.

that liberal socio-political institutions provide relatively better framework to accommodate the contingency of language and self. This will provide a reasonable framework which "revolves around the notions of metaphor and self creation rather than around the notions of truth, rationality and moral obligations."⁶⁸ Rorty believes that the intellectual contribution of Wittgenstein, Davidson regarding the contingency of language, Freud and Nietzsche regarding the contingency of self-hood "do not ground democracy but they do permit its practices and its goals to be re-described."⁶⁹ One can presume that Rorty is trying to reformulate "the hope of liberal society in a non-rationalist and non-universalist way."⁷⁰

It is a general presumption that contemporary, post-modern-liberal order provides far better framework for religious pluralism. However, Rorty claims in "its ideal form, the culture of liberalism would be one which was enlightened, secular through and through."⁷¹ It is important to note that liberal order is not only secular rather, according to Rorty, it would be de-divinized too. The liberal culture would be one "in which no trace of divinity remained, either in the form of divinized world or a divinized self."⁷² The liberal position regarding the traditional dichotomy between sacred and secular was not anti-spiritual or atheistic as compared to their ideological opponent, i.e., leftists whom they consider as "ideological infidels" during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. However, the post-modern position regarding the possible dynamics of liberal culture would, according to Rorty, "have no room for the

⁶⁸ Ibid., 34.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 44.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

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notion that there are non-human forces to which human beings should be responsible."⁷³

The modern urge to discover absolute, certain and universal truth has provided intellectual space for holiness, immortality and legitimacy of divine authority. This sacred and secular dynamics of liberal order is needed to be revisited, according to Rorty. In post-modern world liberal culture "would drop or drastically reinterpret not only the idea of holiness but of devotion to truth, the fulfillment of the deepest need of the spirit."⁷⁴

The fundamental limitation of post-modernity is that it has disentangled the historically established relation between philosophy and politics. It is because of this reason we claim that post-modernism cannot survive on its own. The philosophical position emerges from contemporary post-modernity cannot be spelled out in any substantive political procedure and institution. This disentanglement of philosophy and politics will be far more dangerous because in order to maintain status quo against post-modern radicalism, "pragmatism" will be the most reasonable alternative according to Rorty. Because, only the anti-foundationalist pragmatist can prioritize workability and practicality over the "objective standards of goodness and truth."⁷⁵ Despite the fact that pragmatists are radically doubtful regarding the absolute validity of the vocabulary that any one has adopted to articulate the true expression of reality, even then they are dependent on existing liberal socio-political institutions because they think that they are workable and practical. According to Rorty, "we can think of one sense of community as having no foundation except

⁷³ Ibid., 45.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativisms and Truth*, 33.

shared hope and trust created by such sharing.”⁷⁶ It is because of this reason that post-modern liberalism is ironic. Under the burden of this irony, liberalism should not be scienticized or rationalized rather it should be poeticized so that every one can realize his “idiosyncratic fantasies.”⁷⁷ This strand of post-modern liberalism rests upon a pragmatic illusion of workability, practicality and a so-called radical community of doubt. This solution is not consistent with any community of faith.

We are at the juncture where our ancestors almost three hundred years back were celebrating the intellectual defeat of Christian thought against the ruthless critique of modern enlightened thinkers who were identifying the theoretical contradictions and incoherence’s of scholastic epistemological tradition. Under the historical experience of Crusade we (the Muslims) were enjoying the fall of Christian intellectualism in Western world. We were not only celebrating the intellectual disintegration of Christian intellectual hegemony but we were also claiming that Muslim intellectual tradition via Spain has contributed a lot in the development of such thought (i.e. Enlightenment) which eventually made “the death of God” possible.⁷⁸ For instance, Allama Iqbal claims that, “[The] world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the west. There is nothing wrong in this movement for European culture on its intellectual side and is only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam.”⁷⁹ The rise of modernity has been acknowledged by our intellectuals as the natural unfolding of Muslim intellectual tradition.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 53.

⁷⁸ F. Nietzsche, ‘Gay Science’, 119.

⁷⁹ Allama Jawaid Mohammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Sung-e-Meel Publishers), 14

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It was presumed that modern epistemological tradition has not only enhanced human control over its natural physical environment but it has also provided an objectivistic intellectual framework to reconstruct Islamic thought. "[It] is necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help in the revision and if necessary reconstruction of theological thought in Islam."⁸⁰ As the result of this philosophically incoherent presumption for the last ninety years or so, we are ruthlessly trying to reinterpret, reconstruct, re-excavate Islamic theoretical foundations through modern conceptual framework. In fact, for the last ninety years either we are trying to provide religious justification of modernity, or modern justification of religiosity. The result of these desperate efforts to impose modern conceptual framework over intrinsically non-modern revealed religion, is that we have produced a lot of literature to overcome our intellectual inferiority complex which is the theoretical corollary of the intentional efforts of post-colonial belated consciousness. Islamic modernism, Islamic democracy, Islamic socialism, Islamic nationalism, Islamic economics, Islamic banking, Islamic finance, Islamic feminism etc are all different intellectual adventures to harmonize Islamic intellectual tradition with modern knowledge revolution and its corresponding institutions. Our intelligentsia is so obsessed by the contemporary intellectual dynamics which are interestingly institutionally modern and intellectually post-modern, that it will not be surprising for us to anticipate the intellectual justification of Islamic wine, Islamic Gayism and Islamic lesbianism which are intrinsically oxymoronic. The reason of these far reaching oxymoronic conceptual adventures that, all the above mentioned intellectual attempts have been incorporated in our intellectual tradition and the exponents

⁸⁰ Ibid., 15.

of these oxymoronic conceptual order have substantive following in contemporary Muslim societies.

The intellectual justification of post-modernism will be the last nail in the Muslim intellectual coffin. It must be noted that Islam should not be defended by any theoretical context which is not consistent with the rationale, revelation, historicity and the mechanism of "*Tagleed*" derived from the established collective history of the Ummah.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that:

1. Post modernism is not the absolute rejection of modernism rather it is just the denial of the universality of modern discursive practices.
2. The post-modernist commitment with *Aufklärung* is unquestionable. They want to stretch the possibility of possibilities.
3. Unlike modernists the post-modernists justify Enlightenment values of autonomy and self-determination on aesthetical grounds.
4. There is no non-capitalist reference point of post-modernity; therefore, there is no possibility of transcendence from capitalist live-world.
5. At the theoretical plane the so-called Muslim intelligentsia seeks different arguments to reasonably counter Western dictatorial polity for their non-liberal values and their corresponding socio-political institutions. For instance, they use the post-modern anti-foundationalism, anti-universalism and anti-essentialism to delegitimize American sponsored cosmopolitan universalism, but they are not aware that this pragmatic theorization of post modernism will be counter productive.

The instrumentalization of post-modern discourse to protect pre-modern values and social particularities creates three dimensional problems for post-colonial underdeveloped societies:

1. The post colonial intelligentsia has to compromise the universality of its grand narrative because post-modernism rejects the theoretical possibility of all kinds of grand narratives.
2. The post-colonial intelligentsia has to deny their sixty or seventy years intellectual efforts that have been derived either from religious justification of modernity or modern justification of religiosity.
3. They have to compromise the theoretical legitimacy of the modern institutions which are imposed by their colonial masters.

READING ZAKARIA'S DEFENCE OF LIBERAL TERRORISM*

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The Future of Freedom is a revealing book for understanding the internal contradiction between liberalism and democracy. The book is a logical continuation of Zakaria's article, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy" (Foreign Affairs Nov. Dec. 1997 p. 22-43). It is generally believed that this book is very important to understand American foreign policy towards the Islamic world particularly after the incidence of 9/11. The book is a clear acknowledgment of the internal contradiction in capitalist democracy in a country which has no non-liberal legacy, i.e. America. The non-liberal community i.e. the Red Indians, was completely destroyed by the state governed by Enlightened, liberal, free and autonomous individuals. Fifteen million Red Indians were ruthlessly slaughtered by Americans over a span of two centuries.

The book comprises seven chapters including a conclusion. The introductory chapters provide a brief summary of contemporary politics through a liberal perspective Zakaria considers the present age to be a democratic age. He believes that the defining feature of politics in this era is democracy.

Zakaria thinks democratic process is not just a political procedure rather it is the best known mechanism for piecemeal social engineering. The process of democratization according to Zakaria transforms democracy "from being a form of government to a way of life". (Zakaria 2003 p. 14). He believes that democracy and liberalism are linked with each

* F. Zakaria: The Future of Freedom New York Norton 2003.

other due to the specific historical experiences of the West. According to him, "liberal democracy has been interwoven in to the Western political fabric (Zakaria 1997, p. 23). He claims that in the non-liberal part of the world the relation between democracy and liberalism has been broken. The scope of illiberal democracy is expanding. Democratic political procedure has been instrumentalized to abandon the liberal agenda and legitimize an illiberal socio-political order. Many of the countries around the world "do better on political liberties than on civil ones" (Zakaria 1997, p. 24). This means that people are ready to accept democratic political procedure but are not ready to accept liberal social order. He claims that, "half of the democratizing countries in the world today are illiberal democracies" (Zakaria 1997, p. 24). The rise of illiberal democracy is a threat to individual freedom. Therefore there is a need to ensure liberal rights to protect freedom both at home and abroad. The future of individual freedom is assured not by a democratic but by a liberal regime.

This paper has been divided into three sections. In the first section we will provide a brief summary of liberal political theory and its relation with democratic political procedure. In the second section we will discuss Zakaria's position regarding the relation between democracy and liberalism. In the last section we will try to identify the root cause of this contradiction between liberal theory and democratic procedure.

I. The Liberal Religion

The term liberalism is being used in many different ways. The word liberal was first used in 1812 to describe a Spanish political party. (Hall 1988, p. 35). Those who believe in the universality of liberal values for instance Gore Vidal (see Hall 1988, p. 35) claim that pre-religious societies (Greek / Roman) were embryonically liberal. The fundamental softness of life which is claimed to be provided by liberal public order was also available in pre-modern societies. By softness of public life one means that the private life of individuals is not directly subjected to public order (see Hall Ibid p. 35).

The general characteristics of the political form of liberalism justify its interpretation as a modern phenomenon. The values of liberalism are derived from Enlightenment thought. We can define liberalism, under three core headings: firstly, liberalism is a socio-political movement, which prioritizes the individual over collectivities. Secondly, liberalism considers freedom as ideal and institutionally protects individual freedom by considering this to be fundamental right of an individual. Thirdly, it considers tolerance as a fundamental value. The axiological significance of tolerance is organically linked with the priority of individual freedom. This prioritization legitimizes the equality of all incommensurable conceptions of the good and demolishes any system or hierarchy of values (specifically the value system of religion) which does not recognize the "will to freedom" as the only legitimate public good. Thus it provides the basis of an ostensibly pluralistic society.

Another important characteristic of modern day liberalism is that it is a socio-political movement which presumes an organic relation between liberty and commerce. The Scottish Enlightenment established a relation between wealth and virtue (see Hall 1988, p. 34-44). This intellectual tradition redefines the traditional concept of civic virtue. The traditional

concept of the virtuous life “has its roots in Greek city states” (Hall p. 37). In such societies, the virtuous man is seen as, a citizen who actively participates in political life, which is frugal and orderly and always prepares for wars. “Such a virtuous man was to serve in the militia and it was very largely through popular participation in infantry warfare that the right of citizenship were first gained” (Hall p. 37). Smith rejects this conception of the virtuous life (Ibid p. 37), for two reasons. Firstly in this conception, virtuous man does not respect individual freedom as a legitimate public good and tolerates slavery. Secondly, he does not consider poverty as a social evil and prefers to live a frugal life. Scottish Enlightenment redefines the conception of virtuous man as one who ensures individual freedom and recognizes it as a fundamental right of every individual. Secondly, poverty is accepted as a social evil. In substantive sense, poverty elimination and accumulation of wealth become the ultimate ends of a citizen in a civil society. This axiological transformation posits an organic relationship between liberty and capital and political economy is the science of capital accumulation. The society that emerges from this organic whole of liberty and capital is considered to be a commercial society. Such a society ensures individual freedom through institutional protection of fundamental rights, and it tries to eliminate poverty through both market and extra-market strategies i.e., by improving labour productivity, modernizing education systems and developing infrastructure etc. Liberal political philosophy has markedly been influenced by Scottish Enlightenment thought. Thereby, it is generally believed that a capitalist economy is an inevitable pre requisite for the practice of liberal values.

1.1 Democracy a Political Procedure to Protect Individual Freedom

In the liberal framework freedom is possible only within an order. Liberals do not presume an anarchic conception of freedom. In the Lockean framework “Law” is embryonically an instrument to sustain “liberty”. Locke claims that “in all the states of created being capable of laws, where there is no law there is no freedom” (Locke 1689 p. 306). Locke believes that although the state of nature is the state of absolute freedom it is unprotected. So in the state of nature arbitrary expression of ruthless power is an unintended consequence of this perfect state of freedom and equality. In contrast to the state of nature, Locke gave the idea of civil society. Civil society presumes an authority, which provides a criterion to judge between two or more groups. The criterion basically consists of a system of rights and duties. The Lockean conception of autonomy is derived from his conception of estate i.e. property. The purpose of Law is to protect individual property. The protection of property is considered to be synonymous with the protection of autonomy. Since Locke considers the human body as property, therefore the use of the body i.e. actions, thought, conscience etc should be protected through the system of Laws. In this context he claims that the essential purpose of Law is to protect individual autonomy and freedom and “the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge freedom” (Ibid, p. 306). The enlargement of freedom means the maximization of the individual’s capacity to actualize the absolute right of property without any obstacle. Thus in civil society, the framework of Law protects the individual’s “actions, possessions and his whole property” (Ibid, p. 306) from arbitrary interventions of others and makes individual autonomy possible. The other rights are the corollaries of the property rights in the Lockean framework. For instance the right of conscience, expression, religion etc. are the rights which can not be overridden by any agency even government. The

central issue of political philosophy. Sovereignty and liberty are the two issues, which are paradoxically co-existent. The inverse relationship between the two has manifested itself in the political history of democratic regimes. The sustenance of both dimensions of political life is inevitable yet contradictory. The natural outcome of this paradoxical relation between the sovereignty of the state and individual autonomy is that society is dichotomized into two different spheres. The one is the sphere of the ruling body and the other is the sphere of the people who are rule. Generally it is believed that there is an antagonistic relation between these two spheres. The ruling body (or government) prioritizes authority, however the civilians identify themselves with liberty. Mill believes that the root cause of this antagonism lies in monarchical state structure. In such a political structure the ruling elite derives its authority from inheritance or conquest, and does not hold it at the pleasure of the governed (see *Ibid*, p. 5). This authoritative expression of power is generally conceived as "a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies" (*Ibid*; p. 6). Mill believes that the idea of liberty is derived from the limitation of this authoritative power of the government. According to him, the limit which was set "to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community... was what they meant by liberty" (*Ibid*, p. 6). Mill provides two different ways to constrain the authoritative power of the ruling body as follows:

- i) The derivation of the body of political rights/liberties. This system of rights protects individual sovereignty, which was infringed by the rulers. The violation of these rights justifies civil disobedience.
- ii) The derivation of a constitution by the elected representatives of the people (on the basis of a system of rights/duties). This constitutional system of checks and balances provides both, legitimate expression of political authority and protection of the sphere of individual sovereignty, independent of state coercion.

The phenomena of democratic rule is an attempt to resolve the contradiction between authority and liberty. Mill believes that the elected government is more or less representative of the general interests of the people, therefore these "temporary rulers become the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, whatever any such party existed and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous effort to limit the power of rulers" (*Ibid*, p. 7). According to him even in democratic rule the contradiction between sovereignty and liberty has not been eliminated. The purpose of political parties was to defend the interests of the general public by extending their sphere of liberty. What he tries to emphasize is that even in democratic rule the interests of the ruling body may be dichotomized. It is because of this reason that the strategy to limit the political power of the ruling body was changed. The contradiction between the ruling body and general public can only be resolved by the identification of the mutual interests of both parties. "The rulers should be identified with the people; (so) that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation" (*Ibid*, p. 7). The major concern of this approach is to dilute the antagonism between the ruling body and the general public. In this regard the ruling body itself becomes the instrument of the will of the people (or at-least that of the majority), to determine, a legitimate private sphere of life, to protect individual autonomy and to maintain balance between the public and private spheres of life.

The determination of the legitimate sphere of individual autonomy (right of self-determination) with the help of a body of right/duties along with the derivation of certain rules of conduct are necessary to sustain a just socio-political order. These rules of conduct according to Mill simultaneously impose certain constraints on individuals to sustain a just public order (in the form of laws) as well as protect individual privacy and autonomy.

Mill differentiates government by Nature from government by convention. He believes that the existence of government, if explained in terms of Nature, will take the form of a deterministic political paradigm, in which no choice will be possible. On the other hand, conventionally grounded government is free government, which presumes unlimited choices. He rejects both the extremes as there is always a possibility of choices within certain limits. Government by Nature is an essentialistic conception, which presumes a definite way to run governmental structure. He defines such government in terms of a fixed nature which leads us to a political procedure which is essentially deterministic. It presumes a definite procedure to realize those ends which are compatible with the essentialistic nature of that government. On the other hand, there is a government by convention, which presumes unlimited possibilities to actualize conventions through governmental structure. Since the essence of conventions lies in the form of life therefore there are innumerable choices to actualize those conventions. In a democratic framework, Mill believes, the "will of the people", means the will of the majority. It is because of this reason he acknowledges that the "tyranny of the majority" is an open possibility of this political framework (see Mill On Liberty p. 9). The domination of majoritarian dictatorship poses a threat to individual autonomy. According to Mill there is a need for institutional protection of individual liberty "against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling" (Ibid, p. 9). He categorically claims that "there is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit; and maintain it against the encroachment; is indispensable to the good conditions of human affairs, as protection against political despotism" (Ibid, p. 10). This shows Mill's commitment to liberal values. It implies that the core concern of political theory on the one hand, is to determine those limits and encroachments which are indispensable for the sustenance of capitalist individuality. On the other hand it must ensure the area of non-interference or individual autonomy through the prioritization of certain inviolable rights. Mill identifies certain conditions, which are necessary for the establishment of popular government. These conditions, are as follows:

- a) The existence of a particular system or institutional structure, which determines the body of rights and duties.
- b) General acceptance of that system of government along with public willingness to keep that system standing.
- c) The capacity to maintain and consolidate that particular system of government (particularly through educating people within the limits which are provided by the system of rights and duties).

Historically speaking, capitalist government has been justified as a mean for providing a guarantee to ensure "order" and achieve "progress". The problem arises when we try to prioritize "order" (i.e. rule of Law) over "progress" (i.e. maximization of discounted

consumption flows) or vice versa. Mill believes that although "progress" is the ultimate aim of government the mechanism for the achievement of progress is not sustainable in the absence of 'security' and "order". There is no need to prioritize one over the other. "Order" and "progress" are organically linked with each other therefore a "good government (is) that which achieves progress on the basis of order" (Mill, 1963, p. 791). Mill's approach is basically teleological because as a utilitarian he presumes a specific purpose of human existence (i.e. maximization of pleasure). Thereby the liberal utilitarian conception of the self is decisive to understand this justification of capitalist socio-political order. This organic relation between ontology and politics is of fundamental importance for identifying the qualities of citizens, nature of moral order and statecraft. Mill believes that the legitimacy and the efficiency of the government are related to its capacity for promoting virtues that are compatible with the consolidation of capitalist rules.

In Mill's framework although individual liberty has its importance and he considers individual liberty as a necessary condition of "progress" he does not negate the importance of community (at the political level). Government is fully responsible for developing and improving the life of its people. In this context the role of education is decisive. However Mill acknowledges that education is basically an evolutionary phenomena and it is dependent on the stage of development in which individuals are situated (i.e. their social environment). There is a linear chain of states, the realization of one stage is lexically connected with the fulfillment of the other. Despotism is "a legitimate mode" to rule barbarians and savages. But since there is an open possibility of improvement in political structures, therefore despotism should not be considered as an end. Self government is the most refined form of political evolution. Mill believes that learning from the past and education for the future makes human development possible.

According to Mill the nature of representative government is different from benevolent despotism. Benign dictatorship in the form of absolute rule of morally, spiritually or intellectually developed individuals, might be beneficial but there are two major associated problems:

- a) No proper institutional structure (equipped by a system of checks and balances) which ensures peaceful transference of power.
- b) No institutional security of individual rights and liberty is guaranteed.

Mill favors representative government because he claims that, it is a historically acknowledged fact that the freedom of the individual has been ruthlessly circumscribed in despotism which directly affects "progress". Furthermore "obedience" in despotic regimes (which is a necessary condition of authoritarian rule) undermines the priority of individual liberty, which negatively affects the intellectual, moral and political evolution of society. Intellectual stagnation manifests itself in the form of moral corruption and structural deterioration of despotic regimes. This argument presumes that high culture flourishes in a free and liberal society. Thus the essential function of a state is to provide as much freedom as possible to its citizen so that they can express themselves freely. For Mill self government is the best possible political framework. In this regard representative democracy is comparatively

more practical than direct democracy. It implies that the democratic form of government is an ideal form of polity because:

- a) It provides an institutional framework for the peaceful transference of power.
- b) It ensures individual rights.
- c) It provides a (legally protected) free space to develop the individual's moral intellectual, creative and critical capacities (which provide the firm foundation of capitalist order).

In order to excavate the organic relation between liberalism and democracy Rawls is also one of the major contemporary thinkers.

In his analysis of liberty, Rawls is not concerned with the definition of liberty. It is more than obvious that he is much more interested in "the relative values of the several liberties and why they come into conflict" (Rawls 1971, p. 201) with each other. So he sets aside the traditional distinction between positive and negative conceptions of freedom expounded by Berlin.

According to Rawls, any meaningful explanation of freedom must address three questions which are as follows:

- i) Who are the agents of freedom?
- ii) Freedom from what? i.e. what kind of restrictions or limitations are to be eliminated?
- iii) What legitimate constraints are needed to enhance general freedom i.e. "what it is that they are free to do or not to do"? (Ibid, p. 202).

It is customary to define freedom in terms of obstacles and maximization of freedom is considered as synonymous with the elimination of the identified obstacles. The identification of obstacles (political, social, cultural, religious, emotional, aesthetical etc.) is a never-ending phenomenon; therefore, the absolute realization of freedom is not possible. For Rawls, these questions are organically linked with each other as well as they pose a challenge for contemporary political philosophy. "This or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so" (Ibid, p. 202).

Rawls focuses on the constitutional and legal restrictions, which refrain individual freedom. He acknowledges that there is no one sense of liberty because there are different agents of freedom, for instance (i) person (ii) associations or organization or corporations and (iii) the state. Therefore liberty is the name of a "certain system of public rules defining rights and duties" (Ibid, p. 17). This means that freedom is just a space whose frontiers are determined by the system of rights. According to Rawls, in the political sense the meaning of freedom is determined by the publicly acknowledged institutions, because the prioritized system of rights cannot be protected without having a proper institutional structure.

There are different spheres of liberties due to which there is always an open possibility of clash among different spheres of liberties. The role of institutions (political, legal, and economic) is to protect one agent (person, association, state) from the interference of the other. It is the institutional framework, which imposes legal obligations over the agent, not to interfere in the other's political, religious, moral etc. affairs. Since there are different spheres of liberties, therefore basic liberties should be assessed in a single system rather than particular liberties on their own. The task of the delegate (in a constitutional convention) and legislator is to balance one sphere of liberty against that of the other for the attainment of the "best total system of equal liberties" (Ibid, p. 19).

In the Rawlsian framework, the conception of freedom is not anarchic. He acknowledges certain restrictions and limitations as legitimate and necessary for the sustenance of the system of liberty. The limitation of freedom is not unjust because "these limits are subject to certain criteria expressed by the meaning of equal liberty and (the) serial order of the two principles of justice" (Ibid, p. 20).

He acknowledges that the framework of constitutional democracy is not a perfect political system but in such a system two conditions are necessarily be satisfied namely (i) the principle of equal liberty and (ii) the existence of a "just and effective system of legislation" (Ibid, p. 21).

In the Rawlsian framework, the principle of equal liberty is concretized (in constitutional procedure) in the form of the "principle of equal participation". The initial reference of constitutional democracy is equal political participation. The worth of a democratic decision is determined by the extent to which the principle of equal participation is realized. Before discussing the relation between liberty and political participation, Rawls mentions the general features of constitutional statecraft as follows:

- i) Socio-political and economic policies are decided by elected representatives for a limited period.
- ii) These representatives are accountable to the electorate.
- iii) The representatives have advisory capacity for effective legislation according to legitimate public sentiments.
- iv) The executive body (i.e. judiciary) is responsible for monitoring legislative procedure according to the constitution or the spirit of the constitution.
- v) Political parties are not just interest groups rather they must have some political agenda and public conception of the good.
- vi) The constitution determines the parameters of the legislative body; however, "a firm majority of the electorate is able to achieve its aims by constitutional amendment" (Ibid, p. 222).
- vii) All sane adults have the right to vote.

- viii) Fair, free and regular elections are also important for the sustenance of a constitutional regime.
- ix) The need of a loyal opposition to counter one party dictatorship, to open up healthy bargaining and clash of opinion for the realization of the principles of justice, for the promotion of the public good, and to critically evaluate and analyze the prevailing socio-economic and political policies of the government.

In the Rawlsian framework, the principle of equal liberty is institutionally concretized. Therefore the initial reference of constitutional democracy is the realization of the principle of equal political participation.

Rawls believes that there is always an open possibility of the clash of certain spheres of liberties therefore, there is a need of a “firm constitutional protection for certain liberties particularly freedom of speech and assembly and to form political associations” (Ibid, p. 223). The institutionalization of the principle of equal liberty in the form of equal participation requires a three-dimensional analysis namely the meaning of equal participation, the extent of this participation and its limitation and the measures which are necessary to be taken for the enhancement of its (i.e. equal participation) worth. In this regard, equal participation is characterized by a) one man one vote, b) every citizen has equal access to public offices. This means that everyone is free to i) join political parties, ii) run for elective positions and iii) hold places of authority. However reasonable constraints of “age limit” and condition of permanent residence must be imposed.

As for the question of the extent of participation is concerned, Rawls is not very clear though he believes that the problem of the extent of political liberty (equal participation) is raised if:

- a) The constitution establishes majoritarian dictatorship.
- b) The ability of the majority to achieve its objectives through constitutional amendments is unrestrained.

In order to cope with these problems there is a need to limit the scope and authority of the majority through constitutional checks and balances, separation of state power, judicial review etc. But the problem is that these constraints eventually “limit the scope of the principle of participation” (Ibid, p. 224). Interestingly Rawls believes that these constraints are consistent with the principle of equal participation, because “similar restrictions apply to everyone and the constraints introduced are likely over time to fall evenly upon all sectors of society” (Ibid, p. 224). Lastly there is always a need of institutional backing to promote the sanctity of the principle of equal liberty through the systematic, coherent, and consistent realization of the principle of participation.

Rawls identifies the major cause of the failure of constitutional government as the lack of systematic institutionalization of the principle of participation. He believes that the root cause of all defects is the “failure to insure the fair value of political liberty” (Ibid, p. 226). It is

a historical fact that the disparities in the distribution of material welfare were tolerated by the legal system of constitutional governments. The reason for this according to Rawls was that economic inequalities were mistakenly considered as compatible with political equality. The natural corollary of this is that no measures have been taken to develop such institutions, which are necessary for the sustenance of the formally given political equality. However Rawls believes that political injustice is much more disastrous than market imperfections. Concentration of political power is much more dangerous than that of capital concentration. It is another matter that in today's world capital and political power have become synonymous. Rawls acknowledges that "parties and elections are financed not by the public funds but by private contributions, the political forum is so constrained by the wishes of the dominant interest" (Ibid, p. 226). This simply means that the dominant capitalist directly or indirectly effect the political process in general and individual liberty in particular which is constitutionally guaranteed and institutionally protected. This implies that between the lines Rawls acknowledges capitalist domination as an unintended consequence of constitutional democracy. Rawls believes that since these problems are in fact the problems of political sociology, therefore they do not need to be directly addressed in his theory of justice. In other words the theory of justice must not be taken as "a theory of political system" (Ibid, p. 227).

Rawls believes that the existence of a loyal opposition is necessary for just political process, because it helps to derive a conception of the good (according to the will of the people), and at the same time without negating the only legitimate public good i.e. "individual freedom" (freedom of thought, assembly, expression and property) keeps on interpreting or reframing the meaning of this public good. There is no single and ultimate policy or methodology to maximize individual liberty, therefore the purpose of the opposition is to critically analyze policies and constantly identify the obstacles which obstruct individual freedom.

II. Democracy's Instrumentality

The above analysis reveals that mainstream political theory sees democracy as the only legitimate political procedure to practice liberal ideology. It is also implied that liberal rights are the necessary pre-ambles of a constitutional democracy and they can not be abolished even through the democratic process. The texts also reveal that in liberal order freedom can only be ensured formally, through the institutional realization of the principle of equal political participation. In this context Zakaria's defence of liberal undemocratic political mechanisms and rejection of illiberal democratic procedure by suspending or restricting the right of equal political participation of the citizen of a democratic but illiberal state is directly in conflict with liberal orthodox theory and raises the question of the priority of liberalism over democracy.

Zakaria's conception of democracy is quite general. He believes that "If a country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it democratic". (Ibid, 25). When he defines democracy he totally abstracts from theory and historicity. The justification of one man one vote is not institutionally recognizable without accepting a specific ontological assumption that man is ontologically capable of determining his ends therefore it will be considered as an inviolable right of the individual to frame, revise and rationally pursue his own conception of the good. This phrasographic ontological account is the theoretical justification of the claim

that the good is determined by the will of the people. Zakaria does not present any justification of this absurd ontological pre-supposition underlying constitutional democracy.

Zakaria's conception of democracy is as follows:

"A country is regarded as democratic only if it guarantees a comprehensive catalog of social, political, economic and religious rights. This turns the word democracy into a badge of honor rather than a descriptive category". (Ibid, 25). According to Zakaria constitutional liberalism is not a political procedure for selecting government rather it is a procedure for the selection of "government goals" (Ibid, 25). And what should be the goals of government? "To protect an individual's, autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source, state, church or society". (Ibid, 26). Interestingly he recognizes that all these goals are specific to the western world and derived from the historical experiences of "constitutional liberalism developed in western Europe and the United States as a defense of the inviolable right to life, and property and freedom of religion and speech" (Ibid, 26).

Economic liberalization in undemocratic East Asian countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia S. Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) is interpreted as "progress" Zakaria thinks that economic liberalization will pave the way for cultural and political liberalization. But interestingly he does not believe that illiberal democracy can make people liberal. Rather he wants to abolish the democratic system and establish a liberal dictatorship for the enforcement of liberal rights.

Zakaria believes that political rights are meaningless and sometimes become disastrous for civil society if they are not accompanied by human rights. He is ready to accept undemocratic liberal governments which provide liberal rights. Thus he has rejected the organic relation between equal political participation and the equality of individual liberty i.e. the right of self-determination.

Zakaria prioritizes constitutional liberalism over democracy because while constitutional liberalism guarantees democracy, democracy does not guarantee liberalism. The future of freedom is in danger within politically democratic and culturally illiberal societies, but the future of freedom is secure in undemocratic but culturally and institutionally liberal societies.

It is generally believed that democratic freedom is compatible with any ideological framework because people consider it as a value neutral mechanism. Fareed Zakaria also appears to believe that democracy is a value neutral political procedure. History reveals that democratic process is not compatible with all ideological frameworks because it necessarily transforms society into a liberal order (Iran for example). It is because of this reason that we claim that democratic process is not a value neutral system. Any ideology which does not consider the human being as autonomous law giver and which believes that good is not determined by the will of the people i.e. which is not anthropocentric, is not compatible with democratic political procedure. It must eventually try to control and abolish the democratic process.

Democratic process is theoretically, grounded in liberal ideology and if it has failed to institutionalized individual autonomy (As Zakaria is worried about) then this means that democratic political procedure is not the ultimate political procedure to establish liberal public order. Then the question arises how do we know that Islamic political procedure is incompatible with the development of civil society. The answer is simple. The ontological and epistemological incompatibility between Islam and liberalism delegitimizes capitalist order. In Islam the good is not dependent on the individual's will rather it has been revealed. The conception of self, cosmology and epistemology of Islam denies the right of the individual to change, revise, and pursue his own conception of the good.

Democracy has become irrelevant for the Western world. Their people are already situated in a liberal culture and are enjoying the associated fundamental softness of life. The circuit of citizenship is restricting and the sphere of the market is expanding. It is the circuit of capital which actually guarantees individual freedom in its concrete form. Now the abstract expression of freedom (i.e. vote) is actually irrelevant for a westerner because for him freedom simply means to choose between Reebok and Nike. The issues of high politics are irrelevant for the westerner. Only a small proportion of people participate in the political process. Democratic process does not effect their lives because in capitalist democracy power is not transferred to any one. All citizens are equally subservient to the hegemony of global capital.

In the Muslim world on the other hand the democratic process does play a significant role. People are concerned about the issues of high politics because people are not liberal. So, democracy may create an obstacle for establishing the hegemony of global capital. And it is an open possibility that democracy may be instrumentalized to demolish liberal political and economic imperialism.

The priority of liberalism over democracy reveals that one is expected not only to accept the priority of right, but also its liberal interpretation even if this contradicts the will of the people or violates the right of self-determination of the people. So whatever is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay etc. actually reflects the real spirit of liberalism. Bush and Blair are true liberals. They are following the footsteps of the America Founding Fathers, and they are revitalizing the history of liberalism. Guantanamo Bay and Abu Gharib prisons represent best human rights practices.

III. Justifying Liberal Terror

There are at least two major weakness of Zakaria's analysis and both weaknesses are organically linked with each other.

Zakaria believes that liberal rights are universal and they are the necessary resource to make people civilized. But he rejects the methodology (i.e. democracy) which is theoretically prescribed by liberal thinkers. He emphasizes the genealogical priority of liberalism over democracy. This implies that liberal rights are not naturally nurtured, institutionalized and respected. They need to be protected and imposed upon individuals through state power.

Zakaria tries to give an impression that democracy is not a problem in the West because people are essentially liberal, respect human rights and are civilized. Therefore even when Americans act undemocratically it is tolerable because they respect liberal rights. One of the most important components of the American government i.e. the Supreme Court is extremely undemocratic in nature, because "it is headed by nine unselected men and women with life tenure" (see Zakaria p. 22). Similarly, each American state has two seats in American Senate irrespective of its population ratio. This is the most devastating interpretation of the "right of equal political participation", and thanks to this interpretation "the U.S senate is the most unrepresentative upper house in the world" (Ibid p. 22).

Zakaria tries to give an impression that once people become liberal they democratically establish a framework of rights and start respecting the rights of the "people". But the history of liberal democracies reveals that, liberal democracies have committed massive ethnic cleansing sometimes amounting to genocide specially in colonial context where large social groups were defined as lying out side of "the people". (see Mann 1999 p. 23). Zakaria believes that the liberal constitution guarantees the right of the "people" through civil society institutions but who are those "people", the American constitution was written by "fifty-five middle aged white gentlemen of the highest rank and property closeted for two weeks in Philadelphia" (Ibid p. 23). It is also believed that these archangels occupying a vantage position reflected the will of the people but it is a historical fact that they in there definition of "we the people" did not mean "to include women, slaves and native Americans" (Ibid p. 23) The American constitution is an instrument for protecting the capitalist minority from the non-capitalist majority.

It is also very important to note that the violence against non liberal communities i.e. the Red Indians committed by the Spanish, British, Portuguese, and the Catholic Church was far milder than the atrocities committed by liberal American Revolutionaries, and settlers and that is "why most Indians supported the British in the American Revolutionary war" (Ibid, p. 26). It can statistically be proven that liberal atrocities are far greater than that of non-liberal regimes, Mann believes that deliberate genocidal bursts were more common among British than Spanish or Portuguese settlers. (Ibid, p. 26), who were relatively less liberal than the Britishers.

The history of liberal democracy which has unfortunately been ignored by Zakaria reveals that, "ethnic cleansing, murders, deporting, amounting at its worst to genocide, was central to the liberal modernity of the New World committed first by the settler colonies than by the first new nations. The process continued in North American and Australia until there were virtually no more native people to exterminate" (Ibid, p. 27).

Thus history reveals that ethnic cleansing is a missing link between liberalism and true democracy. Because genocide provides a homogenous society.

This is one of the aspects of liberal democracy which should be presented before defending the liberal dictatorship. The above analysis reveals that Zakaria's distinction between liberal and illiberal democracy is fictitious, deceptive and distorted. It is a historical

fact that “liberal democracies were actually committing genocide against other democracies repeatedly” (Ibid, p. 26). In this perspective what people like Zakaria want to do in the Muslim world is similar to what liberal democrats had previously done in the Western hemisphere during the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.

Secondly, it seems that the prioritization of liberal rights is presumed to be a non-contestable truth and it is not epistemologically possible to question the priority of right over the good or the universality and cultural neutrality of liberal rights. Zakaria tries to give an impression that liberal rights are not in conflict with any civilized society and religion. They are in fact the criterion of sanity, civility and humanity. Therefore it is legitimate to impose those rights even at the cost of democracy prescribed by the liberals themselves. According to Gowan liberals are “talking about cosmopolitan governance, that is cosmopolitan rules and norms, not about everything, but, about certain fundamental things namely human rights and of course, some global governance on the economic field” (Gowan, 2001 p. 5). But this priority of right has been questioned by the communitarians and post-modernist thinkers even within the Establishment. They believe that “right” i.e. abstract and neutral right cannot be derived from pure form i.e. universally valid reason. These rights are derived from the history of a particular community. This means that the system of rights cannot be detached from the good of a community which is historically specific and culturally determined. Zakaria’s whole thesis rests upon the assumption that liberal right has priority over any conception of the good presumed by the individuals or the community. The communitarians are not satisfied with this prioritization of the right over the good, and believe that the prioritization of right over the good undermines the role of community in the constitution of individual selfhood and trivializes the significance of good in the determination of a body of rights.

Men are not to be treated as an object of scientific study. According to Taylor, man is a self-interpreting animal and there is no possibility of having an abstract realm which transcends historical specificity and the particularity of a linguistic community. In this regard human beings are considered to be “creatures whose identity as persons depends upon their orientation and attachment to the conception of the good which they derive from the matrix of their linguistic community” (Mulhall, 1992 p. 102).

The self is embedded in a particular community and answers the questions which have emerged and are organically related to the ontological basis of that community. The priority of right over the good presumes that self identity is not determined by ends, virtues and conceptions of the good which emerge from the history of a particular community. Thus the politics of rights justifies the triviality of communal good and defends the individuality of every person. Sandel believes that in the liberal framework the person is an autonomous chooser of ends, because this autonomous “capacity must be given prior to its exercise, the locus of moral worth in human beings must be seen prior to its ends” (Ibid, . 45). Thus the priority of the self over its ends actually reflects the “essential unity of the self (which) is already provided by the conception of right” (Rawls 1971, p. 563). This implies that the priority of right over the good presumes a specific ontological, metaphysical account derived from the history of a particular community. Therefore Zakaria’s assumptions that these liberal rights are absolute, certain and universal is a questionable claim.

Due to the unavailability of an epistemologically grounded and ontologically backed universalist defence of liberalism it is generally believed that, Western liberal democracy is not universally applicable. The recognition of the cultural particularity and historical specificity of liberal theory justifies a political structure which is democratic but at the same time illiberal in practice. Zakaria is worried about the fact that, "many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with substantial degree of illiberalism". (Zakaria, p. 24). He fears that democracy may be an instrument for overthrowing capitalist order and advocates liberal terrorism to avoid this calamity

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Rise of Fundamentalist Discourse and the Reassertion of Modern Ethos

"The wound is the place, where the light enters you". (Rumi)

*Abdul Wahab Suri**

Abstract

[The religious resurgence in the contemporary world has generally been described as a threat to global peace in general and to the axiological centrality of humanist values i.e. autonomy and self-determination, in particular. This threat presumes an oversimplified version of fundamentalism which is not only predominantly modernistic but also views religious reservations against modern life-world in abstraction to postmodern critique on the colonization of modern discursive practices. Islamic discourse determines the limit of modernity in the non-Western, post-colonial world; on the other hand, it provides substantive theoretical resistance to anti-foundationalist, contingent and relativistic postmodernism prevailing in Eurocentric cultures. In this way, Islamic discourse naturally performs two functions simultaneously which has the potential to be instrumentalised for the sustenance of modern institutional order. – *Author.*]

Introduction

The objective of this paper is to explicate that how the struggle for the resurgence of Islamic order is being instrumentalised by the dominant modern discourse. The emergence of multiple narratives about Islam, for instance, Modern Islam, Fundamentalist Islam, Moderate Islam, Liberal Islam, Democratic Islam, Illiberal Islam, Cosmopolitan Islam etc. are all different narratives to counter the contemporary religious resurgence. In this paper only the fundamentalist discourse will be analysed. This analysis of the phenomena of Islamic fundamentalist discourse from the modern spectacles will be useful for the Islamists, to reconsider their theoretical framework to address their European audience, and to develop strategies to protect Islam from being instrumentalised. Another important concern of this paper is to emphasize the significance of the antagonistic relation between the dominant discourse i.e. modern, with its competing discourses i.e. Islamic fundamentalist and postmodern discourses.

Lastly, it is an attempt to realise that the real change is actually the change of the discourse and any change within the dominant discourse will complement it and its corresponding institutions rather than challenging it in a substantive manner.

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It is important to differentiate fundamentalism from fundamentalist discourse. Although it is difficult to make such differentiation, an attempt will be made to make this differentiation possible. Discourse should not be confused with the medium of communication or "synonymous to the language as such."¹ Discourse rather, determines the condition of meanings. It provides the matrix in which people make sense of their expressions, explications and even the meaning of one's existence. It is important to note that there is no one-to-one correspondence between reality and the discourse of reality. This means that, discourse is a "way of producing that something real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable and therefore meaningful".² Thus engaging in a discourse does not mean that one is confronting with reality as such; rather it is a process of "making and remaking of meaningful conditions of existence"³. Therefore it is actually an act as spectacle and substantive participation in a given discourse. It simply means to acknowledge the conditions of meaning which are embedded in the overall matrix of a given discourse.

It is very important to differentiate Islamic fundamentalism from other manifestations of fundamentalism, for instance Christian, Judaic, Hindu or any other pagan or natural forms of fundamentalism),

Dogmatic disputes about "foundations" and "fundamentals" are not solely the purview of religious activists but also capture an aspect of ostensibly secular debates where the sacred text in question is, say, a constitution."

particularly when we try to study the phenomena of Islamic fundamentalist discourse in Europe. Islamic fundamentalism will never be interpreted as an insistence of a specific religious community for the public recognition of certain fundamental principles necessary to win the appreciation of God or an insistence on legal or constitutional acknowledgement for practicing certain rituals or cultural practices in a public sphere which is intrinsically secular. Although in an academic sense, fundamentalism is not necessarily a religious phenomenon rather "fundamentalism is a way that

leaves open possibility that dogmatic disputes about "foundations" and "fundamentals" are not solely the purview of religious activists but also capture an aspect of ostensibly secular debates where the sacred text in

¹Jim George, *Discourse of Global Politics: A Critical (re)introduction of International Relations* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 29.

²Klein Bradley, *Strategic Discourse and its alternatives* (New York: Center on Violence and Human Survival, 1987), 4.

³Ibid.

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question, is say; a constitution."⁴ But this theoretical elucidation of fundamentalism as just an insistence on certain sacred or secular principles will undermine the complexities which are intrinsically attached to the phenomena of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe.

Islamic fundamentalism will overwhelmingly be interpreted under the burden of a history of violence, invasion, domination, slavery, ethnic cleansing, plundering, colonisation, gender discrimination, spectacles of cultural superiority and nostalgia of the glorious past.

Historically, Islam has been introduced to the Western world twice as a comprehensive threat or an unbearable alternative to the Western life-world and its values and corresponding institutions under the burden of an anti-Islamic discourse. "West's comprehensive idea of Islam persisted intact and essentially unchanged thrived, even over the course of one thousand years"⁵. This implies that the basic features of Islam in the eyes of Europeans have not been changed substantively before and after the 'Enlightenment'. The threat of Islam has a privilege to be sustained in European spectacles from the Dark Ages to the Enlightenment and post-enlightenment. It has generally been argued that the root cause of the West's hostility towards the Islam is innately imbedded in the nomenclature of Islam. For the last thousand years or so, Islam has been presented as one offensive source of violence and darkness which has, interestingly, persisted from the Dark Ages to the Enlightenment. The substantive changes that have occurred in the Western world have not changed the eleventh century "anti-Islam discourse, which to the present day defines and explains Islam and regulates what it is, that we hear and see of the Muslims."⁶

Historically, Islam has been introduced to the Western world twice as a comprehensive threat or an unbearable alternative to the Western life-world.

A substantive threat to the Western civilization irrespective of its religious (i.e. Christian or Jewish), or secular (i.e. modernistic) manifestations, Islam has not just claimed as an Abrahamic religion rather it claims "to have completed the cycle of Abrahamic revelation"⁷. This implies that Christian theological foundations and their corresponding institutions are not enough to understand the ontological

⁴Roxanne Leslie Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), xii.

⁵Jonathan Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes: From the Crusade to the War against Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 5.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibrahim Kalin, "Roots of Misconception Euro-American Perceptions of Islam Before and After 9/11," in *Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition*, ed. Joseph E. B. Lombard (USA: World Wisdom, Inc., 2009), 145.

and teleological dynamics of the will of the God, because the message of the God conveyed in previous revelations must be interpreted in the light of the Quran and Sunnah. Therefore, the nature of tension between Islam and Christianity is not similar to rivalry between two empires fighting for territorial gains and to establish political hegemony. Rather it is a cosmic, theological, ontological as well as epistemological opposition.

The most ironic aspect of this contradistinction between Islam and Christianity is that many claims of the Quran and Sunnah are often "concurring with and sometimes diverging from the biblical account."⁸ Therefore the authenticity and the authority of Christianity's theological claims are always under threat in the presence of Islamic epistemological tradition. The problem is that Islam is not just another religion rather "the message of Islam was (is) too similar to both Judaism and Christianity in its essential outlook."⁹ The differences based on similarities between Islam and Christianity have provided grounds for both theological, as well as, polemical dissent.

The second reason to understand the antagonistic relation between Islam and Christianity is the rapid spread of Islam in Christian lands. Within one century, Islam has spread from Mecca to North Africa and from the Caspian Sea to Spain. Many areas which were under Christian faith converted to Islam and the expansion of Islam in the world had questioned the legitimacy and universality of the Christian faith. Through the spectacles of Christian metaphysics, the spread of Islam has been interpreted as the demonification of a given life-world. The reasons they (many Christian sources) have provided were popular and polemical i.e. "The spread of religion by the sword and the Prophet's appealing to animal desires through polygamy and concubines."¹⁰

During the Dark Ages, Islam had been interpreted as an anti-Christian or anti-Judaic religious force, which intrinsically denied the very foundational legitimacy of these religions and considered them as distortion or deterioration from the fundamental teachings of Prophet Moses (Peace Be upon Him) and Prophet Jesus (Peace Be upon Him). In defense of Mary (Peace Be upon Her), the Quran relays Mary's conversation with her community, thus:

"Oh sister of Aaron! Thy father was not a wicked man nor was the mother harlot. Then she pointed to him (Hazrat Isah). They said: How can we talk to one who is in cradle, a young boy? He spoke: Lo! I am the slave of Allah. He hath given me the scripture and hath appointed me as a Prophet" (xix-Mary: 28, 29, 30. p.301).

⁸Ibid., 145.

⁹Ibid

¹⁰Ibid., 146.

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Islam does insist on the centrality, as well as the availability of the definite text (word of the God) in the form of the Quran while neither the Jews nor Christians were able to protect the scriptures bestowed upon them as they had been revealed by the God. There is no doubt that Islam has an intrinsic competitive relationship with Christianity and Judaism. The antagonism is not just of a political nature, rather it has specific ontological, cosmological and epistemological foundations. The Quran denies the fundamental idea of Christian; that Jesus was the son of God. The Quran refers to Jesus' words:

"Peace on me the day I was born, and the day I die, and the day I shall be raised alive! Such was Jesus, son of Mary: (this is) a statement of the truth concerning which they doubt. It befitted not (the Majesty of) Allah that He should take unto Himself a son. Glory be to Him! When He decreeth a thing, He sayeth unto it only: Be! And it is. And Allah is my Lord and your Lord. So serve Him. That is the right path." (Xix Mary 33; 34; 35; 36, p.302)

If we try to understand these words of God under the conditions of anti-Islamic discourse, it will be obvious that how pre-understanding of the text and hermeneutical space available for indulging in any meaningful dialogical process regarding the truth claims about Islam has "no defense against the underlying fact that the entire conversation takes place almost entirely within the very confines of the discourse"¹¹. It is important to note that the even Pope Gregory who has been considered as the father of anti-Muslim Crusades¹², was either ignorant or confused about the actual claim of Islam irrespective of what the Muslims were

¹¹Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 7.

¹²Although Lyons has claimed that Pope Gregory was the father of anti-Muslim discourse (see, Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 46) in the West but there are other very authentic sources which reveal that this process of anti-Islamic and malignant interpretation of Islam, Prophet (P.B.U.H.) was being underway long before Pope Gregory for instance, St. John of Damascus (c 675-749) has been identified by Kalin as the father of anti-Islamic Polemics during eighth century. For instance St. John claims that "the founder of Islam is a false prophet" (De-Heresibus 764 B quoted in Daniel J Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam: The Heresy of Ishmaelites* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 73.

It is also important to note that unlike Pope Gregory St. John was very well equipped by the language and knowledge of Quran and Sunnah. He was the court official of the Umayyad caliphate in Syria" (Kalin, *Roots of Misconception*, 146).

Henry Stubbe's work in this regard is very revealing to understand the polemical, deceptive and malignant interpretations of Islam and Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) from the authentic Christian religious sources. The result of this polemical exposition is character assassination of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The literature produced in the Western World was enough to be instrumental zed for launching any anti-Islam campaign against Muslims. (For further study see, Stubbe Henry, *An Account of the Rise and Progress of Mohometanism with the life of Mohomet: And a Vindication of him and his Religion from the Calumnies of the Christians*, Christ Church, Oxford from A Manuscript copied by Charles Hornby of Pipe office in 1705 Edited with introduction and Appendix by Hafiz Mahmud Khan Shairani, Afzal Chamber, McLeod Road, Lahore. 1911.

doing in Spain. He has not differentiated Pagans from Saracens and has not clearly identified the epistemological difference between the confronting enemy of Christendom and Christianity in itself. For example, he contended that the "Pagans" who ruled most of Spain in his days, were victims of "ignorance of God"¹³. In reality, Spain was conquered by believers of the God i.e. Muslims.

Let's come to the fundamental question; whether anti-Islamic discourse served the interests of the existing power players in Europe around the eleventh century. There were many challenges before the status quo, for instance, the Church was losing its institutional control over the determination of the legitimate public sphere. The Carolingian Empire (800-888) was gradually disintegrating after the death of Charles the Fat¹⁴. The significance of the Carolingian Empire is that at the coronation of Charles, the Great Pope Leo III referred to him as the Holy Roman Emperor. With the passage of time different regions of Europe including France and Germany, that were initially under the rule of the centralized Carolingian Empire, had initiated gradual efforts to emancipate themselves from the centralized sovereignty of the Holy Roman Emperor.

The rise of ethno-centric, nation-specific monarchies challenged the traditional universal authority of the Church regarding the determination of the legal space, and even, over the appointment of senior clerics. These appointed clerics performed two functions simultaneously; they were the spiritual heads of the community of the

The rise of ethno-centric, nation-specific monarchies challenged the traditional universal authority of the Church regarding the legal space, and even, over the appointment of senior clerics.

faithful; and secondly they were "enormously rich and powerful local landlords".¹⁵ The gradual rise of monarchs (French, German, etc) did not just unfold the process of the decentralization of the political authority of the Emperor; rather by implication it also questioned the Papal Prerogative and legislative hegemony regarding the determination

of substantive political and economic affairs which had intrinsically been the purview of the monarch. The emerging monarchs were interested in having "centralized control over all aspects of social and economic life within their realm".¹⁶

¹³Ibid., 47.

¹⁴See, Goldberg, 2006.

¹⁵Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 44.

¹⁶Ibid.

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This implies that the eleventh century was a significant turning point in European history. The rising monarchies were in search of a new political identity, detachment from the dynastic, centralized control over socio-political and economic institutional structure along with comprehensive control of religious class were underway. The challenge before the existing status quo was not the rise of Islam in the East, rather, "the struggle between the church and the state for the final say over such matters became the dominant issue of eleventh-century Europe."¹⁷

The arrival of the Muslims and their successes, both militarily and religiously, were interpreted in such a mystifying manner that the Islamic threat appears as not just of territorial nature but of a spiritual and ontological nature too.

As the gulf between the sacred and secular has extended, the fundamental structural lacuna has been exposed i.e. dwindling executive power of the Church which it could use to enforce its claims in the public sphere as identified by the church authorities. The solution of this structural loop in a given power mechanism has been given by Pope Gregory as, "the creation of papal fighting force from among the warring European knights, the Militia of St. Peter, to combat heresy and enforce the church's claims against its secular rivals."¹⁸ The rise of the Papal army had no justification without identifying a rising global threat to the universal authority of the Christian faith. Otherwise this call for a Papal army would be interpreted as a counterforce against secular knights of the emerging monarchies. Islam, thus, has been identified as "a race of pagans [that] has strongly prevailed against the [Eastern] Christian empire."¹⁹

The causal foundation of the Papal army was intrinsically an internal issue of the bureaucratic imbalances between the sacred and secular power players in the Christian world. However, the legitimacy of the Papal army has been theorized in reference to the malignant interpretation of Islam, Prophet (PBUH) and the Muslims. The rise of Islam in the East has been identified as evil; the future of all of mankind is at stake at the behest of evil. The concrete manifestation of this evil is the "arrival of the Arabs and unexplained trouble in his native Northumbria"²⁰. It is important to note that the rise of Islam has not been presented as a dynastic problem or a political threat to the emerging monarchies. It has systematically been instrumentalised to revitalize the sacred discourse which was degenerating due to the rising trend of

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., 46.

²⁰Ibid., 51.

excavating new, secular, political foundations to justify political sovereignty. All those religious symbols which were losing their significance and hermeneutical potential to sustain the priority of the sacred over secular, were revitalized. All the connotations were interpreted under the conditions of anti-Islamic discourse. This discourse has revitalized the religious signs and symbols, for instance; good and evil, sin and abolition of sin, infidel and faithful, peace and brutality, etc. The holiness belongs to Christianity and Islam is not just considered a political alternative; rather it is seen as the perfect embodiment of evil; a comprehensive package of demonization.²¹

²¹The Depth of anti-Islamic discourse is not only specific to the theological dynamics of Christian clerical expressions. The literature which is ranging from theology to history, politics to art, literature and even to mysticism etc. reveal a serious well defined and all-encompassing attempt to systematic distortion of communicating apparatus of common man. The literature shows a serious attempt to provide deceptive, dehumanize, de-divinize and demonize picture of almost all the sources of Islam. Under the influence of such baseless and false prophecies, fears and deceptive superstitions Islam has been interpreted not just as political threat rather destructive force which rejects not just Christian values but values of humanity per-se; destruction of the totality of the human-life-world as such. For initial exposition of such understanding of Islam in Europe, see:

- i. *Ecclesiastical History of England and Normandy*, Vol. III, Bohn's edition, 1854.
- ii. *English History*, Vol. I, Bohn's edition, 1854.
- iii. *History of Magic* by Navdaeus, ch.xiv, 1657.
- iv. *History of Crusades* by T. Archer (History of the Nations series).
- v. *Roger of Wendover's, Flowers of History*, Vol. I Bohn 1849.
- vi. *Buckle's Civilization*, Vol. I.
- vii. *Chronicles Globe*, Edition 1899.
- viii. *A Notable History of the Saracens*, 1575.
- ix. *Froissart's Chronicles Globe* edition, 1899.
- x. *The Account of the Prophet in Lithgow's Travels 1634* (reprint 1906).
- xi. *Complete History of the Turks*, Vol. 2 1701.
- xii. *History of Charles the Great Ch. IV* translated by Th. Rodd 1812.
- xiii. *History and Literature of the Crusades* Ed. By Lady Duff Gordon ("The Universal Library").
- xiv. *York Plays*, Edited by Lucy T. Smith 1885.
- xv. *Towneley Plays IX Caesar Augustus E.E. Text Society*, 1897.
- xvi. *The Coventry Mysteries Play*, xxx Shak. Society, 1841.
- xvii. *Epics and Romances of Middle Ages* by Wagner edit by W.S.W. Anson 1883.
- xviii. *Mahomet in Boyle's Dictionary*, 1738.
- xix. *Dante in His Divine Comedy Place Prophet (P.B.U.H.) in to hell along with Hazrat Ali (M.R.I.P.)* see (23-31)
- xx. *Selected Poetry*, Chiefly devotional of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth part II Parker Society, 1845.
- xxi. *Bale's Selected Works*, Parker Society, 1849.
- xxii. "A Needful Caveat" appended to the translation of the *Alcoran of Mohamet* by Ross, 1649.
- xxiii. *A view of All Religions in the World* by A. Ross 3rd (edit) enlarged, 1658.
- xxiv. *A little description of the Great World* by Peter Heylyn, 6th Edition 1633.
- xxv. *The works of H. Smith* Vol. II (ed.) by J.C. Miller Nicholl's Series of Standard Divines, 1867.
- xxvi. *Apocalypses or the Revelation of Notorious Advances of Heresic* Translated by J.D. 1658.

Rise of Fundamentalist Discourse and the Reassertion of Modern Ethos

The arrival of the Muslims and their successes, both militarily and religiously, were interpreted in such a mystifying manner that it appears that the Islamic threat is not just of territorial nature but of a spiritual and ontological nature too. "In the year of one Lord 729, two comets appeared around the sun, striking terror into all who saw them".²² This appearance has been identified by Venerable Bede as a symbolic acknowledgement of the rising of evil i.e. the arrival of Muslims in Europe²³. It is obvious that since the threat is of a demonized nature and it has ontological and spiritual dynamics too, therefore the secular knights will be defenseless against this evil force. Therefore Christianity is inevitable to combat this evil challenge. Bede has further claimed that this menace will be defeated by *Christian knights*.²⁴

According to these prophecies, the rise of the Muslims is the rise of evil and, the discourse of evil eventually has revitalized the discourse of the sacred and holiness. The holy war has been identified with all those objectives which have no meanings without referring to the universal authority of the Church. Thus anti-Islamic discourse has performed three functions simultaneously:

- a) It legitimized the establishment of the Papal army which eventually reinforced Papal prerogatives in the public sphere rather than just as a theological interpreter of religion.
- b) The socialization of the sacred or spiritual ideals has eventually reflected in the mass recruitment of the faithful. The abolition of sins only be guaranteed for those "who battled in name of the papacy".²⁵
- c) The phenomenon of crusade has also been instrumentalised to contain the rising influence of the secular, monarchical ambitions which were directly in conflict with the ecclesiastical hegemony over socio-political order. The implications were obvious: these secular competitors to the sacred papacy "turned to the knights of the Christian West for assistance."²⁶

The most important aspect of Lyon's analysis is that the rise of Islam should be differentiated from the rise of the discourse about Islam. Secondly, he highlights how the confronting status quo has instrumentalised this anti-Islamic discourse to protect its own immediate and long-term interests; or in other words to keep the balance of power in its own hands.

It is very interesting to note that rise of the Enlightenment and the rise of anti-Islamic discourse have simultaneously emerged in the Western world. This is due to the change in the spectacles of Western

²²Lyon, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 51.

²³Ibid., 51.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., 45.

²⁶Ibid., 47.

mind. The priorities of the man-of-doubt were different than that of man-of-faith.

Although Kalin has mentioned Dante as one of the case studies to understand the shift in the perspective of Europeans regarding the

It is very interesting to note that rise of the Enlightenment and the rise of *anti-anti-Islamic* discourse have simultaneously emerged in the Western world.

appreciation of the secular aspect of Islam; and it is also true that Dante is not a man-of-doubt (i.e. philosopher) rather a medieval, classical artist but his intellectual acumen compelled him to appreciate the secular dynamics of Islamic culture and its philosophical expressions. However, under the burden of religious discourse which was predominantly anti-Islamic, he prioritized Ibn-e-Sina (Avicenna), Ibn-e-Rushed (Averroes) and even

Salah-uddin-Ayubi, who was the most distinguished enemy of the Crusaders, on Prophet (PBUH) and Hazrat Ali (May He Rest In Peace). In his *Divine Comedy*, Dante places "The Prophet (PBUH) and Ali (MRIP), his son-in-law and fourth caliph of Islam, in hell. By contrast, he places Salahuddin, Avicenna and Averroes in Limbo."²⁷

This selective abstraction of certain features of Islamic cultural and intellectualism minus its religious and divine identity, is one of the most important features of anti-anti-Islamic discourse. This was, and of course is, not as mature as anti-Islamic discourse; one can provide many references from Western sources that some features as well as some dynamics of Islamic culture were elaborated and appreciated by the Western intelligentsia. It is an acknowledged fact that "the attention paid by European scholars to Islamic culture minus its religion in eleventh and twelfth centuries contributed to what C.H. Haskins has called the 'Renaissance of twelfth century.'"²⁸

The second aspect of this anti-anti-Islamic discourse is to reduce Islam from a universal religion of Abrahamic tradition into a specific, cultural expression which has rested upon a false religious belief. But despite this fact that it has an untruthful foundation, Islamic culture has contributed in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy, mathematics and science. The cultural exchange which took place in Andalusia (Spain) has also been acknowledged by many Western writers. This interesting "dual attitude of rejecting Islam as a religion while admiring its cultural achievements is clearly exemplified in Sandy's work."²⁹

²⁷Kalin, "Roots of Misconception," 150.

²⁸Ibid., 149.

²⁹Ibid., 153.

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Yet it is not just Sandy's work; according to Kalin rather, St. John of the Cross, Pascal, Peter Bayle, Stubbe, Swedenborg and Voltaire etc.³⁰, who although do not consider Islam as a true religion and Muhammad (PBUH.) as a true Prophet, but they do value Islam as a diverse culture. For instance, "Stubbe saw something different in the Prophet of Islam as a man of world. Divested of his claims to have received God's word, the Prophet Muhammad could be appreciated for what he had accomplished in history"³¹. The same line of argument is followed by P. Edward, George Sale, and Carlyle. Therefore one can claim that there are certain aspects of Islam which were attractive to the thinkers of the

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Enlightenment, despite the fact that these thinkers were equally skeptical about the authenticity and truth value of Islam as a revealed religion. It is important to note that the Quranic foundations of Islam were denied, however "human qualities of the Prophet of Islam were invoked by the humanist intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."³² Carlyle's appreciation of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) reveals his anthropocentric cum secular predication, about the Prophet, as he wrote; "Let us try to understand what he meant with the world: what the world meant and means with him, will then be a more answerable question."³³

This anthropocentric exposition of Islam and the personality of Hazrat Muhammad (PBUH), serve different intellectual purposes:

- a) Identifying internal incoherencies of Christianity regarding the determination of legitimate public sphere.
- b) Limitations of Papal prerogatives and their antagonistic role in the development of an open society.
- c) "Simply to cherish their secular humanist philosophy of history."³⁴

II

From the Papal Colonization of Life-world to the Colonization of Discursive Reason: The trajectory from death of God to death of man.

*"He who fights with monsters might take care lest he
thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an
abyss, the abyss gazes also into you."*

Nietzsche, Friedrich

³⁰Ibid., 153-160.

³¹Ibid., 158.

³²Ibid., 159.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

"How man should be?" is one of the most fundamental questions of human existence. The history of ideas reveals that most intellectual efforts have been an attempt to answer this question. The traditional dichotomy between essentialism and anti-essentialism; foundationalism and anti-foundationalism; perfectionism and anti-perfectionism, etc. is the result of the ontological or teleological explications of "who we are"? Therefore consciously or unconsciously, we try to justify our normative stances with respect to our ontological or deontological accounts.

Religious communities, particularly the communities derived from revealed religions, are intrinsically essentialist, foundationalist and perfectionist. Their reliance on specific theological assumptions regarding the justification of their ontological and teleological accounts has philosophically been underestimated by the man of doubt i.e. philosophers. Therefore one of the traditional paradigms of intellectual antagonism has emerged from the theoretical divergence between the *man-of-faith* and *man-of-doubt* regarding the answer to the question; "how man should be"? The philosophical urge of the pre-supposition-less domain of understanding particularly in the context of modern thought is in itself rested upon the assumption that the realm of "apodictic evidence" is epistemologically possible. It is further presumed that on the basis of such a *Self-Evident-Evidence*, one can provide absolute, certain and universal answers to the questions concerning reality, knowledge, morality, values and beauty.

This assumption of the epistemological possibility of *Self-Evident-Evidence* has also been shared by some *men of faith*. It is important to note that the transcendental capacity of pure reason has not only been acknowledged by many of the scholars, both Christians and Islamists, (particularly *Mutazilites*) before the rise of the Enlightenment. They have also tried to provide an abstract answer to the metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, axiological and aesthetical questions raised by the human intellect. These intellectual efforts create an illusion that what has been revealed by the God can be accessible both in substance and in form through abstract pure reason.

The philosophical spirit that has been incarnated in the Christian thought via Aristotle and Plato has manifested itself in the form of the Enlightenment: "They questioned and scarified everything they esteemed until they examined God himself and found it impossible to believe in his providence. According to Nietzsche it was not skepticism but Christian probity that ultimately 'killed' God"³⁵

³⁵The 'death of God' is the symbolic acknowledgement of the intellectual defeat of Christian theology. See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art; Vol. II. The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. David Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1961). Hafer and Raw 1979 quoted in Mark J. Lutz, "Socratic Virtue in Post-modernity: The importance of Philosophy for liberalism," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 4 (1997): 1131.

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The modern dimension of the Enlightenment is intrinsically humanistic and has claimed to have absolute epistemological foundations, which not only answers to the question "who we are", but also "how we should be". The history of the modern theory and its corresponding socio-political institutions along with their organic relation with the self-aggrandizing mechanism of scientific industrial complex reveals that they have duly responded to the Nietzschean *Mad-Man* announcement and tried to fill the vacuum that has been created by the Death of God.

"This" reveals that contemporary Western civilization is intrinsically humanistic and secular. However, there is no doubt that religion is an important cultural component of Western life-world. But the role of religion in a given public order will be determined under the conditions of anthropocentric spectacles towards the understanding of reality. This refutation of the centrality of God or representative of God, i.e. the Pope, is derived from the historical experience of Europeans, and it has not been done by any foreign intruder. The refutation of Christian epistemological authority, its prerogative power, its moral authority regarding the determination of legitimate public sphere, and its corresponding institutions have not been done under the domination of the crescent, i.e. sword of Islam. Christendom and its corresponding values were slaughtered under their own knives, "God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murders of all murders? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives".³⁶

Western civilization is intrinsically humanistic and secular. However, there is no doubt that religion is an important cultural component of Western life-world.

This defeat of the sacred by the secular is not the result of a conspiracy against the people of faith, rather it is the result of the epistemological shifts that occurred during the Enlightenment period. This has not only changed the dynamics of the sacred and secular; rather it has also changed the order of etiological questions. One of the most important aspects of modern Enlightenment thought is that *epistemology took over ontology*. As a result of this shift, all the religious ontological claims were analyzed under modern epistemological conditions and all those claims which were epistemologically unsound have been eliminated from the sphere of knowledge. Therefore, secularization is not the result of the State-Church dichotomy but the emancipation of epistemology from the divinity of revelation as a condition of modern form of knowledge. The refutation of revelation as an ultimate source of

³⁶Ibid.

knowledge is the "death of the God" and the birth of modern man who is epistemologically determined by the universally valid reason. The modern man has filled the vacuum created by the so called "death of god" "who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festival of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? *Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appeal worthy of it?*"³⁷

There is no doubt that the Death of God is one of the most celebrated aspects of "Aufklärung"³⁸ because it is the Enlightenment thought which has actually questioned the Epistemological legitimacy of Christian authority regarding the determination of what ought to be or, how man should be. It is not only relevant to de-legitimize the epistemological authority of Christianity, but it is in fact the de-legitimation of any supra-human or non-human authority that transcends the domain of discursive reason. "Kant indicates right away that the "way out" that characterizes the Enlightenment, is a process that releases us from the status of "immaturity".³⁹ Self-surrender; self-relinquishment of human autonomy to any authority by virtue of any meta-rational telos is the vindication of one's immaturity⁴⁰. By "immaturity", he [Kant] means a certain state of our will which makes us accept someone else's authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for."⁴¹

The most celebrated idea of modernity was to discover the realm of "apodictic Evidence" as the foundation of universal civilization. The self-evident rational foundation will provide a pre-supposition less, unbiased, un-prejudiced, socio-political life-world in which every individual will be determined by his own autonomous will. The modern-enlightenment hope was "that human beings will shed their traditional allegiances and their local identities and units in a universal civilization grounded in generic humanity and a rationale morality".⁴²

³⁷Ibid. See also Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Walter Kaufman, (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).

³⁸See, Immanuel Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What Is Enlightenment?'* Translated by H. B. Nisbet (New York: Penguin Group USA, 2010) and also Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader* edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) in which they both try to answer this question that what exactly the meaning of *Aufklärung* i.e. Enlightenment is?

³⁹Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 305.

⁴⁰This criterion of maturity or the distinction between maturity and immaturity is needed to keep in mind whenever we try to defend Religion not just as an alternative way of life rather than a metaphysically grounded epistemologically viable, teleologically determined and all-encompassing domain of human existence which is intrinsically rested upon the assumption of Absolute, certain universal truth that has been revealed by the God, interpreted by the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) practiced and prescribed by Suhaba (May rest in peace) and transferred by the Islamic scholars through the institution of 'Ijma-e-Ummat'.

⁴¹Ibid., 305.

⁴²John Gray, *Enlightenment Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of Modern Age* (London: New York Routledge, 1995), 2.

The postmodern thought acknowledges that this hope is not realizable because it is rested upon an incoherent philosophical theorization. It has generated an oxymoronic institutional mechanism which theoretically justifies itself as the ultimate source of human-autonomy and self-determination. But contrary to this, the multiple forms of production and consumption, its corresponding social relations, political and economic institutions are derived from modern discursive reasons which abandon the possibility of human freedom. "Couldn't we conclude that the promise of Enlightenment of realizing freedom through the exercise of reason has been, on contrary subverted through the domination of reason itself, which increasingly usurps the place of freedom."⁴³

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It is an acknowledged fact, particularly in postmodern literature that the incoherent equation between freedom and universally valid reason is intrinsically problematic. Particularly, the Frankfurt School of Thought, post-structuralism, and de-constructionism have contributed a lot in this regard. Therefore, the universal non-contestability of the Enlightenment thought, particularly its modern instructional form, has been questioned. As a result of this rising postmodern discourse, it has been claimed that we are living in "an age distinguished by the collapse of the Enlightenment project on a world-historical scale."⁴⁴

There is no doubt that the defenders of modernism, for instance Habermas, consider the postmodern critique as a threat to the Enlightenment project and consider it nothing but a philosophical irrationalism⁴⁵. However, Foucault is not satisfied with this charge against people like Adorno, etc. He is considered a strong defender of existing modernism as well as the absolute rejectionists of the Enlightenment as the victims of the "black mail of Enlightenment"⁴⁶. What is problematic in this one-dimensional process of modernization, according to the critical theorists' perspective, is that the contemporary form of modern institutionalization has been presented as the only ultimate foundation of universal values of human autonomy and unprecedented progress by virtue of universally valid reason. Modernism is the dominating ideological framework for the determination of inter-state and intra-state

⁴³Michel Foucault, *Remarks on Marks*, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascatio (New York: Semio Text (e), 1991), 117-118.

⁴⁴John Gray, *Enlightenment Wake*, 2.

⁴⁵See Jürgen Habermas, "Introduction," to *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Translated by F. Lawrence, (Cambridge MA: The MIT press, 1987).

⁴⁶Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1991), 314.

dynamics, the foreign policy framework, domestic or regional or international mode of production and exchange and the whole discourse of international relations and political economy. All those who believe in the non-contestability of modern

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discursive practices and their universal institutionalization are the victims of the black mail of Enlightenment because they presume that there is only one form of reason that has been expressed in the process of modernization. The life-world that has been derived from the expression and institutionalization of universally valid reason is the best possible expression of discursive reason. Adorno and Foucault both reject this assumption, i.e. there is only one "form of Reason" and any

rejection of this form of reason is the rejection of comprehensive Enlightenment project in its totality and its all possible manifestations. Both Foucault⁴⁷ and Adorno⁴⁸ accept the theoretical possibility of other forms or manifestations of reasons, other than institutionalized modern discursive practices.

This means that neither the postmodern critique on modernity and its corresponding socio-political institutionalization, nor critical theory which has been derived from the Frankfurt School of Thought; are the results of philosophical irrationalism, as it was claimed by many defenders of modernism. It is one of the major objectives of dominant modern discourse that either one has to accept the universality of modern institutionalization of discursive reason or else one would be considered as irrational. It means that the contemporary discourse of modernity is the victim of the counter Enlightenment tendency as through a dictatorial bureaucratic institutional order, it not only imposed specific "form of Reason" but most importantly, it has established that "rational critique of rationality impossible".⁴⁹

⁴⁷Ibid., 316.

⁴⁸Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *The Dialectics of Enlightenment*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 128-131.

⁴⁹David C. Hoy, "Conflicting Conceptions of Critique: Foucault versus Habermas," in *Critical Theory*, ed. David C. Hoy and McCarthy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 145.

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It is not just the postmodernists who are not satisfied with the presumed direct-proportional relationship between individual freedom and discursive reason, it is also Weber who believes that both manifestations of modern Enlightenment i.e. Capitalist liberalism and Socialism cannot be governed without comprehensive mechanism of bureaucratization. He claims that the institutional order which has emerged from the process of modernization is the mechanism of control and bureaucratic discipline which denies human subjectivity and autonomy. "Everywhere we find same thing the means of operation within the factory, the state administration, and the army and university departments are concentrated by means of bureaucratically structured human apparatus in the hands of the person who has command over (beherrscht) this human apparatus"⁵⁰. What it implies is that the possibility of individual freedom is just an illusion in this bureaucratically structured human apparatus. Secondly, and most importantly, the dream of human autonomy is not realizable in both (i.e. liberal capitalism and socialism) manifestations of modernity. In other words, if modernization and bureaucratization are organically linked with each other, then according to Weber, "it makes no difference whether the economic system is organized on capitalistic or socialistic basis"⁵¹.

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Human autonomy is the fundamental spirit of the Enlightenment that has survived even beyond the postmodern critique on modernity and its corresponding institutions. The acknowledgement of human capacity to determine its own destiny is such a modernist virtue that it has been acknowledged by the postmodernists as well. According to many postmodernist thinkers, the real spirit of the Enlightenment is a continuous process of "philosophical interrogation" which tries to stretch the limits of human intentionality and autonomy. According to Foucault "I have been seeking ..., to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation – one that simultaneously problematizes man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being and the constitution of self as an autonomous subject is rooted in Enlightenment".⁵²

The postmodernist thought acknowledges that there is no doubt that the modernist reliance on discursive reason as the only legitimate means to freedom eventually caged the human spirit into the iron cage

⁵⁰Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, eds., *Weber, Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 281.

⁵¹Weber, *Economy and Society*, 223.

⁵²Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" 312.

of rationality. This adversely affected human capacity to give meaning to his life autonomously.

Under the yoke of modern instrumental reasoning, the autonomy of human subjectivity has overwhelmingly been dominated by the modern institutional order. The process of rationalization through modern bureaucratic order has undermined the significance of the process of modern subjectivization which is organically linked with the actualization of human autonomy, according to Klinger. She refers to Touraine that despite this fact that, "Modernity is not based upon one single principle... It is the result of a dialogue between Reason and Subjectivity".⁵³ The dilemma of modernity is that human autonomy has been interpreted differently from the perspective of rationalization and that of subjectivization, she stresses. For instance, according to her; "[autonomy] in the perspective of rationalization is defined along the lines of function, efficiency, expediency, economy and material utility without regard for any higher point of view for religious or moral prescriptions of any kind."⁵⁴ Whereas viewed from the perspective of human autonomy it "implies that human being are no longer assigned a position, rank, and place in a hierarchically structured eternal order, but are set free to find for themselves the meaning and essence of existence and determine its aims."⁵⁵

The modern history of ideas reveals that overwhelming process of rationalization has compromised the conception of autonomy consistent with the perspective of the subject, "[the] position of the subjectivity is hardened or, as Alain Touraine puts it, the subject gets locked in an obsession with identity, as the cleavage between rationality, the system and subjectivity individuality deepens to the detriment of both 'without Reason, the subject is trapped in an obsession with identity: without the subject, Reason becomes an instrument of might'.⁵⁶ If someone argues that post modernity is actually the reassertion of modern subjectivity that has been overlooked by the "Colonization of modern discursive reason,"⁵⁷ then it won't be too unreasonable. There is no doubt that postmodern discourse has radicalized the process of subjectivization; which was initially a modern agenda, by replacing its foundationalist-cum-essentialist basis from anti-foundationalist, contingent and ever-changing unfolding of Dasein. It has been acknowledged that "all features attributed to the ideal postmodern, identity flexibility, reflexivity, fluidity, versatility, creativity, openness,

⁵³Touraine Alain, *Critique of Modernity*, trans. David Macey (Cambridge: Black Well, 1995), 6; Cornelia Klinger, "From Freedom without Choice to Choice without Freedom: The Trajectory of the Modern Subject," *Constellations* 11, no. 1 (2004), 121.

⁵⁴Cornelia, *From Freedom with Choice to Choice without Freedom*, 121.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., 132.

⁵⁷Habermas considers this domination of discursive reason as the colonization of life world, see, Jürgen Habermas, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society and Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984 and 1987.

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(self) irony are much less achievements of a more enlightened and liberal era that has at least freed the self from the confinement of essentialist subject hood".⁵⁸

The anti-Islamic discourse, the re-assertion of Modern Ethos and the poverty of Post-modernity: Muslims in the West Agent or Victim of Terror

"The social function of a religion is independent of its truth or falsity that religions which we think to be erroneous or even abused and repulsive, such as those of savage tribes may be important and effective parts of social machinery, and that without these "false" religious social revolution and the development of modern civilization would have been impossible."⁵⁹

This quotation is an excellent exposition to understand the modern spectacles through which one can see the intended complimentary role anti-Islamic narrative under the slogan of fundamentalist discourse is playing for the reassertion of modern ethos. Brown's social scientific explanation of the role of a religion, as a medium of modern social construction enables us to understand the unintended paradigmatic, complimentary function of Islamic fundamentalist discourse to re-justifying modern disciplinary mechanism as aesthetically more viable option for humans to make sense of their existence.

The 'threat of Islam' (i.e. fundamentalist Islam) under the condition of an anti-Islamic discourse in the West has provided theoretical content to substantively justify modernity as a far more reasonable alternative than: a. Violent, regressive, anti-humanist militant fascism i.e. fundamentalism. b. Philosophical irrationalism of post-modernism and deconstructionism.

The anti-modern tendency of fundamentalism has a potential to theoretically neutralize the postmodern critique on modern institutional mechanism. The rise of fundamentalist narrative has been presented as a global threat by the anti-Islamic discourse. Therefore, it's theoretical

⁵⁸Cornelia, *From Freedom with Choice to Choice without Freedom*, 133. It is important to note that Foucault's and other post-modernists commitment with Enlightenment project are unquestionable. It would be unreasonable to consider post-modern critique on modern disciplinary powers mechanisms or philosophical anarchism or irrationalism. It is just a matter of the hermeneutical disagreement regarding the understanding of Enlightenment project. For instance as a defender of modernity Habermas understands Enlightenment project by virtue of the pinnacle state of "Reason" and freedom will be the ultimate consequence of the institutionalization of reason. Foucault on the other hand, reconsiders the presumed relationship between reason and freedom. Foucault did not consider internal critique of modern disciplinary power and its corresponding institutional formations as a betrayal of Aufklärung, rather he thinks that it is actually the manifestation of the real spirit of Enlightenment project. The rational critique of Modern disciplinary power mechanism is the most serious attempt to stretch the possibility of possibilities.

⁵⁹A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Religion and Society*. (Davidson and Rees-Mogg. 1991. P.185)

and also its corresponding institutional response should be of global nature. The presumption of the 'Global Threat of Fundamentalism' has unveiled the theoretical, as well as the institutional, in the capacity of the postmodern thought to appropriately respond to this presumed global threat. The postmodern critique against modern ethos might be a rational elucidation of incoherent theoretical and contradictory institutional apparatus to guarantee human autonomy, but the fundamental lacuna of postmodern political theory is that it does not have the potential to provide any substantive political procedure or institutional order beyond modern discursive practices to counter fundamentalist discourse in Europe which has been presented (by anti-Islamic discourse) as not only anti-modern, like post-modernists, but also anti-humanist, regressive, intolerant and anti-freedom political ideology.

The disentanglement of
the traditional organic
relation between
philosophy and politics
is also a fundamental
problem of postmodern
political theory.

The fundamentalist narrative cannot be intellectually countered by postmodern intellectualism in abstraction to modern institutional order because fundamentalist narrative has revitalized traditional philosophical issues of modernism i.e. the universality of the grand narrative, essentialism, foundationalism, absolutism, universal-objective moral standards and determination of the public order by virtue of a transcendental, non-human authority. There is no doubt that postmodernism rejects the universality of the modern grand narrative because according to it, every grand narrative is just a narrative; it does not mean that they will give the Islamic fundamentalist narrative an equal status as compared to the modern narrative.

On the other hand, the disentanglement of the traditional organic relation between philosophy and politics is also a fundamental problem of postmodern political theory. The postmodern values of contingency, relativity and spontaneity without modern-discursive-institutional order eventually collapse into ironic pragmatism. The modern discourse has established that anti-foundationalist, postmodern internationalism cannot be translated into a workable policy framework to counter the presumed global threat of fundamentalism, both inside Europe and in the Muslim world.

The post-modern intellectualism is intrinsically parasitic because it cannot make sense or even survive without modernity. In other words, without scienticized and modernized life-world, the postmodern urge of autonomy, contingency and relativity will be meaningless.

Although postmodern thought established that a mechanism of discipline and punishment has developed over scienticization and

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modernization which has actually subverted the possibility of individual freedom and has abandoned the possibilities of other rational manifestations of human reason. However, under the conditions of anti-Islamic discourse, fundamentalism cannot be accepted by the postmodernist as one of the other "idiosyncratic fantasies"⁶⁰, because of its totalitarian and coercive tendencies as it has been claimed by the exponents of anti-Islamic discourse.

The fundamentalist commitment with the universalization of the will of the God is far more problematic for a postmodernist who may find some justifications to accept liberalism, under the condition, that "liberalism should not be scienticized so that everyone can realize his idiosyncratic fantasies"⁶¹. This shows its aesthetical prioritization of modern-liberal life-form which has substantively been challenged both inside and outside the Western world.

There is no doubt that postmodern relativism has been instrumentalised by many religious Muslims to counter the hegemony of modern disciplinary power, and has been identified as a threat to their free choices regarding the determination of what ought to be both inside and outside Western World. According to Haynes, the audience of postmodern thought is different in the Muslim world than in the West. In the Third World, post-modernism is the mobilizing ideology of the educated, disenchanted poor who are the victims of the "disenfranchisement and unfulfilled expectations that are endemic to modernization in late developing region"⁶². This is actually the constituency of fundamentalists according to Euben, whereas Haynes claims that "postmodernism is synonymous with poverty, leading poor especially receptive to fundamentalism arguments which supply the mobilizing ideology."⁶³ On the other hand, postmodernism is addressing the internal, existential vacuum in modern mind-set which has been created by the subjugation of the individual, spontaneous process of subjectivization under the conditions of modern disciplinary power. In this way, the contemporary form of fundamentalist narrative under the condition of anti-Islamic discourse performs many functions simultaneously.

It rejuvenates all the vocabulary which intrinsically represents the modern discourse in the Western World. For instance, the universality of values, the search of human fixed, absolute, universal, essence, or foundation, absolute moral standards to judge human; actions, conduct,

⁶⁰Richard Rorty, *Contingency Irony and Solidarity*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 53.

⁶¹Abdul Wahab Suri, "The Living Death of Modernity: The Poverty of Post-modernity in the time of Terror," *Pakistan Journal of International Relations* 2, no. II (2011), 136.

⁶²Roxanne Leslie Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 22.

⁶³Jeffrey Haynes, "Religion, Secularization and Politics: A Post modern Conspectus," *Third World Quarterly* 18 (September 1997), 719.

desires and even imagination, on the basis of some ontologically grounded and teleological backed epistemological foundations, etc.

Secondly, through the modern spectacles, Islam has been presented as an unbearable alternative to modernism for the alienated, affluent postmodernist class in the West. There is no doubt that postmodern relativism can acknowledge Islam as one of the pluralistic expressions of Western culture, but minus its absolutist and universalistic interpretation.

Thirdly, and most importantly, it has made Muslims visible in the Western World. The millions of Muslims in Europe who are there to resolve the first question out of three identified by Smith H⁶⁴ i.e. how to win food and shelter? In the affluent West, the other two questions i.e. of social and religious ones have been resolved by many ordinary Muslims; mostly immigrants, in compatibility with the answer of the first question and its corresponding prerequisite.

The war against terror that has been initiated by the state-craft of the West against predominantly non-state actors in the Muslim world is normatively as well as structurally; modernistic.

The war against terror that has been initiated by the state-craft of the West against non-state actors in the predominantly Muslim world is normatively as well as structurally, modernistic. According to Haynes, Muslims in the West are in the process of replacing their traditional, ethno-centric networks to new solidarity matrixes⁶⁵. This so-called offensive strategy i.e. 9/11 that has been carried out by non-state actors among Muslims in the Western World has questioned the commitment and social legitimacy of Muslims and has provided a socio-political content to appreciate and celebrate the possible autonomy and self-determination provided by modern disciplinary power. Thus, revitalized rather redefined, the parameters of individual autonomy under the presumed global threat of Islamic fundamentalism. New meanings of privacy, encroachment, surveillance, confinements (Guantanamo Bay) and limitations of the nation state, and its corresponding constitutional guarantees, have emerged.

The existence of Muslim community that has been characterized and described by the social, electronic and print media as "irrational and backward, medieval" and fearful of modernity; Islam (their faith) is by

⁶⁴Smith has identified three questions which make sense of one's existence, the questions are: "How to win food and shelter? Secondly, how to get along with one and another? Thirdly, how to relate total scheme of things." (Huston Smith, *Why Religion Matters*, New York: Harper San Francisco, 2001), 11. According to him first question is of natural second is of social nature and the third one is of religious nature.

⁶⁵ Haynes, *Religion, Secularization and Politics*, 56.

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nature fanatical; Muslims are sexually perverse, either lascivious, polygamists or repressive misogynists or both, they are anti-democratic and despise Western notion of civic freedom and finally they are caught up in a jealous rage at the Western World's failure to value them or their belief⁶⁶.

Under the condition of these presumed deceptions of Muslims, the reasonableness of modernity has been established and celebrated. The modern values of civic freedom, democracy, rationalistic way of life, backwardness of medieval thought and ideals of modernity as an evolutionary form of human socio-political existence etc. have been meaningfully rejuvenated in the popular literature and foreign and internal policy frameworks. The Muslim community has been identified and observed under the conditions of modern-discursive practices. Different debates about Islam and Muslims have been initiated. They have been identified as the anti-liberal community which limits the possibility of possibilities of all those individuals, both inside and outside the Muslim Community, who question the universality of their grand narrative. This community and its corresponding practices have been identified as illiberal and a threat to the liberty available in the Western World; as if the available civic freedom provided by the liberal, modern order is not only meaningful, but also ideal. In fact, the intellectual space of universalizing cosmopolitan liberalism has been widening, which was intellectually, not available in post-modern thought. It is now presumed to be reasonable to argue the coercive imposition of democratic liberal order through the foreign policy framework.

In antagonism with ill-equipped decentralized, unnecessarily violent presentation of the Islamic grand narrative by fundamentalist narrative, the modern grand narrative has been rejuvenated. Interestingly, under the condition of the resurgence of this modern grand narrative, the Muslim community in the West has been re-observed as a potential threat to the freedom available through modern discursive practices and their corresponding bureaucratic institutionalization. Different issues have been raised, for instance: the issue of mosques and minarets in Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Greece, Bosnia etc. The social unacceptability of building religious premises in unified Germany. The problem of the exclusion and inclusion of the Muslim Community in Dutch society; referring to the issue of mosques in the Netherlands, the problem of Burqa or Hijab in France and the limits of multiculturalism in French society; the lack of political representation of Muslims and the problem of mosque constructions in Austria; the status of the Muslim community in post-London bombing scenario; and the limits of cosmopolitan Islam in British multiculturalism.⁶⁷

⁶⁶Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 3.

⁶⁷See, Stefano Allievi, ed., *Mosque in Europe: Why a Solution has been a Problem* (London: NEF Initiative on Religion and Democracy in Europe, 2010).

Thus the artificial rise of the threat of fundamentalism along with different, incoherent, violent glimpses of their political ideology in the Western World has actually left only one reasonable option for Muslim immigrants' i.e. inclusive adoption of modern values and their corresponding institutions. In fact, Haynes acknowledges that, "Muslim Community organizations... often appear to rescue those who are drifting in the Urban milieu".⁶⁸ The respectable option Muslim community has is to actually act as Philanthropist and work for the unconditional sustenance of modern life-world.

Conclusion:

Although there is compatibility between fundamentalist and postmodern narratives, both are different critiques of modernism, but both critiques lead us to a paradoxical conclusion.

Interestingly, post-modernism in the European context, is the result of the comprehensive institutionalization of the modern-discursive reason. The fundamentalism is the result of the incoherent, incomplete, and misguided institutionalization of modern discursive practices in the Muslim world. It reveals that modernity is problematic; both in its comprehensive as well as its incomplete institutional manifestations.

However, the rise of fundamentalist narrative under the condition of anti-Islamic discourse in contemporary political dynamics has provided intellectual breeding grounds for modern intelligentsia to counter both postmodern critiques against the universalization of modern discursive reason and the so-called threat of fundamentalism. It helps modern intelligentsia to re-legitimize the universality of modern discursive practice, as a workable, reasonable, and sustainable alternative to postmodern irrationalism and coercive fundamentalism. Last but not the least Islam is Islam; it is neither fundamentalist nor modern or moderate, liberal nor cosmopolitan. It is what Allah has revealed and it should be presented as it has been revealed with patience and determination.

Patience is not just sitting and waiting it is foreseeing. It is looking at the night and seeing the day. Lovers are patient and they know that moon needs time to become full. (Rumi)

⁶⁸Jeffrey, "Religion, Secularization and Politics," 719.

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IDENTITY CRISIS AND THE DILEMMA OF PROGRESS

Abdul Wahab Soori

"Who are we?" "Do we belong to the Third World?" The answer of this question is obviously "Yes". The significance of this yes, might be factual or geographical but actually we are the "INHABITANTS" of the lost world. We have lost our identify; we don't have ideals with which we can identify ourselves, because most of the ideals, contradict each other, and thus, it becomes, a matter of choosing one or the other.

At present we are living in four centuries at a time. Our religious structure is about 1400 years old; our social infrastructure is like that of seventeenth eighteenth century; we are living in the 20th Century, and we have the information of 21st century. In this conglomerative situation we have totally lost our identity. When we look towards our intellectuals for the remedy of this identity crisis we procure nothing but confusion.

In order to describe and evaluate the "Identity crisis and the dilemma of progress", we have to consider Ayer's announcement, according to which:

"Since the technological revolution is itself irresistible, the arbitrary authority and irrational values of pre-scientific, pre-industrial cultures are doomed. Three alternatives confront the partisans of tribal values and beliefs. Resistance, if sufficiently effective, though it cannot save the tribal values, can bring on total revaluation. Or ineffective resistance may lead to sequestration like that of American Indians. The only remaining alternative is that of intelligent, voluntary acceptance of the industrial way of life and values that go with it.

We need no apology for recommending such a course. Industrial society is the most successful way of life mankind

has ever known. Not only do our people eat better, sleep better, live in more comfortable dwellings, get around more in far greater comfort, and --- live longer than man have ever done before. In addition to listening to radio and watching television, they read more books, see more pictures, and hear more music than any previous generation or any other people ever has. At the height of the technological revolution we are now living in a golden age of scientific enlightenment and artistic achievement. For all who achieve economic development, profound culture change is inevitable. But the rewards are considerable".¹

Thus as is evident from Ayer's statement, "Development" and "Progress" play key role in Identity crisis. According to Jose Maria Sbert,

"Revolution may not have killed the sleep of modern civilization, but it had certainly turned its dreams of progress into recurrent nightmares".²

And the problem is that we have shared that dream along with westerners.

The issue of progress has different significance for westerners and third world nations alike. Gustavo Esteva in his famous article "Development" used the term "Redevelopment" to express the hopelessness of Westerners that they want to progress more, because they are condemned to progress. According to Gustavo on the one hand, in countries like Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, Britain etc. there is a general agreement at public level that socialized medicine, nuclear plants, steel production, polluting factors, poisonous pesticides etc.

"[May] be destroyed, dismantled, exported or substituted".³

But the problem for them is that they too must compete with others and survive in the modern economic infrastructure. Gustavo further illustrates:

"The obsession with competitiveness, for fear of being

left out of the race, compels acceptance of the destruction of whole sections of what was "developed" over the last 30 years. Sacrificed on the altar of redevelopment, these will instead in transnational designs consistent with world market demand".⁴

It means that they are condemned to develop their selves materially. Since the destiny of that development or progress is determined by market forces, they must fulfill the demand of economy, which basically is not their best choice but the best in worst.

On the other hand, he believes that in the underdeveloped countries there is a general agreement at public as well as intellectual level regarding development which is actually redevelopment because it implies the development of a maldeveloped and obsolete infrastructure.

Since the concept of progress and development is considered to be irresistible imperative of power, the progress is actually felt to be a matter of survival. In Jose Maria's words:

"Progress is more than just a journey or an ideal. It is modern destiny. To modern man, and to those who want to share his identity, rejecting faith in progress is unbearable. Modern man is defined by Progress. His self-esteem is rooted in it and it is his deepest justification for the ruthlessness he displays towards his fellow men and nature".⁵ Therefore in these circumstances we have to develop our selves.

Since the issue of progress is so critical, it is accepted that "The Third World had to develop first-before even think about REAL PROGRESS".⁶

According to one school of thought, the third world nations stand at a juncture where the west was 200 years ago. Thus the third world nations have to go through all the process experienced by the west. However, it might be stated that, in reality the condition is not so, simple.

When the west started its journey towards development and progress, the consequences of that development were not as evident to them as they are to us. S. Parvez Manzoor states that:

"Like all Promethean myths, the myth of progress has its sequel in human suffering. Dethroning providence and faith by progress and profanity, man on his own has known neither joy nor freedom. The enlightenment's offspring, a rational humanity liberated from the superstition of religion, has given us the nightmare, of apartheid, the gas-chambers, and the bomb. Science, the greatest creation of the rational mind, has turned out to be a specter of doom, posing the greatest threat to our natural environment and our human existence. If there's been any progress since Western man rebelled against God and deified himself in "The age of enlightenment", it has been in the spheres of human suffering, greed and oppression".⁷

No doubt that the material progress intensified human sufferings a lot but actually, Westerners are also unaware about the repulsive consequences caused by the decline of religious, social and moral institutions. They do have some doubts, fears rather dread about that journey but their increasing control on nature and technological advancement bestowed them enough confidence and they moved on and on. There was almost general consensus about the concept of progress at the intellectual level and we find that in the early stages of modernistic period; in their conception (Modernistic) of universe God was switched over by MAN and he become the author of his own development. The work of Darwin, Marx, Hegel, Kant and Comte etc., help in that transformation of progress or development as a historical necessity. Later on this conception got politicized by politicians and progress modified from history into program and unavoidable fate. The impact of that transformation in the conceptualization of development is that it is undoubtedly believed that this stage (developed form) of west the is: The, "[Natural] culmination of the potentials already existing in neolithic man"⁸ The consequences of this view is that. "History" was reformulated in Western Term⁹ and "[Development]" gave global hegemony to a purely western genealogy of history".¹⁰

Actually what I am trying to highlight is that in this journey of progress their religious, moral and of course family structure collapsed they did not consciously do so, but for the sake of material development they had to sacrifice their religious, values, family structure. And for the past two hundred years defending material justification of human Existence, Westerners once again are turning towards spirituality, and are trying to revine their family structure, providing the pragmatic explanation of religion for social harmony etc.

Our criteria to substantiate the progress is similar to that of Westerners i.e. "Material Progress". Today we too examine the performance of our Govt. on the basis of G.N.P. rate or G.N.P. per capita, but when we expect our intellectuals to provide a legitimacy for this sort of progress and supplicate the recommendation for the Western model of development, they hesitate to do so because they do not have the answers to the questions which follow that sort of verification.

The Russian collapse is the collapse of communist mode of economy and state structure and now capitalist rationality is considered to be as "*The rationality*". The intellectual position of the people who still reject capitalism is not more than utopian Anarchist because they don't have any alternative of free market Economy. It is an acknowledging fact that economic rationality of market has become the inevitable condition for survival and because of this.

The matter of survival in Economic Society is based on the economic interpretation of progress, thus progress and economic progress are considered to be synonymous.

And now the situation is that economic conflict perpetuates tension at social as well as state level. According to Gustavo:

"By equating education with diplomas, following the economic definition of learning. They lacked teachers and school....

After equating health with dependence on medical services, they lacked doctors, health centers, hospitals, drugs....

After equating with the technical activities of production and consumption, linked to the mediation of the market or state, they lacked income and suffered scarcity of food..."⁸⁹11

As we all know that the political form of capitalism is *Liberalism* and the reason behind all that scenario is that we do not have any sound critique of liberalism.

We can roughly categorize our intellectuals by considering *liberalism* as a criterion. The possible categorization is as follows:

1. Orthodox Muslims (Ulmas/Molvies)
2. Liberal Islamists
3. Islamist Liberals.

The first group knows nothing about liberalism, (its effect and consequences) this is the reason that there is no direct confrontation between liberalism and *ulmas* but if we look at the relation between them we find a sort of passive resistance offered by *ulmas* to liberalism. But that group, infact, has no potential to provide an intellectual threat to liberalism and we know that any society which considers "*Freedom*" as THE criterion of "goodness and badness" then religion cannot stand there any longer.

The claim of second group is very interesting, because they believe that, the values of liberalism are infact the values of Islam, actually Islam and liberalism are the two sides of the same coin, but it is a historical objectivity that whenever liberalism proliferates in any society the first institution that collapses in that society is that of religion. And it is a fact that to overthrow religion is one of the defining characteristic of liberalism.

The third group suggests the unity at the name of MUSLIM, like German, French etc. In other words it tries to provide the concept of muslim nationalism and then, on the basis of general agreement adopt, any kind of political, economic and social model. This is the group which is not ready to accept any bargain at the name of progress. This group legitimizes any kind of western model which amplifies the rate of progress or development and their interpretation of development or progress is purely like that of western-

ers i.e. material.

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The motivational forces of such progress are lust, routh, greed, self-interestedness which are never acceptable for any religion, particularly to Islam, which provides the lesson of *Sabar, Sukker, Faqhar and Ghina*. Thus the tussle between religion and economics is obvious. According Jose Maria Sberts:

"Leniency bordering on approval towards such a sin, greed which is now perceived as the veritable psychological engine of material progress".¹²

She further argues that, it is presumed that:

"Greed and arrogance in individual turn into prosperity and justice for nations and all mankind.... an invisible hand, a cunning reason that will do him humanity good even if its members indulge in evil".¹³

That is the reason why religious or traditional moral institutions offers a sort of resistance to the expansion of market industry and modern state. The problem of identity crisis raised on the one hand when we try to measure progress in Western way (as I already explained the historical transformation of the conceptualization of progress and western concept of progress being considered as "THE" concept of progress) and on the other hand we don't want to be like Westerners and want to conserve or secure our moral, religious, cultural and traditional structures (Here I don't mean to secure Feudalism) because the consequences of that development are also evident to us in there most repulsive form, we also noticed that self-interestedness, anxiety, despair, selfishness and individuality are the defining characteristic of Western consciousness which is the inevitable gift of that material progress, we are also aware about the social problems of that society and their struggle to revive their traditional structures.

According to Marcuse:

"A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress".¹⁴

As we know that, struggle of development and the rationality behind that progress made the highest brutality possible. Marcuse accepted that:

"We submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to the perfection of waste, to being educated for a defence which deforms the defenders, and that which they defend".¹⁵

The capitalist claim of free competition in a free market economy is just an illusion.

Marcuse wrote:

"[The] regulation of free competition among unequally equipped economic subjects".¹⁶

Modernity claimed to provide a civil society. The society in which people have the assurance of civil rights. As we know that western interpretation of civil right is unavoidably material but the problem is that, even after attaining immense material development the dream of a civil society is still a utopia for the west.

According to Marcuse:

"Contemporary industrial civilization demonstrate that it has reached the stage at which, "The free society" can no longer be adequately defined in the traditional terms of economic, political, and intellectual liberties not because these liberties have become insignificant, but because they are too significant to be confined within the traditional form".¹⁷

He unveiled the westerners claims of economic, political and intellectual freedom, and for other alternative Marcuse stated:

"Economic freedom would mean freedom from the economy from being controlled by economic forces and relationships; freedom from daily struggle for existence, from earning a living. Political freedom would mean liberation of the individual from politics over which they have no effective control. Similarly, intellectual freedom

would mean the restoration of individual thought now absorbed by mass communication and indoctrination, abolition of "public opinion" together with its makers."¹⁸

Keeping all these aspects of Western society in our mind, when we ask our intellectuals that in order to attain that level of progress do we also have to sacrifice our moral, cultural, social, religious values? then they claim that we need modernization and at the same time, we want to conserve our values, their argument is that:

Since the values are not static, rather dynamic in nature thus there is always a possibility of compatibility between the progress and value structure. But the problem is not that the western society is devoid of values, it does, but in the realm of consumerism the basic determinant of all values is the relation of selling and buying. The question in consideration now is that, whether we ready to accept that value system or not? In the journey of material progress which we are trying to attain there is only one rationality left and that is "selling and buying."

Western development is the product of gradual progress. In this systematic progress the change which occurred in their society was also gradual. They also had some adjustment problems in that process but slowly and gradually society become liberal, however as soon as liberalism proliferated in society, religion and other structures like family lost their significance but that process took hundred of years. And when the last institution of their society collapsed i.e. "family" there were almost 100% literacy rate and they had developed a strong political and economic infrastructure. In Western civilization we find a compatibility between liberalism and progress, that is why they are able to survive in a literally dead society.

Now they are living on the basis of legal relations, there are no human relations possible in that society but as the collapse of human relations took more then 200 years in the mean time they able to developed a strong legal structure on the basis of which they are surviving.

The problem for us is that human relations, in our society are

frequently getting weaker and weaker and we don't have institutions like that of West to sustain morally corrupt society. The last institution in the "Arena" is our family structure which is infact very strong and effectively working but, irony is that in the name of progress and development we are smashing this last instituion, and in that conscious smashing strategy mass media is contributing a lot.

The devastating situation is that we are aware about the problems of Post-Industrial era in Pre-Industrial age that situation is at once blessing and curse, on the one hand it expands our perspective but on the other hand makes us skeptic (at intellectual level) about the concept of progress. In this complex situation we have lost our ability to decide what we ought to do and actually what is happening is that, we are doing nothing.

And are stuck with

"Never ending confrontation with all things foreign beliefs, ideas, weapons, even disease".¹⁹

We are intellectually paralysed by this flow of material progress and actually we have let our selves free in that flow of progress, by accepting the view that,

"The third world had to develop first before even think about REAL PROGRESS"²⁰

Factually we consider our selves as a developing country but actually we are neither developed nor developing rather "progress obsessed" (Taraqqi Zada).

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IS HISTORY A HERMENEUTICAL ACTIVITY

Abdul Wahab Soori

History is basically a human phenomenon and the temporal prediction of history is inevitably connected with human affairs. According to Heidegger, it is the horizon of time, which makes understanding of being (human) possible and in fact reveals its meaning.

“ The horizon which makes it possible for us to understand being as being, is itself the meaning of being. What is this horizon? It is...time ”. (1)

History is not just the cluster of past events but it is an active reconsideration of the past with references to the present and for a better future. History cannot move itself. It is the language which makes history a pure human enterprise. At this stage one might argue that there is a possibility of history of rocks, history of trees, history of production, history of genetics etc. The answer is simple that all these manifestations of history are the expressions of a particular kind of human consciousness and all these are the human interpretations of rock, trees, productions or genetics. Language is the medium through which history proceeds ; most of the people believe that,

“ A proposition reflects reality but it is not reality in itself. ”

Due to this dichotomy between reality and the linguistic expression of reality there is always a possibility of disagreement and it is an acknowledging fact that pure objectivity in historical explanation is not possible, because pure objective statements about the past are not possible. According to Heidegger,

“ Being is essentially directed towards the *future*...resolve understands from it the *past* so as to present the concrete situation. For its circumspect action. The *past* originates from the *future* so as to engender the present.....”

Since history is selective in nature, historical statements are actually selection and summary of events that have occurred in the past. So there is a possibility of (conscious or unconscious) biased selection according to one's moral, political, religious, racial and cultural inclinations. What happened in the past is necessarily influenced by the historian's present. That is why I believe that,

“ We cannot change the past but we can change history.”

We find extreme disagreements among historians about the same phenomenon, that is, Catholic / Protestant, Liberals / Communitarians, Male / Female, Black /

White, etc. The historical truth is dependent on the selection of historical events in an explanation; as the selection is not a purely objective enterprise, because of the incorporation of the subjective element, pure objectivity is not possible. Facts are not neutral and they have different significance for different people, that is why, interpretation is always a central problem of history. According to R.F. Atkinson,

"....., it is as certain as anything can be that there must be more than one sort of explanation in history." (3)

According to Charles Taylor,

"The interpretation aims to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense." (4)

Most of the philosophers believe that the whole life is actually a hermeneutical activity and one can never transcend from the realm of hermeneutics is basically a philosophical discipline which deals with the problem of interpretation.

"A successful interpretation is one which makes clear the meaning originally present in a confused, fragmentary, cloudy form." (5)

As we know that there is no clear line of demarcation between meaning and expression with respect to subject therefore,

"The object of a science of interpretation must thus have sense, distinguishable from its expressions, which is for or by a subject." (6)

Historically it was the task of the theologian to interpret the divine language because the sacred stuff is basically closed in nature and there is a need of a hermeneutical treatment of text. In this regard traditional hermeneutics is important as it provides the ground for "the art of textual interpretation". Later on the scope of hermeneutics extended upto religion, art, literature, law, culture, society and of course history.

Today hermeneutics has become an overall, comprehensive discipline, with the principles regulating all forms of interpretation. In early days, hermeneutics was an attempt to attain objectivity. Later on that aim lost its significance because of the variations in the conceptualization of truth. Hermeneutics is basically a two dimensional approach, which involves :

- a) Understanding
- b) Application

Firstly, the interpreter plays an active role in order to make a text, event or situation intelligible. Secondly, the interpreter also draws out the practical or

factual repercussions of the interpreted meaning. For the economy of understanding we can roughly categorize hermeneutics as :

- a) Romantic Hermeneutics
- b) Philosophical Hermeneutics
- c) Critical Hermeneutics

ROMANTIC HERMENEUTICIANS

The dilemma of the romantics is that despite presuming subject/object dichotomy they try to be one with the object of knowledge. As they presume unified conception of self there is a possibility of the realisation of objective truth, objective beauty etc., and most importantly, objective meaning, since they believe in the objectivity of meaning, there is a possibility of hierarchy of interpretation, that is, the more objective the interpretation the more good the interpretation. Thus for the attainment of the objective meaning they adhere to the notion of entering into the frame of reference of the other (object of understanding) through empathetic attitudes. The relation between the subject and object is central for Romantic Hermeneuticians particularly in the realm of humanities. According to Dilthey,

"... It is ultimately not so much this specific object which distinguishes the human from the natural sciences, nor is it a unique method of investigation, but rather the relationship between the subject and his object..... The researcher.... approach is fundamentally hermeneutic ; he does not leave the sphere of understanding".(7)

And for him,

" Understanding as a relationship and mode of co-existence with the object... in understanding, 'life meets life'. (8)

PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICIANS

The philosophical Hermeneuticians consider the whole life as a Hermeneutical activity. They believe that it is impossible to perceive the actual fact and that during understanding we mould that fact and what we perceive is just an interpretation. They reject the unified conception of self in favour of changing and unfolding self. The self is trapped into a process of becoming. This conception of self transforms the whole conception of truth and there is no possibility of absolute, certain and universal truth. This relativistic conception presumes that there is no ultimate meaning, and if there is no fixed and final meaning, then there is no ultimate meaning and every interpretation is just an interpretation. It means that there is no possibility of hierarchy of interpretation and there is always a possibility of interpretation of interpretation of interpretation and so on and so forth and there is no transcendence from the Hermeneutical circle. Gadamer is one of the main philosophical Hermeneuticians who believe that "...meaning only

emerges when it is interpreted, and continues to re-emerge with each new interpretation".(9)

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CRITICAL HERMENEUTICIANS

We can contrast critical Hermeneuticians from philosophical ones in a manner that for latter Hermeneutics is an end while for the former ; Hermeneutics rather critical hermeneutics is just a means and there is a possibility of transcendence from the hermeneutical circle. They believe that we need critical hermeneutics because "truth is not transparent". Habermas teaches us that the problem of distortion in inter subjective understanding arises because the formal conditions of ideal speech are not fulfilled or realised because of capitalist rationality, technological advancement, scientific determinism, state influence, mass media, advertisement, etc. Thus, due to these extra linguistic factors truth is distorted and the order of "LIVE WORLD" is disturbed and we have to face a phenomenon of systematically distorted communication so there is a need of critical Hermeneutics which incorporates these extra linguistic factors for the attainment of truth. I would consider Collingwood as the classic example of Romantic Hermeneutics . He actually used History as a tool for the development of a Theory of Mind. It means that one can understand the human through history, because for him, history is the "outward of expression of thought"(10). His stand is based on the distinction between the inside/outside events and he believes that history is not just the analysis of events rather a conscious investigation of Action. And for him action is the unity of inside and outside of an event.

" The historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a distinction between what may be called the outside and the inside of an event. By outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements: ... by inside of the event I mean that in it which can only be described in term of thought". (11)

For instance if Alexander attacked the subcontinent, then the attack is the outside of an event while the aim of attack is inside. By inside he means which can only be explained in terms of thought (rational thought). As for Collingwood, "... in History causes always take the shape of reason". (12) He thinks that no doubt... "the subject matter of history is exclusively action : but it would be equally wrong to think that reason cannot be causes".(13) If the rationale of an action is the legitimate content of causation then the inside part (of action) has precedence over outside event in the historical interpretation. On the basis of this assumption he derives a methodology of "re-enactment of past thought" or "re-thinking". For him thought is not timely bound rather it is eternal and continuous. It is one of the reasons that there is a possibility to re-think what has been previously thought about. Because of the influence of romanticism, he used empathetic attitude as a tool to realise the possibility of re-enactment or re-thinking. That is why in his system the historian must put himself into the frame of reference of the historical agent and evaluate him critically. He is very optimistic about the feasibility as well as the authenticity of his approach because of his faith in romanticism.

thought process which went through the minds of the agents as they performed various actions". (21)

On the other hand,

"... interpretation... is an explicatory process in which acts are situated within relevant social and intentional contents of the agent's cultural world". (22)

The clash between psychology and history is obvious as far as the understanding of human mind is concerned. In order to reconcile this dispute, we can segregate there spheres as follows:

"What is mind"? (actual aspect). This is the question of psychology.

"What/how mind does"? (potential aspect). This is the problem of history.

Collingwood could not accept this "structural/functional distinction because he thinks that this distinction might apply to resolve the problem of mind/body dualism, but not in the realm of mind. This is so because he believed that the mind is not a static structure so that one can understand it comprehensively, rather it is a process in which we cannot separate its "isness" from its "function". So psychology is intrinsically an inadequate approach to understand mind and we obviously need history. Brian Fay's criticism on Collingwood's approach is also not sound because of three reasons: first of all, the criticism is not sound because it is against the basic assumption of the romantic epistemological approach which presumes that empathy is necessary for clear understanding, because Brian believes that,

"the thesis that "you must be one to know one" mistakenly equates understanding with empathy or psychological closeness or transcultural identification". (23)

Secondly, Collingwood is working on Hegelian context, which means that, for him history is not a psychological phenomenon rather it is a rational one. The historian through empathetic attitude tries to grasp the rationale of a historical act rather than the psyche of the historical agent which is actually not possible. Thirdly, the historian within Collingwood's paradigm does not lose his contact with the present because in the empathetic attitude he is not just thinking, rather he is re-thinking. It means that because of the historicism he has more rationally deduced, refined and sophisticated mind and a continuity in the rational unfolding or deduction there is a possibility to re-think and think more objectively and clearly what had been thought previously. This is the reason why he presumes that the historian is in a better position to interpret a historical act than the historical agent who is in fact a part of the system.

However the epistemological leap in the romantic approach is that (which I have already pointed out even presuming a gulf between the knower and the known)

They try to be one with the object of knowledge for the attainment of objective meaning. They presume otherness and try to bridge that otherness through empathetic attitude and this is their dilemma.

In the end we can say that we can never eradicate the linguistic aspect from history and this incorporation of the former opens up the realm of hermeneutics. Through hermeneutics our understanding is directed from subjectivity to contextuality. In this contextual interpretation we can minimise the possibility of ethnic, cultural, political, religious and various other disputes. On the other hand we could rather or we should critically evaluate and reinterpret our concepts.

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DECONSTRUCTING GENDER DISCOURSE: A REVIEW*

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Introduction

The work of Kant, Hegel, Darwin, Marx, and Comte transformed the idea of material progress into a historical necessity. It has constantly been claimed that "industrial society is the most successful way of life mankind has ever known... our people eat better, sleep better, live in most comfortable dwellings, get around more in greater comfort, and live longer than they have ever done before" (Ayers xxiv). It is assumed that the existing life style of the developed Western nations is the manifestation of the "natural culmination of the potentials already existing in Neolithic man" (Gustavo p.9). The natural outcome of such an ontological account of human potential is that history has been reinterpreted in purely Western terms.

Material progress legitimises the west's global hegemony (Esteve p.9). This conception of progress presupposes certain values, lifestyle, conceptions of the good, gender, equality and freedom, which are historically determined and culturally specific. The medieval, religious and traditional non-western values are naturally in conflict with these western values and prejudices. Since this idea of progress and development is accepted as universal so, naturally non-western religious values are considered as irrational.

The negation of western values by the non-western world in general and the Islamic world in particular is considered as a reactionary posture, devoid of ontological and epistemological grounding. It is assumed that the dominance of western values lies in the epistemological superiority of western culture. Therefore, it is accepted both at political and intellectual level that "the third world had to develop first before it could even think about real progress" (Shert p.195).

* *Human Development In Asia 2000: the Gender Question* Mahbub-ul-Haq Human Development Centre, Karachi Oxford University Press 2000.

This is the perspective in which the gender issue has been discussed in the Human Development Annual Report 2000. The methodology of the report is two dimensional;

- a) Descriptive
- b) Prescriptive

The first two chapters provide the framework for the subsequent discussion. The third and fourth chapters are of informative nature regarding the gender issue. The rest of the chapters except the fifth and the eighth are of descriptive nature. Chapter eight in general and chapter five in particular are the chapters in which the real prescriptive posture of this Report has been concretized. In this extended review we are more interested in the prescriptive dimension of the Report, along with the conceptual analysis of the basic assumptions regarding the issues of progress, development, equality, liberty and of course "priority of the right over the good." We have contextualised these issues within a framework through which the gender issues in South Asia may be analysed.

This review has been divided into three sections. In the first section, we have identified the major prescriptions of the report. In the second section, we identify the substantive theoretical framework, which is presumed by the Report. We have also identified the internal contradictions of this framework. In the third section we have specifically discussed the gender issue within the theoretical context which we have discussed in our second section.

I. Feminism's Prejudices

There are two major issues, which have been inter-connectedly discussed in this report: "Gender" and "Development". It is claimed that the major cause of under-development in South Asia is gender discrimination. It is also claimed that tendencies like male chauvenism and exploitation of women are reinforced by the traditional, religious, political, legal and social structures of South Asian countries. Due to the discriminatory attitude towards women, economic progress and development is retarded. However, on the basis of empirical data and statistical projection, it is claimed that now things are improving. The following are the different factors of change, which have been identified as root causes of women's emancipation;

- i) Technological advancement;
- ii) Internal dialectic of economic structural change;
- iii) Liberalization of information technology;
- iv) Development of the free market economy and the dismantling of national planning;
- v) The fragility of totalitarian state craft and the "inflation" of the phenomena of non-governmental organisation;
- vi) Repudiation of religious society by individuals and evolution of "contractually structured, civil society";
- vii) Cultural and corporate globalization;

It is claimed that the socio-political, economic and legal emancipation of women is the

objective of all development processes” (Human Development Report p. 29).

The Report acknowledges that human rights in general and women’s rights in particular have been hindered by “Asian values based upon community rights”. Further “countries with a strong religious tradition that is integrated into state administration and governance often perceive human rights as a secular ideology antagonistic to religious and cultural tradition” (Human Development p. 29).

It is claimed that the IIIrd and IVth world conferences on women in Nairobi and Beijing have established a consensus on “the social prioritisation of Human Rights” particularly the unqualified human rights to “freedom of conscience” and “religion”.

The rights based approach is politically backed by the imperialists. “This involves breaking down unequal relationships based on the socially – constructed hierarchies of gender, age, class, ethnicity, religious and other socio-economic factors – through a process of formalization of individual rights and institutional responsibility” (Human Development p. 76).

It is claimed that South Asian women are not enjoying legal equality irrespective of the constitutionally guaranteed equality. The Report suggests that realization of “legal equality” is not possible due to the internal contradiction of constitutions. The articles regarding the issue of “equality” are contradicted by:

- Individual laws
- Gaps in the legal framework
- The decision of parallel judiciaries most importantly the Shariat Courts
- Other constitutional articles and provision

The culturally and religiously governed specific laws are considered as the major obstacle to the realisation of the equal rights of women. In a nut shell, it is claimed that although in South Asian countries women’s legal equality is constitutionally guaranteed they are living as second class citizens. There are three major reasons for this legal inequality.

- a) Constitution contradiction.
- b) Constitutionally created, “Supra-constitutional bodies” like the Council of Islamic Ideology and the Federal Shariat Courts.
- c) Ambiguous articulation of constitutionally guaranteed rights provide room for misinterpretation or discrimination.

As far as problems (a) and (c) are concerned, it is clear that:

- i) These problems are not specific to South Asian constitutional framework because all constitutions are constituted by finite individuals rather than a Divine will. They are therefore necessarily incomplete, opaque and self contradictory.

- ii) Secondly, these problems are not specific to the “exploitation” of women rather we can explain any kind of “discriminatory legal practice” (against any sect, religion, race, community etc) on the basis of the misinterpretation of constitutionally, guaranteed right.

As far as problem (b) is concerned it requires a serious and careful analysis but at this stage we merely note that, between the lines the report suggests that *the creation of supra-constitutional bodies through the constitution is against the spirit of liberal secularism*. Supra-constitutional bodies actually contradict the autonomy of the human will and its sovereignty. The constitution is actually the concretization of human sovereignty. Supra-constitutional agency of any kind negates the absolute autonomy of the human being as autonomous “law giver”. We will excavate the philosophical foundation of this contradiction between constitution and constitutionally created supra-constitution agency in our next section.

In order to “emancipate” women from legal and political dominance of man, the Report suggests a practical strategy. It is suggested that already existing secular anti Islamic laws be consolidated by:

- a) Revitalizing constitutionally guaranteed secular civil codes.
- b) Considering imperialist sanctioned international woman rights treaties as the definite text to win legal battle in favor of women.

II. Feminism Capitalism’s Handmaiden

The Report suggests that over all “emancipation” of women is the necessary precondition of economic progress and development. It claims that the major cause of the economic backwardness of this part of the world is not economic. Social, political and religious structures are real causes of the underdevelopment of South Asia. It is also presumed that South Asian women are the most poor and oppressed sections of humanity and the reason of this religiously sanctioned oppression is the violation of universally valid human rights.

It is interesting to note that the remedy for this gender “oppression” “exploitation” “discrimination” provided by the Report is historically determined and culturally specific. The structural solution to women “suffering” in South Asia is the construction of a policy framework, which is:

- Politically liberal.
- Legally secular.
- Socially civil (contractually structured civil society).
- Economically capitalist (free market economy).

In this section we are going to critically analyse the

- i) Conception of self presumed by the Report
- ii) The authenticity of its prioritization of rights over the good

iii) Its advocacy of the secularization of law and associated political implications

The Report regards the right-based approach as the most profound, comprehensive and effective means for ending gender “discrimination”. Unlike other approaches, which are basically good-based the right-based approach focuses on the constitution of a framework of ‘rights’ which (in principle only) makes the pursuit of every particular conception of good possible.

Liberal theory considers “good” or “virtue” as trivial in the constitution of just principles. Therefore, liberals prioritize rights over the good and try to create a framework in which every body is free to pursue his own conception of the good. This prioritization of fundamental rights theoretically rejects every: legal policy, distributive scheme social constitution, religious expression and political frame work etc which negates individual human rights.

The right-based approach considers the individual as an end in himself. In order to sustain the autonomy of the self, the value of non interference is presumed to have lexical priority over substantive values. The right based liberal version “is grounded in the conception of a subject which is prior to its end, a concept held indispensable to our understanding of a freely choosing, autonomous being” (Mulhall and Swift p. 45)

The autonomy of the self is presumed, the “will” is not caused by its end. It is neither the “means” for the pursuit of some other ends, nor the by-product of some prior causes rather it is an end in itself.

The detachment of the self from its end justifies two things:

- a) The autonomy of the self.
- b) The priority of the right over its ends or the good.

Liberals do not consider freedom as an empirically determined end they regard it as the pre-condition of morality and social justice “the priority of right is ‘derived’ entirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external relationship of human beings and has nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature or with the recognized means of attaining this end” (Sandel p. 1)

The prioritization of the right and the detachment of the self from its ends reflects the moral propensity of the liberals. It not only ignores the significance of the good, and of virtue in the constitution of self identity, it also rejects the role of “historically determined good” in the development of self-identity. According to the right based theorists free and autonomous expression (irrespective of its consequences and ramifications) of “will” “... is most fundamental to the dignity and worth of human beings. ... it elevates them above the realm of causally determined nature” (Rawls p. 30). In the right based liberal paradigm there is no theoretical instrument which makes possible the objective ordering of the individual’s preferences so there is no possibility of self – interpretation and moral growth.

This means that the priority of individual liberty is considered to be the absolute “right” which cannot be overridden even for the general welfare of society. This sanctity of individual “right” was acknowledged by Mill, Locke and Kant. This prioritization of the right is the only fundamental “moral” category because, every body has a right to frame, revise and rationally pursue his own conception of the good.

The right based theorist claims that liberty (right) has precedence over the good. This prioritization is justified by the neutrality of right which every individual possesses (right of self-determination) by birth. Rawls believes that it is unjust to sacrifice freedom for the realization of any particular good or virtue.

The detachment of the self from its conception of the good, end and virtue justifies its antecedent individualization. The uncumbency of the self is in-itself considered to be the sole criterion for authenticity. The identity of this self is that it has not objectively been identified by anything other than itself, “... my values and ends do not define my identity. I must regard myself as the bearer of a self distinct from my values and ends whatever they may be.” (Sandel p. 12).

On the basis of this, the right based liberals claim that the liberal agenda is basically universalist in nature. They believe that the highest order interest of individuals is always “self determination”.

Since this highest order interest has been derived by “pure reason” and this abstraction is independent of the substantive values and cultural influences, therefore universally valid reason legitimises the universality of liberalism.

The social structure which legitimately in-cooperates this a-social individualism is that of civil society. In order to sustain such an antecedently individuated self, civil society performs two functions simultaneously:

- a) Repudiation of religious society
- b) Development of a self-sustaining mechanism by a systematically organized (imperialist sanctioned) legal frame work.

Unlike religious society, civil society assumes “contract” (among equally free, rational and mutually self-interested individuals) as a basis of social association. In such a contractually structured society equally free individuals are held together by the impersonal bonds of interests. The civil society frame work de-legitimizes any bases for social mobilization and cooperation other than self-interest. In civil society there is no role of religion in the public sphere, it is limited strictly to the private life of the individuals and thus trivialised. In a nutshell civil society contrasts itself from religious society. Civil society provides a frame work in which antecedently individuated a-religious, a-cultural, a-historical selves realize their freedom without threatening the autonomy of others.

The problem is that the maximization of freedom is not possible without the maximiza-

tion and accumulation of capital. *In contemporary political economy freedom takes the form of capital. Capital is the concrete form of freedom. The problem is that the realm of capital is the market. It is because of this that in civil society, all relationships are inevitably marketized, "selling and buying" becomes the dominant rational content of human life. The market becomes the value giving agency. In short civil society is simply market society.*

Civil society emphasizes the decentralization of state power along with the consolidation of private power. It assumes a "free" judiciary, media and market. In a nutshell, principally civil society presumes a weak state. *Civil society creates an illusion that individuals are free from state coercion, religious extremism and racial provincialism, but in reality it imposes the dominance and the sovereignty of capital over all other forms of human expression.*

The establishment of contractarian society and dominance of capital are ensured by a capitalist mode of economy. In short civil society is basically a capitalist institution which emerges to sustain a liberal public order, subject to the dominance of capital. *Human right discourse provides the theoretical legitimacy of such a social, political, legal and economic construction.*

The theoretical background of right based liberalism reveals that:

1. The worth of a "self" is not determined by its ends, virtue and conception of the good.
2. There is no role for religion, culture, history and language in the constitution of "self" identity.
3. Since the "rights" are not determined, with reference to my substantive conception of "good" (for instance obeying the will of God,) there is no justification for the existence of any supra-constitutional body. The constitution (in theory) is the concretisation of absolute human sovereignty. A supra-constitutional body of any kind negates the absolute autonomy of the human being, which is against the spirit of liberal constitution and its prioritization of the right over the good.
4. This means that the prioritization of "right" (right of self-determination) over "good" necessarily assumes a secular framework.
5. Secularism is not a-ideological, it resists any legal, social, political, cultural and religious institution which is incompatible with its own epistemology, ontology, metaphysics and axiology.
6. The right based liberal framework allows everyone to pursue his own conception of the good (at the individual level) subject to the constraint that the only public good is the "will to freedom" i.e. the maximisation of capital accumulation.

Let us critically evaluate this liberal strand in another perspective. In this conceptual analysis, we are going to focus on Charles Taylor's argument regarding the possibility of "priority of right over the good" as a universally valid truth and its internal contradictions.

The human self is not to be treated as the object of scientific study. According to Taylor, man is a self-interpreting animal and there is no possibility of having an abstract realm of the self, which transcends historical specificity and a particular linguistic community. The self-interpreting capacity of the individual is the defining characteristic of human being, "human beings are self-interpreting animals, creatures whose identity as person depends upon their orientation and attachment to the conceptions of the good which derive from the matrix of their linguistic community" (Mulhall and Swift p. 2). This means that the constitution of the individual's identity depends upon the orientation and attachment, derived from the social matrix of a particular community and answers the questions which have emerged and are organically related to the ontological basis of that community. The Rawlsian self is antecedently individuated and independent of history and culture, because of this deontological temper self-interpretation is ontologically not possible within the Rawlsian framework. Taylor emphasizes that, self-interpretation is the defining characteristic of the human being but this self-interpretation is made possible by a bounded rationality, the "rationality" derived from the social matrix of a particular language community. Taylor believes that uncumbency of the self is not possible because historical specificity is inescapable. The self is ontologically incapable of escaping from the linguistic/moral space in which it has been situated. "To understand our predicament in terms of finding or losing orientation in moral space is to take the space which our frameworks seeks to define as ontologically basic" (Taylor p. 29). The moral space in which self-interpretation itself exists independently, is irrespective of the fact that whether it is considered as legitimate space for moral evaluation. The natural corollary of this is that the community exists independently and is ontologically prior to the individual. "Finding my bearings is something I do in space that exists independently both of me and my success or failure in orienting myself within it" (Mulhall and Swift p. 106).

Taylor's distinction between moral intuitions and instinctual intuitions is also very crucial in determining the role of community in the constitution of self-identity. He thinks that the rational elucidation or articulation of moral intuitions is possible on the basis of participation in a particular linguistic community. "Moral judgment and intuition are essentially capable of rational elucidation or articulation, a process that requires the invocation of fundamental and wide ranging evaluative frameworks also deriving from the community" (ibid p. 102). So the community is a structural precondition for the constitution of a moral self. On the other hand, the articulation of moral intuitions is possible only in a linguistic matrix, in which the self has been situated. The meaning of moral intuitions has not been derived at an "archemidian" position, it is contextually determined. This context actually provides an overarching category based on certain metaethical narratives which are ontologically grounded in a particular kind of historical specificity. The natural corollary of this metaphysical presumption is that man is condemned to interpret himself, subject to the constraint that the space of this self-interpretation is not being determined by the individual. "... there is no such thing as the structure of meaning for him independently of this interpretation of them; for one is woven into the other ... the text of our interpretation is not that heterogeneous from what is interpreted; for what is interpreted is itself an interpretation. (Taylor, "Interpretation and the Science of Man" p. 109).

The self has been situated in this hermeneutical circle and there is no transcendence from this hermeneutical space. It essentially negates the possibility of an Archemidian stand-

point. This means that the community is the theoretical precondition for the derivation of meaning. It provides the content of interpretation. There is a possibility of more than one interpretation, in a given community, every interpretation is authentic because it is the manifestation of the linguistic community in which the self has been situated, "... the relationship between a person's inner life and the vocabulary available to him for characterizing it is an intimate one (Mulhall and Swift p. 109).

Despite the fact that every interpretation is just an interpretation, it is bounded by the experience, which the self has had as a precipitant of the linguistic community which legitimately constitutes its self-identity. This means that there is no final meaning. Meaning is necessarily derived from interpretation. The content of these interpretations are provided by the language and history of a community.

It is important to note that interpretation by definition does not provide fixed meanings. In order to reach meaning we do not have any instrument other than interpretation. But there is the possibility to objectively evaluate and order these interpretations on the basis of the meta-ethical narratives, which provide the substance of rationality and are by themselves supra-rational. *For instance, liberalism communism, secularism, social welfarism, democracy, popular democracy etc. are all different interpretations which claim to objectify the meta-ethical narratives, which emerged during the particular course of European history.* In this way, Taylor has rejected the antecedently individuated self and has asserted that, it is not possible to derive abstract principles which are universally applicable. Since he presumed community as the ontological precondition for the constitution of self, this means that inter-subjective discourse is necessary for selfhood. Taylor rejects the possibility of the existence of an isolated self rather it is a "... self only in relation to certain interlocutors" (Taylor p. 360). Self-interpretation is possible only in the linguistic matrix, which is prior to the self. The individual is free to interpret but the medium is not derived from the self. This means that the derivation of meaning is a communal phenomena. In a more precise sense, goods, ends or virtues are communally derived by the self in relation to different interlocutors.

The self always has a virtue, which legitimizes its meaningful existence in the hermeneutical circle. It provides space for the culmination of inter-subjective consensus, in Taylor's words, the self always, finds itself in a "web of interlocutors" (Ibid p. 36).

On the basis of this conceptual analysis we can conclude:

1. The right based liberal conception of the self is not universal but historically determined and culturally specific.
2. There is no absolute, rational and epistemologically superior basis for the acceptance of liberal prioritization of right over good.
3. The self cannot detach itself from its end, its conception of good and virtues.
4. The right-based approach is not universally and cross culturally valid.

Human right discourse performs three dimensional functions: a) Development of civil society b) Establishment of the sovereignty of capital and c) Weakening the nation state.

The social form of "right based liberalism" is not compatible with any form of religious society. It assumes a 'civil society' in which the individuals are held together by the impersonal bonds of interest rather than the ties of faith. Civil society repudiates religious society and provides a social sphere which helps individuals to pursue their own conception of the good.

Civil society is basically a capitalist institution of instrumental nature. Its function is to sustain liberal public order, which is disintegrating, because of the politically and socially dangerous growth of inequalities between regions and individuals. Civil society and free market economy reinforce each other. Civil society demolishes any institution (social, political, religious, cultural) which hinders the process of capital accumulation. The market is the realm of capital. The accumulation of capital is not possible without the concentration of capital. The emergence of inequalities due to the concentration of capital is the natural corollary of market growth. Secondly people are naturally unequal in their capacity to accumulate capital therefore, unequal material status is necessary in market society. Thirdly in the market individuals lose their identity as man, or woman, black or white, Muslim or Kafir etc. In the market the identities individuals have are those of labourer, manager, consumer. *Thus each and every relation and identity is marketized and the issue of gender becomes irrelevant and fictitious. In reality the gender issue and human rights struggle in general are merely means to establish the sovereignty of capital.* The economic form of right-based society is capitalism.

- (a) Civil society provides the legitimate ground for the universalisation of capital accumulation for its own sake.
- (b) The concrete form of freedom is capital.
- (c) Maximization of capital is maximisation of freedom.
- (d) The discourse of human rights justifies maximization of capital accumulation for its own sake.

In a nutshell, *"human rights are the obverse of the duty to accumulate capital"*. And the justification of this "duty" is that the individual is compelled to accept the sovereignty of capital because he does not have any instrument other than capital through which he can realize his freedom. Theoretically the individual is free to have any conception of the good, to desire anything he wants but the contradiction is that in actuality the only desire, he can have is the desire to accumulate capital because capital is the only concrete form of freedom.

III. Feminism or Islam

Human Development Report 2000 provides a structural solution to the problem of gender "discrimination". Gender discrimination is not seen as a cultural specific phenomena rather it is seen as a universal problem. However the perspective of the Report is anything, but universalist. It simply assumes that the western social ideological perspective and prejudices are universal and should provide a basis for evaluating all other perspective.

The structural solution, provided in this Report is not only culturally biased but also full of inherent contradictions. For instance the Report legitimizes capitalism. In its conceptual

framework the market itself becomes a value-giving agency. The Market does not respect gender differences. The Market treats male and female as equal contractors. In the Market the question of moral, social and ontological differences are meaningless. Gender difference is trivialised in the Market. The homogenisation of labour obscures this difference and obscures the particularity of womanhood. This tantamounts to destruction of the spiritual foundations of society for commodification of female labour makes love impossible: That is why feminism is in its essence a movement for defeminisation.

The mood of the Report is ostensibly ethical but it's ethical perspective is systematically backed by a particular epistemology and ontology. The problem is that the Report is presented as based on an universalist ethical perspective – where as in fact it represents merely the ethical practices and prejudices of the west. Abandoning the historical genealogical analysis required to situate gender discourse, the Report relies entirely on vulgar empiricism.

The major weakness of such empirical/statistical analysis is that, it is presented as value neutral i.e. scientific, rigorous and presuppositionless. In actuality the Report presumes a particular conception of human nature, purpose of life, and cosmological order. For instance the inherent presumptions of the Report are;

- i) The human being is homo-economicus.
- ii) The purpose of life is to maximize the discounted consumption stream over a given life time.
- iii) The world is eternal and ever lasting.

This gender issue opens up a new paradigm of discourse:

- i) It redefines women's role in accordance with the demands of the Market.
- ii) It provides a rationale for the accumulation of capital for its own sake – and woman is an equal of man essentially as an instrument of never ending capital accumulation.
- iii) It helps to constitute a body of rights/duties:
 - a) To transform the legal system (compatible with the imperialist sanctioned legal system) which establishes the hegemony of global capital and market rationality.
 - b) To widen the labour market and enhance the mobility of cheap (female) labour.
 - c) To transform the social system according to the demands of market globalization.

- iv) Human rights discourse in general and gender discourse in particular is an effective means to disintegrate collectivities (religious, communal, family). Capitalism systematically disintegrates any form of collectivity, which provides a public order for this system. It is because of this, that capitalism is self constitutionally crises ridden. It disintegrates any form of collectivity, which sustains or resists the process of capital accumulation. Religious, traditional, tribal communities naturally resist the process of capital accumulation, because they

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¹ Practical needs are human needs according to their socially determined context.

² Strategic needs are the needs generated by the commitment to confrontation with existing social relationships between male and female.